Outsiders and Insiders: External Appointments to the Senior Civil Service - Public Administration Committee Contents


Memorandum from Prospect

INTRODUCTION

  1.  Prospect is a trade union representing 102,000 scientific, technical, managerial and specialist staff in the Civil Service and related bodies and major companies. Our members are professionals, managers and specialists across a diverse range of areas, including agriculture, defence, energy, environment, heritage, justice and transport.

  2.  Prospect welcomed the opportunity created by the Normington Review to take a fresh look at Senior Civil Service (SCS) workforce and reward strategy. Both Prospect and our sister union FDA also welcomed the support of the Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB) for urgent progress towards a bold reform package and for additional funding to implement the necessary changes. In the event our assessment is that whilst the Normington Review sets out some useful recommendations, it presents a partial perspective.

  3.  For example, the Normington Review defines the SCS largely in terms of skill and professionalism in policy and service delivery, project management and financial management. These are clearly core elements of the SCS, but there is no mention of the vital role played by staff with specialist skills and expertise—which the SCS currently lacks. We are also concerned that Normington's approach predominantly seeks to define the SCS as a separate and distinct body. This in part reflects a partial view of leadership, when in reality this is actually undertaken at a series of levels throughout the Civil Service and across a wide range of functions. A close relationship is retained between those responsible for policy and its execution is key to efficient and effective government.

  4.  Our comments on the specific questions posed by the Select Committee are set out below.

Is the current level of external recruitment to the Senior Civil Service justified? Does it achieve the objectives set out for it?

  5.  This question presupposes a view about the level of recruitment to the SCS generally and of the reasons for it. We would challenge the assertion in the Normington Review that upward pressure on the size of the SCS has been inevitable. Such an argument cannot carry conviction without analytical evidence to support it. It would be helpful to have a breakdown of the size of the SCS by department and agency and some analysis to identify genuine upward pressure as a result of new initiatives.

Should there be ministerial involvement in appointing outsiders? If so, what mechanisms would need to be in place to safeguard against inappropriate political influence in the recruitment process?

  6.  Direct ministerial involvement in appointing external recruits would create challenges for impartiality and could confuse lines of accountability. There have already been examples of such confusion when ministerial advisers have apparently encroached on, or sought to influence, the role of civil servants. Having said this however, we do not agree that the size and structure of the SCS should be left to permanent secretaries, who are unlikely to create any impetus for change. There needs to be greater "corporate" oversight and accountability of permanent secretary decisions. Normington's vision of a greater role for the Cabinet Office is useful in this regard but we do have doubts, based on experience, over the Cabinet Office's ability to exercise effective influence. Whilst an expanded role must be supported by an appropriate level of resourcing, action will be needed in parallel to mount a concerted challenge on deeply rooted SCS culture.

One issue of significant concern is that of pay differentials between those appointed from outside and existing civil servants. Is the practice of paying higher salaries to some external recruits justified?

  7.  Whilst we would not argue that there is never a case for specialists to be externally recruited, there is not a strong evidence base to support the value of doing so. The Government's own evidence to the SSRB noted that "It has not been possible to produce a robust metric that would allow us to definitively measure the value for money of external hires compared to internal appointees". The Government's evidence also notes the conclusion of David Bell's review that "It is always risky for any organisation to bring in `outsiders' to very senior posts, with about 50% of external hires made at Director level being unsuccessful". Although the Normington Review recognises the problems caused by differences in treatment of external appointees and internal promotions, in Prospect's view it does not sufficiently convey the huge sense of frustration and resentment that these practices cause.

What are the implications of making external appointments for the culture of the civil service, including the effects on morale of civil servants and on shared values such as the public service ethos?

  8.  We would be concerned about over-reliance on external appointments leading to denudation of civil service in-house capability and expertise—including loss of corporate memory. Of course there should be appropriate weight on proper valuation of core policy and administrative skills and corporate leadership, but unless there is an accompanying aim to properly value specialists in government, this will reinforce the existing SCS dual culture of "specialists" and "generalists". Normington's perspective ignores the value of senior specialist roles—both as functional leaders and in delivering key government objectives. For example, it is clear that government's capacity as an "intelligent customer" has eroded and that there is insufficient technical expertise both among SCS policy and decision makers resulting in increased use of external consultants without either contextual knowledge or "corporate memory".

  9.  Furthermore, Normington's emphasis on performance pay and part of a new SCS reward strategy fails to acknowledge the difference between public and private sector cultures, though performance pay is increasingly discredited in the private sector too. The pay and workforce strategy for the SCS should flow from a commitment to public service rather than the high risks and big rewards of the private sector. We are opposed to any approach that seeks to replicate the practices of the private sector, and in particular we strongly object to any approach that focuses on a bonus culture at a time of growing public hostility to bonuses. Information gleaned in response to recent Parliamentary questions relating to civil service bonuses reinforces our concerns over lack of transparency and accountability. There is a lack of clarity, both at individual and departmental level, about the criteria for bonus payments. In addition, access to bonus payments appears to be inconsistent and there is often a clash between "corporate" and individual objectives. We of course acknowledge that there are market pressures, particularly where there are pay pinch points, but remain strongly of the view that underlying principles need to inform SCS pay policies.

What can be learned from the experience of the devolved governments or other countries when it comes to making external appointments to the senior ranks of the civil service?

  10.  Whilst Prospect is not in a position to provide a detailed response to this question, we note with interest that the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) reported that it had made no bonus payments in the 2007-08 financial year. Yet, in our experience, the NAW is more effective and directly accountable to stakeholders than some Westminster-based departments.

April 2009



 
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