Memorandum from Prospect
INTRODUCTION
1. Prospect is a trade union representing
102,000 scientific, technical, managerial and specialist staff
in the Civil Service and related bodies and major companies. Our
members are professionals, managers and specialists across a diverse
range of areas, including agriculture, defence, energy, environment,
heritage, justice and transport.
2. Prospect welcomed the opportunity created
by the Normington Review to take a fresh look at Senior Civil
Service (SCS) workforce and reward strategy. Both Prospect and
our sister union FDA also welcomed the support of the Senior Salaries
Review Body (SSRB) for urgent progress towards a bold reform package
and for additional funding to implement the necessary changes.
In the event our assessment is that whilst the Normington Review
sets out some useful recommendations, it presents a partial perspective.
3. For example, the Normington Review defines
the SCS largely in terms of skill and professionalism in policy
and service delivery, project management and financial management.
These are clearly core elements of the SCS, but there is no mention
of the vital role played by staff with specialist skills and expertise—which
the SCS currently lacks. We are also concerned that Normington's
approach predominantly seeks to define the SCS as a separate and
distinct body. This in part reflects a partial view of leadership,
when in reality this is actually undertaken at a series of levels
throughout the Civil Service and across a wide range of functions.
A close relationship is retained between those responsible for
policy and its execution is key to efficient and effective government.
4. Our comments on the specific questions
posed by the Select Committee are set out below.
Is the current level of external recruitment to
the Senior Civil Service justified? Does it achieve the objectives
set out for it?
5. This question presupposes a view about
the level of recruitment to the SCS generally and of the reasons
for it. We would challenge the assertion in the Normington Review
that upward pressure on the size of the SCS has been inevitable.
Such an argument cannot carry conviction without analytical evidence
to support it. It would be helpful to have a breakdown of the
size of the SCS by department and agency and some analysis to
identify genuine upward pressure as a result of new initiatives.
Should there be ministerial involvement in appointing
outsiders? If so, what mechanisms would need to be in place to
safeguard against inappropriate political influence in the recruitment
process?
6. Direct ministerial involvement in appointing
external recruits would create challenges for impartiality and
could confuse lines of accountability. There have already been
examples of such confusion when ministerial advisers have apparently
encroached on, or sought to influence, the role of civil servants.
Having said this however, we do not agree that the size and structure
of the SCS should be left to permanent secretaries, who are unlikely
to create any impetus for change. There needs to be greater "corporate"
oversight and accountability of permanent secretary decisions.
Normington's vision of a greater role for the Cabinet Office is
useful in this regard but we do have doubts, based on experience,
over the Cabinet Office's ability to exercise effective influence.
Whilst an expanded role must be supported by an appropriate level
of resourcing, action will be needed in parallel to mount a concerted
challenge on deeply rooted SCS culture.
One issue of significant concern is that of pay
differentials between those appointed from outside and existing
civil servants. Is the practice of paying higher salaries to some
external recruits justified?
7. Whilst we would not argue that there
is never a case for specialists to be externally recruited, there
is not a strong evidence base to support the value of doing so.
The Government's own evidence to the SSRB noted that "It
has not been possible to produce a robust metric that would allow
us to definitively measure the value for money of external hires
compared to internal appointees". The Government's evidence
also notes the conclusion of David Bell's review that "It
is always risky for any organisation to bring in `outsiders' to
very senior posts, with about 50% of external hires made at Director
level being unsuccessful". Although the Normington Review
recognises the problems caused by differences in treatment of
external appointees and internal promotions, in Prospect's view
it does not sufficiently convey the huge sense of frustration
and resentment that these practices cause.
What are the implications of making external appointments
for the culture of the civil service, including the effects on
morale of civil servants and on shared values such as the public
service ethos?
8. We would be concerned about over-reliance
on external appointments leading to denudation of civil service
in-house capability and expertise—including loss of corporate
memory. Of course there should be appropriate weight on proper
valuation of core policy and administrative skills and corporate
leadership, but unless there is an accompanying aim to properly
value specialists in government, this will reinforce the existing
SCS dual culture of "specialists" and "generalists".
Normington's perspective ignores the value of senior specialist
roles—both as functional leaders and in delivering key government
objectives. For example, it is clear that government's capacity
as an "intelligent customer" has eroded and that there
is insufficient technical expertise both among SCS policy and
decision makers resulting in increased use of external consultants
without either contextual knowledge or "corporate memory".
9. Furthermore, Normington's emphasis on
performance pay and part of a new SCS reward strategy fails to
acknowledge the difference between public and private sector cultures,
though performance pay is increasingly discredited in the private
sector too. The pay and workforce strategy for the SCS should
flow from a commitment to public service rather than the high
risks and big rewards of the private sector. We are opposed to
any approach that seeks to replicate the practices of the private
sector, and in particular we strongly object to any approach that
focuses on a bonus culture at a time of growing public hostility
to bonuses. Information gleaned in response to recent Parliamentary
questions relating to civil service bonuses reinforces our concerns
over lack of transparency and accountability. There is a lack
of clarity, both at individual and departmental level, about the
criteria for bonus payments. In addition, access to bonus payments
appears to be inconsistent and there is often a clash between
"corporate" and individual objectives. We of course
acknowledge that there are market pressures, particularly where
there are pay pinch points, but remain strongly of the view that
underlying principles need to inform SCS pay policies.
What can be learned from the experience of the
devolved governments or other countries when it comes to making
external appointments to the senior ranks of the civil service?
10. Whilst Prospect is not in a position
to provide a detailed response to this question, we note with
interest that the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) reported that
it had made no bonus payments in the 2007-08 financial year. Yet,
in our experience, the NAW is more effective and directly accountable
to stakeholders than some Westminster-based departments.
April 2009
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