Memorandum from William Solesbury, Senior
Visiting Research Fellow, Kings College London and Dr Ruth Levitt,
Independent Researcher
SUMMARY
— We focus on the Committee's interest
in so-called Tsars: their effectiveness (key questions 1 and 7),
accountability (key question 2) and appointment process (key question
6).— Our comments arise mainly from research undertaken
in 2005 which studied the contribution made by "outsiders"
(that is, people coming into Whitehall from previous careers outside)
to the improvement of policy and delivery in Whitehall departments.—
Effectiveness: there is value that expert outsiders—as Tsars
or in other similar roles—can bring to public policy that
complements the skills and knowledge of insider civil servants
and thus enhances the overall quality of advice to Ministers.
However, their contribution must be substantive and critical.
It must not just be the loan of their reputation, even celebrity,
to endorse established policy.
— Accountability: it is not always clear,
at least from the published information about most of these appointments,
whether their accountability lies within the Civil Service or
just to Ministers; in the latter case their accountability to
Parliament is also unclear.
— Appointment process: these differ in
the degree of openness, formality and competition they involve.
While these differences may be appropriate, it may not be self-evident
why one process is chosen rather than another.
— In conclusion we raise several questions
for the Committee to consider which bear on the importance of
upholding the public interest in bringing outside expertise into
government.
INTRODUCTION
1. This memorandum focuses solely on the
Committee's intention to "also examine the effectiveness
and accountability of advisers invited into government to lead
its response on a specific issue—so-called `tsars'."
In relation to such appointments we address their effectiveness
(the Committee's key questions 1 and 7), their accountability
(key question 2) and their appointment process (key question 6).
2. This memorandum is largely based on our research
undertaken at Kings College London in 2005 on the contribution
made by "outsiders" (that is, people coming into Whitehall
from previous careers outside) to the improvement of policy and
delivery. Our research was undertaken through a combination of
document analysis, confidential interviews with a sample of 18
outsiders and 12 other people with relevant knowledge and experience
and a seminar of researchers, practitioners and observers. The
full report of the research titled Evidence-informed policy:
what difference do outsiders in Whitehall make? is at http://evidencenetwork.org,
follow the links to Centre Publications and then to Working Paper
23. The relevant findings are summarised below, before we address
the questions of the effectiveness, appointment and accountability
of Tsars.
OUTSIDERS IN
WHITEHALL: TSARS
AND OTHER
ADVISERS
3. There is a long tradition of appointing
outside specialists to advise Ministers. In our research we identified
the following 12 types of appointment, at that time, for bringing
outsiders into Whitehall.
1. Professionals in "academic" disciplines,
eg medicine, science, economics, statistics—into discipline-specific
roles such as Chief Medical Officer, Chief Scientific Adviser
in departments.
2. Professionals in "support" or "corporate"
functions, eg human resources, IT, finance, communications—into
functional roles in departments, such as Director of Human Resources,
Director of Finance.
3. Top executives, eg Chief Executive, Managing
Director—into chief executive roles in Whitehall.
4. Policy experts, eg health policy, crime policy—into
policy teams, strategy units or other specialist units.
5. Sector/service delivery specialists, eg from
local government or the police or the NHS—usually seconded
into central departments or units.
6. Special Advisers to Ministers, ie political
appointments that are usually not classed as Civil Service posts.
7. Senior "troubleshooters", sometimes
popularly called "Tsars", such as Keith Hellawell (Anti-Drugs
Co-ordinator), Andrew Pinder (e-Envoy) and Celia Hoyles (Maths
Tsar).
8. Chairs and board members of statutory advisory
bodies and commissions, such as the Electoral Commission and the
Commission for Integrated Transport.
9. Independent reviewers or members of special
committees of inquiry, such as Adair Turner (pensions), Philip
Hampton (regulation) and Lord Haskins (rural strategy).
10. Non-executive members of departmental or
agency/NDPB boards and audit committees.
11. Outside researchers, consultants, or other
professional experts commissioned to provide services to Whitehall
departments—usually employed elsewhere or self-employed.
12. Other short term secondments and placements,
eg from business, academe, local government, NHS, police.
We recognised Tsars (number 7 on our list) as
one kind of outsider appointment. But there are others sharing
their purpose of providing policy advice—notably policy
experts (number 4), sector/service delivery experts (number 5),
political special advisers (number 6), independent reviewers (number
9), researchers and consultants (number 11) and secondments and
placements (number 12).
4. The term "Tsar" was seemingly
first used with the appointment in 1998 of Keith Hellawell, a
Chief Constable, to advise the Home Secretary on anti-drugs policy.
Since then the term has become used loosely—not least in
the media—as a descriptive term for specialist advisers.
So, while there have been subsequent appointments titled Tsar,
other similar posts have been titled otherwise. Below we list
and exemplify the range of job titles. We can only exemplify because
there seems to be no consistent record of these appointments—their
inclusion in the Civil Service Yearbook varies between departments
and our inquiries of the Cabinet Office have yielded no information.
The details below of job titles and descriptions are mostly drawn
from departmental and individuals' websites.
5. The following titles are in common use.
— Tsar—eg Anti-drugs Tsar in HO (Keith
Hellawell, appointed 1998-2001), Homelessness Tsar in HO (Louise
Casey, 1999-2003), Swine Flu Tsar in DH (Ian Dalton, 2009).
— Adviser—eg the Chief Adviser on
School Standards in DCSF (Sue Hackman), the Chief Scientific Advisers
in various departments, Faith and Community Policy Adviser in
DCLG (post recently advertised).
— Commissioner—eg the School Commissioner
(Bruce Liddington) in DCSF, the Children's Commissioner (formerly
Sir Al Aynsley-Green; his successor is currently being recruited),
the newly appointed Information Commissioner (Sir Joseph Pilling).
— Independent Reviewer—eg in the
past on Pensions (Adair Turner), Benefits (Freud), Corporate Governance
(David Walker), Skills (Sandy Leitch) and recently Rail Station
Standards for DTp (Sir Peter Hall and Chris Green).
— Champion—eg recent appointments
of "A Voice for Older People" (Dame Joan Bakewell),
a Digital Inclusion Champion (Martha Lane Fox), a Dance Champion
(Arlene Philips), a Health Champion in the NHS (Mike Farrar).
— National Clinical Directors in DH—these
are 15 senior experts who oversee the National Service Framework
for specific services.
6. As well, some non-elected Ministerial
appointments have been called Tsars: for example, recently Lord
Darzi in DH and Sir Alan Sugar in DBIS.
EFFECTIVENESS
7. The Committee's key questions 1 and 7
are "What do these people bring to government? Have they
been successful? ... What are the benefits of appointing increasing
numbers of|special representatives."
8. The general conclusions we drew in our 2005
research were:
(a) Outsiders can bring distinctive and varied
perspectives to bear on the work and culture of Whitehall, which
are based on the skills, experience, domain knowledge and networks
they have developed outside. Thereby they can improve the quality
of policy discourse within departments.
(b) Outsiders' skills, experience, domain knowledge
and networks have the potential to complement those of insiders.
That potential can be realised where (a) there is high level support;
(b) team-working operates effectively; and (c) there is a critical
mass of outsiders.
(c) Recruitment and induction practices are very
important contributory factors in attracting outsiders, bringing
them in and enabling them to succeed. These practices need further
improvement; if they were tailored more exactly to each case,
they could provide much better conditions for outsiders to give
of their best, and for host departments to maximise the potential
benefits.
(d) The more the culture maintained by senior
insiders in Whitehall can become genuinely open, permeable and
responsive to change through external influences, the better use
Whitehall will be able to make of the perspectives outsiders contribute;
this is a long-standing issue, and there remains considerable
scope for improvement.
(e) At the moment, bringing outsiders into Whitehall
is officially promoted as "a good thing". However, it
is not yet being monitored or evaluated in a sufficiently thorough
way, quantitatively or qualitatively, to enable politicians, the
executive or observers to be sure of the exact benefits and costs,
or the lessons for improvement. Until this type of evidence base
is more developed, the whole endeavour risks being seen as a rhetorical
device that lacks real urgency or priority.
We believe that these conclusions still have
validity. There is value that expert outsiders—as Tsars
or in other roles—can bring to public policy that complements
the skills and knowledge of insider civil servants and thus enhances
the overall quality of advice to Ministers. However, their contribution
must be substantive and critical. It must not just be the loan
of their reputation, even celebrity, to endorse established policy.
9. Such advisers need organisational support
to help them make that contribution and it is noteworthy that
some of the more recent appointments—for example, of Martha
Lane Fox and Arlene Philips—have been associated with the
creation of an advisory group.
ACCOUNTABILITY
10. The Committee's key question 2 is "Are
people appointed to these positions sufficiently accountable?
If not, how might they be made more accountable?"
11. There seem to be three models of accountability
for Tsars and variants:
(a) Where outsider specialists are appointed
to advisory posts in the Senior Civil Service, they will have
line managers leading up to the departmental Permanent Secretary.
As civil servants they can be called before Select Committees.
(b) Where the post is statutorily independent
of government—as with the Children's Commissioner—
they are formally accountable to the Minister who appointed them.
They can also be called before Select Committees.
(c) Where outsider specialists are appointed
by Ministers—whether as political Special Advisers, Independent
Reviewers, Researchers and Consultants or Champions, they are
only accountable to the Minister. However a degree of independence
and freedom to speak their mind in public may be part of the deal:
for example, Joan Bakewell as a "Voice of Older People"
is said to be "acting as an independent and informed advocate
on issues which affect old people's lives." (GEO Press release
9 November 2008). Whether such appointees can be called before
Select Committees seems to be at the discretion of the Minister—as
was evidenced in the case of Lord Birt a few years back.
12. It is not always clear, at least from
the published information about most of these appointments, which
of these models applies, and therefore what accountability mechanisms
are appropriate to each appointment.
APPOINTMENT PROCESS
13. The Committee's key question 6 is "Is
the process of appointing `tsars' sufficiently transparent? If
not, how can it be made more transparent?"
14. The same distinctions as above with accountability
seems to apply here:
(a) Appointments made to the Senior Civil Service
are subject to Civil Service Commission procedures and oversight
(including public advertisement, competition etc) and sometimes
with the assistance of recruitment consultants.
(b) Other appointments are made under similar
procedures and with the oversight of the Commissioner for Public
Appointments.
(c) While others are appointed directly by a
Minister through informal procedures of search, interview and
negotiation of terms.
Additionally:
(d) Consultants and researchers will be appointed
through departmental procurement rules that will usually involve
open competition and transparent procedures, but without any independent
oversight.
15. There is here a clear distinction between
the formality of some "Tsar" appointments (usually including
competition, transparency of procedure and independent oversight)
and the informality of others. There can be good reasons for the
informal appointment process—speed, Ministerial confidence
in the chosen appointee, unwillingness of suitable candidates
to undergo a formal appointment process. But the informality may
exclude potentially good candidates and lays the appointment open
to a charge of cronyism.
16. Tsar appointments commonly involve part-time
work for a fixed term. This is suitable where the appointees may
be advising on a specific task rather than ongoing policy development,
they may be dependent on the patronage of a particular Minister,
and they need to maintain their outside profile and experience
to sustain their expertise. These terms contribute to their effectiveness.
We note that of the 54 outsiders in senior civil service posts
in 2005 whom we identified in our research (see Table A of our
report) only 15 are still in the service (on the basis of the
Civil Service Yearbook 2009) and only 10 of those are working
in their field of former outside expertise.
CONCLUSIONS
17. We draw the following conclusions:
(a) "Tsar" has come to be used loosely
as a generic term for a wide range of part time, fixed term advisory
posts in government. Moreover the term invokes vivid associations
with the exercise of (surely now outmoded) autocratic imperial
power, which does not reflect the style or content of expert authority
that today's advisors can bring. The Committee may wish to comment
on this.
(b) In detail these posts have various titles and
remits but have a common purpose in seeking to bring outside expertise
to bear on public policy. Therefore the Committee may want to
avoid restricting its recommendations to the few posts that are
labelled "Tsar", and to widen the scope of its inquiry
so that the many other similar posts are included.
(c) By and large bringing outsiders into departments
in these ways does have value in strengthening the work of government,
provided that certain conditions are met, particularly patronage
and organisational support. The Committee may want to emphasize
that if these appointments are to be more than window-dressing,
the appointees need to be enabled to exercise influence that is
commensurate with their expertise. They are likely to be critical
of existing policies and practices, and this is to be welcomed,
even if it is uncomfortable.
(d) Tsars' accountability seems to vary—sometimes
they are within civil service lines of command, sometimes only
accountable direct to a Minister; their accountability to Parliament
and its Select Committees can be uncertain. The Committee may
wish to comment that this apparent arbitrariness weakens accountability
and that a clearer rationale would be worthwhile.
(e) While some of these appointments are made
subject to formal CSC or OCPA procedures and oversight or departmental
procurement procedures, others are made informally at the discretion
of Ministers. Appointment procedures obviously differ in terms
of the openness and degree of competition involved. The Committee
may want to consider whether the seemingly arbitrary choice of
procedure is in the interest of securing the most effective advice
to Ministers.
September 2009
|
