Memorandum submitted by Dr Adam Corner
(GEO 06)
DR ADAM CORNER AND PROFESSOR NICK PIDGEON,
UNDERSTANDING RISK RESEARCH GROUP,[4]
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY
1. In their recent report on geoengineering
the Royal Society commented that "the acceptability of geoengineering
will be determined as much by social, legal and political issues
as by scientific and technical factors".[5]
We agree fully with this statement and have recently completed
a paper which will be published in the journal Environment in
January 2010 outlining some of the social and ethical implications
of pursuing research into geoengineering techniques.[6]
A key consideration will be the public acceptability of both specific
geoengineering proposals themselves and the governance arrangements
set in place. Research in the UK and elsewhere on the public acceptance
of the risks of new technologies (such as nuclear power or biotechnology)
shows clearly that people raise a range of generic concerns about
new technologies. These include concerns over: long-term uncertainties;
who will benefit; arrangements for control and governance; and
who to trust to regulate any risks.[7]
Geoengineering is unlikely to be any different in this regard.
2. We agree that work on the technical feasibility
of geoengineering should not begin prior to a thorough evaluation
of governance arrangements for research. Our most fundamental
concern is that a programme of public engagement should be an
important component feeding into governance and research priorities.
Thus, the first challenge for geoengineering governance is to
pursue an international programme of upstream public engagement.
This programme of social research needs to meaningfully engage
as broad a range of affected publics and stakeholders as possible.
While conducting upstream public engagement is a significant challenge,
there are now precedents for this type of work in the field of
nanotechnology.[8]
Recent attempts to engage with public opinion towards climate
change governance in advance of the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen
have also suggested that large-scale, international engagement
is possible.[9]
3. Particular proposals to geoengineer the
climate may well encounter objections from groups and individuals
in society on social or ethical grounds, and it would be unwise
to commence a technical research programme (or commit significant
resources) without fully considering these objections. Equally
a programme of public engagement may reveal support for limited
and controlled research into geoengineering. The critical issue
is that such views play a meaningful and legitimate role in the
initial decisions made about research into any technical programme.
The Natural Environment Research Council, together with Sciencewise,
has recently announced a geoengineering public engagement initiative
for the UK, and this is to be welcomed. A legitimate criticism
of much public engagement conducted in the UK in the past however
is lack of a route to influence policy. Accordingly, we urge that
the results of the NERC/Sciencewise engagement process should
be considered seriously by policy makers.
4. In the remainder of the memorandum, we
outline some of the key social and ethical questions that geoengineering
will raise (as we see it) and their relevance for governance.
5. It is clear that humans have the capacity
to geoengineer and have done so on many previous occasions. But
the intentional manipulation of the climate has not previously
been attempted, and the intentionality of geoengineering proposals
might demarcate them from previous anthropogenic interference
in the global climate. This asymmetry between intended and unintended
acts is clearly observed in law, medical ethics and military conduct.[10]
Any governance arrangements should seek to reflect this distinction.
6. Some proposals for geoengineering, such
as release of atmospheric particulates, have clear international
implications. Other proposals, such as localised carbon reduction
efforts, are less problematic in this regard. Any governance arrangements
will need to reflect this heterogeneity amongst the technical
options.
7. The UK and the US have a long history
of international cooperation, but how will the perspectives of
people in the poorest countries be taken into account? While the
current collaboration with the US Congressional Committee on geoengineering
governance might form the first step in a process of more widespread
international cooperation, it is important that the debate over
(and governance of) geoengineering is not confined to nations
that are industrialised, wealthy and politically influential.
People in the poorest nations are often the ones most at risk
from climate change, and may also bear a disproportionate burden
of hazard if unanticipated consequences of geoengineering deployments
do emerge. Hence every effort must be made to develop a broad
international consensus on geoengineering governance.
8. Contemporary research on geoengineering
has its roots in military strategies developed for weather modification.
While geoengineering's military history does not preclude benevolent
uses, it is clear that climate modification schemes come with
a potential for global conflict that should be taken seriously.
Conflict might arise due to the unilateral pursuance of a climate
modification programme by a nation perceived to be placing its
own interests above those of other nations. It is even conceivable
that a wealthy individual or private company might develop geoengineering
technologies. Picking apart the climatic effects that could be
attributed to a rival nation's geoengineering from those which
would have occurred naturally would be extremely difficult. The
scope for conflicteven in the absence of intentional provocationwould
be significant. This underscores the importance of developing
a broad and inclusive international consensusand being
willing to accept the possibility that the consensus might not
be favourable towards some forms of geoengineering research.
9. Geoengineering might be considered a
"dangerous distraction" from the urgent task of mitigation
through more traditional methods of emissions reductions. The
Royal Society refer to this as a "moral hazard" argumentthe
phenomenon whereby people who feel "insured" against
a risk may take greater risks (ie mitigate less) than they would
otherwise be prepared to. Whether geoengineering will suppress
individual and group incentives for action on climate change (or
alternatively galvanise some sections of society) is something
which can only be resolved through careful empirical work. This
emphasises the need for detailed social research on geoengineering's
impact on attitudes to climate change, as well as behavioural
intentions and responses. The Social and Economic Research Council
would be the best placed to lead any sponsorship of such social
research.
10. We conclude that the first and most
urgent task of governance is to initiate a large-scale and international
programme of upstream engagement with as broad a range of affected
publics as possible. The outcomes of this public engagement programme
should form part of the evidence-base for determining whether
a large-scale technical research programme begins at all.
December 2009
4 The Understanding Risk Research Group is based at
Cardiff University and studies public attitudes, engagement with,
and governance of a range of risk issues including climate change,
nuclear power, biotechnology and nanotechnologies. See: www.understanding-risk.org Back
5
The Royal Society. Geoengineering the climate: Science, governance
and uncertainty. (Science Policy Centre Report 10/09, 2009,
pp ix). Back
6
Corner, A & Pidgeon, N (in press). Geoengineering the climate:
The ethical and social implications. Environment Back
7
See eg Risk-Analysis, Perception and Management: Report of
a Royal Society Study Group, London, The Royal Society, pp
89-134; also Bickerstaff et al (2008) Constructing responsibility
for risk(s). Environment and Planning A, 40, 1312-1330. Back
8
Pidgeon, N F, et al (2009) Deliberating the risks of nanotechnology
for energy and health applications in the US and UK. Nature
Nanotechnology, Vol 4, Feb 2009, 95-98; Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council, Nanotechnologies for the Targeted
Delivery of Therapeutic Agents & Nanotechnologies for Diagnostics:
Summary of Public Consultation Findings (Swindon: EPSRC, 2008). Back
9
World Wide Views on Global Warming, http://www.wwviews.org/files/images/WWViews_info_sheet-v80-27_September%2009.pdf
(accessed 2 October 2009). Back
10
D Jamieson. "Ethics and Intentional Climate Change."
Climatic Change 33 (1999): 323-336. Back
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