4 Future regulatory arrangements
59. Having concluded in the previous chapter that
there is a need to develop the regulatory regimes for geoengineering,
we examine in this chapter what regulatory principles and arrangements
should apply and how they might operate.
The formulation of a regulatory
regime
60. The first stage in establishing a regulatory
regime (or regimes) is to decide on principles and common procedures.
The experts who gave us oral evidence favoured a "bottom-up
generation of norms"[116]
rather than a "top-down" approach from an organisation
such as the UN. John Virgoe wished to develop and "socialise"
the norms "among the community of nations, the community
of scientists and other stakeholders".[117]
He considered that the state of international understanding and
also the knowledge base was currently so weak that the outcome
from a top-down approach could be unsatisfactory. He explained:
it is very possible to imagine, if this is put
on the table in some sort of UN forum, you could end up with a
decision [...] to make geoengineering a taboo, to outlaw it, and
that would be a mistake, for a couple of reasons. One is that
it may be that we actually need to be doing this research and
that, some decades down the line, we will be very sorry if we
have not started thinking through these techniques. The second
is that I think there are a lot of actors out there [...] with
the capacity to research and implement these techniques. Some
of them may not feel bound by that sort of international decision,
some of them may not be as responsible, and it would be very unfortunate
if what geoengineering research was happening was going on under
the radar screen, if you like. What we need is an open process
which builds on some of the principles that are already out there
around similar issues; for example, principles developed to deal
with long-range air pollution or weather modification: principles
around openness, transparency and research, notifying a neighbouring
country or countries which might be affected. We probably develop
these through maybe a slightly messier process than an international
negotiation. Individual countries will have a role; communities
of scientists will certainly have a role.[118]
61. While accepting that the "bottom-up"
approach could work well for developing deployment technologies,
laboratory research and computational modelling, Dr Blackstock
had reservations whether it would be sufficient when it came to
field tests, particularly high leverage SRM technologies and those
with trans-boundary impact. He said that as well as the technical
risk and the environmental risk there was the political risk in
the perception of the test.[119]
He cited the recent case of the ocean fertilisation experiment
in 2009—Lohafex—an Indo-German collaboration. He said
that the test would have had very small impacts in terms of the
ecosystems and trans-boundary.[120]
But it demonstrated the political sensitivities any geoengineering
experiments could evoke. He said that at the core of this controversy
was also the "difficulty of defining politically acceptable
(national and international) scientific standards and oversight
mechanisms for ensuring the environmental and transboundary risks
of nominally subscale geoengineering field tests were in fact
'demonstrably negligible'".[121]
DECC explained that a moratorium had been placed on large-scale
ocean fertilisation research under the Convention for Biological
Diversity while a regulatory agreement was being developed under
the London Convention/Protocol.[122]
62. Dr Blackstock took the view that "the consideration
of the norms is partly necessary but not sufficient to address
the sort of political issues that will raise".[123]
In his view it was necessary to have a "mechanism of legitimacy",
to define subscale (that is, small) experiments "before we
start pushing the boundaries of [...] subscale, that is [...]
where we really need to have, not just scientific, but political
agreement".[124]
Where nation states were starting to fund research, particularly
if it went to funding subscale experimentation, Dr Blackstock
considered that "we need to ask what preventive commitments,
what precautionary commitments nation states need [...] up front
in order to avoid exacerbating all the mistrust that already exists
within the international climate arena".[125]
63. Research Councils UK took a more cautious view
than Dr Blackstock. It was concerned that even small-scale actions
could generate negative environmental, social and economic consequences
if undertaken without appropriate controls in place or a sufficient
level of expertise. It cited, as an example, a field trial involving
atmospheric SRM manipulations that might temporally—but
perhaps coincidentally—be linked to extreme weather events
resulting in high economic consequences. Research Councils UK
also considered that some highly controversial techniques could
be applied at relatively low cost and with relative ease, opening
up geoengineering as a feasible unilateral activity to a wide
range of actors with different knowledge, skills and motivations.
Such actions might be linked to political as well as, or even
instead of, environmental concerns. This suggested to Research
Councils UK that "regulation might be best monitored at the
level of supra-national governance structures such as the UN".[126]
64. Dr van Aalst was anxious that if geoengineering
was raised at a high political level too early, it could be sending
the "wrong signals".[127]
He considered that there were more technically oriented UN bodies
that would be more appropriate, such as the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He hoped that, along with some
conscious efforts at consultation focussed primarily on looking
at risks, it "might actually be then guiding us towards more
investments on the mitigation and adaptation sides".[128]
He hoped that discussions in "UN bodies would then trigger
a much wider debate, involving a larger range of stakeholders,
and a more diverse set of stakeholders than have been taking part
in this discussion so far".[129]
65. In our view, there is a case for starting to
develop the international framework for geoengineering now as
opposed to waiting for the state of international understanding
and the knowledge base for geoengineering to grow. Characterising
the development of an international framework as top-down may
be exaggerated as development will not be uniform for geoengineering
techniques and the development of geoengineering regulatory arrangements
is likely to take years. Nor does it preclude the building of
bottom-up practices and approaches to geoengineering. While
accepting that the development of a "top-down" regulatory
framework may have risks and limitations, we consider that these
are outweighed by the benefits of an international framework:
legitimacy; scientific standards; oversight mechanisms; and management
of environmental and trans-boundary risks.
PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED TO GEOENGINEERING
RESEARCH
66. In a submission to our inquiry a group of academics
set out five key principles by which they believed geoengineering
research should be guided.[130]
We welcome the production of the principles by a group of academics
which provide a basis to begin the discussion of principles that
could be applied to the regulation of geoengineering. We consider
that the proposed principles could be useful both to the "top-down"
approach and, to a lesser extent, to a "bottom-up" approach.
(It could, for example, inform the drafting of the code of practice
on research suggested by the Royal Society—see paragraph
89.) We therefore examine the principles in detail. The principles
and part of the explanatory text are set out in the box below.
| Principle 1: Geoengineering to be regulated as a public good
While the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of a geoengineering technique should not be prohibited, and may indeed be encouraged to ensure that deployment of a suitable technique can be effected in a timely and efficient manner, regulation of such techniques should be undertaken in the public interest by the appropriate bodies at the state and/or international levels.
Principle 2: Public participation in geoengineering decision-making
Wherever possible, those conducting geoengineering research should be required to notify, consult, and ideally obtain the prior informed consent of, those affected by the research activities. The identity of affected parties will be dependent on the specific technique which is being researched—for example, a technique which captures carbon dioxide from the air and geologically sequesters it within the territory of a single state will likely require consultation and agreement only at the national or local level, while a technique which involves changing the albedo of the planet by injecting aerosols into the stratosphere will likely require global agreement.
Principle 3: Disclosure of geoengineering research and open publication of results
There should be complete disclosure of research plans and open publication of results in order to facilitate better understanding of the risks and to reassure the public as to the integrity of the process. It is essential that the results of all research, including negative results, be made publicly available.
Principle 4: Independent assessment of impacts
An assessment of the impacts of geoengineering research should be conducted by a body independent of those undertaking the research; where techniques are likely to have trans-boundary impact, such assessment should be carried out through the appropriate regional and/or international bodies. Assessments should address both the environmental and socio-economic impacts of research, including mitigating the risks of lock-in to particular technologies or vested interests.
Principle 5: Governance before deployment
Any decisions with respect to deployment should only be taken with robust governance structures already in place, using existing rules and institutions wherever possible. [131]
|
67. In putting forward these principles the academics said that
transparency in decision-making, public participation, and open
publication of research results were key elements of the framework,
designed to ensure maximum public engagement with, and confidence
in, the regulation of geoengineering research. Alone or in combination,
many of these principles were already applied in the regulation
of hazardous substances and activities such as the trans-boundary
movement of hazardous wastes and pesticides, radioactive substances
and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).[132]
68. Most debate and reservations focused on the regulation
of geoengineering for the public good and public participation
in geoengineering decision-making.
Principle 1: Geoengineering to be regulated as
a public good
69. Commenting on Principle 1—geoengineering
to be regulated as a public good—Mr Virgoe asked who was
the public—the global public? He pointed out that geoengineering
interventions affected the planet as a whole and that there were
number of publics. Some publics were suffering very badly, or
would be suffering very badly, from the effects of climate change.
But some populations might benefit from climate change and, therefore,
would not be happy to see climate change being put into "reverse
gear", if that could be achieved. He said that the impact
of some of the techniques was likely to be heavily differentiated.
Some areas might continue to warm, whereas other areas cooled
faster and there might be unintentional side effects. He considered
that below the surface of the public good "you get into some
difficult ethical territory".[133]
70. Sir David King raised the treatment of intellectual
property rights (IPR). He pointed out that
if we are going to go down the route of carbon
dioxide capture from oceans or atmosphere, and this is going to
be a good thing, we also need to know, where is the investment
going to come from, to take the research into demonstration phase
and into the marketplace, and there will be a marketplace with
a price of carbon dioxide. That is going to be the private sector
companies. If we do not allow protection of IPR, are we going
to actually inhibit that process of investment? So I think I am
a little hesitant to simply back the pure public good argument
without IPR protection.[134]
71. We conclude that Principle 1 of the suggested
five key principles on how geoengineering research should be guided—"Geoengineering
to be regulated as a public good"—needs, first, to
be worked up in detail to define public good and public interest.
Second, the implied restriction suggested in the explanatory text
to the Principle on intellectual property rights must be framed
in such a manner that it does not deter investment in geoengineering
techniques. Without private investment, some geoengineering techniques
will never be developed.
Principle 2: Public participation in geoengineering
decision-making
72. One of the principles international law suggests
might be used in developing a regulatory regime for geoengineering
is the requirement to inform or consult (Principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration).[135]
In the context of geoengineering, however, Mr Virgoe questioned
what the principle meant at the global level, specifically, how
public participation was achieved at the global level and how
to ensure that certain parts of the public, or the public in certain
countries, did not have privileged access compared with other
countries, publics or other parts of the global public.[136]
73. Dr Blackstock said that some countries already
had populations marginalised in terms of climate change or were
on the edge of suffering from climate change impacts, because
those marginalised populations were likely to be the ones most
sensitive to geoengineering experiments and a high level of solar
radiation management experiments and particularly implementation.
He saw a risk that without directive public engagement, an attempt
to reach out and provide the information proactively, "we
end up with them inevitably being surprised later on by rapid
climate change impacts [and] that requires international public
consultation, not just domestic".[137]
Dr van Aalst voiced a similar concern that the more vulnerable
felt "threatened by the possibility that the winners will
protect their wins, and the losers, which clearly are mostly them,
will not get anything".[138]
He wished to see an international debate fostered and to "include
attention for [the] human dimension, and to try and involve that
side of the debate early on".[139]
74. We conclude that Principle 2—"Public
participation in geoengineering decision-making"—is
to be supported but it needs to spell out in the explanatory text
what consultation means and whether, and how, those affected can
veto or alter proposed geoengineering tests.
Principle 3: Disclosure of geoengineering research
and open publication of results
75. On Principle 3—disclosure of geoengineering
research and open publication of results—we would add that
as well as publishing plans and results the agency carrying out
the test should also publish any modelling relevant to the test.
76. The one concern that was expressed to us which
has a bearing on this principle was the effect of classifying
or restricting access to SRM research on grounds of national security.
Dr Blackstock commented that it "would dangerously provoke
[...] international perceptions [...] that national or corporate
interests might try (or just be perceived as trying) to control
or profiteer from nascent SRM technologies".[140]
He added that non-public SRM research would
exacerbate international mistrust about unilateral
control, provoking such disputes and potentially sparking a proliferation
of similarly closed programs. This could even encourage the development
and unilateral testing of SRM schemes targeted to benefit specific
regional climates, regardless of other impacts. And any such developments
could prejudice many countries against cooperation on broader
climate issues—including mitigation."[141]
77. We endorse Principle 3—"Disclosure
of geoengineering research and open publication of results".
The requirement to disclose the results of geoengineering research
should be unqualified. We recommend that the Government press
for an international database of geoengineering research to encourage
and facilitate disclosure.
Principle 4: Independent assessment of impacts
78. On Principle 4—independent assessment
of impacts—we regard independent review of the results of
geoengineering research not only to be good scientific practice
but also good politics. In the final resort decisions weighing
the benefits and risks of a geoengineering intervention will be
made by those most affected by climate change and those affected
by the geoengineering. Those affected and those taking the decisions
on their behalf will need to be confident that the scientific
assessment is the best that can be provided in the circumstances.
79. It is also important to link any decision to
develop, and eventually to deploy, geoengineering to global warming.
Sir David King reminded us that research into impacts, both in
terms of the physical and economic impacts, would also need to
take into account the impacts from rising temperature. In other
words, geoengineering interventions would be deployed against
a temperature rise of, say, 3.5 degrees centigrade.[142]
80. Consideration of impact raised the question of
compensation for those affected by geoengineering interventions.
Research Councils UK said that "approval-based mechanisms
should [...] include protocols for the assessment of fair compensation;
should adverse impacts occur, who would meet the costs of such
impacts" but acknowledged that in some cases it would be
difficult to attribute climatic impacts to particular acts of
geoengineering and "research on how this should be done is
essential".[143]
Dr van Aalst cautioned against purely economic impact assessments
as they tended "to lose out on the perspective of the most
vulnerable groups, which do not count much on the economic analysis
side".[144]
81. Distributional issues—between countries,
and between groups—is likely, in our view, to raise questions
of compensation, as well as political and legal issues of liability,
which, as Mr Virgoe pointed out, will need to be addressed by
a governance regime or through litigation. These issues would
be particularly problematic in the case of a geoengineering intervention
by one country, or a group of countries. We agree with him that
this strengthens the case for seeking the explicit agreement of
all countries through a UN-led, multilateral process.[145]
82. We also endorse Principle 4—"The
independent assessment of impacts". But it too needs to be
worked up in more detail in the explanatory text to: (i) define
impacts; (ii) produce agreed mechanisms for assessing impacts,
including for assessing the impact of global warming; and (iii)
determine whether and how compensation should be assessed and
paid. The agreement of these arrangements will need to command
the broadest level of support across the globe and we consider
that UN-led, multilateral processes are the best way to secure
concurrence.
Principle 5: Governance before deployment
83. The sponsors of the principles were clear that
it was imperative that governance structures were in place to
"guide research in the short term and to ensure that any
decisions taken ultimately with respect to deployment occur within
an appropriate governance framework".[146]
Others took the same view[147]
and we consider that this is a sensible approach. It does not
mean that research, including tests, the regulation of which we
consider below, has to be halted until regulatory frameworks are
in place. It does mean that research must be carried out in parallel
with discussions on the legal, social and ethical implications
of geoengineering, and its regulation and governance.[148]
84. We endorse Principle 5—"Governance
before deployment of any geoengineering technique". We
recommend that the Government carry out research, and press for
research to be carried out through international bodies on the
legal, social and ethical implications, and regulation and governance
of geoengineering.
The precautionary principle
85. One principle of international law not included
in the suggested list is the precautionary principle (Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration).[149]
In his recent article Mr Virgoe pointed out that the
precautionary principle would be likely to influence
debate, particularly as the side-effects of geoengineering techniques
are not yet well understood. But it is unlikely that it could
act as a legal, as opposed to rhetorical or moral, constraint
on geoengineering: as noted by Weiss (2006), "no non-European
international court has thus far accepted the Precautionary Principle
as a binding principle of international law."[150]
He said that it would be necessary to be cautious
in the way international debate on geoengineering was initiated.
Geoengineering was so far from the current mitigation-adaptation
paradigm, and raised so many concerns, "that a premature
discussion might well see geoengineering banned in line with the
precautionary principle".[151]
Already, in June 2008, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity cited the precautionary principle in calling
for a moratorium on ocean fertilisation activities. While he had
sympathy for that decision on the specific issue of ocean fertilisation,
Mr Virgoe said that it was "important that genuine research
into geoengineering techniques are subjected to an appropriate,
cautious regulatory regime rather than a blanket ban".[152]
86. The precautionary principle is an issue that
our predecessor committee considered in 2006. In its Report on
Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making,
the Committee noted that, while the precautionary principle was
"valuable in dealing with uncertainty",[153]
it believed that it was
best to use the term precautionary approach,
but with a consistent explanation of the degree and nature of
the risks, benefits and uncertainty and an explanation of the
concept of proportionality. It should never be considered a substitute
for thorough risk analysis which is always required when the science
is uncertain and the risks are serious.[154]
This approach holds good for geoengineering. To go
further and make the precautionary principle predominant risks
not only halting geoengineering research and small tests being
carried out by those states playing by the rules to develop a
Plan B but it could also force from international and public scrutiny
any research carried out by other bodies or states not playing
by the rules. In our view the five Principles as drafted contain
a precautionary approach and that to go further is unnecessary.
We conclude that the key principles should not include the
precautionary principle as a discrete principle.
Conclusion on principles
87. In our view the principles as drafted provide
a good starting point for either a bottom-up or a top-down approach
to building a regulatory arrangements for geoengineering research.
While some aspects of the suggested five key principles need
further development, they provide a sound foundation for developing
future regulation. We endorse the five key principles to guide
geoengineering research.
Research
88. In our earlier Report on engineering we supported
research into geoengineering. The research that is most controversial
is that into SRM technologies. Dr Blackstock supplied the table
below which summarises the stages of SRM research that could be
undertaken, along with the environmental risks and political issues
each raises.[155] In
this Report we have examined three stages of research: modelling;
development and subscale (that is, small) field testing; and climate
impact testing.
Research: modelling
89. The Minister did not seek to put any constraint
on modelling work and pointed out that the Royal Society had suggested
there should be a code of conduct for research[156]
at a certain level. In her view "a code of conduct is probably
entirely appropriate, and we would very much support that".[157]
Professor Keith considered that the "crucial thing"
was to start from the
bottom up through the management of a research
programme in an international and transparent way. From the bottom
up does not mean just that the scientists decide—that is
certainly not the right answer—but it means, I think, that
it would be premature to start a full UN scale EU Court treaty
process, because it is simply not clear yet what the capacities
are and states, individuals, have not had long enough to consider
seriously what the trade-offs are.[158]
Mr Virgoe said that countries commencing geoengineering
research prior to an internationally agreed framework being in
place needed to make voluntary commitments to full international
collaboration and transparency. Otherwise national geoengineering
research that failed to make or meet such commitments "could
spark international mistrust over future intentions, and disrupt
the already inadequate progress toward essential mitigation".[159]
90. We agree with DECC and Professor Keith and see
no reason to develop the panoply of international regulation to
cover modelling of geoengineering interventions. Provided those
carrying out research follow a code of practice along the lines
of that suggested by the Royal Society, incorporating in particular
Principle 3 on the disclosure of geoengineering research and open
publication of results, we see no reason for an international
regulatory regime applying to paper and computer modelling of
geoengineering techniques.
Research: development and field testing
91. The ETC Group in a graphic phrase wanted to draw
a "'line in the sand' at the lab door". It did not believe
that it was "warranted to move geoengineering out of the
laboratory and the most urgent questions of governance concern
keeping that 'lab door' closed against the pressures from industrial
players to move to open air geoengineering research and deployment".[160]
92. Sir David King took that view that there should
be a temporary ban on solar radiation management as "the
unintended consequences of that are extremely difficult to foresee".[161]
He was
not happy about smaller experiments being conducted
at this stage in time before the unintended consequences have
been fully evaluated. We are dealing with an extraordinarily complex
issue here, and we all know scientifically that complex phenomena,
as complexity increases, we get emergent properties that are not
always easy to predict. So I do think we need to watch the stratosphere
very carefully, but at the same time, in terms of regulation of
the others, get ahead of the game, precisely because firstly,
you want to keep the public on side, if we lose the public, then
we lose the game; and secondly, we want to see that the regulation
encourages the right behaviour.[162]
93. While cautious also, Dr Blackstock did not go
quite as far as Sir David. To encourage international climate
cooperation, he considered that countries beginning SRM research
needed to take early steps to encourage the collective international
exploration of SRM as a possible means for insuring global public
welfare in the face of highly uncertain climate change. This,
he suggested, meant making several preventive commitments. First,
to foreswear climatic impacts testing—and very conservatively
limit field testing—until approved by a broad and legitimate
international process. Second, to keep all SRM research, including
generated knowledge and technologies, in the public domain. Third,
to integrate all SRM research into any subsequent international
research framework.[163]
94. While we understand Sir David's concerns, we
consider that a temporary ban on SRM may not be the way forward.
First, it would have to be negotiated through an international
agreement which will take time and may not be achieved. Second,
as we noted in the previous chapter, small scale testing may already
be underway. Third a ban on all testing could inhibit laboratory
development of geoengineering techniques. Instead, we consider
that the approach suggested by Dr Blackstock may be the way forward.
Much of the focus in the previous chapter on the need for regulation
was on testing. For the reasons we set out in that chapter, we
are of the view that there are good scientific reasons for allowing
investigative research and for seeking to devise and implement
some regulatory frameworks, particularly for those techniques
with the potential to allow a single country or small group of
countries to test or deploy, in order to affect the global climate.
We consider that a ban, even a short-term ban, on all SRM geoengineering
testing would prevent work on geoengineering as "Plan B".
It may well also be unenforceable and be counter-productive as
those carrying out tests do so in secrecy.
95. As we have indicated we favour international
regulation of SRM technologies. But we recognise that it is going
to take time to devise, agree and implement regulatory frameworks
for the testing of SRM technologies. In the meantime, in order
to encourage research into geoengineering techniques and to foster
public understanding of geoengineering, we conclude that development
and small tests of SRM geoengineering should be allowed provided
they:
a) are fully in accordance with an internationally
agreed set of principles such as those we have considered in this
Report;
b) have negligible or predictable environmental
impact; and
c) have no trans-boundary effects.
RESEARCH: CLIMATE IMPACT TESTING
96. As tests increase in scale and impact they need
to be regulated. We consider that any testing that impacts
on the climate must be subject to an international regulatory
framework.
RESEARCH: INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE
AND COOPERATION
97. Mr Virgoe pointed out that given the pre-existing
mistrust on global climate issues, further steps should also be
taken to foster international confidence and cooperation. He considered
that national SRM programmes should involve international scientists,
particularly including those from vulnerable developing countries
and "more importantly, these programmes should give priority
to research on SRM schemes that may preserve global public welfare,
rather than focusing on narrowly defined national interests".[164]
98. We agree with both points and consider that the
UK Government should lead by example. We recommend that any
UK SRM programmes should involve international scientists, particularly
including those from vulnerable developing countries, and that
these programmes should give priority to research on SRM schemes
that may preserve global public welfare. We further recommend
that the UK Government press the governments of other countries
to a adopt similar approach to SRM research.
Formulating international regulatory
arrangements for geoengineering
99. As we noted at paragraph 39, regulatory regimes
for most SMR techniques have yet to be developed. As Mr Virgoe
noted in his recent article,[165]
there are important arguments in favour of a UN process. It would
give the implementation of geoengineering legitimacy, in the form
of a multilateral mandate. Most multilateral environmental regimes
tend to operate by consensus, at least where major decisions are
concerned, whatever their formal decision-making rules. We would
add that it would give a voice to those likely to be most likely
to be affected by the direct environmental consequences of the
use of geoengineering technology. The problem he noted was that
the UN process complicated and slowed down the decision-making
process and any serious geoengineering proposal would certainly
lead to vigorous international debate. He considered that the
chances of achieving a multilateral agreement to deploy geoengineering
were "not good". He identified the following difficulties.
- The UNFCCC/Kyoto process was
committed to the mitigation/adaptation paradigm. Institutional
inertia, and the commitments already made by states, would make
it hard to argue for a complete change in approach under this
process—and equally difficult to establish a separate multilateral
process.
- The introduction of a whole new approach would
raise developing country suspicions that it would divert attention
and funds from adaptation; other countries and communities would
be concerned that it would reduce pressure to mitigate climate
change.
- In the absence of a substantial political community
in its favour, international discussion of geoengineering would
be likely to result in its prohibition in line with the precautionary
principle.[166]
100. But he identified a way forward. The dynamics
might be different if a powerful country, or a group of countries,
"were to act as a policy entrepreneur, pressing for serious
consideration of, or research into, geoengineering" and that
"growing global concern over global warming might also create
more fertile soil for such a proposal, particularly among developing
countries which are likely to be hit earlier, and harder, by the
negative impacts of climate change".[167]
None of the alternative approaches—waiting for events, individual
action or regional or interested groups—would have the legitimacy
that action through the UN would provide. We consider that
the way forward for the regulation of geoengineering is through
the UN and we recommend that the UK Government and other interested
countries develop proposals for the regulation of not only CDR
but also SRM techniques and begin to press them through the UN.
101. The starting point for the formulation has to
be the five key principles which we have discussed in this chapter.
In addition, as Mr Virgoe pointed out, it will be important to
ensure evidence based decision-making.[168]
It will also be crucial that regulatory measures are able to respond
rapidly, if necessary, following the application of geoengineering
techniques. A key criterion for geoengineering to be taken forward
will be the facility to withdraw applications quickly in case
of negative consequences.[169]
The Royal Society considered it was essential that mechanisms
for the regulation of geoengineering were imbued with a high level
of flexibility because:
First, regulatory controls will need to adapt
to the evolution of environmental, scientific, technological,
geo-political, economic and social risks. Major uncertainties
remain about geoengineering and it is impossible to foresee how
technologies will develop, their public confidence, and the measures
that will be needed to shape and respond to such developments.
In addition, environmental, geo-political, economic and social
factors that will influence the development of geoengineering
are also in a constant state of flux and must therefore be accounted
for through flexible regulatory arrangement.[170]
102. As we have noted at paragraph 27, the ENMOD
treaty requires members "not to engage in military or any
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party". We consider that
it is crucial to the development of geoengineering that this principle
is applied comprehensively to all geoengineering technologies.
103. We recommend that the UK Government is proactive
in persuading and working with other governments to press for
regulatory arrangements for geoengineering through the UN. They
should do this on the basis of the following principles and objectives:
a) geoengineering to be regulated as a public
good;
b) public participation in geoengineering
decision-making;
c) disclosure of geoengineering research and
open publication of results;
d) independent assessment of impacts;
e) governance arrangements to be clear before
deployment;
f) decisions to be based on the best scientific
evidence, including social science;
g) regulatory measures to be able to respond
rapidly;
h) regulatory measures imbued with a high
level of flexibility to be able, for example, to encompass new
technologies as they emerge; and
i) prohibition of the use of geoengineering
techniques for military purposes.
Suitability of existing bodies to provide regulation
of geoengineering
104. We received evidence on the suitability of existing
international bodies to provide a model for the regulation of
geoengineering, particularly SRM.[171]
In the time available we have not been able to examine the operation
of the bodies sufficiently to reach a view on whether:
a) any organisation would provide a model for
a regulatory regime for SRM; or
b) existing bodies could be adapted to encompass
SRM.
105. We were therefore attracted to the proposal
of the Royal Society that a suitable international body, not exclusively
a UN body, should commission a review of existing international
and regional mechanisms to:
- consider the relevant roles
of the following bodies such as UNCLOS,[172]
LC/LP,[173] CBD,[174]
CLRTAP,[175] Montreal
Protocol,[176] Outer
Space Treaty,[177]
Moon Treaty,[178] UNFCCC/KP,[179]
ENMOD[180] the regulation
of geoengineering;
- identify existing mechanisms that could be used
to regulate geoengineering research and deployment activities,
if suitably extended as necessary; and
- (for geoengineering in general) identify where
regulatory gaps exist in relation to geoengineering methods proposed
to date, and establish a process for the development of mechanisms
to address these gaps.[181]
106. We recommend that the Government press for
a suitable international body to commission a review of existing
international and regional mechanisms to: (i) consider the relevant
roles of the existing international bodies in the regulation of
geoengineering; (ii) identify existing mechanisms that could be
used to regulate geoengineering research and deployment activities,
if suitably extended as necessary; and (iii) identify where regulatory
gaps exist in relation to geoengineering methods proposed to date,
and establish a process for the development of mechanisms to address
these gaps.
107. The next stage, which DECC suggested, was that
a suitable organisation needed to be identified, whose mandate
would enable it to take the lead in facilitating the collaborative
development of international regulations.[182]
The Royal Society has suggested that an international consortium
is formed to explore the safest and most effective geoengineering
options while building a community of researchers and developers,[183]
and we, like DECC,[184]
consider that this is worth pursuing.
108. As the cost, effectiveness, timeliness and risk
of putative geoengineering approaches vary substantially, Research
Councils UK considered that it was therefore important that international
collaboration was sought at an early stage. It explained that:
An international geoengineering advisory group
may well be an appropriate body to help address these challenges.
With representation from the scientific, policy, commercial, regulatory
and non-governmental communities, such a group would provide independent
oversight of evolving regulatory issues concerning geoengineering.
It would be tasked with the coordination of existing research,
and the identification of a new research agenda, as well as the
development of an effective and objective assessment framework
to inform the regulation of geoengineering. This would involve
making informed judgements about the weight of different environmental,
social and economic costs and benefits and striking an appropriate
balance between short-term and long-term effects.[185]
109. We recommend that, in parallel with the development
of an international regulatory framework, the UK Government press
for the establishment of an international consortium, to explore
the safest and most effective geoengineering options, while building
a community of researchers and developers.
Role of the UK
110. Dr van Aalst pointed out that there was probably
a difference between the sort of debate taking place on geoengineering
in the UK and the debate in other countries, including in several
different states which may already be at the stage of small scale
testing of some geoengineering techniques. He considered that
the UK was "in a way also operating as an international arena,
and in a way setting moral standards and setting an example for
how globally we should be approaching this, which is a very important
side effect for your own considerations, I think, at this stage".[186]
111. We were disappointed to be told by the Minister
that she could not recall any ministerial involvement in discussions
on geoengineering and that it was "unlikely that we have
had any ministerial discussions on regulation, but we are aware,
our officials are alive to the issue, and it is something that
we know needs to be done".[187]
She continued:
Of course, the IPCC is going to be reporting
itself, and we have taken a lot of our leads from reports from
the IPCC. It is clear that if there is to be regulation, it is
going to have to be in some international body, whether a scientific
body, or whether the UN itself, but clearly, this is something
that will have to be developed over time.[188]
112. We recommend that the UK should take the
lead in raising geoengineering within international bodies such
as the EU and the Commonwealth.
116 Q 23 [Professor Keith] Back
117
Q 22; see also Q 23 Back
118
Q 22; see also Q 28 Back
119
Qq 23 [Dr Blackstock] and 24 Back
120
Q 23 Back
121
Ev 3, para 16 Back
122
Ev 21, para 9 Back
123
Q 24 Back
124
Q 27 Back
125
As above Back
126
Ev 23, para 12 Back
127
Q 46 Back
128
As above Back
129
Q 46 Back
130
Ev 42: Professor Steve Rayner (University of Oxford), Professor
Catherine Redgwell (University College London), Professor Julian
Savulescu (University of Oxford), Professor Nick Pidgeon (Cardiff
University) and Mr Tim Kruger (Oxford Geoengineering Institute) Back
131
Ev 44, para 17 Back
132
Ev 43, para 6 Back
133
Q 26 Back
134
Q 43 Back
135
Ev 6 [Mr Virgoe], para 12 Back
136
Q 26 Back
137
Q 30 Back
138
Q 44; see also J Virgoe, "International governance of a possible
geoengineering intervention to combat climate change", Climatic
Change, 2009, 95:103-119, para 2.3. Back
139
Q 44 Back
140
Ev 3, para 14 Back
141
Ev 4, para 19 Back
142
Q 48 Back
143
Ev 23, para 11 Back
144
Q 48 Back
145
J Virgoe, "International governance of a possible geoengineering
intervention to combat climate change", Climatic Change,
2009, 95:103-119, para 2.3 Back
146
Ev 43, para 6 Back
147
Ev 53 [The Royal Society], para 15, and Ev 21 [DECC] Back
148
Ev 21 [DECC], para 14 Back
149
The Precautionary Principle has been endorsed internationally
on many occasions. At the Earth Summit meeting at Rio in 1992,
World leaders agreed Agenda 21, which advocated the widespread
application of the Precautionary Principle in the following terms:
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
(Principle 15) Back
150
J Virgoe, "International governance of a possible geoengineering
intervention to combat climate change", Climatic Change,
2009, 95:103-119, para 3 Back
151
Ev 6, para 16 Back
152
As above Back
153
Science and Technology Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06,
Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making,
HC 900-I, para 165 Back
154
Science and Technology Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06,
Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making,
HC 900-I, para 166 Back
155
Ev 2, para 13 Back
156
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the climate Science, governance
and uncertainty, September 2009, rec 7 Back
157
Q 62 Back
158
Q 12 Back
159
Ev 1, para 4 Back
160
Ev 50, para 10 Back
161
Q 39 Back
162
Q 40 Back
163
Ev 4, para 21 Back
164
Ev 4, para 22 Back
165
J Virgoe, "International governance of a possible geoengineering
intervention to combat climate change", Climatic Change,
2009, 95:103-119, para 4.1 Back
166
As above Back
167
As above Back
168
J Virgoe, "International governance of a possible geoengineering
intervention to combat climate change", Climatic Change,
2009, 95:103-119, para 4.1 Back
169
Ev 24, para 19 Back
170
Ev 24, para 17; see also J Virgoe, "International governance
of a possible geoengineering intervention to combat climate change",
Climatic Change, 2009, 95:103-119, para 2.4 Back
171
For example, Ev 53 [Royal Society], para 21 Back
172
1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Back
173
1972 London Convention with the 1996 Protocol of the London Convention Back
174
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity Back
175
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Back
176
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer Back
177
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies Back
178
1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies Back
179
1997 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change/ Kyoto
Protocol Back
180
1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques Back
181
Ev 53, para 21 Back
182
Ev 21, para 12 Back
183
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the climate Science, governance
and uncertainty, September 2009, rec 4.2 Back
184
Ev 21, para 13 Back
185
Ev 25, para 24 Back
186
Q 40 Back
187
Q 64 Back
188
As above Back
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