Memorandum submitted by the RNIB Group
(EP 03)
INTRODUCTION
The RNIB Group is the product of the union between
the Royal National Institute of Blind People and Action for Blind
People. The union represents the largest charity concerned with
the welfare of blind and partially sighted people. The RNIB group
both delivers services eg Workstep contracts, access to work assessments
etc and also campaigns for improvements in the existing funding
and service provision.
In responding to the Select Committee's investigation
priority has been attached to answering certain questions in greater
depth than others.
QUESTION 1
Are there sufficient safeguards in place to prevent
providers from making fraudulent claims for outcomes they have
not achieved?
Is there sufficient protection for employees who
raise concerns about their employers' delivery of a contracted
employment programme?
1.1 The RNIB group has not encountered dishonesty
in the operation of the commissioning strategy itself but is aware
of the complaints being made by other individuals in respect of
the operation of other organisations. We would support a "whistleblowers
charter" and other measures that provided protection for
those people drawing attention to the misuse of public money.
1.2 Of greater concern to us and explored
in detail within this response is the performance of DWP disability
employment programmes and the impact of their allocated budgets
in resolving the objective of the DWP green paper that "no
(is) one written off."
QUESTION 2
Does DWP's contract management approach ensure
the quality of service received by customers is commensurate with
the level required under the contract terms?
2.1 The DWP contract management approach
is based upon a "black box" approach to provider organised
employment support interventions. Whilst the focus upon a job
is welcome there remains certain key weaknesses to this approach.
These weaknesses are namely ensuring that everyone is treated
fairly and secondly ensuring that those people who do not secure
a job outcome still make measurable progress towards the open
labour market. The numbers of individuals involved may be considerable;
nearly half of those on the Work Choice programme are unlikely
to progress into unsupported employment.
2.2 The RNIB group could best illustrate
this with reference to the new Work Choice programme. Evidence
that one group may be being disadvantaged over another group will
not become available until the autumn of 2009. These results will
then feed into an evaluation strategy for the programme but this
will not be available until early 2010. By this stage prime providers
will have already submitted their tenders.
2.3 The question thus arises—how can
the new contracts (and future contracts) offer the best safeguard
for a quality service to clients (pending any modifications that
the evaluation strategy may identify as being necessary)?
2.4 What constitutes quality?
Ideally quality should be flexible enough to
recognise the range of clients being supported yet specific enough
for an individual to benefit. Quality should be tangible and easily
understood by all. It should be obvious whether it is present
or absent and thus recognisable to an observer. Providers should
find quality interventions appropriate to the client, simple to
administer and not onerous to record.
2.5 Indicators of quality—recommendations
for making improvements
RNIB would contend that in a new market that
emphasises customer choice the client should receive guidance
on what constitutes a quality service. Thus they can form judgements
of their treatment, raise complaints if necessary and even exercise
the "right to control" and change providers, where this
is an option open to them. Quality should thus be derived from
the customer's viewpoint and be clearly linked to the service
standards expected of providers. Therefore the first indicator
of quality ought to be a commitment to customer feedback for clients
to report their experiences to those responsible for service review.
In addition a whistleblowers charter should be established to
give clients the confidence to speak out in the event of them
being given a particularly poor service.
2.6 The second indicator of quality ought
to be the provision of information and communication media appropriate
to the client's needs eg British Sign Language, accessible formats
such as Braille, audio or large print, easy read, Makaton etc.
2.7 A job outcome is a very real sign of
quality but there must be other assessed indicators or standards
too. This is particularly true in terms of the progress made by
those people who do not obtain a job and even amongst the top
performing providers it is likely that these clients may represent
the largest single cohort.
2.8 The recent research to underpin the
development of a distance travelled toolkit (Purvis, A., Lowrey,
J., and Law R, DWP Research Report 566, 2009) promoted a five
step A-E system of measuring client progress. One option could
be to fix some standards around the quality of interventions by
providers that would best enable clients to move through these
stages.
2.9 At the outset of the programme is an
assessment of the client to decide which of the three modules
and possible menu of interventions would best meet their needs.
Following this, marking progress over these A-E stages will depend
in turn upon staff being able to make valid judgements on progress.
Consequently staff training, highlighted in the above report as
a key success factor, ought to be the third benchmark of quality.
2.10 The first transition ie A to B is linked
to client's own recognition of their support needs. Thus an action
plan willingly entered into by clients, in which they have chosen
from an appropriate menu of "life skill" support options,
ought to be established as the fourth benchmark of quality. The
"life skills" that may be appropriate could or should
include the following: possible identification of role models,
peer support, peer mentoring, independent living skills (eg around
mobility training), handling money, basic skills support such
as literacy, numeracy etc.
2.11 The second transition from B to C is
linked to the client making initial progress. The acquisition
of a disability specific skill by the client that is applicable
to a working environment could constitute evidence for this transition
and the training input provided. Examples of these skills could
include accessing documents ie through the use of speech activated
software, communication eg through lip reading, mobility eg use
of public transport etc.
2.12 The third transition from C to D is
linked to the client making sustained progress. The ability of
the client to independently produce a CV could constitute evidence
for this transition and the training input provided.
2.13 The final transition from D to E is
linked to clients routinely demonstrating the necessary level
of competence to acquire a job. The ability of the client to independently
job search and complete a job application form could constitute
evidence for this transition and the training input provided.
2.14 All transitions made should be recorded
in the client action plan. The final and crucial evidence of quality
should be a job outcome. The possibility of employment being an
option should be raised at the outset eg through the aforementioned
discussion of role models conducted at the initial assessment
(if needed).
2.15 In summary quality indicators should
comprise:
— A system for customer feedback into service
delivery review.
— Staff training eg Vocational Rehabilitation
standards, NVQ advice and guidance standards, etc.
— Routine availability of appropriate communication
and information formats specific to clients needs.
— An action plan that includes access to
life skills and basic skills support.
— Acquisition of disability specific skills
that enhance employment prospects (if needed).
— Completion of a CV by the client.
— Acquisition of job searching and job
application skills by the client.
QUESTION 3
Do DWP and the National Audit Office effectively
monitor the accuracy of providers' management information systems,
provider performance against targets, and the evidence on which
provider payments are claimed?
3.1 The RNIB group is aware that the Audit
Office is conducting its own investigation into this issue and
we look to this investigation to determine the answer to this
question.
QUESTION 4
How has the centralisation of contract management
in DWP impacted upon the role of Jobcentre Plus and both provider
and customer experience of outsourced employment programmes?
4.1 It is RNIB's perception that the change
has meant that there is now little understanding of the needs
of the client group on disability programmes within DWP Commissioning.
The arm's length nature of managing contracts raises the need
for disability awareness training and outreach work to be prioritised
for those responsible but especially the many new recruits now
doing this work.
QUESTION 5
Will the customer charter proposed by DWP ensure
that customers, Jobcentre Plus and contractors know what they
can expect of employment programmes?
5.1 The RNIB group supports the Claimant's
Charter as proposed by Citizens Advice, CPAG, Disability Alliance
and Gingerbread, and in particular, the creation of an Employment
Services Ombudsman to oversee and adjudicate on disputes between
individual claimants and either Jobcentre Plus or external employment
support providers, on issues that are not dealt with through formal
review mechanisms, ie over issues of levels and standards of services
provided. We feel that such an approach is important to protect
the position of potentially vulnerable claimants when engaging
with employment support services.
5.2 The RNIB group feels that an Employment
Services Ombudsman could adjudicate in situations in which a person
feels that they have not received the support that is needed,
or that they feel the support offered has been inappropriate or
ineffective, or they do not agree with the actions or directions
that are being imposed upon them. In such a way, we could ensure
good practice is developed and spread through such provision,
which in turn would assist Government in better understanding
the efficiency and efficacy of these multi-million pound contracts.
It could also help to rate the performance of contractors, as
those delivering high quality services would be far less likely
to be the subject of Ombudsman complaints or investigations.
QUESTION 6
Will contract management in the prime contractor
model be transparent and effective in monitoring quality throughout
the supply chain, and in maintaining a role for sub-contractors?
6.1 A commissioning strategy based upon
regionally let contracts for pan disability services doesn't favour
low prevalent impairment groups such as people with sight loss
that require a specific package of measures (that on many occasions
can be expensive) and access to support from an experienced provider.
6.2 Questioning Government on safeguards
for the fairness of the commissioning strategy in August this
year produced the following written response from the Minister
for Disabled People: "It is a high level strategy and, as
such relevant specific data was not available for the Impact Assessment
. We did however make it clear that as the strategy evolves we
would carry out further impact assessments as appropriate."
EVIDENCE OF
THE CURRENT
PROBLEM
1) Low levels of engagement and outcomes
for people with sight loss on Government programmes
6.3 New Deal for Disabled People
The data obtained from DWP on 15 September
2009 covered the period from July 2001 to May 2009 for
starters and up to February 2009 for job outcomes. It shows
that there were 326,370 individual starters during this period
of whom 4,730 had difficulty seeing, representing only 1.5%
of the total. There were 202,240 individual jobs of whom
2400 were achieved by people whose primary condition was
"difficulty seeing," representing only 1.12% of the
total. The conversion rate for the programme as a whole was 62%
as against only 51% for blind and partially sighted people.
6.4 Pathways to Work
In response to a request for data information
was sent by DWP for starts on the Pathways to Work programme up
to January 2009 and for job outcomes up to October 2008.
"The statistics released on 25 June
2009 for Jobcentre Plus Pathways to Work indicated that there
have been: 1,054,120 starts to Jobcentre Plus Pathways to
Work of which 3,640 were by customers whose main condition
was 'diseases of the eye and adnexa'.177,610 job entries
from Jobcentre Plus Pathways to Work of which 510 were by
customers whose main condition was 'diseases of the eye and adnexa'."
DWP 25/6/09
The statistics released on 7 July for Provider-Led
Plus Pathways to Work, which included programme starts up to January
2009 and job entries up to October 2008 indicated that
there have been:
132,150 starts to Provider-Led Pathways
to Work of which 870 were by customers whose main condition
was "diseases of the eye and adnexa". 11,210 job
entries from Provider-Led Plus Pathways to Work of which 70 were
by customers whose main condition was "diseases of the eye
and adnexa". DWP 11/08/09
The information supplied by DWP put the rate
at about 0.66/0.63 of those engaged/job entries by providers
as against 0.34/0.29 for Job Centre Plus pathways provision.
6.5 Our own preliminary analysis suggests
that the Government is achieving around a tenth of the levels
of engagement that might be expected.
6.6 Workstep
The latest data RNIB have obtained on Workstep
is based upon figures from December 2008. At the end of December
2008, there were 13,480 individuals in supported employment
on Workstep. Of these, 720 were recorded as their primary
condition being a visual impairment. Note that for 2,060 records,
no condition is recorded and it is possible that some of them
will have a visual impairment.
"For Workstep, we do have medical condition
information which includes the number who record their primary
condition as being 'visual impairment'. Note that we have no medical
information for approximately 20% of participants. Of the 13,700 who
were in supported employment at the end of 2008-09, 720 were
recorded as visual impairment being their primary condition."
DWP 11/08/09
6.7 Work Choice specialist disability employment
programme
The equalities impact assessment of the Welfare
Reform White Paper contains three paragraphs on SDEP (Work Choice)
and holds out no prospect of data on specific impairment groups
for two years or more, so in the interim there are no safeguards
on whether any group is failing to obtain fair treatment. The
Impact Assessment published in February 2009 identifies a
risk that, "a better resourced and reformed programme does
not target the support it provides at groups of disabled people
with the greatest need for the support it provides." However
the mitigation offered is simply that the new programme will be
less prescriptive and more flexible.
2) the findings of already published research
6.8 The Third Sector Partnerships in Public
Services Action Plan: echoes RNIB's own analysis. "Evidence
shows that commissioning specialist services at the local level
can sometimes limit the ability of specialist third sector providers
(along with specialist providers from other parts of the independent
sector) to bid for contracts. (paragraph 50, page 20)"
6.9 Welfare to Work reform: the third sector's
role—4 February 2009:
"There is strong evidence for the sector's
ability to engage the hardest to reach and it unlikely that the
Government's aspirations for reaching these people, such as those
in receipt of Incapacity Benefit will be achieved without the
strongest involvement of the sector. (page 3)"
CONCLUSION
6.10 The most vulnerable client groups are
having to engage (or not) in programmes driven by accountants
and focused upon hard outcomes. Combined with their "non
interference in the market", DWP allow Prime Contractors
to either actively or passively, promote their services to the
"easier end" of the market. Indeed, if a client is more
expensive to place into employment than another, why would they
choose more difficult clients—they are businesses driven
by shareholder profits.
6.11 It is our own experience that the commissioning
strategy is having a detrimental impact upon the levels of engagement
and consequent outcomes for vulnerable client groups eg people
with sight loss and the viability of those organisations who provide
specialist employment services to them.
RECOMMENDED POLICY
RESPONSE TO
REMEDYING THE
DISADVANTAGE FACED
BY CERTAIN
GROUPS
6.12 The marketplace for commissioning could
exist in two stages. In the first stage competitive tendering
would be the route to select prime-contracting consortia in each
region. In the second stage each successful consortia could be
required to negotiate for impairment specific support provision
with a preferred supplier. The preferred supplier could be established
by DWP based upon a quality assessment against the capabilities
framework.
6.13 This approach would have the advantage
of ensuring that the contracting process was based upon both price
and equality. It would also satisfy the requirement of the EU
procurement directive. The EU procurement directive (2004) states
that "Contracts should be awarded on the basis of objective
criteria which ensure compliance with the principles of transparency,
non-discrimination and equal treatment and which guarantee that
the tenders are assessed in conditions of effective competition".
(Paragraph 46, 2004/18).
6.14 The Government has on occasion departed
from a pan-disability approach in recognition of the need to introduce
specific measures to address the disadvantages faced by particular
impairment groups eg Public Service Agreement 16, the new Learning
Disability Employment Strategy etc. Clearly the Government is
interested in what works. Indeed the principle of contestability
enshrines this pragmatic approach. The former Secretary of State
James Purnell launched the Commissioning Strategy with a commitment,
"So we will be making sure that responsibilities are clearly
defined and we will exploit the benefits of contestability and
competition to drive quality, performance and value for money."
September 2009
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