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Vernon Coaker: That is a very real danger. The Minister will no doubt try to say that he will address that through the protocol because it will lay out what can and cannot be done. It would have been extremely helpful if Members had even a draft to consider. Without it, it is very difficult for us properly to consider and debate the new clause. Having said that, the new clause is extremely important.

4.15 pm

John Mann (Bassetlaw) (Lab): Has my hon. Friend considered the dilemma of a member of a political party being elected and the same police force being requested to investigate election irregularities of another party member—for example, a Member of Parliament who is re-standing in that police area—if the decision on whether the issue should be investigated by the police is marginal? Has he considered that dilemma that the Government are about to create?

Vernon Coaker: That is another interesting dilemma that might arise. No doubt there are many other such examples in which we could point out the dangers.

I cannot stress enough how important the police feel this is and how important I think it is. I am sure that we will all listen to the Minister when he responds not only to the lead new clause but to the amendment tabled by his hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood.

Mark Reckless: I should first declare an interest as a member of the Kent police authority. I thank the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) for his testimonial to my work in that role, which—who knows?—might find its way into one of my election leaflets.

We have heard about the protocol—let us call it that, so that we use common language—and I note that the shadow Minister refers to operational responsibility in the new clause. It would be great to have a clearly agreed definition for operational independence or responsibility as it is, but it is enormously difficult to do that. ACPO’s position has changed on that, which does not necessarily assist us. The Home Affairs Committee visited ACPO two days ago, and it seems that the draft protocol is bouncing between it and the Home Office. ACPO had no objection to the draft being shared with the Committee when we asked for it. Will the Minister give the Committee sight of the protocol, even if it is still an early draft?

Amendment 149 is a probing amendment, because it is very important to get the views of the House and of the Minister on the record. I have tried to emphasise a point that arose from the 1962 royal commission, which is that there is an important distinction, as I put it in the amendment, that the elected commissioner

“shall have no involvement in decisions with respect to individual investigations and arrests.”

That is an important constitutional protection. The Minister spoke quite strongly on that both on Second Reading and in evidence to the Home Affairs Committee. I am slightly concerned that one remark he made in the Committee, regarding the potential for too strict an interpretation of what Lord Denning said in 1968, should not be taken out of context. The context, as the Home Secretary said on Monday, is that we anticipate that it will be the elected commissioner who is in charge, as with the Mayor of London.

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The Minister was very clear on Second Reading and when he gave evidence to the Committee on the role and importance of the elected commissioners and that what we are doing is rebalancing the tripartite system, moving from a police authority leg that has traditionally been too weak and bolstering the role of the democratic and local element with the directly elected commissioner.

I raised that point with the Minister in the Committee on 27 July last year, and asked whether there was any possibility of an incompatibility between what we intended with the legislation and what Lord Denning said in ex parte Blackburn in 1968. The Minister’s reply was important. He said:

“It is often stated, quoting Lord Denning's dictum that the police should be answerable to the law and the law alone. I think that is right in the sense of when they are exercising their powers of arrest and so on that that should not be subject to any kind of political interference. We would all agree about that but, clearly, somebody has to set the police budget and the strategic direction of the police, so there has to be accountability to someone, and our premise is that that should no longer be to the centre, to a faceless bureaucrat, to the Home Secretary; it should instead be to local people through the election of the police and crime commissioner.”

That is what we intend to achieve with the Bill, and it is a distinction that is consistent with what we saw back in the 1962 royal commission.

As the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) knows, the Select Committee received some helpful legal advice on this matter that read:

“This part of Lord Denning’s judgment is not strictly binding as it went beyond the range of issues that had to be decided in that case, and is therefore obiter.”

We then had an assessment from our legal advisers on a leading academic text in this area by Richard Clayton QC and Hugh Tomlinson QC, whose conclusion on Lord Denning’s judgment was:

“The doctrine is an exorbitant one and its legal foundations are very slight”.

I had a look at that leading text and some of the academic debate on the difficulty of defining operational independence and what it was considered to mean. Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson referred to section 6(1) of the Police Act 1996, which the Bill carries over, and wrote that it

“appears to create a specific sphere of responsibility for the police authority”.

They go on to state that section 10(1), which deals with the direction and control of the chief constable, is subject to that provision, and

“only covers immediate operational direction and control but does not bear on the question of the extent to which the chief constable is under supervision of the police authority.”

The Committee went into the academic literature in more detail. We heard from Rick Muir, from the Institute for Public Policy Research, who has done much work—from the left—on this key issue. He agreed with me when I asked whether there was a distinction

“between the individual cases, where clearly the police should have independence in terms of arrest and investigation in those individual cases, and the broader spectrum of setting priorities, determining where budgets are spent and setting policy in general, which is properly the field of elected politicians”.

He observed that unfortunately confusion had arisen because wrongly there had been a

“tendency of chief constables to take Denning to mean that they are in charge of strategy”.

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We do not have before us this protocol that the hon. Member for Gedling referred to, but the Committee was able to draw out some of the key issues.

My amendment emphasises the position in 1962. Unfortunately, when Denning made his judgment, he did not have the advantage of being able to refer to proceedings in the House. Judges have been able to do that only since Pepper v. Hart in, I think, 1994. The key 1962 royal commission, which set the consensus on operational independence, was summarised by the legal advisers in a report to the Committee. They wrote:

“The Royal Commission on Police emphasised the need for impartiality and operational independence of the police in relation to ‘quasi-judicial’ decisions”.

The royal commission included in those quasi-judicial decisions

“inquiries with regard to suspected offences, the arrest of persons and the decision to prosecute,”

adding:

“In matters of this kind it is clearly in the public interest that a police officer should be answerable only to his superiors in the force and, to the extent that a matter may come before them, to the courts. His impartiality would be jeopardised, and public confidence in it shaken, if in this field he were to be made the servant of too local a body.”

The commission said in respect of other duties:

“It cannot in our view be said that”

they

“require the complete immunity from external influence that is generally acknowledged to be necessary in regard to the enforcement of the law in particular cases.”

As our legal advisers point out, those other duties include

“general policies in regard to law enforcement…the disposition of his force, the concentration of his resources on any particular type of crime or area, the manner in which he handles political demonstrations or processions”

or

“his policy in enforcing the traffic laws and…dealing with parked vehicles”.

That clear distinction has therefore run all the way through, from the royal commission in 1962 to the evidence that the Home Affairs Committee has taken. That is what I am trying to emphasise with my amendment 149; indeed, it is also what the Minister emphasised when he appeared before the Committee. I would therefore be grateful if he confirmed that he does not resile from any of those remarks.

The other important point to make about Denning’s judgment in 1968 is that it related not to what a police authority could do in terms of a chief constable, but to what a single individual, Mr Blackburn, who as a publicly spirited gentleman came to court with a judicial review, could do. The question was about the extent to which he as an individual could require the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to implement policing in a particular operational manner. That distinction is made clear by further material, including the 1988 case of Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, in which it was clearly drawn. In that case, Lord Templeman said:

“The question for determination in this appeal is whether an action for damages is an appropriate vehicle for investigating the efficiency of a police force.”

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He concluded:

“A police force serves the public, and the elected representatives of the public must ensure that the public get the police force they deserve.”

It is clearly right that there can be no interference in individual investigations or arrests, but it is important to look at the issue from both sides.

Steve McCabe: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for bringing to the House’s attention what I think is a dilemma that the Minister has created. As I have been listening to the hon. Gentleman, I have been reflecting on what would have happened if we had had police and crime commissioners at the time of the Stephen Lawrence murder and the subsequent inquiry. Does he think that it would have been possible for the police and crime commissioner to fulfil the requirements of both clause 1(8)(g) and his amendment 149?

Mark Reckless: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could cite that provision, which I do not have to hand.

Steve McCabe: I apologise. Clause 1(8)(g) places a responsibility on the police and crime commissioner to

“hold the chief constable to account”

for

“the exercise of duties relating to equality and diversity that are imposed on the chief constable by any enactment.”

In particular, I am thinking of what came out of the Lawrence inquiry.

Mark Reckless: Yes, absolutely. What we saw in that instance was a failure in the operational direction of the Metropolitan police. Rather than waiting years and years for an inquiry to make the Metropolitan police have appropriate respect for diversity and follow up on such crimes in the way it should, a directly elected commissioner with sufficient authority could have pressed for that much more quickly. Indeed, that is one area where we would be looking for clear, elected oversight and guidance for the police.

4.30 pm

Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con): On the point that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) just made, I note that my hon. Friend’s amendment states that

“the police and crime commissioner shall have no involvement in decisions with respect to individual investigations”.

If there were a high-profile murder, would my hon. Friend think it appropriate for the commissioner to say to a chief constable, “I think you should put more resource into that investigation. What you are doing now is not sufficient and there is real community concern”? Or is my hon. Friend saying that that would be inappropriate?

Mark Reckless: That is a very good example, which helps to elucidate the point. It would not be appropriate for the elected commissioner to say, “On this particular individual investigation I would like fewer”—or more—“police”, or, “You should investigate it in this way rather than that.” We do not look to the elected commissioners to do that, but I see a strong role for them in ensuring that justice is colour blind and that the police do not make assumptions about a witness or potential suspect on the basis of ethnicity or any other

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inappropriate basis. We have seen strong progress by the police in that area, but, with the Macpherson inquiry and the way in which some measures have been rolled out, there has not necessarily been the sensitivity that there might have been. The elected commissioner will have a relationship with the wider electorate, however, so they will sometimes be in a position to lead the police in particular areas regarding social attitudes.

I have huge respect for the police, given my work with them in Kent, but there are particular traditions in policing and the work force are made up in a particular way. Those things have changed, with a very welcome and greater number of women now working as police officers, and there has been a significant improvement in black and minority ethnic representation. In Kent, we had the first black chief constable in Mike Fuller, who did an extraordinary job of engaging with the public and involving them closely with the work of Kent police. The police have a significantly smaller proportion of graduates, although it is higher than it was, and the elected commissioner will be able to lead in those areas. I look to him to do so.

I emphasise to the House that the distinction I draw, going back to the 1962 royal commission at least, works both ways, and I am very concerned about budget setting, priorities and some of the management of public protest. My hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Mr Burley) asked some probing questions of various witnesses, but the question of whether there should be a presumption that police officers will travel in pairs, and the extent to which officers might be on bicycles, on foot or in cars, are very properly areas for elected oversight, and inevitably political decisions. If we do draw that distinction, the Bill will help chief constables.

Vernon Coaker: May I be clear about what the hon. Gentleman just said? Did he say that an elected individual should be able to try to influence the chief constable in terms of patrolling in pairs, individually or whatever, and in terms of the other examples he used? Or did he say that he thought it should be open to the police and crime commissioner to direct the chief constable on those matters?

Mark Reckless: In almost all those areas, there will invariably be agreement. There is give and take, and that has been my experience on a police authority. I am sure that in most instances it will apply to the elected commissioner and to the chief constable. I am not convinced that “direct” is the right word, but there might be public concern, as there was a few years ago in my area, about the police spending too much time in cars and not being available on the beat. Indeed, I have often heard it said that two officers who go out on the beat together will naturally tend to talk and enter into exchanges with each other, whereas one police officer on patrol might have a greater tendency to engage with the public.

I think that we would look to elected commissioners to reflect the public view, although I would not necessarily be comfortable with that in individual instances. It would be right for the elected commissioner to say, “Previously we’ve had this presumption that officers should patrol in pairs, but I think in future the presumption should be that where possible officers patrol individually,” and I would expect the chief constable to give effect to

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that. However, if there were issues regarding safety, I would look to the chief constable to have those considered appropriately within the discussion.

I do not agree with the view of ACPO, nor do Conservative Members or members of the Committee necessarily accept it, that police officers operate in a sort of political vacuum where they can, without reference to the elected authority, make the decision themselves. I think that people will campaign on these issues to become the elected police and crime commissioner. In many respects, it is entirely proper that the chief constable should then implement proposals with a democratic mandate behind them, as in the case of the Metropolitan police service following what Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, said about a stronger emphasis on knife crime and having more officers on public transport, particularly buses. The Metropolitan police did then implement that, and that is perfectly proper.

I should emphasise that this point goes both ways. We need to ensure that chief constables recognise the appropriate and entirely proper role of the elected commissioner in making such decisions, but there is also the other side of the coin. My experience on a police authority is that I often get asked about operational matters. A sergeant may ask me whether I thought that a particular police community support officer should be deployed from one area to another, or a constable may ask me whether I am happy about how they have dealt with a particular offence, or whether I think that a particular individual should be charged or dealt with in a certain way. It has then been incumbent on me, as a member of the police authority, to say, “Hang on a minute, this is not a proper area for an elected politician to be determining what happens within the police.” I have always been very clear about that, and when there has been an issue that is a shade of grey I have referred it to our excellent area commander in Medway, Steve Corbishley. Such sensitive issues need to be dealt with at that higher level. One cannot necessarily expect every constable, sergeant or even inspector to be totally au fait with where this line should be drawn. I am echoing the emphasis that the royal commission, and the Minister in Committee, put on this complete protection in relation to individual investigation and arrest. That is an important safeguard, and it should work both ways.

The Bill uses the phrase “have regard to” in relation to the police panel as against the commissioner for the budget, the commissioner in respect of a strategic policing objective, and the chief constable’s need to have regard to the policing plan determined by the Minister. We may be firing the starting gun for litigation, but if so, I hope that Members, particularly the Minister, have given a clear steer to the courts as to the role that we see elected commissioners having and the need to rebalance the tripartite relationship. Lord Hoffmann, in the case of Regina v. Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd, said that, even under the current arrangements, where regard must be had to the policing plan, the chief constable’s discretion was therefore “subject” to the statutory plan. Together with the roles of the chief constable and the Home Office, we have a rebalancing of the tripartite system. We are bolstering the democratic local element by having direct election, and that should provide a far stronger voice for the public in setting policing policy and priorities.

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John Mann: I note the volume of Members taking part in the debate: I think attendance is under 3%. Doubtless everyone has better things to do. I note that fact because at some stage—not today—quorums will have to be challenged in the House if Members, not least on the Government side, do not turn up to promote the Bills that they propose.

I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) on his excellent approach to trying to dismantle the Bill, and I fully support new clause 5. Let me give an additional reason why it is appropriate for the House to vote for the new clause. When this fragile coalition collapses, which will no doubt happen soon after the May elections, if this Bill has reached Royal Assent by then, rather than wasting primary legislative time immediately, my hon. Friend could use a statutory instrument to remove the most objectionable parts of the legislation, which were most eloquently described by the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless). He wishes to direct where police resources go and to make operational decisions, such as those, as he said, on the question of whether policing should be single or double. Those are fundamental operational decisions, and it is quite extraordinary that anyone could oppose the new clause, which seeks to rectify the damage that such a loss of operational independence will cause.

This is an outrage. My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling and I come under the same police authority in Nottinghamshire, and I do not know whether he has found a single member of the Nottinghamshire police who supports the idea that an elected politician with such powers should be above them directing their work, as the Government propose. In my experience, there is great resentment about what the Government are doing to the police, including the idea that a politician should be elected to do that job, on whatever manifesto. That person might come from the mainstream parties, might be a maverick independent or might be a former senior police officer who has perhaps been forced out of the police for reasons that they choose not to declare. There are many different motives why someone might wish to stand for such a position, but when there is an election, the one certainty is that somebody will be elected. We have seen this with elected mayors: however low the turnout, somebody is elected and sometimes the population is rather aghast at what they have ended up with as a result of their inaction, or their inability or refusal to vote.

It is bad enough when such things happen in local authorities, but to put such a person—an elected politician, playing to the gallery for election and re-election—in charge of operational policing matters is an outrage. This modest but well-written new clause at least offers some opportunity to pull that back. Of course, it could go further. If I were writing the memorandum of understanding, I would ensure that some of the other dangers to British policing that are being and have been brought in by this reckless Government were also rectified. There would also be an opportunity to build in something to stop the use of regulation A19, whereby experienced police officers—including those in my area—are refused the opportunity to continue in policing with the experience and training that they have built up, which the taxpayer has paid for. They want to stay on, doing a job and earning a decent living serving the public, but they have been removed by this Government. Police in my area are also very angry about police pensions.

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The dangers to police pensions, and to the basis on which people join and remain with the police, which has been undermined by this rotten Government, could be rectified by some wisdom in a memorandum of understanding or in the statutory instrument behind it, or could be dealt with by emergency legislation on day one when this fragile coalition collapses.

Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con): It is always interesting to hear the hon. Gentleman scrutinise a Bill. He is speaking on behalf of the three Back-Bench Members of Her Majesty’s Opposition who are present. However, has he asked the people of Bassetlaw properly whether they want to have a stake in the policing in their area, to hold the police to account and to determine the priorities for policing? Is he not being presumptuous in assuming that he knows exactly what they want before there is a properly elected commissioner?

4.45 pm

John Mann: I never like to be presumptuous. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman knows, I constantly communicate with the people of Bassetlaw about their views. However, one has to prioritise. My question to them at the moment, which they are answering in their thousands, day in, day out—I am sure that there will be more answers by the end of tonight—is whether they agree with the 30% cut in police and fire services that his Government, backed by the Liberals, are bringing in. That is an even bigger danger to their standard of living and quality of life, and to the security and safety of businesses, pensioners, young people, and the whole population in my area.

I assure the hon. Gentleman that I have had no representations from anybody asking for another elected politician. The Government have prided themselves on getting rid of 50 MPs. Looking at the green Benches today, it appears that they might already have got rid of a random assortment of 50 MPs. Those MPs will be replaced by about 44 new politicians. It is almost a job swap. This is costing the taxpayer money. More crucially, it is diverting us away from the priorities. I know that Members from all parts of the House, and especially the Liberals, will want to vote for this excellent new clause, because it gives us the opportunity to clarify that we will not have meddling by politicians in any area of police operations. I cited the dangers of that in my earlier intervention.

The Government have given us statistics that show that across the country, cases about elections and petitions of one kind or another have been taken to the police, including by political parties. In the county of Nottinghamshire such cases have been taken by political parties, including by the Conservative party. I think that that was a bit spurious and a waste of police time, but the party was entitled to do it. If politicians or their backers are doing deals with one party or another, in the traditional way, to become the candidate for this new elected position, and they are also using the police in making allegations about elections—be they parliamentary, local or even potentially for police commissioners—how will that be dealt with? How will there be impartiality when there is one elected person at the very top? That is a fundamental flaw in the Bill and in the Government’s logic.

There will of course be an opportunity—I will not speak to this point now, Mr Deputy Speaker—to reject this rotten Bill tomorrow at 6 o’clock, or perhaps even

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earlier. In the meantime, any logical, rational, law-and-order politician in this House will back the excellent and considered new clause moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling, because it will amend the Bill in a way that provides some protection. The people in my area want effective policing that is run by the police, and they want the police to be accountable.

I do not know whether as a boy the Minister liked to play with Meccano or Lego, but I can see that he has built up the idea that it is his job to meddle, to take apart and to rebuild. He has taken that forward into adult life, and when it comes to the police force, because he is the Police Minister he has to do something to demonstrate that he is worth his money.

The Minister could tell the police, “Here are the resources I’ve battled with the Treasury to get you. Go out there, catch criminals and give the general public confidence in security and safety. Get on with your job and do a good job, and we will hold you accountable to ensure that you do.” Oh, no. He cannot do that. Instead, he has to meddle and try to rebuild everything, just as the Government are doing with schools and the health service. The excellent new clause 5 would at least pull the Government back from that, so I recommend it to the House, and I trust that all Members will vote for it.

Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD): It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann), who is clearly a grand master when it comes to playing to the gallery. I must say, I was rather worried for his health, or indeed his sanity. I wonder whether he actually believes his doom-mongering vision of the world, but he is certainly very effective at getting across his concerns. He will be very disappointed about this, but I suggest that he should not hold his breath while he waits for the coalition to collapse, because 2015 is a long way away.

I now turn to the new clause and the amendments. It is clearly welcome that the protocol, or the memorandum of understanding, is being discussed and drawn up.

Vernon Coaker: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we should have a draft of that to consider, even if it is a draft of a draft? It really is not good enough that it will be available to the House of Lords to consider without our having had it in front of us.

Tom Brake: I think that the Minister and I would probably agree that in an ideal world it would have been useful to have a draft, but I do not think it is essential. I am sure that the House of Lords will deal with the matter in the professional way that we would expect.

It is interesting to note that initially senior officers had strong reservations about whether they wanted a protocol, so a degree of flexibility will be needed. I have some sympathy with amendment 149, but I suspect that the Minister will make it clear that there is every expectation that the police and crime commissioners will have no involvement in decisions on individual investigations and arrests. That will be a clear requirement.

The one point that may require clarification is what would happen in a case that actually involved the police and crime commissioner. For instance, if they had been assaulted, would the amendment prevent them from taking a decision about whether charges should be pressed? I do not know whether the hon. Member for

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Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) considered that in tabling the amendment, and if he has a response I would be very happy for him to intervene on me at this point. If he is not going to, the Minister might want to pick up on that point when he responds.

In an ideal world we would have been considering a draft protocol, but clearly a lot of work on it is still going on. I am sure that means that when it is put into the public domain, it will be strong and satisfy Members. As I said, I understand where the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood is coming from on amendment 149, but it is clear that there will be no expectation whatever that the commissioners will get involved in individual decisions. One would expect that the police and crime panels would have forceful things to say if they did so.

Nick Herbert: First, I confirm again to the House something that has been confirmed on a number of occasions: the Bill does not change the legal position that the direction and control of forces remains with the chief constable. Therefore, the basis of the legal relationship between police authorities and chief constables is maintained in the direction of control in the Bill.

Nevertheless, there is concern about ensuring the fundamental principle of the operational independence of chief constables, which we debated at considerable length in Committee. As we discussed at some length, there is no statutory definition of operational independence, and indeed, there is general agreement that it would be unwise to attempt such a definition. The matter has been considered on a number of occasions by the courts—my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) spoke of one key case. However, ACPO, which is concerned to ensure that the operational independence of chief officers is not in any way threatened, has said that it does not wish us to try to define it in law.

The debate on the proper role of the chief constable and the proper role of the local body that holds them to account will continue—as it does between police authorities and chief officers and others, with the matter sometimes ending up in court. That is part of what Sir Hugh Orde, the ACPO president, described—not pejoratively—as the tension that should exist in the relationship. However, as I said in Committee, to some extent, we are talking about shades of grey.

Mark Reckless: Is not one limitation of existing case law that an individual litigant—or a company such as International Trader’s Ferry—trying to get the chief constable to do something is different from the relationship that the Minister describes between the police authority and its statutory powers and the chief constable? The Home Affairs Committee heard from witnesses who felt that there is significant scope within the existing regime for police authorities to be more assertive in setting policy—it just happens that they have not done so.

Nick Herbert: My hon. Friend’s point is well made. However, the police and crime commissioner, who will have a mandate, could be more assertive. That is the basis and thrust of the chief constables’ concerns. I cited the example of London. The Mayor of London stood on a manifesto of placing uniformed officers on public transport and tackling knife crime. Whether that cut across the operational independence of the Met has been debated but not resolved, but it is significant that

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those things have happened, and the Metropolitan police have willingly implemented them. We must accept that, to some extent, there are areas of negotiation and shades of grey, which is why all parties agree that it would be a mistake to try to define in statute the notion of operational independence.

However, equally, we are all agreed—as I indicated on Second Reading, the Government were already minded to do this—on drawing up a protocol, as the Home Affairs Committee recommended, to try to set out the precise roles of the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable in the new arrangements, and to broaden the protocol to cover the role of the police and crime panel, given that that is new, and the role of the Home Secretary. It is worth stating that the Government’s intention in introducing that reform is not to abandon the tripartite, but to rebalance it, because we feel that it has been too distorted in the past, particularly in relation to the accrual of power by the centre and the Home Secretary.

Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC): Can the Minister enlighten us as to what would happen if someone breached the protocol?

Nick Herbert: May I come to that in a moment? I will address the status of the document shortly.

As I mentioned earlier, the Home Office has set up a transition board to discuss how the present system will migrate to the new one. One of the issues that we are discussing is the protocol; that work has begun. ACPO has nominated Chief Constable Adrian Lee of Northamptonshire police to be its representative. He will sit on a working party, alongside Home Office officials and representatives from other organisations including the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Police Authority Chief Executives, to discuss the issue. Work is therefore ongoing.

5 pm

I have to say to the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) that it was never going to be possible to produce a draft document in time for Report, and he knows that I never indicated that it would be. However, I have said that we will attempt to produce one in time for it to be considered in the other place. I hope that he will appreciate that that is being done with the best of intentions and at the fastest possible pace, given the complexity of the issue. It is worth reflecting on the fact that a similar protocol that was proposed in Northern Ireland by the Patten commission in 2004 was discussed over several years and has still not been put in place. That is partly because Patten recommended that the concept involved should be one of operational responsibility, and not independence. I note that the hon. Gentleman has chosen to use the words “operational responsibility” in his new clause. We are not using them ourselves, however; we are using “operational independence”. The work is ongoing, and it is our intention to try to produce something for the Lords. I am sorry that we have not had an opportunity to look at a draft here, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that the work is under way.

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I want to turn to the status of the document. New clause 5 seeks to set out the memorandum of understanding in secondary legislation. The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) asked what the consequences would be of not following the protocol. We envisage that this will be an extra-statutory document, and that it will be issued in the form of guidance. I am certainly willing to consider what the legal status of the document should be, and whether it should have some kind of statutory imprimatur, but we really need to see what it looks like first. We need to understand how granular it will be, and whether that would effectively define operational independence in a way that, so far, everyone has made it clear we should not so define it. I reassure the hon. Member for Gedling, however, that this matter should be considered, and I have no doubt that the other place will have a view on it.

Mr Llwyd: I thank the Minister for replying to my question in such short order, and in as much detail as he could muster. If he is saying that some form of legislative vehicle might encompass the protocol, would not regulation by statutory instrument be the obvious answer?

Nick Herbert: I repeat that we do not envisage this being a statutory document. It was originally called a memorandum of understanding by the Select Committee, and I do not think that the Committee’s recommendation envisaged it being a statutory document. Its purpose is to clarify the roles and responsibilities in law. In other words, it will be seeking not to set law but to explain what the law is. The danger is that we will be drawn into a means of setting law, when all the parties involved have so far said that we should not seek to define operational independence by statute. They have said that we should leave the matter to the understanding of the courts and the existing case law.

Mark Reckless: Will the Minister agree to supply the document, at least in draft form, to the Home Affairs Committee as well as to the House of Lords? The Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office are negotiating, but should not the negotiations be for the tripartite system, although we do not yet have the elected commissioners in place?

Nick Herbert: First, the Association of Police Authorities is certainly involved in the drafting; it is part of the group discussing the matter. I agree that negotiations must reflect the tripartite system, and I want to reassure my hon. Friend about that. As to supplying the draft to the Home Affairs Committee, I am happy to agree. Furthermore, if my hon. Friend would like to meet me and officials to discuss it further, I think it would assist our deliberations. I would like to organise that as soon as possible, bearing in mind the considerable experience that my hon. Friend brings as a member of a police authority with a particular view.

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s purpose in proposing amendment 149, according to which

“the police and crime commissioner shall have no involvement”

in deciding whether a person is investigated or directed. In fact, that is the existing common law principle and the courts have consistently stated that the Executive must not interfere in operational law enforcement decisions, so there is no need for that to be written expressly in the Bill.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 419

I hope that the hon. Member for Gedling will accept the good faith with which I agreed with the recommendation of the Home Affairs Select Committee. I hope he will acknowledge that I have listened to the Association of Chief Police Officers and others who have expressed concern about operational independence; restated that we do not seek to cut across that principle; and confirmed that we will bring the draft document before Parliament at the earliest possible opportunity. I appreciate that he would have liked to see it sooner, but I hope he acknowledges the very considerable steps we have taken in this regard.

Vernon Coaker: Before I comment on the Minister’s remarks, I would like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) for his support on the issue of the necessity for this memorandum of understanding. It was interesting that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) commented on what was said by the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless)—that there was an expectation of no involvement. That is part of the problem. The Minister is right to say that the common law position precludes interference, but I am trying to deal with what will happen when the new model comes into effect, particularly the concern that it will change the parameters within which the policing model works.

Mark Tami: Given the sort of person who is going to be elected to the panels, might it not lead to an adversarial relationship almost from day one? Indeed, the person might have stood on a platform in order to take on the chief constable for something he had done.

Vernon Coaker: That is exactly the point. Concerns have rightly been raised about who will be elected and the mandate and manifesto on which they are elected, and particularly about the possibility of its being imposed on the chief constable. Those are very real concerns. The Minister knows that there is a general acceptance of trying not to define in statute too rigidly. I say sincerely that I appreciate he is acting in good faith. I did not say that he had promised to bring the matter before us on Report. My expectation was that he might have been able to do so, but he did not say that and I know that he has acted in good faith.

The Minister seems to have moved again in respect of this new clause. To be fair, it shows the difficulty of trying to navigate through this area, which is one of the most important parts of the Bill. None the less, I noted that the Minister said that he “may” decide that it is necessary to include a statutory legislative provision on which to base the protocol. I agree with the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Lywyd): it is essential for the Bill to contain a requirement with regard to the protocol.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The House divided:

Ayes 216, Noes 311.

Division No. 243]

[5.10 pm

AYES

Abbott, Ms Diane

Abrahams, Debbie

Ainsworth, rh Mr Bob

Alexander, rh Mr Douglas

Alexander, Heidi

Ali, Rushanara

Allen, Mr Graham

Bain, Mr William

Balls, rh Ed

Banks, Gordon

Barron, rh Mr Kevin

Bayley, Hugh

Beckett, rh Margaret

Begg, Dame Anne

Bell, Sir Stuart

Benn, rh Hilary

Berger, Luciana

Betts, Mr Clive

Blackman-Woods, Roberta

Blears, rh Hazel

Blenkinsop, Tom

Blomfield, Paul

Blunkett, rh Mr David

Bradshaw, rh Mr Ben

Brennan, Kevin

Brown, rh Mr Gordon

Brown, rh Mr Nicholas

Bryant, Chris

Buck, Ms Karen

Burnham, rh Andy

Byrne, rh Mr Liam

Campbell, Mr Alan

Campbell, Mr Ronnie

Caton, Martin

Chapman, Mrs Jenny

Clarke, rh Mr Tom

Clwyd, rh Ann

Coaker, Vernon

Coffey, Ann

Cooper, Rosie

Cooper, rh Yvette

Corbyn, Jeremy

Crausby, Mr David

Creasy, Stella

Cruddas, Jon

Cryer, John

Cunningham, Alex

Cunningham, Mr Jim

Cunningham, Tony

Curran, Margaret

Dakin, Nic

Danczuk, Simon

Darling, rh Mr Alistair

David, Mr Wayne

Davidson, Mr Ian

Davies, Geraint

De Piero, Gloria

Dobbin, Jim

Dobson, rh Frank

Docherty, Thomas

Donaldson, rh Mr Jeffrey M.

Doran, Mr Frank

Dowd, Jim

Doyle, Gemma

Dromey, Jack

Durkan, Mark

Eagle, Ms Angela

Edwards, Jonathan

Efford, Clive

Elliott, Julie

Ellman, Mrs Louise

Evans, Chris

Farrelly, Paul

Field, rh Mr Frank

Fitzpatrick, Jim

Flello, Robert

Flynn, Paul

Fovargue, Yvonne

Gapes, Mike

Gilmore, Sheila

Glass, Pat

Glindon, Mrs Mary

Godsiff, Mr Roger

Goggins, rh Paul

Greatrex, Tom

Green, Kate

Greenwood, Lilian

Griffith, Nia

Gwynne, Andrew

Hain, rh Mr Peter

Hamilton, Mr David

Hanson, rh Mr David

Harris, Mr Tom

Havard, Mr Dai

Hendrick, Mark

Hepburn, Mr Stephen

Hermon, Lady

Heyes, David

Hillier, Meg

Hilling, Julie

Hodge, rh Margaret

Hodgson, Mrs Sharon

Hoey, Kate

Hood, Mr Jim

Hopkins, Kelvin

Hunt, Tristram

Irranca-Davies, Huw

Jackson, Glenda

Jarvis, Dan

Johnson, rh Alan

Johnson, Diana

Jones, Graham

Jones, Helen

Jones, Mr Kevan

Jones, Susan Elan

Joyce, Eric

Kaufman, rh Sir Gerald

Keeley, Barbara

Kendall, Liz

Khan, rh Sadiq

Lammy, rh Mr David

Lavery, Ian

Lazarowicz, Mark

Leslie, Chris

Lewis, Mr Ivan

Lloyd, Tony

Llwyd, rh Mr Elfyn

Love, Mr Andrew

Lucas, Caroline

Lucas, Ian

Mactaggart, Fiona

Mahmood, Shabana

Mann, John

Marsden, Mr Gordon

McCabe, Steve

McCann, Mr Michael

McCarthy, Kerry

McClymont, Gregg

McDonnell, John

McGovern, Alison

McGuire, rh Mrs Anne

McKechin, Ann

Meacher, rh Mr Michael

Mearns, Ian

Miliband, rh David

Miller, Andrew

Mitchell, Austin

Moon, Mrs Madeleine

Morden, Jessica

Morrice, Graeme

(Livingston)

Morris, Grahame M.

(Easington)

Mudie, Mr George

Munn, Meg

Murphy, rh Mr Jim

Murphy, rh Paul

Murray, Ian

Nandy, Lisa

Nash, Pamela

Onwurah, Chi

Osborne, Sandra

Owen, Albert

Pearce, Teresa

Perkins, Toby

Phillipson, Bridget

Pound, Stephen

Qureshi, Yasmin

Raynsford, rh Mr Nick

Reed, Mr Jamie

Reeves, Rachel

Reynolds, Emma

Riordan, Mrs Linda

Robertson, John

Robinson, Mr Geoffrey

Rotheram, Steve

Roy, Mr Frank

Roy, Lindsay

Ruane, Chris

Ruddock, rh Joan

Sarwar, Anas

Seabeck, Alison

Shannon, Jim

Sharma, Mr Virendra

Sheerman, Mr Barry

Sheridan, Jim

Shuker, Gavin

Skinner, Mr Dennis

Smith, rh Mr Andrew

Smith, Angela

Smith, Nick

Smith, Owen

Spellar, rh Mr John

Straw, rh Mr Jack

Stringer, Graham

Stuart, Ms Gisela

Sutcliffe, Mr Gerry

Tami, Mark

Thomas, Mr Gareth

Thornberry, Emily

Timms, rh Stephen

Trickett, Jon

Turner, Karl

Twigg, Derek

Umunna, Mr Chuka

Vaz, Valerie

Walley, Joan

Watts, Mr Dave

Wicks, rh Malcolm

Williams, Hywel

Williamson, Chris

Wilson, Phil

Winterton, rh Ms Rosie

Wood, Mike

Woodcock, John

Woodward, rh Mr Shaun

Wright, David

Wright, Mr Iain

Tellers for the Ayes:

Jonathan Reynolds and

Mr David Anderson

NOES

Adams, Nigel

Afriyie, Adam

Aldous, Peter

Amess, Mr David

Andrew, Stuart

Arbuthnot, rh Mr James

Bacon, Mr Richard

Baker, Norman

Baker, Steve

Baldry, Tony

Baldwin, Harriett

Barclay, Stephen

Baron, Mr John

Barwell, Gavin

Bebb, Guto

Beith, rh Sir Alan

Bellingham, Mr Henry

Berry, Jake

Binley, Mr Brian

Blackman, Bob

Blackwood, Nicola

Blunt, Mr Crispin

Boles, Nick

Bone, Mr Peter

Bottomley, Sir Peter

Bradley, Karen

Brady, Mr Graham

Brake, Tom

Bray, Angie

Brazier, Mr Julian

Bridgen, Andrew

Brine, Mr Steve

Brokenshire, James

Brooke, Annette

Bruce, Fiona

Bruce, rh Malcolm

Buckland, Mr Robert

Burley, Mr Aidan

Burns, Conor

Burns, rh Mr Simon

Burrowes, Mr David

Burt, Alistair

Burt, Lorely

Byles, Dan

Cairns, Alun

Carmichael, rh Mr Alistair

Carmichael, Neil

Carswell, Mr Douglas

Cash, Mr William

Chishti, Rehman

Clark, rh Greg

Clarke, rh Mr Kenneth

Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey

Coffey, Dr Thérèse

Collins, Damian

Colvile, Oliver

Cox, Mr Geoffrey

Crabb, Stephen

Crockart, Mike

Crouch, Tracey

Davies, David T. C.

(Monmouth)

Davies, Glyn

Davies, Philip

Davis, rh Mr David

de Bois, Nick

Dinenage, Caroline

Djanogly, Mr Jonathan

Dodds, rh Mr Nigel

Dorrell, rh Mr Stephen

Dorries, Nadine

Doyle-Price, Jackie

Drax, Richard

Duddridge, James

Duncan, rh Mr Alan

Duncan Smith, rh Mr Iain

Dunne, Mr Philip

Ellis, Michael

Ellison, Jane

Ellwood, Mr Tobias

Elphicke, Charlie

Eustice, George

Evans, Graham

Evans, Jonathan

Evennett, Mr David

Fabricant, Michael

Fallon, Michael

Farron, Tim

Featherstone, Lynne

Field, Mr Mark

Foster, rh Mr Don

Fox, rh Dr Liam

Francois, rh Mr Mark

Freeman, George

Freer, Mike

Fullbrook, Lorraine

Fuller, Richard

Gale, Mr Roger

Garnier, Mr Edward

Garnier, Mark

Gauke, Mr David

Gibb, Mr Nick

Gilbert, Stephen

Glen, John

Goldsmith, Zac

Goodwill, Mr Robert

Gove, rh Michael

Graham, Richard

Grant, Mrs Helen

Grayling, rh Chris

Green, Damian

Greening, Justine

Grieve, rh Mr Dominic

Griffiths, Andrew

Gummer, Ben

Gyimah, Mr Sam

Halfon, Robert

Hames, Duncan

Hammond, Stephen

Hancock, Matthew

Hancock, Mr Mike

Hands, Greg

Harper, Mr Mark

Harrington, Richard

Harris, Rebecca

Hart, Simon

Haselhurst, rh Sir Alan

Hayes, Mr John

Heald, Mr Oliver

Heath, Mr David

Heaton-Harris, Chris

Hemming, John

Henderson, Gordon

Herbert, rh Nick

Hinds, Damian

Hoban, Mr Mark

Hollingbery, George

Hollobone, Mr Philip

Holloway, Mr Adam

Hopkins, Kris

Howarth, Mr Gerald

Howell, John

Hughes, rh Simon

Hunt, rh Mr Jeremy

Hunter, Mark

Huppert, Dr Julian

Hurd, Mr Nick

Jackson, Mr Stewart

James, Margot

Javid, Sajid

Jenkin, Mr Bernard

Johnson, Gareth

Johnson, Joseph

Jones, Andrew

Jones, Mr David

Jones, Mr Marcus

Kelly, Chris

Kennedy, rh Mr Charles

Kirby, Simon

Knight, rh Mr Greg

Kwarteng, Kwasi

Laing, Mrs Eleanor

Lamb, Norman

Lancaster, Mark

Lansley, rh Mr Andrew

Latham, Pauline

Laws, rh Mr David

Lee, Jessica

Lee, Dr Phillip

Leech, Mr John

Lefroy, Jeremy

Leigh, Mr Edward

Leslie, Charlotte

Lewis, Brandon

Lewis, Dr Julian

Liddell-Grainger, Mr Ian

Lilley, rh Mr Peter

Lloyd, Stephen

Lopresti, Jack

Lord, Jonathan

Loughton, Tim

Luff, Peter

Lumley, Karen

Macleod, Mary

Main, Mrs Anne

May, rh Mrs Theresa

Maynard, Paul

McCartney, Jason

McCartney, Karl

McIntosh, Miss Anne

McLoughlin, rh Mr Patrick

McPartland, Stephen

McVey, Esther

Menzies, Mark

Mercer, Patrick

Metcalfe, Stephen

Miller, Maria

Mills, Nigel

Milton, Anne

Mitchell, rh Mr Andrew

Moore, rh Michael

Mordaunt, Penny

Morgan, Nicky

Morris, Anne Marie

Morris, David

Morris, James

Mosley, Stephen

Mowat, David

Murrison, Dr Andrew

Neill, Robert

Newmark, Mr Brooks

Newton, Sarah

Nokes, Caroline

Nuttall, Mr David

O'Brien, Mr Stephen

Offord, Mr Matthew

Ollerenshaw, Eric

Opperman, Guy

Ottaway, Richard

Parish, Neil

Patel, Priti

Paterson, rh Mr Owen

Pawsey, Mark

Penning, Mike

Penrose, John

Percy, Andrew

Perry, Claire

Phillips, Stephen

Pickles, rh Mr Eric

Pincher, Christopher

Poulter, Dr Daniel

Prisk, Mr Mark

Pritchard, Mark

Pugh, John

Raab, Mr Dominic

Randall, rh Mr John

Reckless, Mark

Redwood, rh Mr John

Rees-Mogg, Jacob

Reevell, Simon

Reid, Mr Alan

Robertson, Hugh

Robertson, Mr Laurence

Rogerson, Dan

Rosindell, Andrew

Rudd, Amber

Russell, Bob

Rutley, David

Sanders, Mr Adrian

Sandys, Laura

Scott, Mr Lee

Selous, Andrew

Shapps, rh Grant

Sharma, Alok

Shelbrooke, Alec

Simmonds, Mark

Simpson, Mr Keith

Skidmore, Chris

Smith, Miss Chloe

Smith, Henry

Smith, Julian

Smith, Sir Robert

Soames, Nicholas

Spencer, Mr Mark

Stephenson, Andrew

Stevenson, John

Stewart, Bob

Stewart, Iain

Stewart, Rory

Stride, Mel

Stunell, Andrew

Sturdy, Julian

Swales, Ian

Swayne, Mr Desmond

Swinson, Jo

Syms, Mr Robert

Tapsell, Sir Peter

Teather, Sarah

Thurso, John

Timpson, Mr Edward

Tomlinson, Justin

Tredinnick, David

Truss, Elizabeth

Turner, Mr Andrew

Tyrie, Mr Andrew

Uppal, Paul

Vaizey, Mr Edward

Vickers, Martin

Villiers, rh Mrs Theresa

Walker, Mr Charles

Walker, Mr Robin

Wallace, Mr Ben

Walter, Mr Robert

Ward, Mr David

Watkinson, Angela

Wharton, James

Wheeler, Heather

White, Chris

Whittaker, Craig

Whittingdale, Mr John

Wiggin, Bill

Williams, Mr Mark

Williams, Roger

Williams, Stephen

Williamson, Gavin

Willott, Jenny

Wilson, Mr Rob

Wollaston, Dr Sarah

Wright, Simon

Yeo, Mr Tim

Young, rh Sir George

Zahawi, Nadhim

Tellers for the Noes:

Mr Shailesh Vara and

Jeremy Wright

Question accordingly negatived.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 420

30 Mar 2011 : Column 421

30 Mar 2011 : Column 422

30 Mar 2011 : Column 423

New Clause 6

Issuing precepts

‘(1) The police and crime commissioner must notify the relevant police and crime panel (the “panel”) of the precept which the commissioner is proposing to issue for the financial year (the “proposed precept”).

(2) The panel must review the proposed precept and make a report to the commissioner on the proposed precept, which may include recommendations, including as to the proposed precept.

(3) The commissioner must respond in writing to the panel, either to accept the recommendations, in full or in part, or to reject them, and to state whether the proposed precept is revised or unchanged following consideration of the panel’s report.

(4) The proposed precept will then be fixed as the precept under section 40 of the Local Government Act 1992 unless the panel rejects the proposed precept by at least three-quarters of

30 Mar 2011 : Column 424

the persons who are members of the panel at such time voting for such rejection.

(5) If, following such rejection, the panel and the police and crime commissioner agree within 14 days a proposed precept, then the police and crime commissioner shall issue that proposed precept as the precept for the financial year.

(6) Otherwise the panel shall propose an alternative precept, and provision shall be made by the participating authorities for a referendum across the relevant police force area to determine whether the precept proposed by the commissioner, or the alternative precept proposed by the panel, shall be fixed as the precept for the financial year.

(7) The Secretary of State may make regulations with regard to the timing of the provisions of this Clause and the procedures that are to be followed in respect of a referendum described in sub-Clause (6).’.—(Mark Reckless.)

Brought up, and read the First time .

Mark Reckless: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle): With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 151, in clause 28, page 21, line 9, leave out ‘5 or’.

Amendment 152, page 112, line 15, leave out Schedule 5.

Mark Reckless: New clause 6 deals with the police and crime panel and, specifically, the powers that it may or may not have in respect of assessing and setting the precept. Ever since I first considered the issue of elected commissioners and their proper role, I have found the issue of budget setting particularly knotty and difficult. As a strong proponent of elected commissioners, I see a good argument for giving them the power to set the precept and the budget, and just letting them get on with that. I can see the argument that they have the mandate, so surely they should make the decision.

However, I have at least a slight concern about giving such significant budget-setting power over a whole electoral term to one individual. That is why I am attracted to some of the ideas we have heard, including from colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches, about the police and crime panel. There has been a very positive, highest common factor rather than a lowest common denominator approach, and the Bill has been improved through the interchange of ideas between Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members.

We have heard about the capping arrangements of the Labour party in recent years. There was capping under previous Conservative Governments but it seemed to become almost standard in Labour’s 13 years in government for Ministers to set a number—it was never quite clear how they determined that number—over which anything, regardless of the circumstances and however low the council tax base, was capped by central Government. That approach seems wrong to me and we have a proposal to deal with it in relation to local government: instead of having a Secretary of State—I assume for Communities and Local Government—capping a council above a certain level, that Secretary of State would have reserve powers to require a local referendum in an area where he considered an increase to be excessive. That strikes me as a reasonably sensible balance, and certainly an improvement on the status quo and the current capping power.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 425

Dr Huppert: This issue is effectively about the principle of capping, which causes real problems. Is my hon. Friend aware, in the local government context, of councils in Cambridgeshire that used to charge zero council tax and were prevented by capping from charging any at all? We do not want the same sort of ridiculous problems happening with police precepts.

Mark Reckless: Yes, I am aware of that issue. The predecessor council to mine in Medway, Rochester upon Medway council, similarly had no council tax and when Medway took over as a unitary authority, we had one of the lowest council taxes in the country—virtually the lowest except for the Scilly Isles at one point. However, we had the same percentage limit as everyone else, so when central Government put a new burden on local government and we had to fund it as a fixed cost, we were less well-placed to do that because the amount we could get through a percentage increase was less than other councils that had previously had higher taxes could get.

A similar regime to that for local councils has applied to police authorities, but to an extent it has been less controversial than that for councils because police authorities have not had the same democratic mandate as local government. There are only nine elected councillors on my police authority among 17. It is true that the majority of those nine must approve the precept as well as a majority of the 17, but it is certainly less of a democratic mandate than that for local councils in which all the local councillors are elected. I have understood, previously, that when the Communities Secretary, rather than the Home Secretary, has capped an authority, that has not been popular with the authority, but I have understood why it happened. However, I can see the attraction of moving from that to a referendum power as we are doing with local government.

I think there is a potential problem or issue, which I hope can be resolved through the Bill or its application, with bringing in the new body—the local police and crime panel. The panel will have a representative from every council in the police area, and I particularly welcome the involvement of district councils, which have been so important in developing crime and disorder reduction partnerships and community safety partnerships. Their involvement on the ground will be a real advantage: it will bring real insight to the commissioner and the force and it will pull local government more generally into the new arrangements. We hear a lot about the Local Government Association or police authorities not liking the new arrangements, and people who have a particular stake in the existing process might say that, but the districts coming in is going to be a real gain.

There is dispute about how strong the panel will be, and its powers are characterised in various ways, but one of its key powers will be its oversight and scrutiny of the budget. It is proposed that, in extremis, if three quarters of the panel agree, the panel can exercise what is described as a veto in the Bill, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of schedule 5 prescribe that the Secretary of State can make further regulations on that. In Committee, the Minister described some of his intentions for the regulations, but I am a little unclear about that because the regulations referred to in the Bill seem to be about how that veto process will work, whereas quite a lot of the detail that the Minister gave to the Committee seemed to refer to

30 Mar 2011 : Column 426

when or where there would be a referendum and the Secretary of State’s involvement. That is one of the issues, because it is envisaged in the Localism Bill that the Secretary of State will have referendum-calling powers and will presumably use regulations to determine how that happens. It is envisaged in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill that the panel will have a veto and that there will be regulations on that. The crossover is not clear. There will be a directly elected individual who will come to office with a great mandate. One of his responsibilities is to set the budget and the precept, yet there are two other bodies—the panel and the Secretary of State; it is not clear whether it is the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government or the Home Secretary—who have at least some locus standi in setting the budget.

5.30 pm

We have to trust the commissioner generally to get on with it. There should be a reserve power, so that in extremis if there is a serious problem with the commissioner or if he does something that is completely out of line, the body with that power can come in and mitigate the problem. However, I am not convinced that we need two bodies, with the panel supposedly exercising a veto and the Secretary of State possibly requiring a referendum. It is not quite clear how those two things work together. The new clause would try to achieve greater clarity with a focus on the local and democratic. The Bill refers to giving the panel a veto, but when I read what the Minister said about what the regulations would do, it was not clear that it was a veto. If what is described as a veto is exercised, the elected commissioner has to “have regard to” that. We heard in the preceding debate how difficult that phrase can be. Having had regard to the veto, the commissioner can propose another figure—presumably, it would be at least marginally different—and can set it as the precept for the coming year.

Does the phrase “have regard to” mean that the commissioner has to do what the panel wants or, at the other extreme, is it envisaged that he can just come back with something marginally different, and that is his decision as the commissioner? Are we saying that we cannot really make up our mind and that the courts have to decide all this and there will be litigation? That does not strike me as ideal, so I hope that, perhaps in the other place, we will reach agreement on this issue.

Dr Huppert: I am interested in the point that the hon. Gentleman made about having to use litigation. There is serious concern about what would happen if, when a budget was set, there was uncertainty and we had to use court orders. I am sure that he is aware of the cost of rebilling, and there is an important principle that we want to set all the amounts of council tax, while we still have council tax, at the same time, rather than send out multiple letters, which would just add to the cost of that process.

Mark Reckless: In my reference to litigation, I was alluding to the fact that the prospect of dispute, at least on the first occasion, given the narrow time scales and the costs of rebilling, would not be a positive thing. I have worked closely with my hon. Friend on the Home Affairs Committee on the issue—his hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) is

30 Mar 2011 : Column 427

strongly involved in these issues too— and I feel that there is a significant measure of agreement between us. In the coalition, it is important that we decide what we want to do, and state that clearly in the Bill and subsequent regulations so that we do not face the prospect of litigation.

Some Liberal Democrats may like the idea of a complete veto for the panel, but I am not sure that many of my Conservative colleagues would necessarily agree, given that the commissioner has a directly elected mandate and the members of the panel are appointed. However, I am convinced that a measure of financial oversight by the panel and by the councillors from every council who serve on it would be valuable. It will keep the commissioner linked in to local government, which is extremely important. The Minister has a criminal justice portfolio, and there is extraordinary scope for the elected commissioners to act in the wider criminal justice area. However, we do not want a great division to open up between local government and the work of the elected commissioner in criminal justice, so that knitting together is important.

Steve McCabe: I recognise that the hon. Gentleman feels strongly about this element, but if it is valid to argue that the commissioner must be virtually in a negotiation position with the panel so that they arrive at the right decision on the precept, I do not understand why, in every other respect, the commissioner should be able to arrive at his decision independently, with the role of the panel being simply to scrutinise it. Why does the hon. Gentleman make an exception in relation to the precept? Surely the logic of his argument is that the panel should have a different set of powers in relation to the commissioner.

Mark Reckless: The power over the precept is an extraordinarily important one, particularly over the whole elected term of the commissioner. Even I, as a strong supporter of directly elected commissioners, would be slightly nervous about one individual on his own taking those budgetary decisions for a number of years. I welcome the involvement of the panel in that, but I do not envisage a constant negotiation—[Interruption.] I apologise to the House.

A three quarters majority will be required. What is needed is almost a reserve power, so that if the commissioner wants to slash the budget massively against the will of the local area, or put through really hefty increases, there is some oversight and some way that that can be mitigated. The panel is a sensible body to do that, but we need to be clear what it would then do. Would it veto the plans and would the commissioner be obliged to accept that, or would it just say, “Go away and think again”?

The present wording, “have regard to”, represents an intended compromise, but leads to considerable uncertainty. As none of us wants to see litigation on this aspect, I am proposing instead that we bolster the local crime panel with a clear power. That will not necessarily be a veto as, if it is, it will be a soft veto. If the panel was seriously worried about the precept, there could be a referendum in the local area. The members of the panel would be appointed by the councils in that area, so those councils would bear the cost of a referendum. They would think long and hard before calling a referendum if they were paying for it.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 428

That arrangement would provide some protection. If the commissioner went off in one direction, away from others, it would give some possibility of pulling him back, but it would not make him subject to the panel, because the commissioner would have the directly elected mandate, whereas the panel would be appointed. Giving the panel the power to require a referendum would be a sensible way forward.

We may be envisaging a referendum power, but it seems that we are expecting to import parts of the Localism Bill into the policing environment, when we already have a separate police and crime panel as a check on the elected commissioner, whereas we do not have a similar check in local government. I propose that the two should be distinct and that the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government should have the power of referendum for local councils, but in the policing universe where we are setting up a panel that will be representative, that panel should be responsible. In extremis, it would have the power to call a referendum on the local precept. We therefore would not need the central oversight and dictation of the Secretary of State in this area.

The new clause would bring greater clarity and provide the local and democratic arrangements that we need. I commend it to the House.


Steve McCabe: I shall be brief. I am intrigued that the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) has tabled the new clause. It is a matter of great regret that he was not a member of the Committee that scrutinised the Bill. What we are beginning to hear in his contributions is how much doubt exists in the hearts of Conservative Back Benchers about some of the key elements of the Bill. That was evident in some of his earlier amendments, but it is extremely evident in this group. He is prepared to tolerate a single elected individual having enormous power over the shape and influence of an area police force over a four-year cycle. He is prepared to tolerate a police and crime plan that might change the shape and direction of the force beyond all recognition. Despite being a loyal and active member of a police authority that has massive experience and whose benefits he regularly tells us about, he is prepared to put up with all those measures.

The hon. Gentleman realises in his heart the fundamental danger that, if the Government persist with their present approach to cuts in police funding, at some stage authorities in parts of the country of the kind he represents will be on a collision course with the Government. The police commissioner will be forced to look at the question of the precept as a means of off-setting the budget cuts that the force is facing. The hon. Gentleman does not want to be in that position when a single elected police commissioner is able to bring forward a proposal for a hugely increased precept, because he fears what the electors in his area will say about that and the repercussions for himself and his party followers.

Mark Reckless: I must say that that really is not the case and has not been my experience. In Kent we have been able to find significant savings in our budget while protecting the front line and, in the words of our chief constable, have an opportunity to have a more efficient and effective force. As an elected Member, I looked to constituents in the private sector who are suffering and

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wanted to see some savings made in the police budget. My colleagues did not agree this year—they perhaps did not have the same direct election focus—but then they did come to realise this and we found significant savings. It is because we have that democratic element that we are able to find the savings and get the police to operate more efficiently, and the elected commissioners should be able to do that even better.

Steve McCabe: That democratic element cannot be fundamentally unique in relation to setting the precept but absolutely different in relation to any other aspect of the work of the commissioner. It is my contention that the people who support the amendment fear what will happen when the precept has to be ratcheted up to compensate for the cuts. They know that there will be massive electoral consequences and so are seeking to insert a device to denude the commissioner of the one power that they fear more than any other.

Dr Huppert: I am not sure that I agree with everything the hon. Gentleman is saying. Does he not agree that the precept is in some sense absolutely key to what is happening, because it sets the total envelope of resource available to a chief constable to do their job? It is one of the most fundamental decisions that could be made by the commissioner.

Steve McCabe: If I was to stand as a candidate for police commissioner and was setting out my stall for the kind of police force I would want to see, I would not have to put on my election material the caveat, “By the way, I’ll have no power over the fundamental decision about funding.” With the greatest respect, I think that the hon. Gentleman has missed the point. The Government are trying to have it both ways: they want to create political commissars to run the police, but they also want to retain the power to mitigate the risk that the commissioner might come up with a precept that is unacceptable to the electorate. That is classically what is wrong with the Bill. It is designed to give the commissioner power in the areas that suit the Government, but at the heart of the Conservative party there is a doubt about that. The Government are trying to back the proposal while simultaneously watering down its key element because they fear that the course of action that they have embarked on will have electoral consequences for them.

Michael Ellis: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm whether the previous Labour Government did something very similar on elected mayors?

Steve McCabe: I am talking about police commissioners, although I am happy to tell the hon. Gentleman that I am not particularly a fan of elected mayors. However, if we are going to have mayors, I would have them elected, not imposed under a shadowing arrangement first, because that suggests that there is some doubt about their validity. If he wants to talk about elected mayors, he should move on to safer ground.

5.45 pm

I have doubts about the intention behind the new clause. I admire the dedication that the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood shows on these issues. I wonder

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why, however, some Government Members are happy to swallow all the other elements, but on the key element of finance, want the power to water down the powers and take hold of the commissioner.

Dr Huppert: I am still unclear. If the hon. Gentleman does not support the alternative in the new clause, is he saying that he prefers the existing mechanism, which involves the Secretary of State? Which is he arguing for, or is he arguing against both?

Steve McCabe: I am saying quite simply that the nature of the existing powers, as I understand them, would give the Secretary of State the right to intervene. If the Government do not have faith in their own system, it seems right that they should have the power to intervene. However, what I do not want is a scheme that says, “We’re in favour of police commissioners, but by the way we’re going to limit their power when it comes to the area where we think there could be electoral disadvantage for us.”

Dr Huppert: It is a pleasure, as ever, to follow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe). We have spent much time together on the Bill Committee, on a previous Bill Committee and in the Home Affairs Select Committee crossing swords on some of these issues. I am encouraged by the new clause in the name of the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless), because it would do some useful things for which I argued in Committee. It talks about strengthening the panel. We talked earlier about the Liberal Democrats’ initial manifesto commitment to having a strong panel, and there have been negotiations among the different sides about how to fit the two models together. However, the new clause moves in the direction I tend to prefer, so as ever it is a pleasure to work with him.

The new clause also leans more towards local accountability, which to me is very important. I have always been a localist—not only since the formation of the coalition Government—and I think that this policy should be about local determination. That was what was wrong with capping council taxes. We had councils that could not make sensible decisions owing to capping powers and because the Secretary of State was too remote from what was going on locally. Those councils could not make sensible decisions whether on tiny increases in very low council taxes, because those increases went above a certain percentage, or on moving from a council tax of zero, which was possible in a few rather unusual places, because any increase broke the percentage rule.

What the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak said was interesting. First, there is the issue of the precept. Why is the precept different from all other areas? We could adjust a whole lot of different premises, but the precept is the key. As I said in my intervention, it is what determines how much money is available to the chief constable. If only one decision could be made by a commissioner each year, the total amount of cash is surely the one for which we would want to provide the most control. It is also the one on which there would not be advice and policy guidance from other bodies on how to operate and what the constraints might be. It is properly a decision to be taken locally.

There are questions about what one does if a commissioner makes a decision that is held to be unreasonable by other people locally. This applies whether

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to a commissioner or a council leader. Whatever the structure, there will always be situations in which there is disagreement about whether something is being done appropriately. The question is: how do we resolve that disagreement? I was interested in the response that the hon. Gentleman gave to my question. He seemed to be arguing for the Secretary of State to have that power, but that is precisely the opposite of the localist agenda that I would like put in place. The Secretary of State should not be interfering in how the precept is set. They should do their utmost not to have anything to do with it, if possible. They should have a role in setting the framework, but they should not have the power to say, “That is too much. I’m the Secretary of State and I say so.”

Steve McCabe: Perhaps I can clarify matters a fraction for the hon. Gentleman. My point is that the police Minister and the Secretary of State inevitably have some responsibilities for the police that go beyond localism, as was discussed extensively in Committee. In fact, if I recall rightly, we discussed what would happen if the budget was set too low and therefore did not enable the police force to fulfil its obligations. The argument that the Minister advanced at the time was that the Secretary of State should have the power to step in. The hon. Gentleman seems to arguing for a pure form of localism that completely ignores that—

Mr Speaker: Order. Interventions are becoming increasingly lengthy, and they need to be rather shorter.

Dr Huppert: Thank you, Mr Speaker, although this is a matter of great interest, so I have sympathy for the hon. Gentleman, having made my own mistakes earlier this afternoon. I lean towards pure localism. Let us remember that the people on the panel making the decision will be councillors appointed by their local authorities. In Cambridgeshire, for example, I find it hard to see how, say, the representative from Cambridge city council could look at a budget that was insufficient to provide the basic policing and say, “Yeah, that’s fine. I can’t be bothered to interfere with this one.” I do not have that lack of faith in our local councils or our local democratic system. I have concerns, although I prefer the new clause to the original proposals, under which the Secretary of State would have had a strong role. However, I do not entirely agree with everything in the new clause. In particular, I am not comfortable with the idea of having to have a three-quarters majority, which we discussed in Committee, as Members will know. I tend towards a somewhat lower figure.

Michael Ellis: My hon. Friend has misgivings about having a 75% majority, but does he not feel that it ought to be that high, because that is what would be required to overrule a democratically elected figure, which ought to be a severe circumstance and rare happening?

Dr Huppert: It is important to remember that, with the exception of the two independents—another example of how I would not have designed the system—the majority of panel members will be democratically elected, representing their councils in their system. They are not directly democratically elected, but they are indirectly democratically elected. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will know, the model in London is a two-thirds majority for scrutiny of a democratically elected individual, so I

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am more comfortable with two thirds. That does not make a huge difference for a typically sized panel, which will have 12 people. We said in Committee that the difference will be between nine votes and eight votes, but it is more useful to look at it the other way. In order to stop the veto, the commission would have to get four or five people either to vote with him or not to be there. That makes a bigger difference as the panel gets bigger.

The structure of the new clause is more positive than has been described, because it leans towards trying to have sensible discussions and negotiations. It starts with a commissioner making a proposal. Then the panel looks at the proposal and comments on it, before the commissioner works out what he will do. Unless it is vetoed, the precept is set, but if it is vetoed, it does not go to a referendum straight away. Ultimately, that is something that we are all trying to avoid, because of the associated costs of running unnecessary referendums and the risk of re-billing, which is a particular problem with this issue and capping. There is then another opportunity, over 14 days, for the two sides to negotiate and see whether they can come to a more sensible arrangement that works for both of them. Only if that is not possible is a further step taken.

That step is not about saying, “Secretary of State, tell us what to do. It’s up to you.” It is about saying that what should be done is up to local people. It is up to the commissioner to set one option and the panel to set another, and then the public will decide which they prefer. That is a much more appropriate way of doing things. The panel would act responsibly when it came to cost, with the exception of the independents, who do not have that responsibility and are a piece of undemocratic grit in the system. However, it will be local decision making that makes a difference. Local people should have a say in how their precept should be set and how their policing should be run. That is what I would like to see. I am delighted that the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) has moved the new clause for discussion, and I hope that the Government will consider it carefully.

Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab): It feels as though I have entered a meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, which is where I was yesterday, but I am not going to talk about the Metropolitan police in quite the same way today.

I sympathise with some of the arguments about localism which have been advanced by the hon. Members for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) and for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who spoke in favour of the new clause, but I say to them that, although there may be a natural constituency in some police authorities, in many there is not. In the South Wales police area, for instance, it is not easy to conceive of a single constituency of interest. The area does not exist in any other denomination, as it were, and it crosses local authority boundaries, brings together Swansea and Cardiff, which is something extraordinary in itself, and brings the valleys together with two of the three big cities of south Wales, so it would be very difficult to come to a really local idea.

The new clause is primarily about money, however, so I want to ask the Minister a few questions. I realise that he may not be able to answer this evening, but I hope

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that he will write to me on some of these matters, because they are—in relation to chapter 6, in particular—quite important.

The Bill partially determines the way in which somebody is elected, but there is a great deal more work to be done on exactly how the electoral system will work—for precisely the reason that I mentioned: the constituencies do not exist. New constituencies are being created, and we need to ensure that, in terms of how elections are managed, there is some consistency within the constituency that we create. I just wonder whether—

Mr Speaker: Order. Can I just gently point out to the hon. Member for Rhondda that it is on the subject of precepts that he will want to focus his remarks?

Chris Bryant: I know I am chancing my arm, Mr Speaker, but I cannot chance it anywhere else on Report, and these issues have not yet been covered.

Of course, the issue of precepts is fundamentally about money.

Mr Speaker: Order. Can I just remind the hon. Gentleman that there will be an opportunity on Third Reading for him to dilate? Whether that is convenient for him is unknown to me—but it might be appropriate.

Chris Bryant: Mr Speaker, I do not know whether you really want me to dilate at any point.

I was merely trying to say that, on the matter of money, which is the point at hand, there is a question about how any commissioner would be able to make sure that in advance of future elections there was enough money to be able to pay for the process of explaining to the electorate the supplementary voting system, which will not have been used in many other parts of the country. I would be grateful if the Minister were able to expand on how he will achieve that, on the precise powers that will be available to the Electoral Commission and on when he will bring forward supplementary powers in relation to that.

Having chanced my arm as far as I think you will allow, Mr Speaker, I surrender to the rest of the debate.

Nick Herbert: In the three minutes that are now available to me, I will have to try to explain why my hon. Friend’s approach is interesting but wrong in relation to how the precept is dealt with.

I explained in Committee the process following a veto, and the Home Secretary will set that out in regulations. They will require, as the amendment would, that the police and crime commissioner considers the panel’s recommendations and then proposes an amended precept, which must take the panel’s recommendations into account.

This is where the Bill diverges from the proposed changes, however. Under the regulations that we propose, we say that, if the amended precept is “excessive” under the definition in the Localism Bill, the police and crime commissioner will set the precept but a referendum will be triggered. The panel will not be able to prevent that, but it will be able to propose an alternative precept with accompanying reasons that will have to be published. The public will then have to decide—having both sides of the story.

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Dr Huppert: Will the Minister give way?

Nick Herbert: I do not have time, I am afraid.

As we envisage the situation, the public will be able to decide whether to go with the police and crime commissioner’s precept, but only when a precept is excessive. Under the changes that my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) proposes, however, the public would decide every time a panel vetoed a precept, unless the commissioner and the panel were able to reach an agreement within two weeks of the vote. We have not gone down that route, despite considering it very carefully, because referendums are very expensive and the police and crime commissioner would have to pay for them on each occasion. If the commissioner’s amended precept is not excessive within the Localism Bill definition, regulations will require the proposal to go again before the panel. Following that, the police and crime commissioner will be able to set the precept without a referendum. He or she must consider the panel’s recommendations. Where the panel has voted again to reject that precept, he or she must publish the panel’s alternative precept and its reasons and must set out in the same document why he or she did not implement the panel’s proposals.

I accept that the public must have a role in deciding what precept they pay, and under our policy they will have one, or potentially two, opportunities to do this—once when they elect their police and crime commissioner, and again when a police and crime commissioner sets an excessive precept.

6 pm

Debate interrupted (Programme Order, this day ).

The Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83E), That the clause be read a Second time.

Question negatived.

The Speaker then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).

Clause 5

Police and crime commissioners to issue police and crime plans

Amendments made: 6, page 5, line 32, at end insert

‘if, and to the extent that, the plan or variation is different from the draft prepared in accordance with subsection (6)’.

Amendment 7, page 6, line 11, after ‘plan’, insert ‘or variation’.—(Nick Herbert.)

Clause 6

Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime to issue police and crime plans

Amendments made: 8, page 6, line 44, at end insert

‘if, and to the extent that, the plan or variation is different from the draft prepared in accordance with subsection (6)’.

Amendment 9, page 7, line 12, leave out ‘and (7) to (8A)’ and insert

‘(7) to (8A), and (10) to (12)’.—(Nick Herbert.)

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Clause 10

Co-operative working

Amendments made: 10, page 10, line 4, leave out ‘in’ and insert ‘for’.

Amendment 11, page 10, line 27, at end insert—

‘“functions” does not include functions which are exercisable only in relation to Wales and relate to matters in relation to which the Welsh Ministers have functions;’.—(Nick Herbert.)

Clause 18

Delegation of functions by police and crime commissioners

Amendment made: 12, page 14, line 8, after ‘arrange’, insert ‘under this section’.—(Nick Herbert.)

Clause 19

Delegation of functions by Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime

Amendment made: 13, page 15, line 8, leave out from ‘of’ to end of line 9 and insert

‘the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime which is, in accordance with subsection (1), exercisable by the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime.’.—(Nick Herbert.)


Clause 25

Other grants etc under Police Act 1996

Amendment made: 15, page 19, line 20, leave out sub-paragraph (ii).—(Nick Herbert.)

Clause 28

Police and crime panels of local authorities

Amendments made: 16, page 20, line 22, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

‘(1) Each police area, other than the metropolitan police district, is to have a police and crime panel established and maintained in accordance with Schedule (Police and crime panels) (police and crime panels).’.

Amendment 17, page 20, line 33, leave out ‘elected local policing body’ and insert ‘police and crime commissioner’.

Amendment 18, page 21, line 12, leave out from ‘commissioner’ to end of line 15 and insert—

‘(6A) The police and crime panel for a police area in England must send copies of any such reports or recommendations to each local authority whose area falls wholly or partly within the police area.’.

Amendment 19, page 21, line 18, leave out from beginning to end of line 28 and insert—

‘(8) Schedule (Police and crime panels) (police and crime panels) has effect.

(9) In this section “local authority” means a county council or a district council.’.—(Nick Herbert.)

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Clause 29

Power to require attendance and information

Amendment made: 20, page 21, line 33, at end insert—

‘( ) Nothing in subsection (1) requires a member of the police and crime commissioner’s staff to give any evidence, or produce any document, which discloses advice given to the commissioner by that person.’.—(Nick Herbert.)

Clause 30

Suspension of police and crime commissioner

Amendment made: 14, page 22, line 16, leave out ‘of two years or more’ and insert ‘exceeding two years’.—(Nick Herbert.)

Clause 103

Interpretation of Part 1

Amendment made: 21, page 64, line 38, leave out ‘established under’ and insert ‘referred to in subsection (1) of’.—(Nick Herbert.)

New Schedule 1

‘Police and crime panels

Part 1

Type of panel which police area is to have

England

1 (1) Each police area in England, other than the metropolitan police district, is to have a police and crime panel established and maintained in accordance with Part 2 of this Schedule.

(2) But the Secretary of State may, by order, provide that any such police area is to have (for as long as the order has effect) a police and crime panel established and maintained in accordance with Part 3 of this Schedule (instead of a panel established and maintained in accordance with Part 2).

(3) The Secretary of State may make an order under sub-paragraph (2) in relation to a single-authority police area only if the Secretary of State is of the opinion that the relevant local authority has failed to nominate or appoint one or more of its councillors as members of the panel in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 9.

(4) The Secretary of State may make an order under sub-paragraph (2) in relation to a multi-authority police area only if the Secretary of State is of the opinion that all the relevant local authorities have (whether at the same time or at different times) failed to nominate or appoint one or more of their councillors as members of the panel—

(a) in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 9 (in the case of a police area which covers ten or more local authorities), or

(b) in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 (in the case of a police area which covers nine or fewer local authorities).

Wales

2 Each police area in Wales is to have a police and crime panel established and maintained in accordance with Part 3 of this Schedule.

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Part 2

Panels established by local authorities

Establishment and maintenance of panels

3 (1) This Part of this Schedule applies in relation to each police area in England (other than the metropolitan police district), unless an order under paragraph 1(2) has effect in relation to the police area.

(2) The local authority or local authorities which such a police area covers must—

(a) establish and maintain a police and crime panel for the police area, and

(b) make the panel arrangements (see paragraph 23) for the police and crime panel.

(3) In the case of a multi-authority police area, all the relevant local authorities must agree to the making or modification of the panel arrangements.

(4) In the following provisions of this Part of this Schedule, a reference to a police and crime panel is a reference to a panel established and maintained in accordance with this paragraph.

Membership and status

4 (1) A police and crime panel for a police area is to consist of the following members—

(a) the relevant number of persons properly appointed as members of the panel; and

(b) two members co-opted by the panel.

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), the “relevant number” is—

(a) ten (if the police area covers ten or fewer local authorities); or

(b) the number that is equal to the number of local authorities which the police area covers (if the police area covers eleven or more local authorities).

(3) A police and crime panel is—

(a) a committee of the relevant local authority (if it is the panel for a single-authority police area), or

(b) a joint committee of the relevant local authorities (if it is the panel for a multi-authority police area).

(4) A police and crime panel may not exercise any functions other than those conferred by this Act.

Persons properly appointed as members of panels

5 (1) In this Part of this Schedule, a reference to a person properly appointed as a member of a police and crime panel is a reference to—

(a) a person nominated by a relevant local authority to be a member of the panel, and appointed by the authority as a member of the panel, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 9, paragraphs 7 and 9, or paragraphs 8 and 9, or

(b) a person nominated by the Secretary of State to be a member of the panel, and appointed by the Secretary of State as a member of the panel, in accordance with paragraph 10.

(2) In the case of the police and crime panel for a multi-authority police area which covers nine or fewer local authorities, the panel arrangements must make provision as to the relevant local authority or authorities who are to have power to appoint the extra members of the panel (see paragraph 8(3)(b)).

(3) For that purpose “extra members” means the number of members of the panel produced by this calculation—

where L is the number of local authorities which the police area covers.

Single-authority police area: nomination by local authority

6 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to the police and crime panel for a single-authority police area.

(2) If the number of appointed members of the police and crime panel is less than the full complement, the relevant local authority may nominate the appropriate number of its councillors to be members of the police and crime panel.

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(3) A relevant local authority may not make a nomination under this paragraph if, and for as long as, a notice given to the authority by the Secretary of State under paragraph 10(8) is in force.

(4) In this paragraph—

“appropriate number” means the number that is equal to the difference between—

(a) the full complement; and(b) the number of appointed members of the panel;

“full complement” means ten members.

Police area covering ten or more local authorities: nomination by local authority

7 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to the police and crime panel for a police area which covers ten or more local authorities.

(2) In a case where—

(a) the number of appointed members of the police and crime panel is less than the full complement, and

(b) there is no member of the panel who was appointed by a particular relevant local authority,

the authority may nominate one of its councillors to be a member of the police and crime panel.

(3) A relevant local authority may not make a nomination under this paragraph if, and for as long as, a notice given to the authority by the Secretary of State under paragraph 10(8) is in force.

(4) In this paragraph, “full complement” means the number of appointed members which the panel is to have by virtue of paragraph 4(1)(a).

Multi-authority police area covering nine or fewer local authorities: nomination by local authority

8 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to the police and crime panel for a multi-authority police area which covers nine or fewer local authorities.

(2) In a case where—

(a) the number of appointed members of the police and crime panel is less than the full complement,

(b) a particular relevant local authority does not have power under the panel arrangements to appoint an extra member of the panel (see paragraph 5(2)), and

(c) there is no member of the panel who was appointed by the authority,

the authority may nominate one of its councillors to be a member of the police and crime panel.

(3) In a case where—

(a) the number of appointed members of the police and crime panel is less than the full complement,

(b) a particular relevant local authority has power under the panel arrangements to appoint one or more extra members of the panel (see paragraph 5(2)), and

(c) the number of members of the panel who are members by virtue of appointment by the authority is less than the authority’s quota of members,

the authority may nominate the permitted number of its councillors to be members of the police and crime panel.

(4) A relevant local authority may not make a nomination under this paragraph if, and for as long as, a notice given to the authority by the Secretary of State under paragraph 10(8) is in force.

(5) In this paragraph, in relation to a police and crime panel and a relevant local authority—

“full complement” means ten members;

“permitted number” means the number that is equal to the difference between—

(a) the authority’s quota of members; and(b) the number of members of the panel who are members by virtue of appointment by the authority;

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“quota of members” means the number of members calculated by adding one to the number of extra members of the panel which the authority has power to appoint under the panel arrangements (see paragraph 5(2)).

Appointment after nomination by local authority

9 (1) This paragraph applies where a relevant local authority makes a nomination under paragraph 6, 7 or 8.

(2) If the nominee accepts the nomination, the relevant local authority may appoint the nominated councillor as a member of the panel.

(3) If the nominee does not accept the nomination, the relevant local authority may nominate another of its councillors to be a member of the police and crime panel (and sub-paragraph (2) or this sub-paragraph applies accordingly, as if the nomination were made under paragraph 6, 7 or 8).

Failure of local authority to appoint member: nomination and appointment by Secretary of State

10 (1) This paragraph applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that—

(a) the number of appointed members of a police and crime panel is less than the full complement, and

(b) a relevant local authority (the “defaulting local authority”)—

(i) has failed to nominate or appoint one or more of its councillors as members of the panel in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 9, paragraphs 7 and 9, or paragraphs 8 and 9, or

(ii) does not have power to make such a nomination and appointment because of paragraph 6(3), 7(3) or 8(4).

(2) The Secretary of State must nominate the appropriate number of persons who are councillors of relevant local authorities to be members of the police and crime panel.

(3) Sub-paragraph (4) or (5) applies in relation to each nomination which the Secretary of State is required to make under sub-paragraph (2).

(4) If the nominee accepts the nomination, the Secretary of State must appoint the nominated councillor as a member of the panel.

(5) If the nominee does not accept the nomination, the Secretary of State must nominate another person who is a councillor of a relevant local authority to be a member of the police and crime panel (and sub-paragraph (4) or this sub-paragraph applies accordingly, as if the nomination were made under sub-paragraph (2)).

(6) In complying with this paragraph in relation to the police and crime panel for a multi-authority police area, the Secretary of State must secure (as far as is reasonably practicable) that the fair representation objective is met.

(7) The “fair representation objective” referred to in sub-paragraph (6) is—

(a) in the case of a police area which covers ten or more local authorities, the objective that each relevant local authority has only one of its councillors as a member of the panel;

(b) in the case of a police area which covers nine or fewer local authorities, the objective that each relevant local authority has at least one of its councillors as a member of the panel.

(8) If the Secretary of State—

(a) is satisfied that a relevant local authority has failed to nominate or appoint one or more of its councillors as members of the panel as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b), and

(b) is considering whether to exercise, has decided to exercise, or has exercised, the power under this paragraph to make a nomination,

30 Mar 2011 : Column 440

the Secretary of State may give the authority notice that the Secretary of State is satisfied as mentioned in paragraph (a) of this sub-paragraph.

(9) A notice given under sub-paragraph (8) may be withdrawn by the Secretary of State at any time.

(10) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(b)(i), it is irrelevant that a relevant local authority which has failed to nominate or appoint a councillor as a member of the panel—

(a) may have power under any of paragraphs 6 to 9 to make a further nomination; or

(b) is complying with, or has complied with, the panel arrangements relating to that panel.

(11) In this paragraph—

“appropriate number” means the number that is equal to the difference between—

(a) the full complement; and(b) the number of appointed members of the panel;

“full complement” means the number of appointed members which the panel is to have by virtue of paragraph 4(1)(a).

Costs of the panel

11 (1) This paragraph applies to a multi-authority panel.

(2) The panel arrangements must make provision about—

(a) how the relevant local authorities are to meet the costs of the panel; and

(b) insofar as the provision is necessary, how funds paid (whether by the Secretary of State or otherwise) to meet the costs of the panel are to be paid to, or distributed between, the relevant local authorities.

Part 3

Panels established by the Secretary of State

Establishment and maintenance of panels

12 (1) This Part of this Schedule applies in relation to—

(a) each police area in Wales, and

(b) each police area in England in relation to which an order under paragraph 1(2) has effect.

(2) The Secretary of State must—

(a) establish and maintain a separate police and crime panel for each police area to which this Part of this Schedule applies, and

(b) make the panel arrangements (see paragraph 23) for each police and crime panel established and maintained in accordance with this paragraph.

(3) The Secretary of State may make different panel arrangements for different police and crime panels.

(4) In the following provisions of this Part of this Schedule, a reference to a police and crime panel is a reference to a panel established and maintained in accordance with this paragraph.

Membership and status

13 (1) A police and crime panel for a police area is to consist of the following members—

(a) the relevant number of persons appointed by the Secretary of State as members of the panel; and

(b) two members co-opted by the panel.

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), the “relevant number” is—

(a) ten (if the police area covers ten or fewer local authorities); or

(b) the number that is equal to the number of local authorities which the police area covers (if the police area covers eleven or more local authorities).

(3) A police and crime panel is not a committee or joint committee of any local authority or local authorities.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 441

Wales: persons appointed by the Secretary of State as members of panels

14 In this Part of this Schedule, a reference to a person appointed by the Secretary of State as a member of a Welsh police and crime panel is a reference to—

(a) a person nominated by a relevant local authority to be a member of the panel, and appointed by the Secretary of State as a member of the panel, in accordance with paragraph 16(2) to (4)(a), or

(b) a person nominated by the Secretary of State to be a member of the panel, and appointed by the Secretary of State as a member of the panel, in accordance with paragraph 16(4)(b) to (6).

Wales: Secretary of State to ask local authorities to nominate members of panels

15 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to a Welsh police and crime panel if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the number of appointed members of the panel is less than the full complement.

(2) In the case of a police and crime panel for a single-authority police area, the Secretary of State must ask the relevant local authority to nominate the appropriate number of the authority’s councillors to be members of the panel.

(3) In the case of a police and crime panel for a multi-authority police area, the Secretary of State must—

(a) decide which of the relevant local authorities to ask to make nominations under this sub-paragraph (the “nominating authorities”);

(b) decide what number of nominations under this sub-paragraph each nominating authority is to be asked to make; and

(c) ask each nominating authority to nominate that number of the authority’s councillors to be members of the panel.

(4) In complying with sub-paragraph (3), the Secretary of State must secure—

(a) that the number of nominations which the nominating authority or authorities are asked to make (when taken together) is equal to the appropriate number; and

(b) that (as far as is reasonably practicable) the fair representation objective is met.

(5) The “fair representation objective” referred to in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is—

(a) in the case of a police area which covers ten or more local authorities, the objective that each relevant local authority has only one of its councillors as a member of the panel;

(b) in the case of a police area which covers nine or fewer local authorities, the objective that each relevant local authority has at least one of its councillors as a member of the panel.

(6) In this paragraph—

“appropriate number” means the number that is equal to the difference between—

(a) the full complement; and(b) the number of appointed members of the panel;

“full complement” means the number of appointed members which the panel is to have by virtue of paragraph 13(1)(a).

Wales: consequences of Secretary of State asking local authorities to make nominations

16 (1) This paragraph applies if, under paragraph 15, the Secretary of State asks a relevant local authority to nominate a councillor to be a member of a Welsh police and crime panel.

(2) The authority may make the nomination.

(3) If the authority makes the nomination, and the nominee accepts the nomination, the Secretary of State must appoint the nominated councillor as a member of the police and crime panel.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 442

(4) If the authority fails to make the nomination, or the nominee does not accept the nomination, the Secretary of State must either—

(a) ask the authority to make another nomination (and sub-paragraph (2), and sub-paragraph (3) or this sub-paragraph, apply accordingly, as if the request were made under paragraph 15); or

(b) nominate a person who is a councillor of a relevant local authority to be a member of the police and crime panel.

(5) If the nominee accepts a nomination made under sub-paragraph (4)(b), the Secretary of State must appoint the nominated councillor as a member of the panel.

(6) If the nominee does not accept the nomination, the Secretary of State must nominate another person who is a councillor of a relevant local authority to be a member of the police and crime panel (and sub-paragraph (5) or this sub-paragraph applies accordingly, as if the nomination were made under sub-paragraph (4)(b)).

England: persons appointed by the Secretary of State as members of panels

17 In this Part of this Schedule, a reference to a person appointed by the Secretary of State as a member of an English police and crime panel is a reference to a person who has been appointed by the Secretary of State as a member of the panel in accordance with paragraph 18.

England: nomination and appointment of members of panels by Secretary of State

18 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to an English police and crime panel if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the number of appointed members of the panel is less than the full complement.

(2) The Secretary of State must nominate the appropriate number of persons who are councillors of relevant local authorities to be members of the police and crime panel.

(3) Sub-paragraph (4) or (5) applies in relation to each nomination which the Secretary of State is required to make under sub-paragraph (2).

(4) If the nominee accepts the nomination, the Secretary of State must appoint the nominated councillor as a member of the panel.

(5) If the nominee does not accept the nomination, the Secretary of State must nominate another person who is a councillor of a relevant local authority to be a member of the police and crime panel (and sub-paragraph (4) or this sub-paragraph applies accordingly, as if the nomination were made under sub-paragraph (2)).

(6) In this paragraph—

“appropriate number” means the number that is equal to the difference between—

(a) the full complement; and(b) the number of appointed members of the panel;

“full complement” means the number of appointed members which the panel is to have by virtue of paragraph 13(1)(a).

Liabilities of panels

19 (1) All relevant liabilities relating to a police and crime panel are liabilities of the Secretary of State (and accordingly are not liabilities of any member of the panel).

(2) Any expense incurred by a member of a police and crime panel—

(a) in respect of a relevant liability, or

(b) otherwise in the exercise of, or purported exercise of, a function of the panel,

is to be borne and repaid by the Secretary of State.

(3) In this paragraph “relevant liability” means a liability which, but for this paragraph, would be a liability of a member of a police and crime panel (whether personally or as a member of that panel) in respect of anything done by—

30 Mar 2011 : Column 443

(a) that person in the exercise, or purported exercise, of a function of a member of the panel,

(b) any other member of the panel in the exercise, or purported exercise, of a function of a member of the panel, or

(c) the panel in the exercise, or purported exercise, of a function of the panel.

Provision of financial and other resources

20 (1) The Secretary of State may provide financial and other resources—

(a) to a police and crime panel in connection with the exercise of the panel’s functions;

(b) to the members of a police and crime panel in connection with the exercise of their functions; and

(c) to one or more of the relevant local authorities covered by a police area in connection with the exercise of functions by—

(i) such an authority in relation to the police and crime panel for that police area,

(ii) that panel, or

(iii) the members of that panel.

(2) The Secretary of State may provide financial or other resources under sub-paragraph (1) subject to conditions.

(3) In the case of resources provided under sub-paragraph (1)(c), the conditions which may be imposed include conditions requiring a relevant local authority to pass resources to, or share resources with, another relevant local authority.

(4) The power under this paragraph to provide resources is in addition to the duty under paragraph 19(2).

Part 4

General provisions

Restrictions on membership of panel

21 The police and crime commissioner for a police area may not be a member of the police and crime panel for the area.

22 A person may not be a co-opted member of the police and crime panel for a police area if the person is any of the following—

(a) a member of the staff of the police and crime commissioner for that police area;

(b) a member of the civilian staff of the police force for that police area;

(c) a member of a local authority which is covered by that police area;

(d) a Member of Parliament;

(e) a member of the National Assembly for Wales;

(f) a member of the Scottish Parliament;

(g) a member of the European Parliament.

Panel arrangements

23 (1) Panel arrangements are arrangements for the establishment and maintenance of a police and crime panel.

(2) Panel arrangements must make provision about the co-option of, and holding of office by, the two co-opted members of the police and crime panel.

(3) Panel arrangements must include provision about—

(a) the term of office of appointed members and co-opted members of the panel;

(b) resignation, and removal, of appointed members and co-opted members of the panel;

(c) conditions for re-appointment of appointed members and co-opted members of the panel.

(4) Panel arrangements may not make rules of procedure for the police and crime panel (as to which see paragraph 24).

(5) Panel arrangements may make different provision for different cases.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 444

(6) The following persons must comply with the panel arrangements relating to a police and crime panel—

(a) each relevant local authority;

(b) each member of the police and crime panel.

Rules of procedure

24 (1) A police and crime panel must make rules of procedure for the panel.

(2) A police and crime panel’s rules of procedure must make provision about the appointment, resignation and removal of a person to chair the panel.

(3) The police and crime panel’s rules of procedure may, in particular, make provision about—

(a) the method of making decisions, and

(b) the formation of sub-committees.

(4) A sub-committee of a police and crime panel may not co-opt members.

(5) This paragraph is subject to paragraph 26.

Voting by members

25 All members of a police and crime panel may vote in proceedings of the panel.

Exercise of special functions

26 (1) The special functions of a police and crime panel may not be discharged by a committee or sub-committee of the panel.

(2) In this paragraph “special functions” means the functions conferred on a police and crime panel by—

(a) section 28(2) (scrutiny of police and crime plan);

(b) section 28(3) (scrutiny of annual report);

(c) Schedule 5 (issuing precepts); and

(d) Part 1 of Schedule 8 (scrutiny of appointment of chief constables).

Allowances

27 The panel arrangements may make provision about the payment of allowances to members of the police and crime panel.

Promotion of, and support, for panels

28 The panel arrangements must make provision for—

(a) the role of the police and crime panel to be promoted;

(b) administrative and other support to be given to the police and crime panel and its members;

(c) support and guidance to be given to—

(i) members of relevant local authorities,

(ii) members of the executives (if any) of relevant local authorities, and

(iii) officers of relevant local authorities,

in relation to the functions of the police and crime panel.

Validity of proceedings

29 The validity of the proceedings of a police and crime panel is not affected by a vacancy in the membership of the panel or a defect in appointment.

Duty to produce balanced panel

30 (1) In exercising functions under Part 2 or 3 of this Schedule, a relevant local authority must secure that (as far as is reasonably practicable) the balanced appointment objective is met.

(2) In exercising functions under Part 2 or 3 of this Schedule, the Secretary of State must secure that (as far as is reasonably practicable) the balanced appointment objective is met.

(3) The “balanced appointment objective” referred to in this paragraph is the objective that the appointed members of a police and crime panel (when taken together)—

(a) represent all parts of the relevant police area;

(b) represent the political make-up of—

(i) the relevant local authority, or

30 Mar 2011 : Column 445

(ii) the relevant local authorities (when taken together);

(c) have the skills, knowledge and experience necessary for the police and crime panel to discharge its functions effectively.

31 In co-opting members, a police and crime panel must secure that (as far as is reasonably practicable), the appointed and co-opted members of the panel (when taken together) have the skills, knowledge and experience necessary for the police and crime panel to discharge its functions effectively.

Application of other legislation

32 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations—

(a) modify a relevant enactment in its application to Part 2 panels, or

(b) provide for a relevant enactment not to apply to Part 2 panels.

(2) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, provide for a relevant enactment to apply (with or without modifications) to Part 3 panels.

(3) In this paragraph—

“Part 2 panels” means police and crime panels established and maintained under Part 2 of this Schedule (which are committees or joint committees of the relevant local authority or authorities);

“Part 3 panels” means police and crime panels established and maintained under Part 3 of this Schedule (which are not committees or joint committees of any local authority);

“relevant enactment” means an enactment which applies to a committee of a local authority or a joint committee of local authorities.

Regulations about notifications

33 The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about notifications to be given by persons in relation to—

(a) their compliance, or failure to comply, with any duty imposed under this Schedule; or

(b) their exercise, or failure to exercise, any power conferred under this Schedule.

Regulations about making nominations

34 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about—

(a) the making of nominations (including provision about when nominations lapse);

(b) the notification of nominations (whether to the nominee or any other person); and

(c) the acceptance and refusal of nominations (including provision about when nominations are to be treated as having been accepted or refused).

(2) In this paragraph “nomination” means a nomination by a relevant local authority or the Secretary of State of a person to be a member of a police and crime panel.

Regulations about making appointments

35 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about—

(a) the making of appointments;

(b) the notification of appointments (whether to the appointee or any other person); and

(c) the termination of appointments (including provision about when appointments are to be treated as having been terminated).

(2) In this paragraph “appointment” means—

(a) the appointment by a relevant local authority or the Secretary of State of a person as a member of a police and crime panel, and

(b) the co-option by a police and crime panel of a person to be a member of the panel.

30 Mar 2011 : Column 446

Regulations about modification etc of functions

36 (1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision for modifying, suspending, transferring or removing relevant functions insofar as they are exercisable in relation to police and crime panels in respect of which the Secretary of State is, or has been, required to nominate members.

(2) In this paragraph, “relevant functions” means functions conferred on relevant local authorities or the Secretary of State by this Schedule.

Interpretation

37 (1) A reference in this Schedule to a police area which covers a local authority is a reference to a police area whose area is the same as, or includes, all or part of the local authority’s area.

(2) The circumstances in which a relevant local authority may be taken, for the purposes of this Schedule, to have failed to nominate or appoint a councillor as a member of a police and crime panel include circumstances where a councillor who is nominated and appointed fails to remain as a member of the panel for such a period as the Secretary of State considers reasonable.

(3) In this Schedule—

“appointed member” means a member of a police and crime panel by virtue of paragraph 4(1)(a) or 13(1)(a);

“co-opted member” means a member of a police and crime panel by virtue of paragraph 4(1)(b) or 13(1)(b);

“councillor”, in relation to local authority, means a person who—

(a) is a member of the local authority, or(b) is the elected mayor of a mayor and cabinet executive (within the meaning of Part 2 of the Local Government Act 2000) of a relevant local authority;

“English police and crime panel” means a police and crime panel for a police area in England;

“local authority” means—

(a) in relation to England, a county council or a district council;(b) in relation to Wales, a county council or a county borough council;

“multi-authority police area” means a police area which covers two or more local authorities;

“panel arrangements” means the arrangements referred to in paragraph 23;

“relevant local authority”, in relation to a police area, means a local authority which the police area covers;

“single-authority police area” means a police area which covers only one local authority;

“Welsh police and crime panel” means a police and crime panel for a police area in Wales.’.—(Nick Herbert.)

Brought up.

Question put, That the schedule be added to the Bill.

The House divided:

Ayes 306, Noes 222.

Division No. 244]

[6.1 pm

AYES

Adams, Nigel

Afriyie, Adam

Aldous, Peter

Amess, Mr David

Andrew, Stuart

Arbuthnot, rh Mr James

Bacon, Mr Richard

Baker, Norman

Baker, Steve

Baldwin, Harriett

Barclay, Stephen

Baron, Mr John

Barwell, Gavin

Bebb, Guto

Beith, rh Sir Alan

Bellingham, Mr Henry

Berry, Jake

Binley, Mr Brian

Blackman, Bob

Blackwood, Nicola

Blunt, Mr Crispin

Boles, Nick

Bone, Mr Peter

Bottomley, Sir Peter

Bradley, Karen

Brady, Mr Graham

Brake, Tom

Bray, Angie

Brazier, Mr Julian

Bridgen, Andrew

Brine, Mr Steve

Brokenshire, James

Brooke, Annette

Bruce, Fiona

Bruce, rh Malcolm

Buckland, Mr Robert

Burley, Mr Aidan

Burns, Conor

Burns, rh Mr Simon

Burrowes, Mr David

Burt, Alistair

Burt, Lorely

Byles, Dan

Cairns, Alun

Cameron, rh Mr David

Campbell, rh Sir Menzies

Carmichael, rh Mr Alistair

Carmichael, Neil

Carswell, Mr Douglas

Cash, Mr William

Chishti, Rehman

Clark, rh Greg

Clarke, rh Mr Kenneth

Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey

Coffey, Dr Thérèse

Collins, Damian

Colvile, Oliver

Cox, Mr Geoffrey

Crabb, Stephen

Crockart, Mike

Crouch, Tracey

Davies, David T. C.

(Monmouth)

Davis, rh Mr David

de Bois, Nick

Dinenage, Caroline

Djanogly, Mr Jonathan

Dorrell, rh Mr Stephen

Dorries, Nadine

Doyle-Price, Jackie

Drax, Richard

Duddridge, James

Duncan, rh Mr Alan

Duncan Smith, rh Mr Iain

Dunne, Mr Philip

Ellis, Michael

Ellison, Jane

Ellwood, Mr Tobias

Elphicke, Charlie

Eustice, George

Evans, Graham

Evans, Jonathan

Evennett, Mr David

Fabricant, Michael

Farron, Tim

Featherstone, Lynne

Field, Mr Mark

Fox, rh Dr Liam

Francois, rh Mr Mark

Freeman, George

Freer, Mike

Fullbrook, Lorraine

Fuller, Richard

Gale, Mr Roger

Garnier, Mr Edward

Garnier, Mark

Gauke, Mr David

Gibb, Mr Nick

Gilbert, Stephen

Glen, John

Goldsmith, Zac

Goodwill, Mr Robert

Gove, rh Michael

Graham, Richard

Grant, Mrs Helen

Gray, Mr James

Grayling, rh Chris

Green, Damian

Greening, Justine

Grieve, rh Mr Dominic

Griffiths, Andrew

Gummer, Ben

Gyimah, Mr Sam

Hague, rh Mr William

Halfon, Robert

Hames, Duncan

Hammond, Stephen

Hancock, Matthew

Hancock, Mr Mike

Hands, Greg

Harper, Mr Mark

Harrington, Richard

Harris, Rebecca

Hart, Simon

Harvey, Nick

Haselhurst, rh Sir Alan

Hayes, Mr John

Heald, Mr Oliver

Heath, Mr David

Heaton-Harris, Chris

Hemming, John

Henderson, Gordon

Herbert, rh Nick

Hinds, Damian

Hoban, Mr Mark

Hollingbery, George

Hollobone, Mr Philip

Holloway, Mr Adam

Hopkins, Kris

Howarth, Mr Gerald

Howell, John

Hughes, rh Simon

Hunt, rh Mr Jeremy

Huppert, Dr Julian

Hurd, Mr Nick

Jackson, Mr Stewart

James, Margot

Javid, Sajid

Jenkin, Mr Bernard

Johnson, Gareth

Johnson, Joseph

Jones, Andrew

Jones, Mr David

Jones, Mr Marcus

Kelly, Chris

Kennedy, rh Mr Charles

Kirby, Simon

Knight, rh Mr Greg

Kwarteng, Kwasi

Laing, Mrs Eleanor

Lamb, Norman

Lancaster, Mark

Lansley, rh Mr Andrew

Latham, Pauline

Laws, rh Mr David

Lee, Jessica

Lee, Dr Phillip

Leech, Mr John

Lefroy, Jeremy

Leigh, Mr Edward

Leslie, Charlotte

Lewis, Brandon

Liddell-Grainger, Mr Ian

Lidington, rh Mr David

Lilley, rh Mr Peter

Lloyd, Stephen

Lopresti, Jack

Lord, Jonathan

Loughton, Tim

Luff, Peter

Lumley, Karen

Macleod, Mary

Main, Mrs Anne

May, rh Mrs Theresa

Maynard, Paul

McCartney, Jason

McCartney, Karl

McIntosh, Miss Anne

McLoughlin, rh Mr Patrick

McPartland, Stephen

McVey, Esther

Menzies, Mark

Metcalfe, Stephen

Miller, Maria

Mills, Nigel

Milton, Anne

Mordaunt, Penny

Morgan, Nicky

Morris, Anne Marie

Morris, David

Morris, James

Mosley, Stephen

Mowat, David

Munt, Tessa

Murrison, Dr Andrew

Neill, Robert

Newmark, Mr Brooks

Newton, Sarah

Nokes, Caroline

Norman, Jesse

Nuttall, Mr David

O'Brien, Mr Stephen

Offord, Mr Matthew

Ollerenshaw, Eric

Opperman, Guy

Ottaway, Richard

Parish, Neil

Patel, Priti

Paterson, rh Mr Owen

Pawsey, Mark

Penning, Mike

Penrose, John

Percy, Andrew

Perry, Claire

Phillips, Stephen

Poulter, Dr Daniel

Prisk, Mr Mark

Pritchard, Mark

Pugh, John

Raab, Mr Dominic

Randall, rh Mr John

Reckless, Mark

Redwood, rh Mr John

Rees-Mogg, Jacob

Reevell, Simon

Reid, Mr Alan

Robertson, Hugh

Robertson, Mr Laurence

Rogerson, Dan

Rosindell, Andrew

Rudd, Amber

Russell, Bob

Rutley, David

Sanders, Mr Adrian

Sandys, Laura

Scott, Mr Lee

Selous, Andrew

Shapps, rh Grant

Sharma, Alok

Shelbrooke, Alec

Simpson, Mr Keith

Skidmore, Chris

Smith, Miss Chloe

Smith, Henry

Smith, Julian

Smith, Sir Robert

Soames, Nicholas

Spencer, Mr Mark

Stephenson, Andrew

Stevenson, John

Stewart, Bob

Stewart, Iain

Stewart, Rory

Stride, Mel

Stunell, Andrew

Sturdy, Julian

Swales, Ian

Swayne, Mr Desmond

Swinson, Jo

Syms, Mr Robert

Tapsell, Sir Peter

Teather, Sarah

Thurso, John

Timpson, Mr Edward

Tomlinson, Justin

Tredinnick, David

Truss, Elizabeth

Turner, Mr Andrew

Tyrie, Mr Andrew

Uppal, Paul

Vaizey, Mr Edward

Vickers, Martin

Villiers, rh Mrs Theresa

Walker, Mr Charles

Walker, Mr Robin

Wallace, Mr Ben

Walter, Mr Robert

Ward, Mr David

Watkinson, Angela

Weatherley, Mike

Wharton, James

Wheeler, Heather

White, Chris

Whittaker, Craig

Whittingdale, Mr John

Wiggin, Bill

Williams, Mr Mark

Williams, Roger

Williams, Stephen

Williamson, Gavin

Wilson, Mr Rob

Wollaston, Dr Sarah

Wright, Jeremy

Wright, Simon

Yeo, Mr Tim

Young, rh Sir George

Zahawi, Nadhim

Tellers for the Ayes:

Mr Shailesh Vara and

Mark Hunter

NOES

Abbott, Ms Diane

Abrahams, Debbie

Ainsworth, rh Mr Bob

Alexander, rh Mr Douglas

Alexander, Heidi

Ali, Rushanara

Allen, Mr Graham

Bailey, Mr Adrian

Bain, Mr William

Balls, rh Ed

Banks, Gordon

Barron, rh Mr Kevin

Bayley, Hugh

Beckett, rh Margaret

Begg, Dame Anne

Bell, Sir Stuart

Benn, rh Hilary

Berger, Luciana

Betts, Mr Clive

Blackman-Woods, Roberta

Blears, rh Hazel

Blenkinsop, Tom

Blomfield, Paul

Blunkett, rh Mr David

Bradshaw, rh Mr Ben

Brennan, Kevin

Brown, rh Mr Gordon

Brown, rh Mr Nicholas

Brown, Mr Russell

Bryant, Chris

Buck, Ms Karen

Burnham, rh Andy

Byrne, rh Mr Liam

Campbell, Mr Alan

Campbell, Mr Ronnie

Caton, Martin

Chapman, Mrs Jenny

Clarke, rh Mr Tom

Clwyd, rh Ann

Coaker, Vernon

Coffey, Ann

Cooper, Rosie

Cooper, rh Yvette

Corbyn, Jeremy

Crausby, Mr David

Creasy, Stella

Cruddas, Jon

Cryer, John

Cunningham, Alex

Cunningham, Mr Jim

Cunningham, Tony

Curran, Margaret

Dakin, Nic

Danczuk, Simon

Darling, rh Mr Alistair

David, Mr Wayne

Davidson, Mr Ian

Davies, Geraint

De Piero, Gloria

Dobbin, Jim

Dobson, rh Frank

Docherty, Thomas

Dodds, rh Mr Nigel

Donaldson, rh Mr Jeffrey M.

Doran, Mr Frank

Dowd, Jim

Doyle, Gemma

Dromey, Jack

Durkan, Mark

Eagle, Ms Angela

Edwards, Jonathan

Efford, Clive

Elliott, Julie

Ellman, Mrs Louise

Engel, Natascha

Evans, Chris

Farrelly, Paul

Field, rh Mr Frank

Flello, Robert

Flint, rh Caroline

Flynn, Paul

Fovargue, Yvonne

Gapes, Mike

Gilmore, Sheila

Glass, Pat

Glindon, Mrs Mary

Godsiff, Mr Roger

Goggins, rh Paul

Greatrex, Tom

Green, Kate

Greenwood, Lilian

Griffith, Nia

Gwynne, Andrew

Hain, rh Mr Peter

Hamilton, Mr David

Hanson, rh Mr David

Harris, Mr Tom

Havard, Mr Dai

Hendrick, Mark

Hepburn, Mr Stephen

Hermon, Lady

Heyes, David

Hillier, Meg

Hilling, Julie

Hodge, rh Margaret

Hodgson, Mrs Sharon

Hoey, Kate

Hood, Mr Jim

Hopkins, Kelvin

Hunt, Tristram

Irranca-Davies, Huw

Jackson, Glenda

Jarvis, Dan

Johnson, rh Alan

Johnson, Diana

Jones, Helen

Jones, Mr Kevan

Jones, Susan Elan

Joyce, Eric

Kaufman, rh Sir Gerald

Keeley, Barbara

Kendall, Liz

Khan, rh Sadiq

Lammy, rh Mr David

Lavery, Ian

Lazarowicz, Mark

Leslie, Chris

Lewis, Mr Ivan

Lloyd, Tony

Llwyd, rh Mr Elfyn

Love, Mr Andrew

Lucas, Caroline

Lucas, Ian

Mactaggart, Fiona

Mahmood, Shabana

Mann, John

Marsden, Mr Gordon

McCabe, Steve

McCann, Mr Michael

McCarthy, Kerry

McClymont, Gregg

McDonnell, John

McGovern, Alison

McGovern, Jim

McGuire, rh Mrs Anne

McKechin, Ann

Meacher, rh Mr Michael

Mearns, Ian

Miliband, rh David

Miliband, rh Edward

Miller, Andrew

Mitchell, Austin

Moon, Mrs Madeleine

Morden, Jessica

Morrice, Graeme

(Livingston)

Morris, Grahame M.

(Easington)

Munn, Meg

Murphy, rh Mr Jim

Murphy, rh Paul

Murray, Ian

Nandy, Lisa

Nash, Pamela

Onwurah, Chi

Osborne, Sandra

Owen, Albert

Pearce, Teresa

Perkins, Toby

Phillipson, Bridget

Pound, Stephen

Qureshi, Yasmin

Raynsford, rh Mr Nick

Reed, Mr Jamie

Reeves, Rachel

Reynolds, Emma

Reynolds, Jonathan

Riordan, Mrs Linda

Robertson, John

Robinson, Mr Geoffrey

Rotheram, Steve

Roy, Mr Frank

Roy, Lindsay

Ruane, Chris

Ruddock, rh Joan

Seabeck, Alison

Shannon, Jim

Sharma, Mr Virendra

Sheerman, Mr Barry

Sheridan, Jim

Shuker, Gavin

Skinner, Mr Dennis

Smith, rh Mr Andrew

Smith, Angela

Smith, Nick

Smith, Owen

Spellar, rh Mr John

Straw, rh Mr Jack

Stringer, Graham

Stuart, Ms Gisela

Sutcliffe, Mr Gerry

Tami, Mark

Thomas, Mr Gareth

Thornberry, Emily

Timms, rh Stephen

Trickett, Jon

Turner, Karl

Twigg, Derek

Umunna, Mr Chuka

Vaz, Valerie

Walley, Joan

Watson, Mr Tom

Watts, Mr Dave

Wicks, rh Malcolm

Williams, Hywel

Williamson, Chris

Wilson, Phil

Winnick, Mr David

Winterton, rh Ms Rosie

Wood, Mike

Woodcock, John

Woodward, rh Mr Shaun

Wright, David

Wright, Mr Iain

Tellers for the Noes:

Graham Jones and

Mr David Anderson

Question accordingly agreed to.