10 Oct 2011 : Column 98

There is no question but that those convicted of a recordable offence should have their DNA stored indefinitely; that is not a point between us in this House. It is necessary but insufficient, as the Government apparently accept which is why they seek to go further. The European Court ruled that indiscriminately keeping the DNA of those arrested but not convicted of a recordable offence was not proportionate. It breached the famous article 8 on the right to privacy and family life, which after last week’s shenanigans may well be known from now on as “the cat’s clause”. [Interruption.] That sounded good in front of the bathroom mirror this morning! The issue therefore is for how long the DNA of those arrested but not charged or convicted should be retained, consistent with the principle of necessity and proportionality. The Government say three years, in accordance with the so-called Scottish model; we say six years, in accordance with all the evidence.

It is worth mentioning that the Crime and Security Act 2010 broke from the Scottish model in not retaining the physical material from which the DNA is derived. That must be destroyed within six months after it has been translated into a series of numbers known as a DNA profile. This meets an important criticism by the European Court and addresses the concerns of those who are rightly worried about the purposes to which such genomes could be put. The Scottish model retains the DNA of those arrested but not convicted of serious offences only for three years, with a provision for a two-year extension that is so complex, bureaucratic and time-consuming that it has never been used or even applied for.

The three-year retention period used in Scotland is not based on any evidence or analysis that I can find. The figure appears to have been plucked from the air. The Minister will tell us that a review of the Scottish system by a Professor Fraser a year after it was introduced proves that the system works, but that review did not assess whether a longer retention period would be beneficial or whether retention for three years was detrimental to solving serious crimes. The retention of the DNA of those arrested but not convicted can be justified as necessary and proportionate under the terms of the European Court’s decision if their risk of being re-arrested is higher than that of the general population. Analysis conducted by the Home Office suggests that that is indeed the case and that the risk falls to that of the level of the rest of the population gradually over a period of six years. It dips after three years, but it leaves a significant tail that is not eradicated until after six years.

This analysis also established that the propensity to be re-arrested is not determined at all by the nature of the original alleged offence; in other words, there is no case for maintaining the DNA of those arrested but not convicted of serious offences. For instance, Mark Dixie, the murderer of Sally Anne Bowman, had his DNA taken because he was involved in a pub brawl—a minor offence. The provisions in the 2010 Act which we seek to retain are therefore based on evidence, unlike the Scottish model which is based on no evidence whatever.

The coalition partners decided to adopt the Scottish model when they were in opposition, since when they have struggled to make the facts fit their policy, rather than their policy fit the facts. Therefore, every so often they ask for a new hazard curve—the research that was done when I was Home Secretary—the latest of which they have published and circulated, claiming, tendentiously, that it is broadly supportive of the approach taken by