The
Committee consisted of the following
Members:
Chairs:
Mr
David Amess
, †
Hugh
Bayley
Alexander,
Heidi (Lewisham East)
(Lab)
†
Barwell,
Gavin (Croydon Central)
(Con)
†
Bruce,
Fiona (Congleton)
(Con)
†
Cairns,
Alun (Vale of Glamorgan)
(Con)
†
Clark,
Greg (Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local
Government)
†
Dakin,
Nic (Scunthorpe)
(Lab)
†
Dromey,
Jack (Birmingham, Erdington)
(Lab)
†
Elliott,
Julie (Sunderland Central)
(Lab)
†
Gilbert,
Stephen (St Austell and Newquay)
(LD)
†
Howell,
John (Henley) (Con)
†
Keeley,
Barbara (Worsley and Eccles South)
(Lab)
†
Lewis,
Brandon (Great Yarmouth)
(Con)
†
McDonagh,
Siobhain (Mitcham and Morden)
(Lab)
†
Mearns,
Ian (Gateshead)
(Lab)
Morris,
James (Halesowen and Rowley Regis)
(Con)
†
Neill,
Robert (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Communities and
Local Government)
†
Ollerenshaw,
Eric (Lancaster and Fleetwood)
(Con)
†
Raynsford,
Mr Nick (Greenwich and Woolwich)
(Lab)
†
Reynolds,
Jonathan (Stalybridge and Hyde)
(Lab/Co-op)
†
Seabeck,
Alison (Plymouth, Moor View)
(Lab)
Simpson,
David (Upper Bann)
(DUP)
†
Smith,
Henry (Crawley)
(Con)
†
Stewart,
Iain (Milton Keynes South)
(Con)
†
Stunell,
Andrew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Communities and
Local Government)
†
Ward,
Mr David (Bradford East)
(LD)
†
Wiggin,
Bill (North Herefordshire)
(Con)
Sarah Davies, Committee
Clerk
† attended the
Committee
Public
Bill
Committee
Tuesday
1 February
2011
(Afternoon)
[Hugh
Bayley
in the
Chair]
Localism
Bill
Clause
5
Powers
to make supplemental
provision
4
pm
Question
(this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
The
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government (Andrew Stunell): It is good to serve under your
chairmanship, Mr Bayley. We have had a lively and interesting debate on
clause stand part and I should like to sum up the points that have been
made and explain exactly what the clause does and does not say. I shall
start with subsection (1), which I described this morning as the
barrier buster. It enables the Secretary of State to amend by order,
revoke, repeal or disapply any provision that prevents or restricts
local authorities from exercising the general power. It is
similar to the provision in section 5 of the Local Government Act 2000
and the powers under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. As
I explained, it is governed by the procedure set out in clause
6(1).
The general
power is only part of the story. It brings about real change and it can
ensure that local authorities are truly free to act. But it is also
essential to ensure that unnecessary barriers are removed. That is what
this subsection is about. It is what local government has asked for. I
referred to the vanguard authorities, and quite a long queue of other
local authorities have come to us with propositions, hoping to jump the
gun, so to speak, on this provision. The Government recognise that the
order is very broad and a number of Members have drawn attention to
that, but it is needed to ensure that existing barriers to the
operation of the new power can be removed and can deliver freedom from
central control. Use of the order-making power is subject to the
appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. Again, I pointed out this
morning that this is set out in clause 6 which we will come to
shortly.
Subsection
(2) is the simplifier. It enables the Secretary of State to remove any
provision that overlaps the general power. Its purpose is to allow
simplification of the law in order to reduce overlap and confusion. It
is subject to a negative procedure—hon. Members who are diligent
readers can see that set out in clause 201—unless it is used in
conjunction with the barrier buster. This is appropriate as it only
enables the removal of obsolete or overlapping specific powers
simplifying the law; it does not enable the making of any material
change. That brings me back to our discussion this morning on the
different procedures that apply to the various orders that can be made
under the clause and I thought it might be helpful if I clarified what
these are.
Orders made
under subsection (1)—the barrier buster—are subject to
the procedure set out in clause 6. In short, this is modelled on the
procedure adopted for legislative reform orders under the 2006 Act.
Orders made under subsection (2)—what I described as the
simplifier subsection—are subject to a negative procedure which
is set in clause 201. Orders made under subsections (3) and (4), which
impose restrictions or conditions, are subject to an affirmative
procedure, which is also set out in clause 201. Subsections (3) and (4)
provide the Secretary of State with powers first, to prevent local
authorities from exercising the general power in certain circumstances
and secondly, to set conditions around the use of the power. They
provide a necessary safeguard, given the breadth of the new power, to
ensure that risks to both local government finances and the Exchequer
are
managed.
The
Government expect to use the power in these subsections very rarely.
They might be used, for instance, to deal with risks that arise from
authorities’ use of the new general power to engage in certain
new financial transactions, perhaps of a sort that has not yet even
been invented. That power is subject to an affirmative procedure, the
same procedure that was applied to the similar power taken by the
previous Administration to prevent the misuse of the well-being power.
If the power is to be used effectively, it may need to be used rapidly
and, therefore, such a procedure gives the right balance between
ensuring proper scrutiny of attempts to curtail local authority powers
on the one hand, and swiftness of action to protect communities on the
other. When I responded to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East
this morning, I hope I illustrated why that was necessary, and how it
might have effect. Subsections (5) and (6) enable the Secretary of
State to exercise these powers in respect of all or any particular type
of local
authority.
Orders
made under clause 5 are subject to the consultation requirements set
out in subsection (7). I want to reassure the hon. Member for Worsley
and Eccles South that, contrary to what she said, the Secretary of
State, having consulted, cannot simply ignore the results. General
public law principles have effect and the Secretary of State must have
regard to the outcome of that consultation and must report to
Parliament on
it.
Question
put, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
The
Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes
7.
Division
No.
3
]
AYES
Barwell,
Gavin
Bruce,
Fiona
Cairns,
Alun
Clark,
rh
Greg
Gilbert,
Stephen
Howell,
John
Lewis,
Brandon
Neill,
Robert
Ollerenshaw,
Eric
Smith,
Henry
Stewart,
Iain
Stunell,
Andrew
Ward,
Mr
David
Wiggin,
Bill
NOES
Dakin,
Nic
Dromey,
Jack
Elliott,
Julie
Keeley,
Barbara
Mearns,
Ian
Reynolds,
Jonathan
Seabeck,
Alison
Question
accordingly agreed to.
Clause 5
ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
6
Procedure
for orders under section
5
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Barbara
Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South) (Lab):
I welcome you, Mr
Bayley, to the Chair; it is a pleasure to serve under your
chairmanship.
The
Minister will understand that we think the powers in clause 5, on which
we have just voted, are too sweeping, because we covered that at some
length this morning. In terms of the procedure for the orders, will the
Minister tell us more about the process of further consultation? There
is concern about consultation—I still have great concerns. If
there had been a belief on the part of the Government and ministerial
team in consultation, there would have been rather more consultation on
parts of this Bill. For instance, the whole section regarding community
empowerment measures has had very little consultation or scrutiny. That
makes it difficult for local authorities to plan. It also makes it
difficult for voluntary and community organisations, because all those
organisations are currently affected by the cuts imposed by the
Government. Will future consultation on any changes affecting measures
in the Bill be better than that we have seen in the run-up to the
Bill?
Andrew
Stunell:
The correct answer to the question is, yes, we
certainly intend the consultation to be appropriate and thorough, and
to be taken seriously by the Secretary of State when he receives it, as
he is duty bound to
do.
Question
put and agreed to.
Clause 6
accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
7
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
8
General
powers of certain fire and rescue
authorities
Jack
Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab):
I beg to move
amendment 31, in
clause 8, page 7, line 39, leave
out ‘may by order’ and
insert
‘must
report to Parliament on how that provision impacts on the exercise of
the power conferred by section 5A(1), and how the Secretary of State
proposes to address this by presenting a Bill to Parliament
to’.
The
Chair:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 32, in clause 8, page 7,
line 42, leave out from ‘then’ to
‘amend’ and
insert
‘the
Secretary of State must report to Parliament on how that power impacts
on the exercise of the power conferred by section 5A(1), and how he or
she proposes to address this by presenting a Bill to Parliament
to’.
Amendment
33, in
clause 8, page 7, line 46, leave
out from beginning to end of line 16 on page
8.
Amendment
34, in
clause 8, page 8, line 19, leave
out from beginning to end of
Clause.
Jack
Dromey:
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship,
Mr Bayley.
In principle,
we broadly welcome the Government’s proposals to provide fire
and rescue authorities with the new powers contained in clause 8. The
Bill does not provide those authorities with a general power of
competence, but the powers are wide-ranging and will enable the fire
authority to do anything connected with or incidental to its functions.
The powers are, therefore,
welcome.
We
are, however, extremely concerned about and oppose the far-reaching
powers provided to the Secretary of State. He seeks to give powers with
one hand and take them away with the other. On the one hand, he allows
himself the power
to
“by
order amend, repeal, revoke or disapply any statutory
provision”
that
he
thinks
“prevents
or restricts relevant fire and rescue
authorities”
from
exercising their new powers, thus giving himself powers that should
face proper scrutiny in Parliament. On the other hand, he allows
himself
to
“by
order make provision preventing relevant fire and rescue
authorities”
from
doing anything under the new power specified in the order. That
effectively proscribes the fire and rescue authorities from carrying
out anything that the Secretary of State deems
inappropriate.
We
are familiar with the epistles from Brentwood and Ongar, which are
regularly issued to local government on everything from bin collection
to parties on the occasion of the royal wedding. However, as has
already been mentioned, the Bill contains 142 order-making powers for
the Secretary of State, and that does not sit well with the rhetoric on
localism. The Minister said this morning that the powers are
“limitless”. In reality, however, they are limited by 142
powers. We are unable to scrutinise the regulation properly, because it
has not yet been published, and we do not yet have the code that is
being worked upon by the Select Committees on Communities and Local
Government and on Political and Constitutional Reform, even though we
were promised it this morning. This is a “now you see it, now
you don’t” localism, and it would be closer to the truth
to call the legislation the centralisation Bill from hereon
in.
As
we have already discussed in relation to local authorities, we believe
that the extension of the Secretary of State’s powers is too
broad. They could be used to repeal or revoke any number of statutory
provisions with minimal parliamentary scrutiny. Such a provision is
unnecessary and confers on the Secretary of State an extensive and
unwarranted power. It is worrying that he should seek such broad
powers, even in principle, given his rhetoric on
localism.
I
will cite two examples of that Churchillian rhetoric on localism. The
first is from the Secretary of State
himself:
“The
Localism Bill is one of the most radical pieces of legislation to be
debated in this chamber for decades…It represents everything
this Government stands for and is the cornerstone for everything we
want to do. It will revitalise local democracy and put power back where
it belongs—in the hands of the
people.
For
too long, Government has believed that Whitehall was the centre of the
universe.”
Well,
there will be 142 opportunities for it to remain the centre of the
universe. He goes on to say:
“We
genuinely believe in local democracy, in local communities, and in
local solutions… By pushing power out, getting Government out of
the way, letting people run their own affairs; we can build a stronger,
fairer
Britain.”
Yet
he reserves for himself 142 powers to dictate the terms of that
stronger, fairer
Britain.
4.15
pm
Brandon
Lewis (Great Yarmouth) (Con):
At the risk of repeating
this morning’s debate, could the hon. Gentleman reflect on the
fact that some of those powers, which he has referred to as being
centralising, actually give the Secretary of State the power to do what
local government wants and to help get things out of the way so that
local government can do what it needs to do? That includes the fire
service, which surely will not always want to wait for the time frame
that the passage of a Bill through Parliament would take. This seems a
good way of moving out power locally, and is quite the opposite of the
argument that he is
making.
Jack
Dromey:
There are two responses to that, both of which are
based on trust. First, if we are legislating for a general power of
competence, do we trust local government to exercise that properly?
Secondly—the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for saying
this—we do not trust the Secretary of State to exercise his
powers properly. I will come to some examples of that
later.
Brandon
Lewis:
Just as we discussed this morning, particularly on
the first two amendments, these are powers that enable the Secretary of
State to move things or waive things that local government has
requested he moves. It is not the other way round; it is being driven
from local government upwards. Again, it seems to be the opposite of
what the hon. Gentleman is
arguing.
Jack
Dromey:
In the event that there was a need, based on
experience, to act, I am confident that, with co-operation between the
parties, that could be done quickly and effectively through a Bill.
Looking at past precedent, it could even be accommodated and
accomplished within three
days.
Returning
to the Churchillian rhetoric, the Minister of State, Department for
Communities and Local Government has
said:
“We
are using the powers of the Government and Parliament to give power
away rather than to increase it for ourselves. That is the direction in
which this Government will continue to go. We will give more and more
power to the
people.”
He
goes on to say
that
“there
is something about the British people that means they do not like being
told what to
do”—
I
agree with
that—
“they
have a quality that makes them want to push back when people try to
boss and bully
them”.
I
agree with that, too. But he then goes on to say that
they—describing us—should not be
concerned
“about
the Secretary of State's powers. The key power is the general power of
competence.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2011;
Vol. 521, c. 653-55.]
Would that the key
power, the general power of competence, was what we are talking about,
but the problem is that it is constrained by the ability of the
Secretary of State to use 142 powers to undermine
it.
Gavin
Barwell (Croydon Central) (Con):
Having sat through this
morning’s proceedings and the start of this afternoon’s
deliberations, I am confused about the approach that Labour Members are
taking to this issue. The hon. Gentleman is talking about the number of
order-making powers, and he is essentially saying that the Secretary of
State is taking too much power. This morning the hon. Member for
Worsley and Eccles South, who is sitting next to him, criticised those
on the Government Front Bench for taking a laissez-faire
approach—that is the phrase she used—because the
Government were not planning to force local authorities to keep minimum
standards of social care. Are they in favour of more central direction,
or
less?
Jack
Dromey:
We need to distinguish between two things. On the
one hand, is it legitimate for Parliament to prescribe the minimum
standards that should be provided, particularly to vulnerable groups,
by local government? Yes, there is a powerful case for that. But, on
the other hand, the Bill offers the illusion of localism while saying
that the Government will retain 142 powers to constrain that localism
if they see
fit.
Brandon
Lewis:
I, again, want to clarify the use of those 142
powers—this came up in the evidence sessions, too. In many
cases, those powers are to free up, not to
restrain.
In
the case we had this morning and two of the cases listed here, we can
see that those powers are for the Secretary of State to use where local
government requests it to free up statutory instruments, so that local
government can move forward. That is quite the opposite from what he is
arguing, which is why I am getting confused. The Opposition seem to be
arguing against their own
case.
Jack
Dromey:
Not for one moment; we have studied international
experience with great interest. In this country, hon. Members will know
that local authorities are creatures of statute, whereas in some of our
continental counterpart countries, local authorities reside within a
constitutional framework. I shall give some examples of how local
authorities are free elsewhere, including in one common law
jurisdiction.
In France,
there is a three-tier system of government—regions, departments
and communes, each with their own territorial competence. They are able
to
“settle
any matter within its territorial jurisdiction provided it is not
devolved by law upon another
authority.”
In
Sweden—again, I shall quote from a Government
statement—councils
“shall
conduct their own
affairs.”
That
has been interpreted as a power of general competence and gives
councils the ability to act in the best interests of their local
residents. That is expressed as being “any matter” by way
of public interest within their boundaries that can be provided on a
not-for-profit basis. In Denmark, there is the general power of the
kommuner to act in the interests of the community, provided that the
action is not provided by another institution or arm of
Government.
New Zealand,
which has a common law tradition, adopted in 2003 a power of general
competence and a formulation of the roles and responsibilities of local
government. That involves, and I
quote:
“a
statement of the purpose of local government, being to enable local
decision-making and promote well-being…a definition of role,
being to give effect to these purposes and to perform the duties and
exercise rights confirmed by legislation…a statement of status
and powers confirming that…authorities have full capacity to
carry on or undertake any activity or business, do any act or enter
into any transaction, and to fulfil this capacity…full rights,
powers and
privileges.”
That
is not what is being offered by this centralism
Bill.
Henry
Smith (Crawley) (Con):
I have been fascinated to hear the
tour around Europe and the Commonwealth with regard to how local
government operates; I am just perplexed about why that research was
not carried out during the last 13 years and why the Labour Government
did not enact any such thing. The general power of competence does many
of the things described in other countries and therefore represents a
radical shift in power for the first time in many
years.
Jack
Dromey:
It certainly represents a radical shift of power
to the Secretary of State, with his 142
powers.
The
Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government
(Greg Clark):
I say gently to the hon. Gentleman
that if he wants to have a debate about whether the Secretary of
State’s powers need to be put in a different context, it is
worth separating out the powers that allow the Secretary of State to
bust the barriers that get in the way of local authorities and fire and
rescue authorities.
Surely the
hon. Gentleman can have no objection to the simplification provision in
the Bill. Why does he not concentrate more narrowly on the clauses to
which he objects? We may then be able to make some progress on those
points.
Barbara
Keeley:
On a point of order, Mr Bayley. We seem to have
two Ministers speaking in this section. I did not think that that was
allowed. Perhaps you could advise
me.
The
Chair:
I do not see a problem with Committee members
contributing. It was an intervention and Mr Dromey gave way,
so I imagine he wanted to hear what was being
said.
Jack
Dromey:
If the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg
Clark) wishes to reconsider the sweeping scope of the powers that the
Secretary of State has taken in the Bill and to come back to the
Committee and the House to acknowledge that, in light of the force of
the argument, it might be wise to circumscribe those powers greatly, we
will be ready for that
discussion.
Greg
Clark:
What I say to the hon. Gentleman is this. I made a
commitment in the evidence session that we will consider reasonable
cases. We all want to devolve powers. He persists in regarding as a
Henry VIII power the provision to take out duplicate legislation, but
we
are not in the territory to do that. I say again gently to him that he
may want to reflect overnight on whether he wants to narrow his
points.
Barbara
Keeley
rose—
The
Chair:
Order. The hon. Lady must sit down for a minute.
Under our rules, it is completely impossible to have a three-way
debate. She is able to make a point of order, but she cannot reply to
an intervention that has been made to another Member’s speech.
She can, of course, speak later if she wants or even intervene on her
colleague. Mr Dromey has the floor at the
moment.
Barbara
Keeley:
Can my hon. Friend give way to
me?
The
Chair:
Of course he can do
that.
Barbara
Keeley:
The Minister said that we as a Committee can go
through the powers one by one. The other point about the Henry VIII
power is that it is the note from the Department of Communities and
Local Government to the Regulatory Reform Committee that describes
these powers as Henry VIII powers. That is where it comes
from.
The
Chair:
Order. It would help the Committee if we had
two-way debates. Although that comment was in the form of an
intervention to Mr Dromey, it appeared to be addressed to the Minister.
Perhaps it would make more sense for the hon. Lady to speak later
during this debate. There is no difficulty with two Opposition
Front-Bench spokesmen speaking in the same debate just as
there is no difficulty with two Ministers doing so. Mr
Dromey has the
floor.
Jack
Dromey:
Thank you for your ruling, Mr Bayley. It will add
to the wisdom of our
deliberations.
Before
I continue, let me say that the rather disparaging remark about
European and common law comparisons is to be regretted. We learn
valuable lessons from where a general power of competence has worked
elsewhere in Europe and
internationally.
The
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government (Robert Neill):
If the hon. Gentleman is
looking for valuable lessons and comparisons, will he take on board the
opinion of Mr Mike Bennett, the assistant director general
of the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives, who said
that
“the wording of
the general power of competence looks good in the Localism
Bill”?
If
it is satisfied, why is not the hon.
Gentleman?
The
Chair:
Order. Perhaps I should remind those on the Back
Benches that they are not excluded from this debate. Mr Dromey has the
floor.
Jack
Dromey:
I shall make reference to the evidence of SOLACE
later on. We are also concerned that in retaining the power to impose
an order, the Secretary of
State may undermine the flexibility of fire and rescue authorities and
their ability to provide the services that they believe are
necessary.
That fear was
expressed by Dr Keohane in relation to local authorities, but it is no
less relevant to fire and rescue authorities. The amendments in these
sections have been grouped, so I will take each one in turn to explain
the purpose of each
amendment.
Where
it is deemed that a statutory provision prevents or restricts fire and
rescue authorities from exercising their powers, or if it overlaps with
those powers, amendments 31 and 32 will require the Secretary of State
to report to Parliament on how the provision impacts on the exercise of
the power conferred by proposed new section 5A of the Fire and Rescue
Services Act 2004 in subsection (1) and on how the Secretary of State
proposes to address that by presenting a Bill to
Parliament.
Alun
Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con):
Does the hon. Gentleman
not accept that even if a credible case can be made from today’s
debate, amendment 32 really blows out all the credibility around those
other amendments for which a credible case could be made—not
that I accept that.
Clause 8,
which amendment 32 seeks to amend, is extremely restricted as it is,
and it relates to the overlap of power. It relates to making it easier
for fire authorities, and other authorities, to prevent the risk of
judicial review, delay and confusion. Does that not expose all the
other amendments as purely spoiling
motions?
4.30
pm
Jack
Dromey:
Not for one moment. We believe that localism
should be localism, and that a general power of competence should be a
general power of competence. We are not in favour of unreasonably
constraining a power that all parties in the House have
welcomed.
Stephen
Gilbert (St Austell and Newquay) (LD):
I am curious about
what the hon. Gentleman has just said. If I am following the Opposition
argument correctly, they want to retain powers to ensure national
standards. Do you have any idea of how many powers you would retain?
Would it be 142, 242 or 542?
The
Chair:
Order. I, as Chair, do not retain any powers at
all.
Jack
Dromey:
The hon. Gentleman, like me, is new to this House.
As I understand it, the purpose of the Committee stage is to scrutinise
the Government’s Bill, not our Bill. We accept that
circumstances might arise that require action in light of experience
and the issue is about how we deal with that. Do we have an inadequate
mechanism with potentially dangerous consequences and 142 powers
retained, or do we have the full scrutiny of Parliament? We are in
favour of the full scrutiny of Parliament.
Gavin
Barwell:
On the issue of constraining the general power of
competence, what does the hon. Gentleman have to say in response to the
point made by the Under-Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Hazel
Grove (Andrew Stunell), in the previous debate? He
said that the order-making powers taken by the Government are equivalent
to those taken by the previous Government in relation to the general
power of
well-being.
Jack
Dromey:
There is common cause in favour of legislating for
a general power of competence. We learn valuable lessons from history,
including the necessity of getting the relationship between local and
central Government right. We think that the Bill gets it wrong because
it retains too much power for the Secretary of State and therefore
frustrates the thrust for localism.
Several
hon. Members
rose
—
Jack
Dromey:
I have been generous with my time, and I would
like to continue. Where it is deemed that a statutory provision
prevents or restricts fire and rescue authorities from exercising their
powers, or that it overlaps with those powers, amendments 31 and 32
would require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the
impact of the provision, so that appropriate action can be
taken.
Crucially,
that would apply a more reasonable and democratic level of rigour to
the procedures, and more adequate safeguards against the unnecessary
use of power. In the evidence sessions, Councillor Porter of the Local
Government Association said that there are 142 places where the
Secretary of State has taken reserved powers in the Bill. He
added:
“If
the most needed ones are retained, and the Secretary of State is asked
to speak about them in the House…it would give the sector more
confidence”––[Official Report, Localism
Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 25,
Q36.]
Those
are his words.
We agree with
Councillor Andy Porter. In a document entitled “Memorandum by
the Department for Communities and Local Government”, produced
for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the power in
proposed new section 5C(i) to the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 is
described as a “Henry VIII power.” That is appropriate
for the Secretary of State.
We understand
that in some circumstances, a relevant fire and rescue authority might
find itself unexpectedly constrained by restrictive statutory
provisions. However, a far more appropriate mechanism for dealing with
such an eventuality would be proper consideration by
Parliament.
There will be
fewer examples of where that power may need to be exercised than in
relation to the general power available under the Bill to local
authorities. Nevertheless, we recognise that the powers should be as
effective as possible. We believe strongly that fire and rescue
authorities should be able to operate as freely as possible. We
therefore support a mechanism that would allow parliamentary review of
restrictive statutory provisions in Parliament through the passage of a
Bill.
Amendments 33
and 34 remove the proscriptions applied to the powers that the Bill
hands to fire and rescue authorities. We believe that such sweeping
powers will undermine those authorities’ ability and confidence
to use their powers. Andy Sawford of the Local Government Information
Unit said that the limitations are not necessary.
The document
issued by the Department for Communities and Local Government says that
the powers that amendments 33 and 34 seek to remove are
considered
“necessary
in order to prevent fire and rescue authorities from pursuing
activities which are within the ambit of their extended powers but are
considered seriously undesirable”.
Considered undesirable
by whom? On what past experience of fire and rescue authorities is that
based? Our experience has certainly been that they are admirable
institutions and provide the country with a first-class service of
which we can be proud.
Given the
Secretary of State’s rhetoric about localism, would it not be
preferable to allow fire and rescue authorities the discretion to
determine what is seriously undesirable? Does the Secretary of State
not trust them? Should such a situation arise, would it not be
preferable for the Secretary of State to bring a Bill before Parliament
to make the necessary amendments to this Bill?
The same
document regarding the powers in the Bill admits that there
is
“no
indication of how the powers might be exercised in terms of the
activities which might be
prohibited”.
Are
Ministers therefore taking powers in accordance with the views of
Donald Rumsfeld? He said that there are known unknowns and
“unknown
unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t
know.”
We
argue that as it is not indicated where such powers might be necessary,
it would be better for them not to be conferred on the Secretary of
State. Should known or unknown unknowns arise, the Minister can
introduce a Bill to Parliament.
Greg
Clark:
The hon. Gentleman seems to think that a Bill is
necessary to do any business in Parliament, despite the fact that
statutory instruments can be debated by both Houses. Is it his view
that statutory instruments should be abolished and everything should be
done through a Bill? In what circumstances does he think that statutory
instruments should be
used?
Jack
Dromey:
Historically, statutory instruments have been the
House’s stock in trade, but the fundamental point is this:
either the Government believe in localism and in setting fire and
rescue authorities free or they do not. Our view is that those
authorities should be trusted to use the powers that will be available
to them to provide a yet better service—I shall give an example
in a moment—and to innovate. In the highly unlikely
event—we cannot conceive of one—that any serious problem
arises requiring the public interest to be defended, the Government
could introduce a Bill in the House.
Greg
Clark:
This goes to the heart of the matter. I think that
both sides are united in regarding it as essential to have
parliamentary scrutiny of any provisions that might prove necessary,
but I am still at a loss to understand why a Bill rather than a
well-debated and scrutinised statutory instrument is necessary in all
circumstances, given that the point will usually be quite
narrow.
Jack
Dromey:
Because the Government have said, “As part
of the big society, we believe in localism and we will legislate
accordingly to set the people free”, and in this case it is to
set fire and rescue authorities free. The only problem is that the
Government then say, “We’re not sure. We want to retain
controls and have 142 powers to
exercise.”
Greg
Clark:
May I have one final try? I am clearly not
expressing myself terribly well. As far as I can understand from these
exchanges, there is a unity of view that sometimes in the future it may
be necessary to introduce some changes to the powers under the power of
general competence. The narrow issue to be debated is whether it is
always and everywhere necessary for that to be debated through a Bill
or whether there are circumstances in which it could be done through a
statutory instrument, for which various levels of scrutiny are
available. It is a reasonable question to ask. Since we agree that the
measure will be needed in certain circumstances and that Parliament
should debate it, why is the hon. Gentleman’s point that we can
only, always and everywhere do so through a
Bill?
Jack
Dromey:
There are two fundamental points. First, I repeat
that we believe in trusting fire and rescue authorities. We are
confident that they will exercise the powers admirably and well in the
public interest. Secondly, in the history of debate in the House, there
is a marked contrast between the scrutiny inherent in, on the one hand,
a Bill brought before it and, on the other, the sometimes cursory
consideration given to a statutory instrument. It is entirely
legitimate for the Government to say that circumstances might arise in
which they have to, with reluctance, constrain the power of general
competence, but that they hope to avoid those circumstances. However,
in the event that such circumstances arise, our strong view is that the
appropriate way to deal with that is through a Bill, which we hope will
be the exception rather than the
rule.
There
is another, perhaps more important, dimension to the argument on why
fire and rescue authorities require the new powers and why they would
benefit if the Committee supported the amendment. The powers are being
rightly conferred on fire and rescue authorities to allow them to be as
flexible and as innovative as possible in how they provide their
services. It might have seemed inappropriate 20 years ago for fire and
rescue authorities to have such powers, but the nature of their work,
the service they provide and how they tackle fires has changed beyond
all recognition.
The Fire and
Rescue Services Act 2004 brought many positive changes to the fire
service and strengthened the case for additional powers for fire and
rescue authorities. The main purpose of the Act was to deliver a
modernised fire and rescue service that responded to the needs of the
21st century. It repealed the Fire Services Act 1947 and brought about
many of the positive changes recommended by Sir George Bain in his
report of December 2002. It also broadened the duties placed on the
fire service to include rescue and tackling terrorist action, as well
as its traditional role tackling
fires.
In
addition, the Act placed more emphasis on fire prevention. In
particular, the new duties on all fire and rescue authorities to
promote fire safety underpinned the necessary shift towards a more
prevention-based approach, thereby saving lives and reducing the number
of fires in the first place. It also replaced outdated legislation with
a new statutory framework, which recognised fire and rescue
services’ existing role in responding to a range of interests,
such as road traffic accidents, alongside their traditional
fire-fighting role. It also created new duties to respond to other
emergencies, such as serious flooding, and to plan for and respond to
terrorist threats.
Those
significant changes in 2004—the evidence is absolutely clear,
and the Minister will be aware of it—contributed significantly
to, for example, the 46% reduction in fire fatalities in
England in the period April to September last year, compared with 10
years earlier. They were also significantly responsible for the 31%
fall in fire alarms attended this year compared with 10 years earlier.
It was as a result of those reforms and a gradual evolution in the
nature of the services that the fire and rescue authorities provide
that we arrived here today, where it is necessary to provide fire and
rescue authorities with greater
powers.
4.45
pm
We
know that as a result of the reforms that have already taken place,
fire and rescue authorities engage extensively with communities up and
down the country. If our amendments are accepted, the new powers will
ensure that fire and rescue authorities will be able to provide the
best service possible and be as innovative as
possible.
Alun
Cairns:
I accept many of the points that the hon.
Gentleman makes about innovation in the fire authorities and the
difference that that has made, but why does he then propose the
amendments, given that they would call for new Bills should the
services need to react? In the relatively short time of today’s
debates, four of the amendments tabled by the Opposition have called
for new Bills to come before Parliament. In view of the time that there
is each year for new Bills to go through Parliament, what kind of
situation does he foresee? Is it at all
practical?
Jack
Dromey:
It is of the highest importance that we should be
guided by the primary principle that, while acting in the public
interest on the one hand, we should not, on the other hand, while
welcoming localism, unnecessarily circumscribe it. I have already
answered the hon. Gentleman’s question in some detail. The
essential difference between the Government’s position and
ours—I stress this again—is that we trust fire and rescue
authorities to exercise their proposed powers in a way that will be
strongly in the public
interest.
Gavin
Barwell:
The hon. Gentleman can make that case in respect
of one of the amendments that he has proposed to subsections (3) and
(4), but not for the amendments to subsections (1) and (2). He keeps
repeating the line that all 142 of the powers circumscribe localism. He
might disagree with subsections (1) and (2) for the reasons that the
right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich set out earlier, but he
cannot argue that they circumscribe localism. What they do is allow the
Secretary of State quickly to push through measures that have been
requested by local authorities or, in this case, fire and rescue
authorities.
Jack
Dromey:
Where it is necessary, in the light of experience
or the unexpected happening, to push changes through quickly, to use
the hon. Gentleman’s words, I am confident that there would be
positive dialogue in this House about making the necessary changes. It
comes down fundamentally to this choice: do we make
the changes by way of a Bill before the House, or do we trust the
Secretary of State to use his 142 Henry VIII powers? We prefer the
former, not the
latter.
Greg
Clark:
The hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South
referred to the suggested code of practice to govern the relationship
between central and local government that was prepared by one of the
professors who gave evidence to the Committee, and I have now had a
chance to look at it. He makes provision for exactly the kind of powers
that are in the Bill. He says that the powers given to local
authorities may not be undermined or limited by another central
authority except as provided for by statute. Since the Bill contains
provisions to limit them by statutory instrument, it seems that the
professor’s evidence justifies our
approach.
The
Chair:
Before Mr Dromey replies, I have to tell Members
that the document by Professor Jones which was referred to earlier has
now arrived. If any hon. Member wants it, it is available on the table
in the middle of the Committee
Room.
Jack
Dromey:
Thank you, Mr Bayley. You have made my point for
me. I got used to speed-reading a long time ago, but if one had had the
benefit of having the document before us this morning, they might have
been able to respond intelligently to the point that the Minister just
made. No doubt we can return to that. Thank you, Mr Bayley, for
producing the document at last; we will give it careful scrutiny and it
will no doubt be the subject of further debate in Committee.
The amended
powers will give fire and rescue authorities the clarity they need to
carry out their duties, particularly in relation to community fire
safety programmes and home fire-risk assessments. That is an absolutely
crucial area of their work. In some cases, fire and rescue authorities
have not been clear that they have the power to carry out some of the
functions they deem necessary, such as setting up a company to provide
training and consultancy—including in partnership with the
private sector—using their expertise that is not available
elsewhere. They have also faced issues in determining how far they can
go in relation to intervention in the home, for example, proactively
replacing a chip pan with a more suitable appliance in the home of an
elderly resident, or someone they know to be severely at risk, such as
a drug addict.
Having spoken
to representatives of the fire authorities, I know that they believe
these powers—and they are welcome—will remove that
uncertainty, enable authorities to provide their services in the most
efficient way possible, and allow the space for them to innovate. That
will be severely undermined, however, if these authorities are
constantly worried that their powers might be undermined by a diktat
issued by the Secretary of State, particularly when the current
Secretary of State is so fond of sending out epistles on the one hand,
and would no doubt be fond of using his 142 powers on the
other.
Henry
Smith:
The hon. Gentleman’s argument would have
more credibility if it had not been for his party in Government, which
sought to impose regional fire offices on the fire service across the
country, costing £250
million.
Jack
Dromey:
I think we can be proud of the structure now
obtaining for the fire and rescue authorities and how they operate. Our
Government were instrumental in putting those arrangements in
place.
My
hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South pointed out, in the
earlier debate on the power of general competence in relation to local
authorities, that a number of organisations have raised serious
concerns about the 142 Henry VIII powers being taken to himself by the
Secretary of State. Lest we forget, those concerns were expressed by a
majority of the organisations that gave evidence on the local
government issues before us. They included witnesses from the Local
Government Association, the Local Government Information Unit, the
Centre for Local Economic Strategies, the leader of Cheshire West and
Chester council, the leader of Shropshire council, Professors Jones and
Stewart, the New Local Government Network, the Society of Local
Authority Chief Executives, Unison and London Councils. Ten different
bodies of evidence, all clearly expressing their grave reservations, to
a greater or lesser extent, about the power that the Secretary of State
wishes to retain for himself.
We contend,
therefore, that in order to ensure that fire and rescue authorities can
use these powers in the best possible way and that the Secretary of
State does not take unnecessary and unwarranted powers to himself, our
amendments should be accepted. We hope that the Committee will take
account of those concerns and support the
amendments.
The
Chair:
Before I call the next speaker, I entirely
understand why Mr Dromey was unable to comment on a paper that he had
not had an opportunity to read. It may help the Committee, however, to
hear that Professor Jones told the evidence session that he had
submitted that paper to the Political and Constitutional Reform
Committee, but it had in fact been lost somewhere between the London
School of Economics and Westminster. It is not, therefore, the
Government’s fault that it was produced late, and it is now with
us. As I said earlier, hon. Members can consult it by taking a copy
from the
table.
Mr
Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab):
We are
discussing the provisions in the Bill that amend the Fire and Rescue
Services Act 2004, and I endorse the comments made by my hon. Friend
the Member for Birmingham, Erdington about the important changes
effected by that legislation. It would be odd if I did otherwise, as I
was the Minister who both commissioned the Bain review and subsequently
gave effect to its conclusions by taking the legislation through
Parliament. It made some important changes and advances, and statistics
on fire deaths and on the effectiveness of the fire and rescue service
show that to be the
case.
I
am sympathetic to the localist principle of extending more powers to
local government and, more specifically, to the fire and rescue
service, as we sought to do in 2004 against opposition from
the Conservative party at the time—but let that pass. I am
preoccupied with the contradictions in the Bill, and nowhere
could they be clearer than in clause 8. It starts, as other parts
of the Bill do, with some ringing endorsements of the
devolutionary principle. Right at the beginning, the 2004 Act is amended
by inserting proposed new section 5A, which
states:
“(1) A relevant fire and
rescue authority may
do—(a) anything it
considers appropriate for the purposes of the carrying-out of any of
its
functions”.
That
is the devolutionary principle enunciated firmly right at the outset.
Unfortunately, that approach does not continue, because proposed
new section 5B, which is the next insertion into
the 2004 Act, contains the
following:
“(1) Section
5A(1)”—
which
is the devolutionary principle that I have just
quoted—
“does not enable a
relevant fire and rescue authority to
do—(a) anything which
the authority is unable to do by virtue of a pre-commencement
limitation, or(b) anything
which the authority is unable to do by virtue of a post-commencement
limitation”.
Let
us look at the definitions of pre- and post-commencement limitations. A
pre-commencement limitation is defined
as
“a
prohibition, restriction or other limitation imposed by a statutory
provision that—
(a) is contained in
an Act passed no later than the end of the Session in which the
Localism Act 2011 is passed,
or(b) is contained in an
instrument made under an Act and comes into force before the
commencement of section 8(1) of that
Act”.
A
post-commencement limitation is defined
as
“a
prohibition, restriction or other limitation imposed by a statutory
provision that—
(a) is contained in
an Act passed after the end of the Session in which the Localism Act
2011 is passed, or(b) is
contained in an instrument made under an Act and comes into force on or
after the commencement of section 8(1) of that
Act”.
It
seems that the Government have the fire and rescue services well and
truly caught. They can do what they like, but they cannot do anything
that is prohibited by a statute or statutory instrument that came into
force before the Act comes into effect or any legislation that comes
into effect afterwards. That seems to be a pretty firm lock and
limitation on the powers. Proposed new section 5C(3) contains the
parallel to the clause to which I objected strongly this morning. In
words similar to those that apply to local authorities in the earlier
passage, it
states:
“The
Secretary of State may by order make provision preventing relevant fire
and rescue authorities from doing under section 5A(1)
anything which is specified, or is of a description specified, in the
order.”
5
pm
There
we have it. Yes, it sounds good, because it contains a devolutionary
principle, but the limitations are incredibly tight. The Secretary of
State has that power either to legislate or, by order, to limit the
power of fire and rescue authorities.
Mr
David Ward (Bradford East) (LD):
I am confused, because
the right hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out the limitations of pre and
post-commencement. Does he seek to remove the power of the Secretary of
State to remove those limitations?
Mr
Raynsford:
As the hon. Gentleman will recall from our
debate this morning, I have always made the point that there are,
inevitably, necessary limitations. I object, however, to the
Government’s trying to pretend that this is an epoch-making,
revolutionary, devolutionary Bill that totally changes the relationship
between central and local government. In practice, as we dig down and
investigate the detail—as the hon. Gentleman recognised in his
contributions this morning—it becomes clear that it includes
some draconian powers, which limit the devolution that is offered. My
criticism of the Government is not that they seek to be devolutionary,
but that they speak with forked tongue. They claim that the devolution
is epoch-making when in fact it is limited, curtailed and circumscribed
by draconian provisions. The Bill may be a useful, modest move in the
right direction, but the attempt to present it as a fundamental,
epoch-making, devolutionary measure is completely unrealistic and over
the
top.
Ministers are a bit
desperate in trying to sell their case. We have heard the
Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the hon.
Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, claiming that some official at
SOLACE supported the Government’s proposed extensions of power
to local government, specifically the general power of competence. I am
surprised that the Minister said that because while I cannot remember
which official at SOLACE he quoted, he and all members of the Committee
will recall that we had evidence from SOLACE during the
Committee’s first sitting on 25 January. I quote from
Derek Myers, the chairman of SOLACE, who I assume is the highest
authority. He
said:
“Could
I talk about the limitations on the power of general competence? We
think this is too cautious as
drafted.”––[Official Report, Localism
Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 38,
Q55.]
That is
what the chairman of SOLACE said, and if the Government are scrabbling
around trying to find a more junior figure in the organisation to offer
some comfort to their case that the Bill is devolutionary, they have a
long way to go.
Robert
Neill:
The right hon. Gentleman has regaled us with his
long and distinguished history as a local government Minister. If he
sets such store by devolution to local government, why, during the
three years that he was a Minister for local government, did he not
introduce such a
power?
Mr
Raynsford:
The hon. Gentleman’s memory may be
short, although he was not in the House at the time. We introduced a
whole series of measures. I have referred to the Local Government Act
2003—he might well wish to listen—which repealed the
provisions of the Conservative Government that had required local
authorities to seek consent from the Secretary of State for borrowing.
The 2003 Act extended a power of borrowing to local authorities, and I
have quoted that provision. It also got rid of the extremely offensive
section 28, which most people in the gay and lesbian community regarded
as deeply offensive. I am ashamed to say that the Conservative party
opposed our repeal at the time. Although it has changed its mind now,
and rightly so, at the time it was hostile to it. That devolutionary
measure removed some pretty unpleasant and draconian provisions that
the previous Conservative Government had passed. All that
I am saying to him—in the nicest possible way, because he is a
neighbour of mine in south-east London—is that if someone
over-claims for their particular measures, the outcome is likely to
disappoint them. In particular, there is likely to be a reaction from
the supposed beneficiaries when they find that the promised liberation
from government restriction is not as great as the prospectus had said
it would be. The problem with the legislation is that the Government
are overselling it and promising too much. In reality, it will come as
a great disappointment to many people in local government, for the
reasons that I have set out.
Robert
Neill:
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr
Bayley. This has been a lively, wide-ranging debate on what is, in
fact, a narrow issue. Perhaps I will be forgiven if I do not go down
all the interesting avenues that have been explored in the past few
exchanges and instead concentrate on the essential issues of dispute
between the Government and the Opposition, which are highlighted in the
amendments.
I am grateful
to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington for setting out his
support for the concept behind the clause. Although we will have a
stand part debate in due course, it was sensible for him to do so
because he referred to it in his analysis, and I agreed with what he
said about the clause’s benefits. It is something that I
advocated before I came to the House, when I was the leader of a fire
authority, and I am glad that it has been welcomed across the piece in
the fire community. To that extent, we are on common ground.
I join him in
paying tribute to the work of fire and rescue authorities, and I have
no doubt that they will exercise their powers sensibly, proportionately
and constructively. However, for the reasons that were rehearsed in
relation to other powers and local authorities, it is perfectly
sensible that there should be fail-safe provisions and restrictions
upon any body that is created by statute. The provisions give exactly
the freedoms that fire authorities seek. They also remove what would
otherwise have been an anomaly, because some fire authorities in the
United Kingdom are part of a county council, and county council fire
services would have had the benefit of the power of general competence
as principal authorities in any event. Creating a general power for all
fire authorities enables stand-alone fire authorities, or Metropolitan
authorities—such as the one I once led in London, or the
authority in the hon. Gentleman’s west midlands
constituency—and what are generally referred to as combined fire
authorities to have an equivalent power, which gives them the freedom
to operate. That is within the context of there being single purpose
authorities, rather than multi-purpose authorities, such as a county
council.
Jack
Dromey:
The Minister has extensive experience in this
House, and also outwith, in his former capacity of fire and rescue.
Will he tell us in what circumstances the Government might choose to
exercise the powers that they wish to
retain?
Robert
Neill:
I will happily come to that, but I hope the hon.
Gentleman understands that that point returns to the basic principle of
what we have sought to do with the power of general competence. That
power is being mirrored in relation to the particular purposes of fire
and rescue authorities. Generally, we are giving local authorities the
same powers that an individual has for legal purposes, and those are
subject to being capable of constraint by statute. That is the same
position for fire and rescue authorities as it is for anything else.
So, it is not necessary to think in the rather
draconian terms that the hon. Gentleman does. It may well be that, at
the end of the day, it is not necessary to use the powers, and I hope
that that is the case. To say, however, that there should never be a
fall-back position whereby the Secretary of State has a reserve power
would contradict the stance that his party took in government, and that
virtually every Act has taken in recent times. To my mind, that
principle cannot be objectionable.
Jack
Dromey:
In the context of a Localism Bill, retaining that
central power for the Secretary of State is draconian. I press the
Minister again: under what circumstances might the Secretary of State
have to exercise such powers?
Robert
Neill:
I will come back to the general principle of a
Henry VIII clause, but the very important point that the hon. Gentleman
neglects is that the bulk of these proposals are intended to free up
local authorities and to give the Secretary of State the ability to
remove restrictions on them. One might want to look at public safety
issues where the order-making process might be appropriate, but it is
not sensible to try to flag up those situations in advance. My point
was fairly made in interventions from my hon. Friends the Members for
Croydon Central, for Great Yarmouth and for Vale of Glamorgan: the
amendments seek to make it harder for the Secretary of State to free up
fire authorities rather than easier.
Amendments 31
and 32 would mean that to remove a restriction on a fire authority,
rather than using secondary legislation—it is worth remembering
that it will be secondary legislation, subject to scrutiny—it
would be necessary to bring a Bill before Parliament. We all know that
that is a longer and more cumbersome process. I am surprised that those
who say they are devolutionists argue that the measure should be
fettered in that way. With all due respect to the hon. Member for
Birmingham, Erdington and his colleagues, it is a little rich to
criticise the Government for taking powers to remove restrictions on
local authorities or, if necessary, to put a restriction on the
exercise of a power by a local authority when they themselves, in the
dying days of the last Parliament, took powers by statutory instrument,
in the same situation as we have here, to abolish local authorities and
create wholly new ones. The right hon. Member for Greenwich and
Woolwich talked about forked tongues. That phrase does not sit easily
with those who supported such proposals. What we are doing is entirely
consistent with practice
here.
The
Bill provides for a rigorous process of scrutiny and consultation. That
is set out in the clauses. There will have to be consultation and there
will then have to be scrutiny based on the procedures for making
legislative reform orders under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform
Act 2006. That is set out in clause 8. The hon. Member for Birmingham,
Erdington said that these are powers to the Secretary of State, but the
Secretary of State is, of course, subject to the scrutiny of
Parliament. That is the well-established
procedure.
Mr
Ward:
There were some discussions this morning about the
Secretary of State as opposed to a Secretary of State. I was also
struck by the use of the
phrase
“If
the Secretary of State thinks that a statutory
provision”.
Could there not be a
more welcoming word than “thinks”? The Secretary of State
might be approached by, receive representations from or be lobbied by a
fire authority or a local authority and such a word could demonstrate a
willingness to look at the barriers that are standing in the way of the
general power of
competence.
Robert
Neill:
That is an interesting point. I understand it
because it is a point that I raised in opposition in relation to
previous local government legislation. The advice that I got, which I
am prepared to accept now, is that “thinks” is standard
drafting in clauses of this kind. It mirrors the existing legislation
and the circumstances that my hon. Friend postulates. Representations
or consultations can be the device by which the Secretary of State
thinks that such a step is necessary. The term of art has been used
consistently by parliamentary draftsmen, so that is the thinking behind
it. I am sure that my hon. Friend is right that the Secretary of State
would often, in exercising these powers, be responding to
representations from fire authorities, in relation to this clause, or
from local authorities more generally. We are at one on how it is
likely to work in practice.
5.15
pm
Amendment
32 deals with overlapping powers. Again, it seems ironic that the
Opposition, who say that they wish to be localist, should say that
those powers, which run the risk of judicial review—that is one
of the fears that would exist—can only be resolved by primary
legislation when, in fact, it is perfectly standard procedure to do
that through secondary legislation, subject to the same constraints,
consultation and scrutiny outlined in the clauses. I assure the hon.
Member for Birmingham, Erdington that the purpose is to simplify. It
will not impact upon the powers and, because there is consultation and
scrutiny, I submit that it is entirely appropriate to leave those
clauses as they
stand.
On
amendment 33, it is true that the clause as drafted has the ability to
set certain restrictions and conditions, but that is not new or
exceptional. Any Government would, inevitably, expect to have a
fail-safe power to protect either ratepayers or the Exchequer, so it is
neither new nor unique. In fact, similar conditions were set out in
relation to the well-being power in the Local Government Act 2000,
which the previous Administration introduced, and we have broadly built
upon that framework. The powers are not intended to be used lightly,
and there will be safeguards of consultation and
scrutiny.
With
respect, there has been a tendency during this Committee to suggest
that the Government and the Secretary of State will use this as an
intrusive power, but that is not the case. The use of the powers is
entirely intended to be benign, and to characterise it otherwise is to
have spent too much time, since we are discussing Henry VIII, thinking
that the television series, “The Tudors”, genuinely
reflects 16th-century history. It does not, and the suggestion that the
Secretary of State seeks to use draconian powers to restrict fire
authorities does not reflect the reality of the clause’s
intention either.
Nic
Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab):
The hon. Member for Bradford
East rightly focused on the word “thinks,” which is, of
course, a neutral word. It could allow the powers to be taken and used
in a non-benign as well as a benign way. That is part of the problem
with the Bill as drafted and, whether that is the norm for draft
legislation or not, it will remain a problem. I am pleased that the
Minister acknowledged that that is a problem that he has himself
identified in the past. We are all committed to localism and are driven
by what local people want, so will he update us on what consultation
has taken place with fire authorities and what they have said? Are they
enthusiastic about the changes, or do they share the concerns of those
who gave evidence to
us?
Robert
Neill:
On the point about the word “thinks,”
all I can tell the hon. Gentleman is that the order will be the result
of the Secretary of State’s thinking and it will be subject to
scrutiny. Therefore, the rationality of the appropriateness or
otherwise of his thought is itself subject to both consultation and
scrutiny, and that provides a
safeguard.
The
extension of a power of general competence has been welcomed by both
the Local Government Association and the Chief Fire Officers
Association. I am not aware of specific representations on the
limitation issue in relation to the clauses under discussion, although
I accept that the points made by some local government associations
about limitations generally will, by implication, apply to them as
well. I am not trying to avoid that, but neither do I think that they
are justified if we consider the context in which the safeguards are
being
provided.
Amendment
34 would omit proposed new section 5D of the Fire and Rescue Services
Act 2004. That is the exact provision, however, that sets out the
scrutiny that will provide a safeguard. It also refers to the
Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, and I would have thought
that that was desirable. I therefore argue that the amendment will
defeat the object of localism, rather than advance it. For those
reasons, I hope that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington will
reflect on the debate and not press the amendment to a Division. If he
seeks to do so, I must advise the Committee to vote against
it.
Jack
Dromey:
I wish to make one point only. The hon. Gentleman
has been uncharacteristically vague about the necessity for these
powers. I asked twice for circumstances in which it might be necessary
for them to be used. We will be pressing the amendment to a Division,
but I ask that on Report he return to the House to spell out and
justify why he believes—in light of the experience of fire and
rescue authorities, which are admirable organisations—such
powers are
necessary.
Question
put, That the amendment be
made.
The
Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes
14.
Division
No.
4
]
AYES
Dakin,
Nic
Dromey,
Jack
Elliott,
Julie
Keeley,
Barbara
McDonagh,
Siobhain
Mearns,
Ian
Raynsford,
rh Mr
Nick
Reynolds,
Jonathan
Seabeck,
Alison
NOES
Barwell,
Gavin
Bruce,
Fiona
Cairns,
Alun
Clark,
rh
Greg
Gilbert,
Stephen
Howell,
John
Lewis,
Brandon
Neill,
Robert
Ollerenshaw,
Eric
Smith,
Henry
Stewart,
Iain
Stunell,
Andrew
Ward,
Mr
David
Wiggin,
Bill
Question
accordingly negatived.
Question
put forthwith (Standing Orders Nos. 68 and 89), That the clause
stand part of the
Bill.
The
Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes
9.
Division
No.
5
]
AYES
Barwell,
Gavin
Bruce,
Fiona
Cairns,
Alun
Clark,
rh
Greg
Gilbert,
Stephen
Howell,
John
Lewis,
Brandon
Neill,
Robert
Ollerenshaw,
Eric
Smith,
Henry
Stewart,
Iain
Stunell,
Andrew
Ward,
Mr
David
Wiggin,
Bill
NOES
Dakin,
Nic
Dromey,
Jack
Elliott,
Julie
Keeley,
Barbara
McDonagh,
Siobhain
Mearns,
Ian
Raynsford,
rh Mr
Nick
Reynolds,
Jonathan
Seabeck,
Alison
Question
agreed to.
Clause
8
accordingly
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
9
Fire
and rescue authorities:
charging
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr
Raynsford:
I shall not detain the Committee for long, but
I have a question on one of the provisions in section 18C, which this
clause inserts into the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. Section 18C
covers charges for malfunctioning alarms. It is well known that that is
a serious problem for the fire and rescue service, and the principle is
absolutely right. Subsection (5), however,
states:
“The
references in subsection (2) to “sea” are not restricted
to the territorial sea of the United
Kingdom.”
Is
that simply a reference to the channel tunnel, because there are
reciprocal fire arrangements between Britain and France for
firefighting in the channel tunnel that may involve British
firefighters operating outside the territorial sea of the United
Kingdom? If it is not limited to that, could the Minister tell me where
it is envisaged that fire and rescue authorities may be involved in
responding to alarms outside the territorial sea of the United
Kingdom?
Robert
Neill:
The right hon. Gentleman raises an interesting
point, and I admire him for the detail of
it.
The
Chair:
Order. Was Mr Dromey trying to catch my
eye?
Jack
Dromey
indicated
assent.
The
Chair:
It might make sense to call Mr Dromey
first.
Jack
Dromey:
We broadly welcome this clause and its provisions
concerning faults and calls from automatic fire systems, such as
automatic fire alarms. We also welcome the provisions at sea, although
my right hon. Friend is right about the importance of clarity on that.
Could the Minister reassure us—this is the one reassurance that
I ask for—that the proposed powers will not apply to domestic
premises?
Robert
Neill:
I can assure the hon. Gentleman at once that we do
not intend to do that. It is worth stating the general background,
because I believe this is the end of this stand part debate. I will
endeavour in the course of my remarks to address the pertinent question
raised by the right hon. Member for Greenwich and
Woolwich.
The
clause redefines the process by which fire and rescue authorities
charge for certain discretionary services. It is important that it is
set out very clearly in the clause that that does not give the ability
to charge for their core services of attending fires, saving lives, and
giving emergency treatment. It does not cover road traffic accidents,
at which the fire and rescue service are often the first in attendance,
nor does it address pumping out floodwater as a result of, for example,
the storms that we have seen. Those are outwith the provision and
intended to be
so.
The
clause provides for a more efficient, swifter process, and it puts the
power entirely in the hands of the fire and rescue authority and its
community. At present, if fire and rescue authorities want to charge
for one of those discretionary services, the Secretary of State has to
carry out a full public consultation and, on the basis of that, must
decide for what they may charge and who they may charge. He must then
lay an order before Parliament. That is a lengthy process and,
moreover, it has to be done on a national basis. At present, no local
discretion is permitted and it is insufficiently flexible to respond to
differing situations across the
country.
We
are simplifying the process by devolving to each FRA the power to
determine, in consultation with its local community, what it should
charge for. I think that is consistent with the thrust of the proposal,
but, as I have said, there are certain core functions and national
responsibilities that clearly would not be charged for: extinguishing
fire; protecting life and property in the event of fire; providing
emergency medical assistance; and protecting life from serious
harm.
The
right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich rightly referred to the
particular instance of false calls from faulty alarms in non-domestic
premises. That is a significant burden for fire and rescue authorities.
The latest statistics show that, in the three years leading up to
2009-10, 35% of all attendances by fire and rescue authorities were to
false or faulty alarms, usually in unoccupied offices or warehouses.
Fire services should clearly have the power to recoup that cost from
people who fail to maintain a piece of equipment, and that is the
thinking behind the measure.
5.30
pm
The
sea point was mentioned. That involves an element of belt and braces,
and it is most unlikely that such situations will occur. However, some
fire and rescue authorities have expressed an interest in procuring
helicopters. That is not something that the Government are pushing on
them, but some services have thought about that possibility. One could
conceive of circumstances where such a service was used—if a
vessel was on fire at sea, for example. It is unlikely, but by the
nature of the situation, one or two fire authorities have fire boats.
The measure would also cover the channel
tunnel.
Ian
Mearns (Gateshead) (Lab):
A little thought: it might
involve cross-border arrangements between the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland, for example. Also, if there was a large fire in
France, a tender could be put out through the European procurement
regulations for someone to come and put the fire
out.
Robert
Neill:
Apparently it does not include Northern Ireland,
but I understand the point. Sometimes, because firefighters are in the
business of saving lives, they are likely to respond and do the decent
thing, even if the law is unclear. No one would criticise them for
that.
Mr
Raynsford:
I am still puzzled. If there was a fire at sea,
I understand why the fire service would wish to respond, even if it
were outside the United Kingdom’s territorial seas. However, I
cannot envisage a circumstance in which the fire service would have a
direct wire from an automated alarm from something outside our
territorial seas. I can envisage that in the channel tunnel, but I
cannot imagine any other circumstances where a malfunctioning automatic
fire alarm would be wired in to a British fire authority. That is why I
was puzzled by the reference. The Minister’s explanation, while
plausible and interesting, is not wholly convincing when the clause
deals with provisions for charges for malfunctioning alarm systems. I
would be grateful if the Minister would give some thought—not
now, as this is a complex matter—as to whether he envisages a
situation where British fire authorities would be wired up to automated
alarms that operate outside our territorial
waters.
Robert
Neill:
I simply say that proposed new section 18C(2)
applies to “a report of fire, or explosion, at sea or under the
sea.”
That
width is deliberate because although we have talked generally about
false alarms as the most obvious issue, because of the responsibilities
for rescue, there could be other
circumstances.
Alison
Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View) (Lab):
I have had an odd
thought: could the measure potentially apply to oil rigs that could
conceivably have alarms?
Robert
Neill:
It probably could. That is a helpful intervention
and I will adopt it in the spirit in which it is meant. We are talking
about fire and rescue, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for
fulfilling that function. I will get back to the right hon. Member for
Greenwich and Woolwich, in writing if need be, with further
clarification. I hope that the Committee will understand
that the measure intends to provide flexibility in a life-saving
service. It is not intended to create legal
complications.
Mr
Raynsford:
I am most grateful to the Minister for his
reply. Although I do not intend to detain the Committee, it does leave
open a question as to how the fire and rescue authority would actually
secure payment of the charge if the charge is to be made to an
organisation based outside our territorial waters. I do not expect to
pursue that issue further, but there might be difficulties in ensuring
payment in those
circumstances.
Question
put and agreed
to.
Clause
9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
The
Chair:
The question is that clause 10 stand part of the
Bill.
Barbara
Keeley:
Shall I speak to amendment
35?
The
Chair:
We have not quite come to that. If nobody seeks to
debate clause 10, I will put the question, which is that clause 10
stand part of the
Bill.
Barbara
Keeley:
Clause 10 brings in schedule 2, and there are a
whole bunch of amendments to schedule
2.
The
Chair:
We put the question on clause 10, and then have a
separate consideration of schedule 2, under which we will take a series
of groups of amendments. If we agree that clause 10 should stand part
of the Bill, that does not preclude debate on schedule 2 or the listed
amendments. Does that help the hon.
Lady?
Barbara
Keeley:
But just seeking clarity, clause 10 does nothing
but bring in schedule 2. Perhaps this is just my newness, but it would
help if the matter were clarified. I am not sure whether others
understand.
The
Chair:
For the benefit of the whole Committee, if we agree
clause 10, it means that reference is made in the Bill to schedule 2,
and we can therefore have a debate about it and of course consider all
the amendments that Members have tabled. If the Committee is minded to
allow clause 10 to stand part of the Bill, that does not in any way
prejudice the debate on schedule 2.
Clause 10
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Schedule
2
New
arrangements with respect to governance of English local
authorities
Barbara
Keeley:
I beg to move amendment 35, in schedule 2,
page 173, leave out line
2.
The
Chair:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 36, in schedule 2, page 173, leave
out lines 22 to
24.
Amendment
37, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out lines 27 to 29 and
insert—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must report to
Parliament and present a Bill to make provision prescribing a new form
of governance for any local authority which has made proposals for new
arrangements under subsection
(5).’.
Amendment
38, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out lines 30 to
40.
Amendment
39, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out lines 41 to 44 and
insert—
‘(5) A local
authority may propose to the Secretary of State that he or she makes
provision through legislation for a new form of governance arrangements
to apply to that authority if the authority thinks that the conditions
in subsection (6) are
met.’.
Amendment
24, in schedule 2, page 215, leave out line
8.
Amendment
25, in schedule 2, page 215, leave out line
12.
Barbara
Keeley:
Amendment 35 to schedule 2 is on permitted forms
of governance for local authorities. This group of amendments would
make changes to another proposed power for the Secretary of State.
Instead of the Secretary of State having the power to make a provision
prescribing arrangements for local authority governance, the amendment
proposes—in familiar phrasing—that the Secretary of State
reports to Parliament on any proposals for new governance arrangements
for local authorities and presents a Bill to Parliament to bring in any
new arrangements.
The Bill is
caught in the conflict between localism and the taking of centralised
powers—a conflict that we keep coming back to. Earlier, I
mentioned the important fact that 11 of our 14 witnesses who gave
evidence about local government had issues with the powers that the
Bill gives to the Secretary of State. The Opposition welcome the idea
of innovation in governance arrangements, but Parliament has an
important scrutiny role, in terms of prescribing arrangements for new
forms of governance. It should not be for the Secretary of State alone
to agree or deny those arrangements.
The Local
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 introduced
executive arrangements in place of the committee system for most local
authorities, with two of the three executive leadership models
involving directly elected mayors. Through that legislation, moving to
a mayoral system could be achieved through petition, or through prior
approval from local electors through a referendum. That is unlike the
situation under the Bill, which seeks to impose mayors on 12 cities,
and perhaps on many more
later.
The
2007 Act reduced the leadership options for English councils to just
two—directly elected mayor with cabinet, and indirectly elected
leader with cabinet. It also meant that councils could adopt a mayoral
system simply by resolution, without the need for a referendum. As we
know, some councils have expressed the wish to return to the committee
system of governance, and I understand that. I was a councillor in
Trafford, and was a committee chair and a vice-chair when the
leader-and-cabinet system was introduced. A number of my colleague
councillors felt that their role had been taken away from
them.
The
Bill brings in the option of councils returning to the committee system
that was in place before the Local Government Act 2000. We support that
change, but we do not support an enduring power for the Secretary of
State to prescribe new governance arrangements without the scrutiny of
Parliament. As I keep saying, the Bill has not had enough scrutiny and
consultation, and that starts to show in places.
Clearly,
there is a debate going on about what constitute effective forms of
governance. Councils will be forced by the swingeing cuts imposed on
them to look at different ways of doing things. They may then make
proposals to the Secretary of State for those different governance
arrangements, if they believe that those arrangements would be an
improvement. We have councils that want to outsource everything they
do, and councils that want to run the charging model of easyJet and
Ryanair. Potential airline passengers have choice: they can always fly
with another airline or travel by another form of transport. However,
residents of an area cannot choose another council without moving. It
is therefore right that we have some balance when considering what
could be important changes to forms of governance.
Labour
Members believe that the right balance would be to have rigorous
parliamentary scrutiny of any new governance arrangements proposed,
rather than giving powers to approve governance arrangements to the
Secretary of State. I want to avoid getting into the same debate time
and again in Committee, but I have to say that Labour Members do not
believe that statutory instruments constitute a rigorous form of
parliamentary scrutiny. I served in the Whips Office for some time, and
I know that a debate goes on when one tries to get Members to serve on
SI Committees. The debate hinges on Members asking, “How long
will I be there for? Is it only five or 10 minutes?” We should
dispel here and now the notion that that constitutes rigorous
scrutiny. I have known SI debates to last for half an hour
or 40 minutes, but in such cases all the Members tend to sit
there tutting.
As I said
with regard to the Secretary of State’s powers over the general
power of competence, it was made clear last week that many individuals
and organisations are unhappy about the extent of the powers given to
the Secretary of State in different parts of the Bill. One witness
stated that the Secretary of State needs to prescribe less. The
Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, the
right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells—this will come to haunt
him—said that we can go through these powers
“one by one, and
you have my word that I do not intend this to be
centralising”.––[Official Report,
Localism Public Bill Committee, 27 January 2011; c. 168,
Q281.]
The
power for the Secretary of State to prescribe new governance
arrangements is centralising. He could prescribe new arrangements even
where he has not had a proposal from a local authority. He could also
refuse to accept a local authority’s proposals for new
arrangements. Those matters ought to be dealt with through full
scrutiny, not just through
regulations.
I
trust that the Minister will accept that the power contained in the
Bill is centralising. It will not empower a local authority if the
Secretary of State refuses a proposal just because it does not suit his
views. It is not properly democratically accountable to have major
changes in governance for local authorities without full—fuller
than a statutory instrument—parliamentary scrutiny. I hope that
the Committee will support the amendments.
Andrew
Stunell:
I thank the hon. Lady for her welcome
announcement that the Opposition are rethinking their views about the
committee system in local government; that is a very welcome
recantation—that is, perhaps, not too strong a word. The removal
of the committee system under the Local Government Act 2000 was widely
regarded by local government colleagues around the country as an act of
vandalism. In every subsequent local government Act put in front of the
House by Labour Members, there was a challenge on that point—on
reinserting the provision. I am pleased that this time we have their
consent.
5.45
pm
I
want to give the broader context of schedule 2. It is lengthy, but
about 98% of it consists simply of a reprint of part 1A of the Local
Government Act 2000. That includes quite a number of the powers for the
Secretary of State, which have just been reproduced lock, stock and
barrel. I hope that Opposition Members will bear that in mind when they
level their poisoned darts at us for including them in the
Bill.
Barbara
Keeley:
The general view outside this place, and the view
of the Opposition, is that there should have been a
redrafting—that some of the powers and provisions are not in
keeping with localism. That is the problem. It is not good enough just
to reprint them from a Bill from 10 years ago, and say “That is
why they are
there.”
Andrew
Stunell:
That is an interesting point, coupling the twin
arguments, “We were right in the first place” and
“The Government have not reformed Labour’s proposals
enough.” The hon. Lady is entitled to argue that she was right
first time round or, alternatively, that she was wrong first time
round. I am not sure which argument she is deploying on this
occasion.
Gavin
Barwell:
Does my hon. Friend not think it remarkable,
given what the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South has just said,
that her amendments do not amend what she thinks are the defects in the
previous legislation, but instead strike out a provision that allows
the Secretary of State to give local authorities more freedom in their
governance arrangements? How can anyone regard giving local authorities
more options as more centrist? That completely passes me
by.
Andrew
Stunell:
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I want to
draw the Committee’s attention to the construction of the Bill.
Earlier, I was reprimanded by the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles
South for quoting from it, but I will run the risk of a second
reprimand by pointing out that what she is planning to do is delete the
third of three options that appear in proposed new section 9B(1) of the
reprinted 2000 Act. That, of course, is implemented via the final
paragraph of 9B(4), which says:
“‘prescribed
arrangements’ means such arrangements as may be prescribed in
regulations made by the Secretary of State under section
9BA.”
I refer the
hon. Lady to subsection (4) of section 9BA, which appears
immediately underneath:
“In
considering whether or how to exercise the power in this section, the
Secretary of State must have regard to any proposals made under
subsection
(5).”
Subsection
(5)
says:
“A
local authority may propose to the Secretary of State that the
Secretary of State make
regulations”,
and
so on. In other words, we are proposing something that is in the hands
of the Secretary of State, acting on consideration
of proposals produced by local authorities.
That brings
me to a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East made
about whether we should be changing Bradford’s executive
members. There we go: 9BA(4) allows Bradford to come to the Secretary
of State and say, “Please may we have 12?” or whatever
number or circumstance it thinks appropriate. The Secretary of State
must have regard to that. I am not a lawyer, but I think that is a very
strong requirement on the Secretary of State. If he chooses to proceed,
he comes back to the paragraph of text that has been challenged and, if
the Opposition are successful, is about to be deleted. I have to say to
my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East that if that were deleted
from the Bill, the Secretary of State would not have the power to
listen to representations from Bradford, and we would all be stuck with
the systems set in statute. As for the hon. Member for Worsley and
Eccles South saying that the measure is in some way centralising, that
seems to defy the rational use of language, because if we remove the
line from the Bill we will have two options, prescribed by a statute
that does not give anybody the capacity to change them without getting
yet another Act of Parliament through the House.
We are
offering a system in which the Secretary of State must have regard to
proposals that come from local authorities to change the governance
systems—“governance” is a hard word to say; I have
to be careful about that—that they operate, and a system that
introduces flexibility on their behalf. It is not taking anything away
from local government; it is bringing something to local government.
The whole basis, therefore, on which this string of amendments has been
tabled is
misconceived.
Nic
Dakin:
The Minister is spelling out his position very
clearly. Can he explain to me, however, how the imposition of a
referendum on shadow mayors for 12 authorities sits comfortably with a
localism agenda? Surely localism should start from the people, and not
be imposed from the centre. How does that sit with localism? I would
also like to know about the cost of referendums. The cost to London was
identified by the councillor who gave evidence as approximately
£5 million. Local people should choose how to spend their money
and not be forced to spend it on referendums they might not want. If
the Minister could also explain the criteria by which the 12 cities
were identified, that would be
helpful.
Andrew
Stunell:
I am more than ready to do that, but may I
suggest that we wait until we reach a clause that has anything whatever
to do with that?
The
Chair:
Yes, that would be
wise.
Andrew
Stunell:
We are talking about governance arrangements, and
the specific provision that the hon. Member for Scunthorpe was
criticising, relating to the
mayor, will not be dealt with through the procedure that we are
considering at all. It is covered by specific
clauses, and we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them
later.
On the second
broad issue—given that the amendments are completely
misconceived, I could perhaps stop, but I will just go on—the
hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South claimed that statutory
instruments were essentially a nullity as far as the House was
concerned. Well, for 13 years, the Labour party put through an average
of, I think, 3,000 statutory instruments a year. If we multiply 13 by
3,000, that is 39,000, or some other very large number of statutory
instruments, and as she reported from the Government Whips Office, the
question was whether they were going to take longer than five minutes.
I do not know what scrutiny was like for Government Members under the
previous Government, but the I hope that the Opposition in this
Parliament take the scrutiny of statutory instruments seriously, as the
Opposition did in the previous Parliament, and I am sure that she will
be a model of excellence on that in the coming five years.
On the value
of statutory instruments, as compared with Acts of Parliament, as a way
of holding Ministers to account, yes, it is a lesser procedure. It is a
procedure where progress can be made much more rapidly. We need a
flexible system that allows the Secretary of State to give local
authorities more, not fewer, choices, and that allows him or her to do
so expeditiously and without unreasonable delay. That is exactly what
the text of schedule 2 does, and exactly what would be defeated were we
foolish enough to support these amendments.
Barbara
Keeley:
Briefly, the Minister was trying to give us the
idea that the Secretary of State would feel bound to move on the
proposal that he got from Bradford, or any other local authority. As I
read it, however, proposed new section 9B(1) says that the Secretary of
State “may” do that. One can posit a case in which
certain favoured authorities are allowed new arrangements, and certain
other authorities are not. My concern is about “may”. My
amendment says that if the Secretary of State has proposals, they
“must report to Parliament”. That wording is stronger, so
I will push the amendment to a Division.
Question
put, That the amendment be
made.
The
Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes
14.
Division
No.
6
]
AYES
Dakin,
Nic
Dromey,
Jack
Elliott,
Julie
Keeley,
Barbara
McDonagh,
Siobhain
Mearns,
Ian
Raynsford,
rh Mr
Nick
Reynolds,
Jonathan
Seabeck,
Alison
NOES
Barwell,
Gavin
Bruce,
Fiona
Cairns,
Alun
Clark,
rh
Greg
Gilbert,
Stephen
Howell,
John
Lewis,
Brandon
Neill,
Robert
Ollerenshaw,
Eric
Smith,
Henry
Stewart,
Iain
Stunell,
Andrew
Ward,
Mr
David
Wiggin,
Bill
Question
accordingly
negatived.
Barbara
Keeley:
I beg to move amendment 40, in schedule 2,
page 180, line 27, leave out from beginning to end
of line 22 on page 191 and
insert—
‘9F Overview and
scrutiny: functions and
definitions(1) Governance
arrangements of a local authority (whether under executive
arrangements, the committee system or prescribed arrangements) must
include the operation of an overview and scrutiny function (referred to
in this Chapter as the scrutiny function) which must be operated by way
of the appointment by the authority of one or more committees of the
authority (referred to in this Chapter as overview and scrutiny
committees).(1A) The role and
structure of the scrutiny function, and the overview and scrutiny
committees, should be set out in the authority’s
constitution.(2) Executive
arrangements by a local authority must ensure that its overview and
scrutiny committee has power (or its overview and scrutiny committees,
and any joint overview and scrutiny committees, have power between
them)—(a) to review or
scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with
the delivery of public services in the local area by the authority or
another designated person,(b)
to make reports and recommendations to bodies delivering public
services in the locality on matters which affect the authority’s
area or the inhabitants of that
area,(c) to review or
scrutinise decisions made but not implemented by the authority
(call-in).(3) In this Chapter,
“joint overview and scrutiny committee”, in relation to a
local authority (“the authority concerned”),
means—(a) an overview
and scrutiny committee of another local authority exercising relevant
functions (within the meaning given by subsection (1)) of the authority
concerned, or(b) a joint
overview and scrutiny committee of two or more authorities exercising
such functions.(4) The power
of an overview and scrutiny committee under subsection (2)(c) to review
or scrutinise a decision made but not implemented by the authority
(call-in) includes
power—(a) to recommend
that the decision be reconsidered by the person who made it,
or(b) to arrange for its
function under subsection (2)(c), so far as it relates to the decision,
to be exercised by the
authority.(5) For the purposes
of this Chapter, a “designated person” is a person or
organisation that commissions or provides services, goods or facilities
to the public within their local authority area. This includes, but is
not limited to—(a) a
relevant commissioner or provider of NHS services or social care
services, subject to section
9FC,(b) a responsible
authority under the Crime and Disorder Act
1998,(c) a water authority or
waste water authority,(d) an
integrated transport authority under the Transport Act 2008; a company
providing local bus services or a Train Operating Company under the
Railways Act
1993,(e) JobCentre
Plus,(f) a flood risk
management authority or emergency planning
authority,(g) the Environment
Agency,(h) the Homes and
Communities Agency,(i)
Highways Agency,(j) a county
council, in an area where the authority exercising its powers under
this section is a shire district,
(k) a shire district, in an area where the authority
exercising its powers under this section is a county
council.(6) In London, the
relationship between London Boroughs and designated persons who are
directly accountable to the London Assembly should be subject to the
agreement of procedures between those
organisations.9FA Overview and
scrutiny committees: supplementary
provisions‘(1) An
overview and scrutiny committee of a local
authority:(a) may appoint one
or more sub-committees, and(b)
may arrange for the discharge of any of its functions by any such
sub-committee.(2) A
sub-committee of an overview and scrutiny committee may not discharge
any functions other than those conferred on it under subsection
(1)(b).(3) A reference in this
Act to an “overview and scrutiny committee” will include
reference to a sub-committee established under subsection (1) and to a
joint committee established under section
9F(3).(4) An
overview and scrutiny committee of a local authority may not include
any member of the authority’s executive (under executive
arrangements), the chair of a decision-making service committee (under
the committee system) or any equivalent decision-making person or
persons under executive
arrangements.(5) An overview
and scrutiny committee of a local authority may include persons who are
not members of the authority
(co-optees).(6) Any person
co-opted under subsection (5) will not be entitled to vote at any
meeting of that committee, unless the Council’s constitution
makes provision for such persons (either individuals or as a class of
person) to vote.(7) Section
499 of the Education Act 1996 is
repealed.(8) An overview and
scrutiny committee of a local authority is to be
treated:(a) as a committee or
sub-committee of a principal council for the purposes of Part 5A of the
Local Government Act 1972 (access to meetings and documents of certain
authorities, committees and sub-committees),
and(b) as a body to which
section 15 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (duty to
allocate seats to political groups)
applies.(9) Subsections (2)
and (5) of section 102 of the Local Government Act 1972 apply to an
overview and scrutiny committee of a local authority as they apply to a
committee appointed under that
section.9FB Overview and
scrutiny committees:
powers‘(1) An overview
and scrutiny committee of a local
authority—(a) may
require members of the executive (under executive arrangements), the
chair of a relevant committee (under the committee system), officers of
the authority or designated persons, as defined by section 9F(5)
to—(i) attend before it
to answer questions, subject to section 9FC and
9FD,(ii) provide information
to it that relates to the functions of the committee, subject to
section 9FC and
9FE,(iii) have regard to any
reports or recommendations that the committee produces that relate to
the functions of the committee, subject to section 9FC and
9FF,(b) may require any other
member of the authority to attend before it to answer questions
relating to any function which is exercisable by the member by virtue
of section 236 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health
Act 2007.
(2) It is the duty of any member, officer or person
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) to comply with any
requirement mentioned in that paragraph, subject to sections
9FF (2) and (3).9FC Overview
and scrutiny committees: powers in relation to
substantial changes to local NHS
services‘(1) Where an
overview and scrutiny committee proposes to use its powers under
section 9FB(1) in relation to a relevant NHS body or NHS
provider—(a) it should
have regard to any joint arrangements put in place under subsections
(2) and (3); and(b) it should
have regard to any formal consultation arrangements put in place under
those subsections.(2) When a
relevant NHS body or NHS provider proposes a substantial change to the
commissioning or provision of health services (referred to in this
section as a “substantial change”) that will affect the
authority’s or authorities’ area, or the area’s
inhabitants, it must consult the overview and scrutiny committee of
that authority or
authorities.(3) Where a
substantial change under subsection (2) affects more than one principal
authority, or where it affects the services provided by a shire
district in an area for which there is also a county council, the
scrutiny functions of those authorities must
either:(a) establish a joint
committee to consider the proposal,
or(b) put in place another
joint working arrangement which allows all those authorities affected
by the proposal to input into the response to the
consultation.(4) Where a
committee or joint committee uses its powers under section 9FB(1) to
scrutinise an NHS body or NHS provider, apart from subsections (1),(2)
and (3) above, that organisation or person will be under the same
obligation to attend meetings, provide information and respond
to recommendations as any other designated person, subject
to subsection (5).(5) Where
information or attendance at an overview and scrutiny committee is
requested in connection to a substantial change, the relevant NHS body
or NHS provider must satisfy that request in a manner that ensures that
the overview and scrutiny committee has an opportunity to substantively
contribute to the
consultation.(6) A relevant
NHS body or NHS provider is required to provide a formal response to
those it has consulted on a substantial change, including to any
relevant overview and scrutiny committee. This response must set
out—(a) the action that
the NHS body or NHS provider proposes to take with regard to the
substantial change,(b) the
reasons for that decision,(c)
any other information which the NHS body or NHS provider feels is
relevant, and(d) any other
information which the NHS body or NHS provider has agreed with any
relevant overview and scrutiny committee shall be
provided.(7) If an overview
and scrutiny committee or joint overview and scrutiny
committee—(a) is
dissatisfied with the process of the consultation on the substantial
change,(b) is dissatisfied
with the response provided by the NHS body or NHS provider to the
consultation,(c) is
dissatisfied with the reasons given supporting that response,
or(d) is not satisfied that
the substantial change is not in the interest of the inhabitants of the
area,it
may—(e) if it is not a
joint committee, recommend that full Council refer the matter to the
Secretary of State for Health for a direction,
and(f) if it is a joint
committee, refer the matter to the Secretary of State for Health for a
direction.
(8) For the purposes of this
section—(a)
“relevant NHS body” means an NHS body other than a
Special Health Authority which is prescribed for those purposes in
relation to the authority;
and(b) “relevant NHS
provider” means a body or person which provides services under
the Health and Social Care Act 2011 in pursuance of arrangements made
by the Board or a commissioning consortium and is prescribed, or is of
a description prescribed, for those purposes in relation to the
authority.9FD Overview and
scrutiny: duty to attend
meetings‘(1) This
section applies where an overview and scrutiny committee of a local
authority proposes to use its powers under 9FB(1)(a)(i) to require a
person to attend a committee
meeting.(2) When a request is
sent to a designated person to attend a meeting of an overview and
scrutiny committee, other than in accordance with section 9FC, that
request must—(a) give
reasonable notice of the meeting, considering subject matter and
urgency,(b) make clear the
purpose for which the designated person is being requested to attend,
and(c) be proportionate and
reasonable,unless the scrutiny
function of the local authority and the relevant public body have
agreed to waive or alter any of these
requirements.(3) Subsection
(2) shall not apply when an overview and scrutiny committee proposes to
use its powers under 9FB(1)(a)(i) to require an officer or member of
the authority to attend the
meeting.9FE Overview and
scrutiny: duty to provide
information‘(1) When a
request is sent to a designated person to provide information to a
scrutiny function, that request
must—(a) specify the
format in which the information is to be
provided,(b) make clear the
purpose for which the designated person is being requested to provide
information, and(c) be
proportionate and
reasonable.(2) Subsections
(1)(b) and (1)(c) will not apply where a request is sent to an officer
or member of the council to provide
information.9FF Overview and
scrutiny: reports and
recommendations‘(1) An
overview and scrutiny committee may publish reports and
recommendations.(2) Subject to
subsection (3), the overview and scrutiny committee must by notice in
writing require—(a) the
authority,(b) the executive
(under executive
arrangements),(c) a relevant
committee of the council (under the committee system),
or(d) a designated
person,to accept or reject the
recommendation, and in doing so
to—(e) consider, and
have regard to, the report or
recommendations,(f) respond to
the overview and scrutiny committee within two months, advising what
(if any) action that body or person proposed to
take,(g) provide reasons for
the decision if the body or person proposes not to take any action,
or(h) publish the
response.(3) In this section,
an “accepted recommendation” means a
recommendation submitted to a person covered by
subsections (2)(a), (b), (c) or (d), where the requirements
of subsections (2)(e), (f), (g) or (h) have been
satisfied.(4) Subsection (2)
will not apply where a recommendation is made which does not relate
to—
(a) an issue for which the subject of that
recommendation is responsible,
and(b) an issue which does not
affect the inhabitants of the
area.(5) An overview and
scrutiny committee may require updates to be provided on the
implementation of an accepted
recommendation.(6) Where an
overview and scrutiny committee proposes to exercise the powers in
subsection (5), this requirement
must—(a) be set out at
the time the recommendation is made under subsection
(2),(b) indicate after what
period of time an update, or updates, will be required,
and(c) specify the format in
which the update is to be
provided.9FG Statutory
scrutiny officers‘(1) A
local authority must designate one of its officers to discharge the
functions in subsection
(2).(2) Those functions
are:(a) to promote the role of
overview and scrutiny within the
locality,(b) to provide
support to the authority’s scrutiny functions,
and(c) to provide support and
guidance to—(i) members
of the authority,(ii) such
persons who are not members of the authority but who sit on an overview
and scrutiny committee or
committees,(iii) officers of
the authority, and(iv) other
designated persons,in relation
to the authority’s scrutiny
function.(3) An officer
designated by a local authority under this section is to be known as
the authority’s “statutory scrutiny
officer”.(4) The local
authority must provide the scrutiny officer with such staff,
accommodation and other resources as are, in the officer’s
opinion, sufficient to allow the officer to discharge the functions in
subsection (2).(5) A local
authority may not designate any of the following under this
section:(a) the head of the
authority’s paid service designated under section 4 of the Local
Government and Housing Act
1989,(b) the
authority’s monitoring officer designated under section 5 of
that Act, or(c) the
authority’s chief finance officer, within the meaning of that
section.9FH Reference by a
member of an authority to an overview and scrutiny committee
(councillor call for
action)‘(1) The
constitution of a local authority must include provision which enables
any member of an overview and scrutiny committee of the authority to
refer to the committee any matter which is relevant to the functions of
the committee.(2) For the
purposes of subsection (1), provision enables a person to refer a
matter to a committee or sub-committee if it enables the person to
ensure that the matter is included in the agenda for, and discussed at,
a meeting of the committee or
sub-committee.(3) The scrutiny
function must develop and have regard to procedures (“councillor
call for action procedures”), which should be applied by the
relevant scrutiny committee, and which ensure that such provision
referred to in subsections (1) and (2) operate in an effective way.
Such provisions should ensure
that—(a) reference to
committee or sub-committee occurs where other avenues for resolution
have been exhausted,(b) the
matter affects all or part of the electoral area for which the member
is elected or any person who lives or works in that
area,
(c) the matter relates to the authority or a
designated person, and(d) such
a reference is not vexatious, persistent or
discriminatory.(4) In reaching
its decision under subsection (3), the committee or sub-committee
should also have regard
to—(a) any powers which
the member may exercise in relation to the matter by virtue of section
236 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health
Act 2007 (exercise of functions by local councillors in
England),(b) any
representations made by the member as to why it would be appropriate
for the committee or sub-committee to exercise any of its powers under
section 9F(2) and 9FB in relation to the matter,
and(c) the powers under
sections 9F and 9FB.(5) Where
the committee proposes to refer a matter for discussion under
subsections (1) and (2) it may have recourse to its powers under
sections 9F and 9FB.9FI
Publication of reports, recommendations and responses —
confidential and exempt
information‘(1)
Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 shall have effect with
regard to overview and scrutiny
committees.(2) Where
publication would involve making public any confidential or exempt
information, a summary of the document or report shall be produced
which omits the
information.(3) Where a
witness at an overview and scrutiny committee is asked a question, the
answer to which would require them to provide information which would,
if published, be confidential or exempt, they will not be obliged to do
so if the committee is meeting in
public.(4) In this
section:(a)
“confidential information” has the meaning given by
section 100A(3) of the Local Government Act 1972 (admission to meetings
of principal councils),(b)
“exempt information” has the meaning given
by—(i) section 100I of
that Act, or in relation to a report or recommendations of an overview
and scrutiny committee,(ii) a
resolution of the overview and scrutiny committee under section 100A(4)
of the Local Government Act 1972 which applies to the proceedings, or
part of the proceedings, at any meeting of the overview and scrutiny
committee at which the report is, or recommendations are, considered,
and(iii) section 246 of the
National Health Service Act
2006.’.
The
Chair:
With this it will be convenient to discuss
amendment 19, in schedule 2, page 204, line 17, leave out
‘may’ and insert
‘must’.
Barbara
Keeley:
Amendments 40 and 19 aim to strengthen the
scrutiny function in local authorities. The Minister conveniently
exhorted me to work hard on scrutiny over the next five years, so I
hope that he, and the team at his side, will support the amendments.
They show, like our amendment on Second Reading, that we believe that
the scrutiny function is important and we want to help local
authorities to move it along.
The Centre
for Public Scrutiny sent Committee members a briefing on the need for
the changes. It is a national charity that aims to promote transparent,
inclusive and accountable planning and delivery of
public services, and supports the individuals, organisations,
and communities to hold decision makers to account. Holding decision
makers to account has been today’s
theme, and we raised questions on that on Second Reading. The Centre
for Public Scrutiny reminds us that the Bill
consolidates a range of existing scrutiny legislation brought in by
various Acts, but in many ways it does not go far enough.
It is timely
to look at scrutiny now because the amendments offer the opportunity to
clarify the inconsistencies in legislation, to take account of changes
to policy and practice since it was passed, and make the law on
scrutiny easier to understand for those who practise it and have a
stake in good scrutiny. Amendment 40 brings in some provisions proposed
in the Local Authorities (Overview and Scrutiny) Bill, which had
cross-party support but failed to be enacted due to lack of
parliamentary
time.
Some
people believe that scrutiny has failed to be effective and others have
commented that they cannot find successful examples, but there are
many, some of which I will quote later. Local government groups have
called for the introduction of stronger scrutiny powers and for more
resources to be available to the scrutiny committees or for the
scrutiny function. The all-party group on local government published a
report of its inquiry, “The Role of Councillors”, in June
2007. It argued that after the legislation was introduced in 2000, the
Government concentrated on the executive decision-making function of
councillors and said:
“Now
there is a need for some rebalancing, as it is vital for the democratic
representation of communities that there should be an effective role
for all councillors. In developing the role of councillors who are not
part of the executive, overview and scrutiny has had varying levels of
success. The powers of scrutiny, and scrutiny support, should be
strengthened to increase its
effectiveness.”
The
Centre for Public Scrutiny feels that, while scrutiny may not have had
a high profile nationally, it has helped to secure, and is securing,
significant improvements for local people in a number of different
parts of the country. In fact, the centre gives good scrutiny awards
every year, and it tells me that last year it received nearly 100
entrants, most of which were of an extremely high
standard.
6
pm
Some
may ask what the scrutiny functions are doing. The scrutiny work has
resulted in significant cash savings for the authority or its partners,
and in improvements in dialogue between the council and local
residents. Some of the work has also led to measurable improvements in
local services, including some high-quality work on value for money.
Many scrutiny functions have therefore successfully tackled issues that
can go beyond the council’s powers or that involve councils
working with other authorities. What they do is very much in the spirit
of this Bill because they enhance local partnership working and can
look at local crime and disorder policy. They also help areas meet the
challenge of finding financial savings and, most
importantly—particularly as we will talk about community
empowerment later—they can open up decision making on policy
development to democratic accountability for the community. Those are
the reasons why scrutiny is
important.
Much
of that work has been carried out in innovative ways, not just in
formal committee meetings but through councillors going out, speaking
to local people and
gathering evidence. Members may have heard some of the examples of
notable practice—one case is very much close to home. Wyre
Forest district council reviewed renewable energy provision. South
Derbyshire district council was engaged in a long-running review of
slow broadband speeds in the district. That led to key successes,
because BT announced that it would upgrade three exchanges that serve
the district to superfast broadband. That is the sort of service
improvement that can be brought
about.
Tunbridge
Wells borough council worked jointly with Maidstone borough council to
review the local provision of mental health services. I am sure that
the Minister knows of and supports that, but I understand that the
review was very well received and that it resulted in the new mental
health forum, which is chaired by the Minister of State, Department for
Communities and Local Government, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge
Wells.
The
Centre for Public Scrutiny believes that that type of increased
partnership working and local autonomy in relation to a wide range of
public services means that, in future, it will be become increasingly
difficult to discern whether a service is delivered inside or outside a
council, and that is why we have to look at the scrutiny powers. The
centre feels that the current scrutiny powers and those in the Bill do
not always help scrutiny functions to investigate the issues that
directly affect local people if their influence is limited because a
partner agency is involved. One of the key recommended changes is to
equalise the powers that scrutiny has over the council and other
partners, including health and crime and disorder partners. They
currently have slightly different responsibilities under different
legislation—for historical reasons, scrutiny powers have come
together in different ways—and the change will help augment
local democratic
accountability.
The
changes suggested by amendment 40 seek to achieve that and to clarify
and simplify scrutiny legislation, which has become increasingly
complex over the past 10 years. Current scrutiny legislation
can impose unreasonable requirements on the scrutiny function, and
resource issues are being discussed in relation to that. However, the
current legislation still fails to give the clout that scrutiny across
the board needs to give its work the profile it deserves. Proposed new
section 9F in amendment 40 offers a complete rewrite of all the
sections relating to scrutiny in part 1. The issue is also linked to
the new health provisions: the Secretary of State for Health emphasised
yesterday how important the scrutiny function would be in local
councils once the changes in the Health and Social Care Bill are
enacted.
The
amendment would maintain the existing framework of scrutiny, allow
practitioners more scope to innovate, and keep the broad powers similar
to what they are now. It will make the business of scrutiny easier to
transact both for practitioners and for those they hold to account. The
proposed changes bring together the existing, separate regimes for the
scrutiny of health, crime and disorder and other local government
matters.
Although
the powers for a reference to the Secretary of State for Health in the
case of any substantial variation in NHS services are kept separate,
everything else has been merged together. I think that we all
understand from the number of interventions on the
Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Health that references to
the latter tend to be on larger issues, such as the closure of
hospitals. Scrutiny powers to challenge and hold partners to account
are, in amendment 40, broadly similar to those that exist
for the partner authorities, and there are safeguards that require
scrutiny to be exercised in a proportionate manner. Those who are
included in the new scrutiny powers that are suggested in the amendment
might feel that that is too much for them, but there is a framework for
those greater powers to engage with local service delivery issues
without being limited and constrained by current anomalies.
Amendment 40
also expands the number of organisations with which scrutiny can
engage. Instead of a list of organisations, the definition of such
partners is given under designated persons, which is a class
description, and it is the same as the definition that is about to be
adopted in the proposed Local Government (Wales) Measure. In Wales, the
Measure has gone through significant pre-legislative scrutiny, and that
definition has not been found wanting.
The Bill has
not had the benefit of pre-legislative scrutiny, although, as my right
hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich said, if ever a
measure cried out for pre-legislative scrutiny, this is it. We may
benefit from the pre-legislative scrutiny that has been carried out in
Wales, because we were denied that opportunity
here.
Gavin
Barwell:
The combined effect of amendments 40 and 19 is to
stipulate that authorities that choose to operate under the committee
system must have a scrutiny and overview committee. Does the hon. Lady
regard requiring an authority to do so as a localist measure? As a
former councillor herself under the committee system, does she
recognise that under that system all members of an authority are
engaged in scrutiny work as a function of being on a committee, as
opposed to an executive system where a split exists between executive
and non-executive members?
Barbara
Keeley:
The briefing that we have received from the Centre
for Public Scrutiny, which I recommend to the hon. Gentleman if he has
not already read it, stated that scrutiny has moved on from the notion
of committees. I gave examples—one of them was close to home for
the Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government,
the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells—whereby scrutiny
reaches out beyond the committee sitting or the council into the
community, which is what we want to see. I do not believe that it is in
any way non-localist to state that those councils that return to the
committee system must have a scrutiny function. Scrutiny is very
important. In his opening remarks, the Secretary of State for Health
referred to the importance that health scrutiny will assume in almost
every area of the country.
Gavin
Barwell:
The hon. Lady has made the case with passion that
she thinks that that is important. When he criticised the Government
earlier, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington said that the
attitude was one of “We know best.” Does the fact that
the hon. Lady thinks that scrutiny is important justify making all
local authorities do what she would like them to
do?
Barbara
Keeley:
I hate to think what sort of local authority would
not want to have some form of scrutiny in this era of huge change,
particularly in the NHS. I cannot see how that
would work.
Alun
Cairns:
Will the hon. Lady give
way?
Barbara
Keeley:
No; I will try to make progress now. To summarise,
amendment 40 would introduce more powerful scrutiny committees to
follow up on their recommendations, which is important. It would remove
anomalies such as councils co-opting statutory education co-optees,
which they do not need to do. It will equalise roles and
responsibilities across counties and districts in two-tier areas. That
anomaly can no longer be justified. It will clarify the roles and
responsibilities of joint committees, which are an increasingly popular
way to transact scrutiny business in a proportionate manner.
Cross-authority
working—about which Ministers from the Department for
Communities and Local Government talk a great deal—is important,
so cross-authority scrutiny will also become important. I have given
the example of the joint scrutiny work on mental health services that
was carried out by Tunbridge Wells and Maidstone borough councils. I
feel sure that the Minister of State, Department for Communities and
Local Government, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells would
appreciate measures that enable better joint work on scrutiny across
authorities.
Greg
Clark:
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for referring to
something that has worked successfully, and I have no doubt that both
councils would want voluntarily to continue those arrangements. The
hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington said earlier that we should trust
local government and fire and rescue authorities, and the hon. Member
for Worsley and Eccles South herself said that she could not see an
authority choosing not to have these arrangements. Why does she not
want to trust local government in the way that her colleague
does?
Barbara
Keeley:
Because we believe that scrutiny is important.
Members should look at the briefing from the Centre for Public
Scrutiny. Amendment 40 includes as part of its text that every local
authority must have a scrutiny function—that is important.
Members may not agree, but what about the citizens who live in an area
where there is no scrutiny? Particularly now, when we have lost one
tier and will be losing another tier in terms of primary care trusts so
that things will all go straight to GPs. None of us really has an idea
how all that will work. This is the time to strengthen
scrutiny.
The
difficulty for many scrutiny functions in a variety of councils is that
they are restricted as to who they can call, and in their resources.
They cannot move into areas such as health or crime and disorder, yet
those are the very areas that local people expect councils to deal
with. As a constituency MP, I have had incredible problems with
utilities, areas that flood and so on—there are many things.
Citizens and residents tend not to understand that councils do not have
authority over those
things.
We
believe in the scrutiny function in this place. Select Committees have
great powers to call witnesses and use resources in that way. It is not
right in any way to deny it to local authorities.
Amendment 40
would remove the power of the Secretary of State to issue regulations
and guidance, so, to that extent, it is not centralising. Regulations
and guidance are unnecessary and are not in the
spirit of localism. I hope that the Committee will support the
amendments, which would strengthen the important scrutiny function in
local
authorities.
Brandon
Lewis:
I will not keep the Committee long. I found the
hon. Lady’s words surprising. We keep hearing that the
Opposition are in favour of localism, but yet again we have an
amendment that would tell local government how to do something. I fully
support the Government’s position and oppose the amendment for a
couple of
reasons.
Barbara
Keeley:
It may help the Committee if I make it clear that
these amendments were tabled at the request of the Centre for Public
Scrutiny. They do not give the Opposition’s position, which is
that we support scrutiny and want to extend it. Is the hon. Gentleman
saying that the Government do not support scrutiny and do not support
resourcing it and giving local authorities
powers?
Brandon
Lewis:
The hon. Lady might like to clarify when she speaks
later whether the Opposition actually support the amendments or whether
a quango has told them what they must support in a Committee. I am not
sure what she is arguing. The simple fact is that the
Government’s position is to say to local authorities that they
should scrutinise, but how they scrutinise is something that they can
decide locally. It is true localism, not the top-down control that the
Opposition argue for through the guidance of a quango paid for by the
Government.
The
hon. Lady says that she used to work with a fourth-option authority
that had a committee system. I was on a committee system fourth-option
authority in opposition and then as the leader of one for five years.
It had an overview and scrutiny committee in the format laid out in the
current legislation. The committee structure is a complete farce. I
have not spoken to anyone in a fourth-option authority that still has
committees who has not found the same thing: senior officers wasting
their time and, therefore, taxpayers’ money trying to find
something for the overview and scrutiny committee to do. That makes a
farce of the law. They want to make it seem that something is happening
when it is not. The reality is that in a committee system, the
committee, which back-benchers sit on, take part in and are involved
in, performs the scrutiny role itself and is self-perpetuating in that
way.
Ian
Mearns:
I served in a local authority for 27 years and am
aware of different ways of running the committee system in different
places. In my local authority in Gateshead, we had an open committee
system whereby there was no whipping beforehand and committees could go
on at length, rightly, to scrutinise properly the proposals put forward
by officers and senior members. In other local authorities not too far
away from where I was, the committees were pre-whipped and proposals
went through on the nod. If that was to be the system adopted under the
new proposals, it would seem only fair to allow a scrutiny system to be
adopted, unless, of course, the local authority determined
otherwise.
6.15
pm
Brandon
Lewis:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention,
but he fails to point out that, ultimately, on any
council, there is always a council meeting where
councillors—whether in opposition or not—can make
comments and speak against an issue that they were not happy with when
it was brought up
earlier.
Barbara
Keeley:
If the hon. Gentleman thinks that the existing
powers are fine, can he say how scrutiny—for example, in the
case of the changes to the NHS—is going to happen? Is he clear
about
that?
Brandon
Lewis:
First, I would refer to good opposition. Secondly,
I would refer to the Government’s position in schedule 2, which
states:
“Executive
arrangements by a local authority must include provision for the
appointment by the authority of one or more committees of the
authority”.
It
goes on to say that authorities must have scrutiny. What type of
scrutiny that is and how it is structured is up to the local authority.
The core difference is having the local decision made by a local
authority that is answerable to the electors. If a local authority is
acting in a way that the electors do not like, that puts the power back
in the hands of the electors. That is what local elections are about.
That is what democracy is about. As a democrat, that, not the
amendment, is what I
support.
Alun
Cairns:
I could not support my hon. Friend more strongly.
It is strange, however, that the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles
South made a comparison using the Welsh Assembly Government’s
Local Government Measure, which is currently going through, because
that is the most centralising piece of legislation that has been in
front of the Assembly. It is so centralising that the Labour party in
Westminster would find it extremely difficult to support, because it
takes powers away from local authorities and into the
centre.
Brandon
Lewis:
I am grateful for that intervention. I cannot
support the amendment. From what the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles
South has said, it seems that it was created by a quango and the
Opposition have not necessarily thought it through and do not
necessarily even support it. The Government’s position in the
Bill as it stands is perfectly legitimate: having local power making
local decisions with local people being able to deal with that at
elections if they want, rather than having some farcical situation that
does not add up and is, yet again, top-down control from the Labour
party.
Mr
Ward:
I find myself in a difficult position considering
quite a prescriptive Bill and an even more prescriptive amendment, so I
disagree with everybody so far. For consistency, I retain my
fundamentalist position, which is that it should be for a local
authority to decide how to carry out its own scrutiny. I see nothing
wrong, whether it is centralism or not, in ensuring that there is a
duty on the local authority to carry out an overview and scrutiny
function and a duty to disclose what that is, so that the local
electors know. As with the previous group of amendments, I believe that
local electors have a right to be badly governed and badly scrutinised
locally, but it should be for them to decide.
Returning to
the previous string of amendments, I was won over by the argument for
the prescribed arrangements, and I wonder why we cannot extend that to
the overview and scrutiny function. If it does, I am sorry, but I have
missed that. I was won over by the argument that the prescribed
arrangements for governance allow the local authority to approach the
Secretary of State and say, “We don’t like that, and we
don’t like that. We think this is better for us.” Could
that not be extended into a prescribed arrangement for overview and
scrutiny, which local authorities could then ask the Secretary of State
to think about with a view to a local
choice?
On
the choice between prescriptive and very prescriptive, there is a long
list of named or prescribed bodies, which extends the scope of overview
and scrutiny beyond the authority itself. Is that not already covered
in the Bill where it is stated that the local authority can look at
anything that concerns anybody within the area? A couple of broad
clauses already cover that point.
Mr
Raynsford:
As I made clear at the start of our
proceedings, I have an interest in this matter as I am chair of the
Centre for Public Scrutiny. [
Interruption.
] I made
that clear at the outset, and it is right for me to repeat it now. I
must say to the hon. Gentleman who referred to it as a
“quango”, that it is not a quango, it is a
charity.
Brandon
Lewis
rose—
Mr
Raynsford:
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman in a
moment, but I would like him to listen to my point. I thought that his
party was keen to encourage the voluntary sector, charitable
organisations and the big society, and that he would be slightly less
churlish in his references to an organisation that works to support the
public interest by promoting good-quality scrutiny and more efficient
government.
Brandon
Lewis:
I am sorry if the right hon. Gentleman took my
words in that way. I referred to the organisation as a quango on the
basis of my understanding that its funding came from the Government
through local government, that it was entirely funded that way and that
it is effectively a Government body. I was amazed that the Opposition
seemed to be tabling amendments that came from such a body, rather than
from their own thought processes.
Mr
Raynsford:
I assure the hon. Gentleman that the CFPS is a
charity that receives and seeks funding from a range of sources,
including charitable donations and money earned from informative
conferences and publications. I do not ask him to accept that point
from me, but I ask him to look at the work done by the CFPS over the
years. I hope he will accept that it is a worthwhile
organisation.
Scrutiny has
advanced significantly over the past 10 years, but the
legislative framework has not kept pace. My hon. Friend the Member for
Worsley and Eccles South highlighted that in her introductory remarks,
and I want to highlight two areas where that point is very relevant.
First, there is a growing focus on scrutiny by local authorities of
organisations outside the local
authority. We are particularly aware of the changes being introduced by
the Secretary of State for Health, and there is a strong
presumption of scrutiny of local health arrangements being exercised by
local authorities. Secondly, there are a growing number of partnerships
between local authorities and other partner bodies. A scrutiny function
that embraces that situation can ensure that those partnerships
genuinely work in the public interest.
In the
previous Parliament, I had the fortune, or otherwise, to inherit a
private Member’s Bill which fell at the election, as mentioned
earlier. It was designed with all-party support to extend the principle
of scrutiny to partnerships. But for the general election, it would
probably have been enacted by now, but it fell because of lack of time.
The principle of rationalising scrutiny functions to embrace
partnerships and take on board the new functions of scrutiny beyond the
local authority boundary is a reality. Although Conservative Members
may want to have a pop at the Labour party about centralism, I ask them
to think seriously about the benefits of having effective scrutiny in
local government, particularly in those areas where local governments
relate to outside organisations.
I understand
that the Government may not accept the amendment—it is detailed
and sophisticated and contains many provisions on which they may wish
to spend more time. However, I urge Ministers to be serious about the
issue, and recognise that it is important and that there is a need for
clarification and for the law to be updated. If they allow a situation
to develop where it is presumed that scrutiny will apply only in
authorities with cabinet and executive responsibilities and structures,
and not in local authorities with committee structures, a two-tier
system will develop. The benefits of that wider scrutiny of partners
and outside bodies will not occur in a local authority with a
traditional committee structure because there is no obligation to have
that scrutiny function. Quite serious problems will develop in the
years ahead if the Government do not address this. I urge Ministers not
to reject the provision in a partisan spirit, but to look at it as a
genuine effort to extend good quality governance, not just in local
government but more widely at a local level involving wider partners,
and to see whether they can come forward in due course with alternative
proposals of their
own.
Andrew
Stunell:
We have had an interesting debate in which a
number of good points have been made. I hope that this will be the last
part of the struggle between localism and freedom on one side and
command and control on the other. Labour Members want to introduce yet
another control on local authorities and yet another prescription on
what they shall and shall not do. On this occasion, they would retrofit
a scrutiny function on those smaller authorities that have a committee
system at the moment and impose it on any authority that chose to go
down that route in future. However, there does not seem to be much sign
that existing rules and regulations prevent local authorities from
being innovative. The hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South gave the
Committee a number of examples of innovative, laudable and effective
ways of carrying out the scrutiny function, for which I am grateful.
Even if the existing rules and regulations are a bit rusty and creaky
in places, they clearly do not inhibit such practice.
Let me deal
with a couple of key points that have been made. The Bill, including
the schedules to it, amounts to 406 pages, so it is understandable that
Opposition Members have not directed their attention to page 236. Were
they to do so, however, they would see that paragraph 87 of schedule 3
sets out a requirement for every local authority to have a health
scrutiny committee. If there were such a loophole regarding health, the
requirement in schedule 3 would block it. There is no requirement for a
particular format, but the Bill includes a
safeguard.
I
can tell my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East, who is a
self-confessed fundamentalist on this, that the prescribed arrangements
to which he referred are also capable of delivering on scrutiny.
Bradford might want to propose an innovative way of approaching
scrutiny and therefore want the flexibility to do that. It can use the
route that we discussed under the previous clause to bring that to the
attention of the Secretary of State so that it could become a
prescribed system of governance for it and other local authorities. The
amendment would impose additional and unnecessary duties on all local
authorities, yet those who propose it freely admit that the scrutiny
function already happens in all local authorities and that there is a
lot of innovation and forward-thinking about how to do
it.
Mr
Raynsford:
Will the Minister give
way?
Andrew
Stunell:
I shall just develop my point for a
moment.
While
the Bill provides specifically for the health scrutiny function, I
would also draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that the
forthcoming health Bill also contains parallel requirements. There does
not seem to be any need for the amendments in practice. They send
exactly the wrong signal about what a localism Bill is about in theory,
and I hope that that the Committee will reject
them.
6.30
pm
Mr
Raynsford:
I will not get into a partisan dispute about
imposition, but the hon. Gentleman’s argument that this is
somehow prescriptive is unconvincing, given that the paragraph deep in
the schedule to which he referred states that local authorities must
establish health scrutiny committees. Frankly, that is an unconvincing
argument against this attempt to create a coherent scrutiny function
that covers not just health, but wider partnership arrangements with
other organisations, which should reflect the development of good
practice and scrutiny over the years. It is surely a progressive
approach and not one to be rubbished, although that is, unfortunately,
what the Minister has
done.
Andrew
Stunell:
It is possible to be both progressive and
centralist. I might acknowledge that this is progressive, and I hope
that the right hon. Gentleman would acknowledge that it is
centralist.
Barbara
Keeley:
I gave some examples of good scrutiny, but I do
not want people to be misled into thinking that it is possible either
under existing legislation or under
the Bill to do everything that would be required for an effective
scrutiny function, because it was made very clear to the Committee that
that is not the case. It is important to address such things as the
duty to attend meetings. In the House, our scrutiny function in Select
Committees is enhanced by the power to require attendance. If that is
missing, scrutiny is less
effective.
My
right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich referred to the
wider partnerships that will exist. I have given some examples of the
substantial benefits of working with outside providers, such as
BT’s work in mental health, but there are many areas in which
scrutiny would not be effective, because the people called would not
attend.
I
would hope that Ministers would not use the disparaging language and
tone of the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth. I deplore such a way of
talking about a charity that is doing very effective work, and I hope
that he will look at the briefing and think again. Dismissing
everything as a quango is not an effective way of critiquing
things.
Finally,
I wish to address the distinction that the Minister keeps coming up
with about what the Government think is localist. The Government
apparently think that it is okay to impose mayors and to dictate that
mayors become chief executives. If there is any imposition, the
imposition is in this Bill, and we will come to that shortly. We think
that this amendment is important, and we intend to return to the
subject on Report, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Barbara
Keeley:
I beg to move amendment 2, in schedule 2,
page 191, leave out lines 25 to 30 and
insert—
‘(1) There is a
presumption that meetings of a local authority executive, or a
committee of such an executive, are to be open to the
public.(2) A local authority
executive, or a committee of such an executive, may decide to hold a
meeting in private if it thinks that in all the circumstances it would
be inappropriate to hold that meeting in
public.’.
The
Chair:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following:
Amendment
3, in schedule 2, page 191, line 31, leave
out
‘prescribed’.
Amendment
4, in schedule 2, page 191, line 34, leave
out
‘prescribed’.
Amendment
5, in schedule 2, page 191, leave out lines 38
and
39.
Amendment
6, in schedule 2, page 192, leave out lines 23
to
28.
Barbara
Keeley:
We need touch on amendment 2 only briefly. It has
been tabled in the spirit of the transparency and openness that already
prevail in good local authorities. However, the group has also been
tabled in the spirit of localism, because amendment 6 would remove the
link to regulations in which the Secretary of State prescribes the
circumstances in which meetings must be open to the public, or in which
meetings or proceedings will be held in private. In the spirit of
localism, such conditions cannot be prescribed by the Secretary of
State. To avoid
undue secrecy, however, the presumption of holding executive meetings in
public seems to provide the right balance. When I checked, I found that
a great number of councils specify in their constitution that there is
such a presumption, but I think it is right to include such a provision
in the Bill while we are considering all things local
government.
Amendments
3 to 6 would also remove the Secretary of State’s power to
prescribe which written records are made of decisions made at meetings
held in private or by individual members of a local authority
executive. Matters such as what records are kept are better decided
locally and defined in a local authority’s constitution. A
number of local authorities already operate with such a presumption,
and I have seen good examples from Durham and East Sussex. I trust that
the Committee can support the
amendments.
Andrew
Stunell:
As the hon. Lady says, many authorities have open
executive meetings as a matter of course or policy. My own borough of
Stockport is one, and I would commend that approach to local
authorities. We need to be careful with what we are saying, however, to
ensure that we do not produce perverse outcomes. Among the requirements
proposed is that every decision should be recorded. That sounds a good
idea, but let us be clear that existing regulations require executive
decisions made in connection with the discharge of a particular
executive function to be recorded. Even if such a meeting is held
behind closed doors, the decision should be recorded. The proposal
would—probably inadvertently—impose quite a burden
through the recording of all sorts of decisions, and not just those
that are related to the discharge of an executive function. It goes
very much wider and deeper than is required from that point of
view.
Barbara
Keeley:
I will say this for the first time, although I
might do so again: the Minister has an army of civil servants and
parliamentary draftsmen to draft things. If he is saying that he could
accept the spirit of our proposal, we would be happy to allow our
amendments to be altered so that any complexities or technicalities
could be addressed. Perhaps he will tell us whether he is in favour of
a presumption of openness and transparency under which executive
committees should meet in public, unless they decide the circumstances
are not suitable to allow
that.
Andrew
Stunell:
I want to give the hon. Lady as much comfort as I
can, but I remind her that the Bill, as far as practicable, avoids
prescription for local authorities. I undertake to consider the point
that she raised, if that would be helpful. I hope that she will take
stock, however, because neither the Government nor the ministerial team
are in any way inclined to add burdens to local authorities, and we
would not want any provision in this area to impose an unreasonable
burden.
Barbara
Keeley:
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Barbara
Keeley:
I beg to move amendment 7, in schedule 2,
page 194, line 27, leave out from beginning to end
of line 39 on page 196.
The
Chair:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following:
Amendment
42, in schedule 2,
page 195, line 22, leave out
‘may’ and insert
‘must’.
Amendment
43, in schedule 2, page 199, leave out lines 4 to
25.
Barbara
Keeley:
The amendments would remove the proposal to allow
an elected mayor to be the chief executive of a local authority. Of all
the powers in the Bill to direct the Government’s arrangements
for local authorities from Whitehall, this is the strangest. We have
been hearing about it from the Secretary of State for some months, but
I am not convinced that there is any compelling reason why elected
mayors should become the chief executives of their authorities. I agree
with the evidence of our witnesses—doubtless that will cause
amusement—because, from my experience, Professor Jones was right
to
say:
“There
are two types of leadership that you need: political leadership looking
out to the world of politics…and administrative
leadership…It is very rare to find one person who can combine
those two leadership roles. When you look at different systems around
the world, you find that there is always a duality of
leadership—one person who deals with the politics and one person
who deals with the
administration.”
Henry
Smith:
Will the hon. Lady give
way?
Barbara
Keeley:
I will make a bit more progress, if I may.
Professor Jones
continued:
“Whether
a local authority or a central Government is a success or not depends
on the interaction and the partnership between the political leader and
the administrative leader.”––[Official
Report, Localism Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011;
c. 42-43,
Q68.]
The
proposals in the Bill mean that the council leaders of our 12 largest
cities could find themselves becoming shadow mayors, whether they or
local people want that or not. The next pressure would then be for the
mayor to become the chief
executive.
Henry
Smith:
There are indeed examples from around the world of
political and administrative roles being combined at the top. I know
that we are talking about a localism Bill, but perhaps the most famous
example is the President of the United
States.
Barbara
Keeley:
I did comparative US and UK politics for my
degree, but I do not think that the Committee has time to get into that
tonight.
Under the
Bill, the leaders of our 12 largest cities could find themselves
becoming shadow mayors, and then there will be pressure on them to
become the chief executive. In an article about how the Bill will
affect Leeds, the Yorkshire Evening Post
said:
“A
Department of Communities and Local Government spokesman said:
‘Mayors will move to the mayoral management model and ensure
that their mayor is the chief executive
officer.’”
There
does not seem to be a lot of localism in the thrust behind the
provision.
Professor
Jones said in evidence to us that the Bill would
produce
“Whitehall
dominance: the same old ministerial games still being played; Ministers
intervening; and civil servants devising their schemes and drawing up
papers very similar to the Bill before the
Committee.”––[Official Report, Localism
Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 42, Q65.]
Here we have an example
of that. Even before Parliament has debated the Bill, which is in
itself centralising and imposes governance arrangements on our 12
largest cities, we have DCLG officials turning what might have been an
option into something that will have to be ensured. It is very telling
that such conversations are happening. Ministers have already been
picking fights with local authorities that have a mayor if they are
appointing chief
executives.
I
have been an assistant engineering manager in the IT industry and I was
also a councillor in Trafford. I started as vice-chair of social
services and later became cabinet member for all children’s
services. We sometimes had to deal with tricky and complex
issues—particularly around children—and I valued the
advice that I received from senior officers. That is the real
difference. In addition to administrative leadership, professional
advice is needed from people with a depth of experience. Even though I
have a managerial background, I would not have felt ready to take on
the chief executive role or assumed that I had the knowledge to
co-ordinate all the county’s functions, including
staffing.
Let
me give a brief example of the difference between the co-ordination
role of professional officers and the role of elected leaders. On 2
November, we had a terrible gas explosion in Irlam in which a number of
people were injured, one very seriously. Three houses collapsed, with
people trapped inside, and 200 families had to be evacuated. It was
clearly a major incident. Barbara Spicer, the chief executive of
Salford city council, took over and co-ordinated the work at the
explosion site with the police and emergency services. She and her team
did a brilliant job on that day and in the following weeks getting
emergency aid, and supporting and helping all the families affected.
This is, I think, the first opportunity that I have had to mention that
incident in Parliament and to say how grateful I am, as the local MP,
for the work that she did. I know that some very difficult decisions
had to be made, because there was an ongoing police inquiry. Our chief
executive was able to undertake the role because she had done detailed
work on contingency planning with police and other agencies, and that
stemmed from her long experience in senior roles in different
authorities.
If
Salford had had an elected mayor, under the preferred model being put
forward by DCLG and the Secretary of State, that mayor would have
directed those operations without the skills and the professional
competence required—depending on the individual. Is it now being
suggested that there is no need for professional competence for the
running and co-ordinating of our local authorities, because I find that
terribly
worrying?
When
the Secretary of State has talked about local authority chief
executives and the role of elected leaders, he has
said:
“A
lot of chief executives are very nice people whom one can take home to
meet one’s mum. But they haven’t got a job anymore. All
of the position could be subsumed into the leader’s
role.”
Alison
Seabeck:
My hon. Friend makes a good point. She may well
remember that a football mascot got elected as mayor in Hartlepool. To
be fair to the gentleman concerned, he has been doing a very good
job—
[Interruption.] No, to be fair, he has committed himself fully,
but he could not have done that job, as he would be the first to admit,
without having had the fall-back of good officers and a good chief
executive to guide him through those early
years.
6.45
pm
Barbara
Keeley:
I thank my hon. Friend for that example. This is a
massive miscalculation. It is a mistake to muddle political leaders and
professionally skilled chief executives, or professional senior
officers of any discipline. We can draw a parallel with the Health and
Social Care Bill, which was debated in the Chamber yesterday. That Bill
will force professionals into roles that they do not want, that they
are not trained for, and that they do not want to do. It forces
commissioning and other managerial functions on to GPs who only want to
get on with their medical role.
The Localism
Bill will muddle up political and professional roles in local
authorities, and it is a recipe for confusion. All that will happen is
that somebody will be chief executive, even though they will not be
given that title, because local authorities will still need a person to
perform that role. It is wrong to make the assumption that muddling
those roles will work, so I urge the Committee to support the
amendment.
Mr
Bayley, may I seek your advice? Will amendment 42 be debated
separately, or should I speak to it now?
The
Chair:
If you have things to say about
amendment 42, now is the time.
Barbara
Keeley:
Before anyone tries to pull me up on it, amendment
42 is an alternative to amendment 7. Although amendment 7 would remove
the mayoral management model altogether, which would be our preference,
amendment 42 would provide that when a mayoral management model comes
into force at the mayor’s request, the mayor
“must” set out their plans for the new combined role,
rather than “may” set them
out.
The
Bill provides that the mayor may issue reports on plans covering such
things as the co-ordination of the local authority’s functions,
the number and grades of staff in the local authority, the organisation
of staff, and the appointment and management of staff. Those are
significant policy areas, and any new executive mayor would have broad
powers to reorganise and restructure a local authority—that
might be something that the Government want. With the removal of the
separate and professional role of chief executive, however, there is a
serious risk that such areas could be mismanaged. We know of examples
of the executive mayor model getting into difficulties. A mayor in such
a position could politicise the appointment of staff, which might lead
to serious mismanagement of the local authority, meaning that it could
not carry out its functions or keep within a legal budget. There are
examples of that happening, so it is important that we have as much
democratic accountability and scrutiny as
possible.
Gavin
Barwell:
The hon. Lady may be aware that the Greater
London authority is considering abolishing the position of chief
executive while keeping a head of paid service. That would be done
under legislation passed by
the previous Government. If the Labour party has the concerns that she
is setting out, why did it allow that situation to arise for
London?
Barbara
Keeley:
It is not a question of allowing it; it is a
question of forcing it. In the quote I read earlier, the DCLG
spokespeople said that there would be a requirement, which is our
concern. In fact, the Secretary of State has said that a mayor
“will” become the chief executive.
The key point
for amendment 42 is that any mayor’s plans must be published in
full to enable full scrutiny and discussion, and any new mayor should
not have the option of avoiding that.
Mr
Ward:
I have struggled with the prospect of elected mayors
anyway, which does not help my consideration of amendment 7, but if
they are in place, I have no real objection to the elected mayor
proposing anything that they want to the authority—within
reason, of course. What concerns me is proposed new section
9HB of the Local Government Act 2000, which is covered by amendment 42.
Am I reading the provision right? Does it say that the proposition made
to the authority has to be agreed by only 34% of its members? Surely
that is a drafting error. We should be talking about figures of two
thirds, 50% and so on. I query that such a huge transfer in power could
take place on the basis of a very small minority of the elected members
of an authority.
Stephen
Gilbert:
I shall not detain the Committee for long, but I
would like to make some points about a visit I undertook yesterday with
the Communities and Local Government Committee. We had the pleasure of
going to talk to the elected mayor of Torbay. I was struck by what the
hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South said about there being no
compelling reason to have such a provision in the Bill. The compelling
reason is that mayors in some local authorities want to take this step.
When I talked to both the mayor and chief executive of Torbay, I was
struck by the enthusiasm with which they were looking at some of the
powers in the Bill and their potential.
I shall give
one clear reason why both the mayor and the chief executive in Torbay
indicated that they were considering this avenue: it is about where
responsibility lies and the buck stops in local government. Who is the
person who has the power and can take the decisions on things about
which local people want their local authority to respond? We are all
aware of cases in which there is a confused relationship between the
leader of a local authority, the mayor and the chief executive. People
do not see the best line of approach and who is taking the clearest
decisions. For the sake of our democracy, that is something we need to
address. In addition, some local authorities want to go down this road
and some populations would welcome the clarity that would result from
giving elected people further responsibility over
services.
Ian
Mearns:
I understand that the hon. Gentleman found
compelling evidence on his trip to Torbay that the authority in that
one place might want to go down that route. However, in the eyes of the
local electorate, who would be the most qualified person to take
over the dual role of mayor and chief executive? From the
perspective of the local population, given the expertise that they would
want from the head of paid service in the local authority, the answer
would probably be the chief executive. Although the chief executive
would appoint a head of paid service, he would still be the head of
paid service. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman has taken account of
the implication in the Bill that 12 very large local
authority areas will be compelled to go down that line. It is not a
question of whether they would want to do that. Torbay might, but
Manchester or Birmingham might not.
Stephen
Gilbert:
When we get to the relevant provision, I am sure
that we will properly explore that matter. However, as I understand the
Bill, 12 major cities will be subject to a referendum on whether they
want an elected mayor. I do not think that giving somebody a choice is
quite the same thing as compelling them to do it. The hon. Gentleman
makes the point that we would still need a head of paid service, but of
course we would not—the Bill makes that clear. The Bill will
enable some local authorities—Torbay or perhaps the Greater
London authority—to make arrangements that will empower one
individual to set clear directions for the authority. Such directions
are sometimes vague at present, and they are not transparent or
clear.
Andrew
Stunell:
If I may, I shall deal with a couple of the
practical, factual points that have emerged in the debate. I direct
hon. Members’ attention to proposed new section 9HO of the 2000
Act, which is on page 202 of the Bill. That provision makes it clear
that the mayor cannot simultaneously hold one of the posts listed in
the proposed new section. As the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles
South will see, the position of the authority’s director of
children’s services, as appointed under the Children Act 2004,
is included on the list. The mayor cannot double up on that, so there
will be, to address the example she gave, a chief officer with that
function and responsibility. Proposed new section 9HO(2)(a) makes it
clear that the authority will continue to have a head of paid service
and chief executive officer, although not a chief executive. Other
provisions make it clear that that person will have responsibility for
staffing, appointments and so
on.
Ian
Mearns:
I am interested in the relationship. If the mayor
becomes the chief executive officer and there is a separate head of
paid service—I accept that there is that
distinction—would it mean that in the new relationship under
which the mayor is the chief executive officer, the head of paid
service would be impelled to follow instruction from the
mayor?
Andrew
Stunell:
As I think we all understand, a local authority
is not a regiment of soldiers. An obligation to follow a command does
not have the same force as it would in a military situation. The
position will be exactly the same as if the deputy chief executive
received an instruction from the chief executive, because if it were
lawful and sensible, it would be followed. I do not think that the
Nuremburg defence would get the head of paid service very far, if he
said that he was just instructed to do something. I am not sure how I
can answer that question in a meaningful way, except to say that there
would be a power relationship between the
mayor and the head of paid service, with the head of paid service
carrying out the instructions that he or she received from the
mayor.
Ian
Mearns:
I accept that distinction, but
there would be a different nuance from if, under the current
arrangements, the deputy chief executive of the council was given an
instruction from the leader of the council. The deputy chief executive
would have to take advice from his chief executive and other legal
officers about following a particular set of
instructions.
Andrew
Stunell:
As the hon. Gentleman said earlier, local
authorities have different cultures. I could point him to some local
authorities in which what the leader says is the word of God to
everybody else, but I could also point him to others in which the word
of the chief executive is more towards that position. A wide range of
things is happening in local authorities at the moment, and our
proposal is within that wide
range.
I
will pick up two other points that were made. I was asked whether there
are any examples of a move from dual leadership to single leadership.
The example that I have in front of me is that of the elected mayors of
North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. The dual leadership model has ended
there and the exact system that we propose has been
introduced.
My hon.
Friend the Member for Bradford East asked whether the Bill contained a
misprint, but we have used the exact same legislative provision for
when elected mayors propose a budget—the wording reflects
existing legislation. A practical example is that a two-thirds majority
of the Greater London assembly is required to overturn the
Mayor’s proposed
budget.
Mr
Ward:
That is slightly different, because that is about
overturning a decision of a mayor who is in place. This is about a
decision to upgrade the mayor that is taken by a tiny minority. Surely
there is a difference between someone who has been elected and is
already in place seeking a mandate and, in this case, someone seeking a
mandate from a
minority.
7
pm
Andrew
Stunell:
I will have to take further advice and return to
that point later in the debate, if I may. I do not want to mislead the
Committee with an off-the-cuff
reply.
Barbara
Keeley:
It would be helpful if the Minister came back to
the Committee on this one, because my note says that that is the
case—if the elected mayor proposed to his or her local authority
that they should switch to the mayoral management model, the local
authority would need to pass a resolution by two thirds the other way
to refuse it. The switch would pass on a third,
therefore.
The
Minister says that that brings forward a proposal relating to other
mayors and budgets, but that is a very different thing. As I said
earlier, the mayoral model mayor can take on all those extra
functions—on staffing, on organisation and on which staff are
appointed—but he does not even have to issue reports. Amendment
42 was intended to make him issue a report, so that there would be some
scrutiny. I hope that he will come back to us on
that.
Andrew
Stunell:
I have just told the
Committee that that is what my colleagues or I will do as the debate
progresses.
In
a broader context, the Government want our largest cities to have
powerful and visible directly elected mayors accountable to their
citizens. Mayors can act as ambassadors for their authorities and
areas. We want mayors who will build effective
partnerships and use their powers to provide strong, visible leadership
and firm direction for the city and the city’s
administration.
The
Government believe that where such mayors exist, there is no need for a
high-profile and highly paid chief executive sitting alongside the
mayor and carrying out many of the same activities. Therefore, proposed
new sections 9HA to 9HE set out the broad framework, which we have
called the mayoral management arrangements, under which the mayor could
become the chief executive officer of the authority, to whom the head
of the paid service reports
directly.
Proposed
new section 9HC provides that those local authorities operating the
mayoral model as a result of a referendum must adopt the mayoral
management
arrangements
“within
a reasonable period after the first election… of an elected
mayor… and… in any event, within the first term of office
of the
mayor”.
Amendment
7 would remove that requirement and we shall resist
it.
Ian
Mearns:
Those arrangements would be forced into place
quite soon after the agreement was made. Do the measures at
all affect, in retrospect, any of the existing mayoral model
towns and cities around the
country?
Andrew
Stunell:
The arrangements are specifically for the new
category of mayor, if I may call it that, in the large cities. Other
provisions foresee the possibility of existing mayors adopting such
powers on their initiative over time. That is what my hon. Friend the
Member for Bradford East was referring
to.
The
measures will give councils an opportunity to streamline their
administration and to make significant savings—taking council
chief executives off the payroll and combining the remaining head of
the paid service post with other statutory posts such as monitoring
officer or finance officer. Under the mayoral arrangements, the mayor
can issue reports—currently issued by the head of the paid
service—on matters such as how the council can discharge its
functions and the number and grades of staff it needs to do
so.
Amendment
42, it appears, would limit the mayor’s discretion, compelling
him or her to issue such reports regardless of whether they were
necessary or appropriate. If we put in place a mayor with substantial
executive powers, it seems sensible to let him or her exercise those
powers.
Barbara
Keeley:
I referred to amendment 42 and said that it
proposed replacing “may” with “must”
because the plans might be for substantial changes—how things
are to be co-ordinated, the number of grades of staff and their
organisation, or how staff are to be appointed and managed. Is the
Minister saying that it should be optional for a newly
created—newly imposed—mayor to issue such reports? If he
decided not to issue the reports, because he did not have to, there
would be no
scrutiny of what he was doing. He could politicise everything he did in
managing staff and there would be no way of anyone
knowing what he was
doing.
Andrew
Stunell:
I believe that the existing
scrutiny functions, which we decided not to amend, will safeguard the
hon. Lady’s concern and the councils concerned from such a risk.
Of course, it is quite appropriate that they should be so safeguarded.
There will still be a role for the head of the paid service. It will
not be the same as that of a chief executive, but more like that of a
chief operating officer. Under those arrangements, the head of the paid
service will still be responsible for appointing, dismissing and
disciplining all but the most senior members of staff. Personnel issues
in relation to senior staff will continue to be the responsibility of
the full council and therefore not the mayor alone. As for the other
responsibilities of the head of the paid service, that will be a matter
for each authority to decide.
The Bill puts
in place a number of safeguards. There will still be a chief finance
officer to ensure financial propriety, and a monitoring officer. I have
already mentioned, for instance, the requirement for a
children’s services
officer.
Mr
Raynsford:
The Minister has mentioned the chief finance
and monitoring officers. Will they report to the chief operating
officer or to the
mayor?
Andrew
Stunell:
On their pay and rations, and organisation and so
on, they will be reporting to the head of the paid service. He will be
responsible and they will be part of that paid service. Clearly, the
political direction and the direction of policy will be in the hands of
the mayor. That is the intention of having an executive mayor in that
position.
Mr
Raynsford:
The Minister will be well aware of the
sensitivity of the issue. There may be a question of financial concern,
which might lead the chief finance officer to wish to make a report, or
one involving the chief monitoring officer, who may be concerned about
probity. If either of those officers is ultimately directed by the
mayor, that might make it virtually impossible for them to act in the
way Parliament has rightly given them powers to act—to maintain
the integrity and probity of the local
authority.
Andrew
Stunell:
The first thing I would say—I think the
right hon. Gentleman knows this—is that each officer named in
the schedule is a statutory appointee with statutory duties and a
statutory duty to blow the whistle, if I may put it that way. That
statutory duty is not taken away by the legislation or by the
introduction of the mayor. Of course, there will still be members of
the council. There will still be a full council with a proper set of
processes and checks and balances in place. There is provision in the
legislation to ensure that all members of the council, including the
elected mayor, continue to receive impartial, professional and robust
advice from council
officers.
I
said to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East that I would come
back to the Committee on the 34% issue, and I will write to the
Committee setting out the position as soon as possible. I urge the
Committee to reject the amendment.
Barbara
Keeley:
I will not press the amendment to a vote because
we consider the matter so important that we want to come back to it on
Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Barbara
Keeley:
I beg to move amendment 8, in schedule
2, page 196, line 43, leave out ‘or
requiring’.
The
Chair:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 9, in schedule 2,
page 196, line 43, leave
out
‘operating a mayor and cabinet
executive’.
Amendment
10, in schedule 2, page 196, line 45, at end
insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Amendment
11, in schedule 2, page 197, line 1, leave
out
‘operating a mayor and cabinet
executive’.
Amendment
12, in schedule 2, page 197, line 4, at end
insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Amendment
13, in schedule 2, page 197, line 6, after
‘mayors’, insert ‘or elected
leaders’.
Amendment
14, in schedule 2, page 197, line 17, after
‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Amendment
65, in schedule 2, page 197, line 23, after
‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Amendment
15, in schedule 2, page 198, line 37, after
‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Amendment
16, in schedule 2, page 198, line 39, after
‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Amendment
17, in schedule 2, page 198, line 45, after
‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Amendment
64, in schedule 2, page 198, leave out lines 46 to
48.
Amendment
18, in schedule 2, page 198, line 48, after
‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected
leader’.
Barbara
Keeley:
Although it sounds as if it would mean a lot of
change, amendment 8 would just remove the power for the Secretary of
State to require a specified local authority to confer a local public
service function on its elected mayor. Labour Members believe that that
power is another centralising measure. I remind the Committee that the
Minister of State offered to go through the powers one by one to check
whether they are
centralising.
For
the Secretary of State to require a local authority to confer a local
public service function on its elected mayor is centralising—how
can it be anything else? If the mayor or elected leader does not want
that function, it should not be imposed on them, and I do not know why
the right hon. Gentleman wants to draw up orders requiring that
provision. It is not in line with
localism.
Part
7 deals with the transfer of additional powers to the Mayor of London,
and there has been a great deal of consultation and involvement with
the Mayor and the GLA about that. Why is the transfer of powers being
dealt with in one way for London and differently for other cities?
There was no question of requiring power to be conferred on the London
Mayor. It was done through substantial consultation and
agreement.
Amendments
9 to 14, 65, 15 to 17, 64 and 18 would allow the transfer of functions
to elected leaders as well as to elected mayors. Ministers have said
that they believe in localism and that the Government should not
prescribe governance arrangements, but then this Bill
prescribes and it directs, particularly in respect of governance
arrangements for local authorities, and schedule 2 is
another example. It confers a local public service function only on
elected mayors, not on elected leaders. I am not sure which Minister
will reply, but I ask why the Government are taking such an
approach.
For
those local authorities and their local residents that do not choose to
have an elected mayor, why should an effective
leader with a different model of governance not take on extra powers?
We could deduce that, by offering the carrot of extra powers only to
elected mayors, Ministers are trying to bring yet another pressure to
bear on local authorities to do what they want. The Government also
want to take the powers to impose mayors on any local authority, so
perhaps it is only a short-term carrot, because the big stick will be
imposing mayors on local authorities in the long term. I urge members
of the Committee to resist this further attempt at centralisation, give
equality to local authorities and support the amendment. I hope that
they can do
so.
Julie
Elliott (Sunderland Central) (Lab):
I want to speak about
the unfairness of the powers as I see the position, coming from
Sunderland, which is the largest city in north-east England. It is not
in the list of 12, although our smaller neighbouring city of Newcastle
is. The proposals, if they are not amended, mean that an elector voting
in Sunderland will be voting for people with less power for that larger
population than electors voting 12 or 13 miles away in Newcastle. To
me, that is an unfair
anomaly.
The
impact assessment published by the DCLG stated that, 10 years ago, the
people of Sunderland voted against having a mayor. That is correct, but
that was for a mayor under a completely different system with
completely different powers. If there are such unequal powers, how can
we possibly say that the Bill is fair and is putting power back into
the hands of local people? It will not. It will create huge
inequality.
I
have cited a stark example of what would happen in my area, but such
examples will transpire throughout the country if the amendments are
not accepted. Those proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley
and Eccles South are sensible and clear, and would equalise the playing
field so that local people who elected their local politicians,
whatever system of government it be, would be electing people who had
the same powers to act on their behalf and would not be prescribed to
by the Secretary of
State.
Robert
Neill:
There has been a restructuring of the ministerial
team to deal with the amendments and to share the burden. I say to the
hon. Member for Sunderland Central that we make no bones about the fact
that, as a matter of policy, we believe that it is in the interests of
England’s great regional and provincial cities to have the
opportunity to have directly elected
mayors.
7.15
pm
Barbara
Keeley:
Except
Sunderland.
Robert
Neill:
I will come to that. We chose the 12
major cities outside London that have not so far had a referendum. As
the hon. Member for Sunderland Central said, the people of Sunderland
had a referendum and chose not
to have a mayor, which is why it is not on the list. I will make two
other points. If the people of Sunderland wish, under existing
provisions, to meet the threshold for a referendum through a petition
for a mayor, there is nothing to prevent them doing so. Leicester,
which is also a city that we originally considered, has decided to have
a mayoral referendum under existing legislation. If the hon. Lady
believes that Sunderland wishes to be included on the list and tables
an amendment on the subject, the Government will consider it
sympathetically.
Julie
Elliott:
That completely misses the point. My point is
about the unequal nature of the powers prescribed by the Secretary of
State, whichever form of government an area has. When people vote in
elections for a tier of government, the powers that they vote to
elected politicians for them to perform their functions with should be
equal. It is not about whether areas have a mayor, a leader-and-cabinet
system or a committee system; it is about the equality of powers that
politicians
have.
Robert
Neill:
With respect, the hon. Lady is wrong, because a
directly elected mayor has the specific legitimacy of their personal
and direct electoral mandate. It is perfectly proper to give extended
powers to someone who has been directly voted for by the people of
their city, as opposed to someone who has effectively been elected by
the members of the majority group on the council—in practical
reality, that is the leader. I have every respect for leaders of
councils, but there is a difference between a directly elected mayoral
figure and a leader, even under the strong leader model, which is why
it is perfectly legitimate to give mayors additional
powers.
I
should not have said that Leicester will have a referendum; it has
decided to have a mayor. I think that that is because Leicester city
council is controlled by the hon. Lady’s party, which has
decided to move to the mayoral model without even having a referendum,
so the hon. Lady’s argument is not
consistent.
Ian
Mearns:
Another anomaly in the north-east region is that
since the unification of both Durham and Northumberland counties into
unitary authorities, Durham is now the biggest geographical and
population area of the single-tier authorities in that region. It has a
population of almost 500,000 and, although it is a geographical county,
it is a unitary authority. It should not therefore be discriminated
against in relation to Newcastle or anywhere
else.
Robert
Neill:
The same proposition applies if the hon. Gentleman
wants to table an amendment on Durham. It is a bit rich to talk about
Durham as an example, because it was his Government who imposed a
unitary authority on the people of Durham, without
giving them any referendum—and they did so by secondary
legislation.
I
have set out my stall on that issue, and I will return to the gist of
the amendment. The Government have made it clear—it is part of
the coalition agreement—that we believe in encouraging directly
elected mayors in the major provincial cities of England. Those cities
are the obvious places for directly elected mayors because, as the hon.
Member for Sunderland Central and others
have indicated, they have a real sense of identity and place, and people
and businesses identify with them. They are therefore the most
appropriate places to start having the directly elected mayor model.
That would exactly replicate what we see in the great provincial cities
of Europe and north America. We take the view that those mayors, having
the legitimacy of being directly elected, can be given additional
powers.
The
amendments would undermine that proposition, which is why I ask hon.
Members to reject them. Proposed new section 9HF enables the transfer
of functions to public services. We are enabling the transfer of the
discharge of local public service functions; interestingly, as I
understand it, that is exactly the approach adopted by the Labour-led
Welsh Assembly Government in the Principality, so there are precedents
there. The Opposition are not on the strongest ground on a number of
fronts with these amendments.
Proposed new
section 9HF, which the schedule will incorporate into the 2000 Act,
provides a mechanism enabling the Secretary of State to transfer such
functions by order. Of course, Parliament will scrutinise and debate
that order, but if Parliament has willed that the mayor should have
such powers by order, and it has therefore been properly scrutinised in
this place, it is not necessary or appropriate to require further
approval and scrutiny at the local level, which is what amendment 8
would require. It would create duplication that would undermine the
authority of the House.
Initially, we
envisage using the order-making power to confer local public service
functions on mayors in the specified larger cities. I await with
interest an amendment adding Sunderland or wherever to the list.
However, we do not want to prevent mayors in other areas from having
the power to exercise such functions as appropriate, so proposed new
section 9HG puts in place a mechanism that would allow any existing or
future mayors to apply to the Secretary of State for a transfer of
those local public service functions, or an order conferring those
functions on
them.
Importantly,
the new section ensures that a mayor has a democratic mandate to
discharge any additional functions conferred by the Secretary of State.
It does so by providing that a mayor can apply for additional functions
in the first year of his or her term of office only. The application
must include such information and evidence as shall be specified by
regulations. A new mayor should, in the first year, demonstrate that
the application was, in effect, part of their election platform, and
that the electorate had endorsed the proposed transfer of functions by
voting for them. That is an entirely localist and democratising
provision.
Amendments
64 and 75 would remove those provisions, which are important democratic
safeguards; I am sorry to see the Opposition seek to remove them. For
those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South
and her hon. Friends will reflect, and that she will withdraw amendment
8. If she does not, I ask the Committee to reject
it.
Barbara
Keeley:
I am not convinced on the point about the
legitimacy of direct elections, because we will move on shortly to the
issue of imposing shadow mayors, and I cannot see what legitimacy there
is in direct elections when the Government will force a city to have a
shadow mayor whether it wants one or not.
I think the
Minister has missed the point. The point of the amendment, and the
point so well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central,
is that there should be equality of treatment. The Government are
taking a very poor approach in the Bill by not treating major
population centres, such as Durham and Sunderland, equally, in terms of
powers. The city of Manchester is a small slither in the middle of
Greater Manchester, and yet it qualifies for a shadow
mayor.
There
is some strange thinking in the Bill. We do not go along with the
imposition of shadow mayors, and there is strange thinking behind the
places that were selected. Manchester is not one of our largest cities,
but it is part of the very large conurbation that is Greater
Manchester. If anything is problematic, it is picking out places and
saying, “That one will have a shadow mayor.” I will
withdraw the amendment. I do not intend to move amendment 44, because
there is a set of amendments on governance arrangements, and we intend
to come back to them on Report.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Barbara
Keeley:
I beg to move amendment 20, in schedule 2,
page 206, leave out lines 29 to
31.
The
Chair:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 21, in schedule 2, page 210, leave
out lines 3 to
25.
Amendment
22, in schedule 2, page 210, leave out lines 26 to
47.
Amendment
23, in schedule 2, page 212, line 18, leave
out from beginning to end of line 31 on page
214.
Barbara
Keeley:
The amendments would remove the Secretary of
State’s power to direct or order the imposition of shadow
mayors. For me, and for other Labour Members, this is one of the most
controversial aspects of the Bill, and the one that most contradicts
the Government’s claim to be localist. The Secretary of State
wants the power to order a local authority to cease its existing form
of governance or executive and to start operating a mayor-and-cabinet
executive.
That approach
is the opposite of what some of the Ministers here advocated when they
were in opposition. The Under-Secretary of State for Communities and
Local Government, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, said in
the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill Committee in
2007:
“I
would prefer that the Government did not prescribe the governance
system for councils at all. I would prefer that it was left for them to
decide in a broadly devolutionary
fashion”.––[Official Report, Local
Government and Public Involvement in Health Public Bill Committee,
25 February 2007; c.
251.]
How does
he square that with imposing shadow mayors, and with forcing a council
to cease the arrangements that it prefers and to adopt a
mayor-and-cabinet executive
model?
The
Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the hon.
Member for Hazel Grove, also used to favour a localist, rather than
centralist, approach. He told the same Committee:
“I
want to make the pure gospel point that governance should be entirely a
matter for local councils”.––[Official
Report, Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Public Bill
Committee, 20 February 2007; c. 269.]
If he could make that in
favour of localism point so fervently in a debate on the return to the
committee system, why do he and his fellow Ministers feel that it is in
any way right to impose shadow mayors on 12 of our cities? During the
same Committee sitting, the Under-Secretary of State for Communities
and Local Government, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst,
acknowledged that the mayoral model did not suit every local
authority:
“I
see the logic of the strong mayor model. It is not always appropriate
but one sees the logic of adopting the American pattern of one directly
elected figurehead”.––[Official Report,
Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Public Bill
Committee, 20 February 2007; c.
251.]
Since
the idea first emerged, we have asked Ministers and the Secretary of
State to clarify their intentions, and they have caused a great deal of
confusion by giving different answers. On 21 October the Secretary of
State gave the following answer to my hon. Friend the Member for
Kingston upon Hull North (Diana
Johnson):
“She
seems to be suggesting that we would somehow impose mayors on those 12
cities, but of course we will not-that is completely out of the
question. The proposals will be subject to referendums. Once we know
the views of the people in those 12 cities, we will move on
to the election of a mayor if people vote for
that.”—[Official Report, 21 October 2010; Vol.
516, c.
1117.]
In the
same question session the Secretary of State was asked by my hon.
Friend the Member for North Tyneside (Mrs Glindon) whether he intended
to turn council leaders into mayors before holding a referendum. The
Secretary of State admonished her,
saying:
“Perhaps
the hon. Lady should have paid a little more attention to the earlier
question, when I ruled out the possibility that we would be imposing
mayors. This will be subject to a
referendum.”—[Official Report, 21 October 2010;
Vol. 516, c.
1125.]
Perhaps
the Secretary of State should apologise to her at the next opportunity
for saying one thing and doing another.
We had
further confirmation a week later of the Government’s stated
intention not to impose mayors, but to hold referendums. The
Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the hon.
Member for Bromley and Chislehurst,
said:
“However,
the decision of whether to have a mayor must ultimately rest with local
people…The timing of the referendums is important, as my right
hon. Friend the Secretary of State recognised when he said in the House
last week, in response to a suggestion that we would impose
mayors,
‘of
course we will not—that is completely out of the question. The
proposals will be subject to
referendums.’
I
can do no more than refer hon. Members who have asked about the timing
to what my right hon. Friend said last week. He put it very
simply:
‘Once
we know the views of the people in those 12 cities, we will move on to
the election of a mayor if people vote for
that.’
I
should have thought that that was pretty crystal
clear.”—[Official Report, 27 October 2010; Vol.
517, c.
120WH.]
It
might have seemed crystal clear, but between 27 October and
13 December, when the Bill was introduced, the Government did a U-turn,
and we are now looking at proposals to turn elected
council leaders into shadow mayors, whether they or local people want
that.
7.30
pm
Some
of our council leaders do not want the imposition. The leader of
Bradford council, Councillor Ian Greenwood, has said that the automatic
selection of shadow mayors is counter-productive to democracy. He told
the Bradford Telegraph
&
Argus the day after
the Bill was introduced that he felt uncomfortable being thrust into
the role from next summer, before the referendum to
find out whether the public want a permanent mayor, which will not be
held until May 2012. He
said:
“My
view is this is not the right thing for Bradford. The ability to call
for a referendum for an elected mayor already exists. I can’t
see why this is just about 12 places…I am uncomfortable about
being given an office I wasn’t elected to. I don’t feel
it’s the right thing to do. Leadership is not about dictating,
it’s about taking people with you—it’s true of all
good leaders. I also think it’s wrong to say we are elected
mayors when we have not been elected. It’s silly and
counter-productive in terms of
democracy.”
Interestingly,
the leader of the Conservative group on Bradford council does not want
the imposition either. In the same article, Councillor Anne Hawkesworth
said:
“My
colleagues and I are not supportive of elected mayors. We do not think
that the proposals are suited to the needs of the Bradford district. We
are hopeful that local people will recognise that an elected mayor
would be unlikely to improve the quality of life of local residents or
the quality of services provided to them and vote to reject the
proposals.”
Other
council leaders have also spoken against the proposals, including the
leaders of Leeds, Sheffield and Bristol city
councils.
Importantly,
the imposition of shadow mayors is also anti-democratic, in that it
would lead to a group of shadow mayors who were not representative of
the populations they represented. The Centre for Women and Democracy
has pointed out that the proposals will put a woman at the helm of only
one local authority—Bristol—because only one of the
leaders in post in the 12 authorities is female. If the proposals went
ahead, she would join two existing women mayors, in Watford and North
Tyneside, making a total of only three elected mayors out of 25.
Although there is gender diversity among council leaders, at 14% it is
not as good as it might be, and the measure would take it down
to 12%. There are issues relating to other aspects of background, too,
particularly in some
cities.
The
proposals are centralising, and they are not wanted by some of the
leaders—leaders from across political parties and opposition
groups. They will cause Ministers to provoke colleagues in different
cities to have to run possibly expensive campaigns to reject the
proposals, so I urge the Committee to support the
amendments.
Robert
Neill:
I shall be very brief, because I normally am. I am
afraid that the hon. Lady misses the point, because ultimately the
choice rests with the people, and the provision simply sets out a
mechanism by which that is achieved. Nothing has contradicted that
which has been said by my right hon. and hon. Friends. The position is
that, ultimately, the decision will be taken by the people of those 12
cities in a referendum, which we anticipate will take place in May
2012. We have been clear about that, and we have said
that it is proposed that in the
interim—early in 2012—the leader of the council at that
time will become the shadow mayor. That person, and therefore their
nature, personality and gender, might have changed.
On the gender
point, which did not sound very democratic, if the leader of Bristol
council does become the mayor, there will indeed be three female
mayors, and I hope that there will be more in due course. As it
happens, all three will be members of political parties that support
the coalition, so we need not
take any lectures from Opposition
Members.
Alison
Seabeck:
What legal recourse will the Government have if
the leader and deputy leader say they do not want to take on the
responsibility? The schedule does not go further down the pecking order
than deputy leader, if a taker for the job cannot be
found.
Robert
Neill:
I think that that is a pretty hypothetical case,
but, as we can see, subsections (2)(b), (3) and (4) make provision for
those matters. I do not think that we will end up in that situation. If
someone really does not want the job, he or she can stand down as
leader and another person can be appointed in their place. If there is
no leader of the council at the point that that is done, the deputy
leader will become the shadow mayor. If there is no leader or deputy
leader at the time the order is made, the fall-back position is that
the Secretary of State has the power to designate a member of the
authority as the shadow mayor. It is as simple as that, so that has
dealt with
that.
Barbara
Keeley:
I have read that the leader of Leeds city council
says he will not become shadow mayor. The Minister says he is not aware
of any cases—that is a case. With reference to the question from
my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View about what happens in
the case of a council that does not want this, is it a localism measure
to depose a council leader because he or she does not want to go along
with such an
imposition?
Robert
Neill:
Nobody is deposing any council leader, nor do we
know whether the current council leaders will be the leaders when the
measure comes into force. I think it presumptuous to say that that will
remain the situation. With respect, the hon. Lady raises a false
argument. There is a mechanism. Why do we say that there should be a
shadow mayor? Because we believe that, with the new system, it is good
to have a short period in which people can see an elected mayor in
practice and get a sense of what is on offer. It is interesting to
note, for example, that a considerable number of research and opinion
polls suggest that directly elected mayors have much higher name
recognition than the equivalent council leaders, so there is an
argument for raising that
profile.
All
that will be subject to the will of the voters of the city in the
referendum. It is worth remembering that the shadow mayors will be
shadows rather than full mayors, so that the full mayoral model is not
imposed—the shadow mayor will not have the power to take on the
mayoral management schemes, taking over the role of the chief
executive. Nor will shadow mayors be able to propose those changes to
the council until after the referendum has taken place and they
have—or have not—been confirmed in office. That is
important: people will have chosen to go down the directly elected
route, and then full elections for the mayor will follow.
This is a
transitional arrangement, which we think is sensible. It is a new
endeavour. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South
denigrates the
situation of the city of Manchester. I do not belittle Manchester; it is
a key economic driver in this country. She seemed to be hinting that
the boundaries were too small. If she wants to take
that to the logical conclusion, is she going to propose that Manchester
expand? Is she going to say that to her friends who control the
councils around
there?
Perhaps
the hon. Lady should recognise that New York, Paris and all the major
French cities have not felt the need to change their boundaries. The
five boroughs of New York operate within the existing city boundaries,
going back pretty much to the beginning of the last century. The
boundaries of Paris have not been changed since the creation of the
périphérique. That is true of Bordeaux, Lyons,
Toulouse—all the other major cities. The mayors of those cities
work in collaboration with the surrounding municipalities and mayors,
and, as hon. Members will know, in French, the communautés
urbaines. That is exactly what can happen with joint working between
local authorities here; it is no argument against having a directly
elected mayor. In effect, this is an attempt to wreck this part of the
Bill and I hope that hon. Members reject the
amendments.
Barbara
Keeley:
We end the debate with the Minister
misrepresenting me. There is an important thing to say about his
comments on what I said about Manchester. This schedule and all the
measures that we have discussed today are confusion and muddle. They
involve imposition and are centralising; they do not involve localism
in any way, shape or
form.
I
was a councillor in Trafford and I represent a constituency in Salford,
which is a city next to Manchester. It behoves a DCLG Minister who is
trying to impose shadow mayoralty on part of the 10 local authority
areas in Greater Manchester to understand the politics. There is not a
councillor in Trafford or Salford who would ever suggest that
Manchester should expand its boundaries. We jealously guard our own
positions. Salford is a city, and with two cities next to each other
like that, we would never want that to
happen.
The
Government are creating a difficult situation for Greater Manchester.
Given the geography and the fact that Manchester is just a sliver at
the centre of Greater Manchester, it would be difficult indeed to try
to direct or to give extra powers to what is only one tenth of the
area—an important central part of that area, but only one tenth
of it. I cannot tell the Minister how many times we have had
discussions about mayors but always rejected the idea. We would keep on
doing
so.
The
Committee will probably be glad to hear that I intend to withdraw the
amendment, only because this is all such a mess. I very much want to
return to the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 2
agreed
to.
Clause
11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
agreed to.
Clause 12
ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That further consideration be now
adjourned. —(Bill
Wiggin.)
7.42
pm
Adjourned
till Thursday 3 February at half-past Nine
o’clock.
