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Protection of Freedoms Bill
|©Parliamentary copyright||Prepared 30th March 2011|
Publications on the internet
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Protection of Freedoms Bill
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Annette Toft, Rhiannon Hollis, Sarah Davies, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
That if, on Tuesday 5 April, references to specific times in the Standing Orders of this House shall apply as if that day were a Wednesday, the Order of the Committee of 22 March shall be amended as follows—in paragraph (l)(d) leave out ‘10.30 am and 4.00 pm’ and insert ‘9.00 am and 1.30 pm’.
As Members are aware, next Tuesday is the final day for the House’s deliberations before the Easter recess. I understand that there is a motion on the Order Paper that will mean that the sitting hours next Tuesday may be slightly different. I therefore seek an amendment to reflect that if that motion is passed; in other words, this is a contingent motion. I hope that our proposed amendment is clear. As I said, it is contingent on the relevant motion being passed on the Floor of the House. If it is not, the hours would remain the same.
the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 10.30 am on Tuesday 22 March) meet—
(a) at 4.00 pm on Tuesday 22 March;
(b) at 9.00 am and 1.00 pm on Thursday 24 March;
(c) at 10.30 am and 4.00 pm on Tuesday 29 March;
(d) at 9.00 am and 1.30 pm on Tuesday 5 April;
(e) at 10.30 am and 4.00 pm on Tuesday 26 April;
(f) at 9.00 am and 1.00 pm on Thursday 28 April;
(g) at 10.30 am and 4.00 pm on Tuesday 3 May;
(h) at 10.30 am and 4.00 pm on Tuesday 10 May;
(i) at 9.00 am and 1.00 pm on Thursday 12 May;
(j) at 10.30 am and 4.00 pm on Tuesday 17 May;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order; Clauses 1 to 19; Schedule 1; Clauses 20 to 39; Schedule 2; Clauses 40 to 53; Schedule 3; Clauses 54 to 56; Schedule 4; Clauses 57 to 60; Schedule 5; Clauses 61 and 62; Schedule 6; Clauses 63 to 101; Schedules 7 and 8; Clauses 102 to 107; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 7.00 pm on Tuesday 17 May.
‘(4) If the person was under the age of 18 at the time of the offence the retention period is 3 years.’.
‘(d) in the case of material taken or derived less than six years before the commencement day from a person who—
(i) was arrested for, or charged with, the offence and
(ii) has not been convicted of the offence,
the destruction of the material at the end of the period of six years beginning with the day on which the material was taken or derived.’.
John Robertson (Glasgow North West) (Lab): I am looking for clarification on the clause and answers to the questions that I asked earlier. Some points were made to me about why DNA should not be as important as I deem it to be. DNA can be useful in many cases. As a supporter of identity cards, I thought that that would be another area where it was going to be used. Alas, that was another Bill that I supported that has bitten the dust, but there we go. Having said that, it is important for some Government Members to remember that not everyone agrees with them. Some of us Opposition Members probably think that we should not agree with them, but we are entitled to our opinion, just as Government Members are entitled to theirs. As much as I honour their opinion, I expect them to do the same to mine. Just because they disagree with me does not mean that I am wrong; just that they think I am wrong. In my case, I know that I am right, but there we go. I made that point for Government Members; perhaps I will remember that when I am asking questions. I am not doing it just to be awkward, but because I want to know the answers.
We talked about the law. Of course the law in Scotland is slightly different from the law in England. Scottish law is made not so much on an evidence base but according to what is probable. I have made some inquiries since last week’s evidence sessions with the police, and I talked to some friends who are lawyers, and to the police force north of the border, about the difference between the three-year and six-year provision and why Scotland went down the road of three years. To be perfectly honest, no one could tell me exactly why the three-year provision was chosen, but they said that the part of the law that allows them to go back to court is perceived differently from how it would be south of the border.
To that effect, I wonder whether the Minister, in citing Scottish ideas of the law, might be slightly misguided. As seems to have happened in Scotland, I wonder whether, because this is done on a probability or a possibility base, the police have not bothered to use this law at all since its inception. Some people might think
I asked the Minister about the cost issue. When I spoke to the people in Scotland whom I mentioned earlier, they said that the cost of extending the period from three years to six put a big question mark on whether it was worth doing—particularly for something that is based not on evidence but on the judge’s perception, at that time, of reliability. If there is some question in police’s mind that it is a waste of their time and effort—a waste of the money it would cost to bring the case to a judge, and a waste of the time that would be spent by everyone involved in deliberating whether to extend the period from three years to six—the chances of the police doing that are remote. They have plenty of other things they have to do that take up a lot of time, and their going through this process is unlikely.
That brings me back to the 1,000 cases issue that we discussed earlier. I would have liked a breakdown of the cases the police were talking about. If they were very minor, perhaps we do not really care, although I would say—I made this point from the other side of the Chamber when we were in government—that we always seem to neglect the victims of the crime. We are so busy looking after the human rights of those who did the crime that we have a habit of forgetting those of the person who has had ill done to them. I wonder whether we go down a road we do not want to go down in some cases. In these 1,000 cases, that may come back to haunt us one day. Perhaps we will never know. Why will we never know? Because we have not looked at whether we should extend the period from three years to six, or to somewhere in between.
Alternatively, as my hon. Friend the Member for Eltham said, the Minister may be correct. Perhaps three years is right, but we will never know because the Government’s position is already so entrenched that they have no thought that they might be wrong. That is a big mistake for any Government to make, and if my Government were making it I would say so. I did so in the past when I thought the previous Government were going too far. It is the duty of every Member of this House to do that if they think their party is going a step too far—if, for example, a lawyers charter for making money is being created, as we discussed in debating a previous Bill, ensuring that enough ambiguity exists within the system for lawyers to make a fortune for years, while the victims never get the justice they deserve. I am sure that colleagues will come across many such cases in years to come, just as those of us who have been in Parliament for some time have dealt with such cases in the past.
Given that the Government are engaged in a cost-cutting exercise, which they are very good at, will the Minister tell me how much this system will cost to set up? He
I am willing to listen and I am open to the Government’s stance on a lot of things in the Bill. I have my concerns, which I have expressed, in particular on using a form of law south of the border that is not based on evidence, compared with one based on evidence. I have always said that I have a real problem with the “not proven” verdict that we can get north of the border, where the person is found neither innocent nor guilty, which could be an “innocent” verdict with the stigma of guilt written in, although not an actual “guilty” verdict. People’s innocence can be brought into question because they or their lawyer could not persuade the jury to acquit, rather than to give a “not proven” verdict. I would hate to see that happen south of the border as well.
I ask the Minister to look at the costs. If he cannot supply the figures—I doubt whether he will be able to supply them all—I am sure he will write to us with the answers. I also ask him to consider the different styles of law north and south of the border. When writing a Bill, it is important that the same rules should be followed south of the border as north of the border, where I come from.
James Brokenshire: This has been a helpful debate, highlighting some of the distinctions and differences of approach, with the Opposition’s starting point perhaps contrasting with where the Government are. The hon. Member for Glasgow North West has highlighted his opinion, as did the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Eltham. I get a strong sense that their starting point would be indefinite retention, with the hon. Member for Glasgow North West perhaps wanting to see the DNA database expanded. That argument is respectable. Equally, however, I disagree with it; indefinite retention would not be proportionate, and that is my and the Government’s view.
Mrs Jenny Chapman (Darlington) (Lab): I have listened to the debate extremely carefully. I would argue that our starting position is not as put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North West, but that we want the approach to be based on evidence. From the evidence I have been reading, a retention period of six years would seem to mark the point at which the figures for the population that would have its DNA retained equals those for the rest of the population. That is our starting point and we have not heard anything from the Minister to suggest a retention period of three years.
James Brokenshire: We will come to that, I assure the hon. Lady. I appreciate that she might not have been in the House at the time, but the previous Government’s starting position was that they wanted to indefinite retention, hence the changes made under them. In
Mrs Chapman: I am more interested in what the Government are about to do, rather than in the positions of the past. However, in the hazard rate analysis, once the level of error is built in for both populations, six years would seem to be a minimum period. If we allow the errors, based on the evidence, we could be looking more at a period of 10 years.
James Brokenshire: If the hon. Lady is now exhorting her Front Bench to go for a 10-year period, that may be news to them. Perhaps it is consistent with the line of approach that I have been articulating.
The hazard rate analysis, which I examined closely at the time and have continued to review, in many ways supports a three-year retention period. That was the view that the Home Affairs Committee ultimately reached. Regarding the same evidence that the hon. Lady has quoted as suggesting a six-year period, the Information Commissioner states that he
It is interesting that the Information Commissioner, taking the self-same information that the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Eltham pray in aid, suggests a shorter period. I read a lot out this morning about a three-year retention period, and how it was quite robust regarding the sensitivities from which the hon. Lady draws her conclusions. Ultimately, there is evidence, but it points to a three-year period, because of the way in which the hazard rate curve comes down rapidly after the first three years. If anything, that supports the Government’s argument.
James Brokenshire: I point to the specific reference in the hazard rate analysis. The previous Government were content to adopt a three-year period for young people, even though the hazard rate analysis showed that that was the area where there was the most likelihood of offending. If the hon. Lady is correct in her suggestion, no doubt the previous Labour Government would not have listened and would have stuck to the six-year period. The hazard rate analysis document is quite interesting and useful in many ways in setting out the information about a three-year period. The previous Government were very happy to adopt a three-year period for what the hon. Lady herself may agree is the
“I want to take my party on a journey to a different identity for the future: social democratic on economic policy, standing for redistribution and tackling inequality, liberal in our respect for individual rights.”
We will see whether that sense of liberalism is reflected in the party’s approach, but the problem is that it is not borne out by what we are seeing. Despite the rhetoric about the new Liberals on the other side of the Committee, Labour Members are not acting in a liberal way. It will be interesting to see how this progresses, in view of some of the statements that have been made and some of the rhetoric about change in how the Opposition consider and reflect on what the future holds. Equally, that needs to be borne out in their actions and their approach to a number of the issues that we have before us.
John Robertson: The job of Opposition is to ask questions and to scrutinise. If the Minister honestly expects the Opposition to sit and say nothing, he would be better telling the Liberals to come and sit here. Then we will have them sitting here doing nothing, as they are over there. Perhaps we can agree that it is our job to ask the questions. The fact that he shut down my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington from asking a question would suggest that he does not want to hear anything that has a go at his Bill.
James Brokenshire: I will respond to the hon. Member for Glasgow North West, because I am pleased and grateful to have the support of the Minister for Equalities, my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green, sitting alongside me, who will be playing an essential part in the consideration of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman’s pejorative comments were pretty ill-directed in the message they were seeking to send.
The hon. Gentleman wants to look at evidence. In essence, the argument is that the more DNA we retain, the higher the detections and the greater the impact on crime and bringing crimes to justice. I say clearly, that is not borne out by historical evidence. If one takes the figures from 2005-06—after the change relating to DNA taken on arrest rather than charge—the total DNA-related detections were 40,000. The latest information I have for last year is that detections were down to 32,000.
In the light of the significant growth in the DNA database over that time by around a couple of million—I am happy to confirm the details—is it the case that, as night follows day, the more on the database, the higher the detections? That is not borne out by what has happened. The Opposition may say that there have not been so many detections because crime has fallen so significantly. Even if one accepted that argument, the fact is that total DNA-related detections, as a proportion of total force detections over that time, went down from
I say clearly that there is evidence to show that simply putting more people on the database does not equate to more detections. We are comfortable looking at past evidence, rather than seeking to guess and extrapolate, albeit that the hazard rate analysis is interesting and useful in supporting the case that we seek to make.
Mrs Chapman: Our position is not that we want more people on the database; we want to get the right people on the database. Criminologists know a lot of things, but the only thing they know for sure is that the most reliable indicator of future criminality is being arrested for a crime. That is why we want those people on the database.
Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con): The hon. Lady talks about getting the right people on the database. Will the Minister clarify and confirm that according to Home Office statistics from 2007, 500,000 people were wrongly put on that system? That is why the system has to change.
James Brokenshire: My hon. Friend makes a very important point, of around 1 million people without any current convictions sitting on the national DNA database. I hope the hon. Lady would accept that simply putting people who are innocent until proven guilty on the DNA database is not in principle the right approach. With the DNA expansion programme that took place under the previous Government, there was a desire to get as many people on to the DNA database as possible and to keep them on there. It was only as a consequence of the S. and Marper judgment that there was any acknowledgment, reluctantly, that that might be the wrong course of action. So that is the history to all of this. It is important to highlight that to give some context and background to our debate.
Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD): Does the Minister agree that there is one respect in which one should extend the DNA database, and that is for people who have been found guilty but whose DNA is not currently there?
James Brokenshire: That is a point of agreement on both sides. There should be the right to take DNA samples from those who have been convicted of offences and whose DNA has not been taken. That was a point of agreement under the previous Government. I said that at that time when I was on the Opposition Benches. Obviously that power has been implemented and as we heard in evidence last week, the Association of Chief Police Officers is now taking it forward to get convicted people on the database.
There is a sense of proportionality and judgment and we can look at the evidence historically and at what the previous Government produced. But even as the analysis
There was also an analysis of the Scottish system, to take on board the point made by the hon. Member for Glasgow North West. Professor James Fraser, an eminent expert in forensics, examined the robustness of the Scottish system taking account of the views of stakeholders, the available information and experience elsewhere. He concluded that the
It is not just me who recognised that this was the case. I draw the Committee’s attention to the letter that Lord Bach sent to Lord Pannick following a debate on DNA retention. Referring to the Fraser report, he wrote:
Lord Bach, then Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice, drew attention to the examination by Professor Fraser of the Scottish system which supported the three years, plus two years’ extension.
The hon. Member for Glasgow North West referred to costs. According to the regulatory impact assessment, the initial set-up costs are £10.8 million and the average annual running costs are £3.1 million. So the set-up costs are materially lower than those envisaged in the Crime and Security Act 2010. There is a clear difference here. We believe on the basis of historical evidence and the analysis that has been undertaken in relation to the future—the hazard rate analysis curve—that three years is an appropriate period for retention.
I recognise that there is a broad range of views in this area but I ask the Committee to recognise that the weight of opinion in various arenas is in favour of the Scottish model, as we heard from Liberty, Justice, the Law Society, the Criminal Bar Association and GeneWatch in oral evidence last Tuesday. We have consistently supported the adoption of the Scottish model and that was a central plank of the programme for Government announced last May. We believe it represents an appropriate balance between the rights of those who have not been convicted by a court and the necessities of public protection in some of the most difficult cases.
Mrs Chapman: Has any analysis been done of the different intervals at which crimes are committed following arrest? I have read research that suggests that in the initial three-year period, when the Minister is right to say there is a very steep drop-off in criminality, most of those crimes will be relatively less serious in the minds of most people. There is a much longer interval between initial arrest and subsequent arrest for very serious crimes, such as sexual crimes or nasty, violent crimes.
James Brokenshire: We have looked at a number of pieces of evidence. The hazard rate analysis has been helpful in that regard, and indicates why we think that three years is appropriate. In that analysis, it was interesting that sexual crimes and violent crimes were also highlighted as a potential distinction, which is a reason why we put specific emphasis on those cases. Again, that was an issue for the previous Government. They made distinctions between serious crimes and less serious crimes, as embodied in the 2010 Act.
Mrs Chapman: I cannot resist intervening, because the Minister is wrong, although I am truly grateful to him for giving way again. The report says that offenders very rarely tend to be specialist offenders and, most often, they are generalists. It is therefore not possible to tell on first arrest, depending on the crime that they have been arrested for, what future crimes people might commit. The Government just do not have the evidence to support treating DNA in this way.
James Brokenshire: I again refer to the quote from the then Labour Justice Minister, Lord Bach, who made the point that the different approach of the Scottish system did not have a material impact on the ability to solve serious crimes. The hazard rate analysis draws this out in one of the charts relating to sexual offences and serious violence. It looks at a one-year period, when there could be repeat offences within the same category of offences, so the document draws attention to that specific point.
In suggesting that six years is the appropriate period, the Opposition have the balance wrong. It is interesting that there is some confusion; they were willing to start off with a three-year period, albeit not in the way that we would frame it in the clause. We have different views that are not likely to be reconciled in the course of this sitting. None the less, in light of our debate, I ask the hon. Member for Eltham to withdraw his amendment.
Clive Efford (Eltham) (Lab): We fundamentally differ in our approach to the matter. As my hon. Friends the Members for Darlington and for Glasgow North West have attempted to point out, we are not arguing for a fixed position on length of time. As was said at the time of the 2010 Act, we need detailed analysis of the assistance that retention of details for more than three years, and up to six, gives the police for detecting and preventing crime. We can then consider whether the measure is appropriate, or whether four, two, five, seven or eight years would be better. As the Minister indicated, some data in the hazard rate analysis suggest that there are issues about a longer period. We are not proposing that or arguing for it; what we are saying is that there must be an evidence-based approach.
The Minister has responded to some issues, but there is still the matter of extensions. It has been made clear to us that extensions are unlikely to be sought by the police and that none, as yet, has been sought in Scotland, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North West said. Has ACPO outlined any costs for taking steps to extend the retention of materials? I suspect that the figure is zero, since the association has already said
My hon. Friend the Member for Darlington raised important issues about the hazard rate analysis, not least that the first crime is not a sign of what might take place later. Also, for more serious crimes, she has seen data that suggest that there will be a longer time lapse between arrest for a first offence and committing a second or more serious crime. We fundamentally disagree with the Minister about such matters, and we shall press the amendment to a Division.
‘(7) The responsible chief officer of police or a specified chief officer of police may write to a person on the DNA database to notify them that an extension of the retention period is necessary on an opt-out basis.
(7A) If the person responds wanting to opt-out, the responsible chief officer of police or a specified chief officer of police may apply to a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) for an order extending the retention period.’.
‘(7) The responsible chief officer of police or a specified chief officer of police may write to a person on the DNA database to notify them that an extension of the retention period is necessary on an opt-out basis.
(7A) If the person responds wanting to opt-out, the responsible chief officer of police or a specified chief officer of police may apply to a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) for an order extending the retention period.
(7B) The commencement of new section 63F shall not take place before the following—
(a) the Secretary of State must make an order made by statutory instrument which sets out circumstances in which DNA will be retained and a criteria for extension decisions,
(b) the Statutory Instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, both Houses of Parliament.’.
‘(7) The responsible chief officer of police or a specified chief officer of police may write to a person on the DNA database to notify them that an extension of the retention period is necessary on an opt-out basis.
(7A) If the person responds wanting to opt-out, the responsible chief officer of police or a specified chief officer of police may apply to a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) for an order extending the retention period.
(7B) The person on the database may apply for the Court to be held on camera.’.
(7A) If the person responds wanting to opt-out, the responsible chief officer of police or a specified chief officer of police may apply to a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) for an order extending the retention period.
(7B) The person will remain on the DNA database, including after the initial retention period, if the court process is subject to delay.’.
Clive Efford: The amendments deal with the process whereby the police may apply for someone’s DNA to be retained for an extended period. The Bill proposes that such applications should be made through a magistrates court. We suggest that in the first instance it may be more appropriate for the police simply to write to the person indicating their intention. That might avoid a whole load of bureaucracy and unnecessary court time.
We are also concerned that, theoretically, somebody could be arrested for something prescribed by the Secretary of State—a serious violent or sexual offence, say—but not convicted, so they are innocent before the courts. The police might then make an application because of their concern about the nature of the crime. Despite the matter not being tested before the courts and not being proven, that person’s name would be put before the courts and a public procedure undertaken in which the police would set out a case for the retention of their DNA.
If I am wrong, I am happy to be put right by the Minister, but my understanding from reading the Bill is that it is theoretically possible that a person in such circumstances, whose DNA has been retained under a prescribed procedure, could find themselves named in open court. That seems a retrograde step. It would clearly cause distress to that person. Even though their DNA had been retained for a serious crime, they might be innocent so it could have an enormous effect on their life; they might feel stigmatised by having gone through the courts.
Professor Alec Jeffreys gave evidence to the Select Committee for its report on DNA last year. He cited a case in which someone apparently committed suicide because of the shame they felt at being on the DNA database. Somebody who had been through open court, and whose name had been used in open court, would presumably feel that even more severely. That is a concern, and it is worthy of the Committee’s discussion to determine whether the procedure will be that such applications are to be made in open court and, therefore, reportable in the local press. Magistrates courts could put a restriction on the reporting of such cases, but in close-knit communities no restriction can be put on word of mouth. In theory, somebody could find themselves stigmatised.
I might have misread the Bill, but this is a probing amendment and I am happy to be put right by the Minister. The amendment suggests that if there is disagreement, the matter could then go before a magistrates court to be determined. If the police write to an individual and say, “We are minded to keep your DNA for an extended period,” and the person says, “No, I do not agree with that,” there has to be some sort of adjudication. That is our proposal, but Governments have the habit of accepting only amendments that have been drafted by the parliamentary counsel. The DNA strategy board could deal with the matter if the Government do not accept this excellent amendment. Perhaps another adjudicating body should deal with such situations in camera, without the full glare of someone being named in public.
Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con): Is the hon. Gentleman not concerned about an officer writing a letter in that fashion? If he recalls the evidence given on the historic gross indecency convictions, he might be concerned that such letters may in themselves intrude into the private lives of individuals who receive them. Family or friends may see them, which may be injurious to the recipient.
Clive Efford: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, which may be true. Presumably, the person would have received a letter telling them that they were going to court, so I am not sure where it begins and ends—perhaps they get a text message.
Nicola Blackwood (Oxford West and Abingdon) (Con): I think my hon. Friend’s point is that the letters in the proposal would go to every single person whose name is removed from the database rather than only to those for whom the police choose to extend the retention period.
Clive Efford: I am sorry if I have given that impression and have misled the hon. Lady. That is not what I suggest; I merely suggest that if the police were minded to keep someone’s data, they should indicate their intention to that person.
I accept the point that the hon. Member for Northampton North has made. Even under the Bill, however, if the police were inclined to keep someone’s data for longer, they would have to communicate with the person in some way. In that case, the same situation applies, and the matter is worthy of further consideration. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will draft a more accurate amendment.
Gareth Johnson (Dartford) (Con): Will the hon. Gentleman concede that an additional difficulty with the amendment is the service of documents? From my experience, in approximately a quarter of summonses some difficulty arises in the service of documents—people move addresses and so on. Of course, people might level allegations at the police, saying that they have deliberately sent letters to addresses they knew were incorrect, and so on. How would the hon. Gentleman tackle that problem if the amendment were accepted?
Clive Efford: We are opening up a number of interesting questions that had not occurred to me. Such questions apply, of course, both to our proposal and the Government’s provision. I shall take the hon. Gentleman through the process, if I understand it correctly. The police assess an individual case and then decide whether they want to extend the retention of that material. To do so, they must apply to a magistrates court. They might send a letter to people saying, “Look, we don’t need to go to court. If you’re in agreement, we’ll keep your information for another couple of years,” or they might send one saying, “We intend to apply for this extension and we are going to the magistrates court. This is what you need to do and these are your rights.” The problem that the hon. Member for Dartford has highlighted would apply to both procedures equally, so we have the same problem.
Gareth Johnson: The difference between the two systems is that there will at least be a judicial process in the Government’s provision. Under the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, all that is required is that a letter be sent. Such a letter might go into the great blue yonder, and the DNA extension would apply if there were no reply.
Clive Efford: The hon. Gentleman may understand something that I do not. How does he think that the process in the Bill will be communicated to the individuals concerned? Presumably they will have to be told. Under those circumstances, I cannot see the difference. The documents still need to be delivered, whether that is done using my proposal or that of the Government.
Gareth Johnson: The point is that it is something the court can take into account. The court can say that it is not satisfied there has been an adequate service, and therefore it will not extend the time limit. Under the
Clive Efford: If the police are concerned about an individual, I hope they would have some idea where that individual is, and that they would ensure they elicited some sort of response before taking any action. We have returned to the same problem. The court will have to make a decision based on the evidence put before it by the police. Are we saying that the court will make that judgment in the absence of any response from the individual, and that no attempt will be made to contact that individual? As far as the procedure is concerned, the DNA strategy board will oversee the management of the data and can issue guidance. The proposals for the strategy board are not dissimilar from proposals in the previous legislation, and they will include an oversight of how the police manage the information. They could also include an oversight as to how the procedure works.
The Bill is aimed at protecting the civil liberties of innocent people. I would find it difficult if one of my constituents came to me because their name was going to be presented before a court, and the police said that they wanted to keep that person’s data for a longer period. We would all have a great deal of difficulty dealing with that piece of casework if it came our way, and I have suggested a means by which we might avoid that but still have some oversight. The points made by Government Members are legitimate in terms of having oversight of the process, but, as I understand it, that lies with the DNA strategy board.
Clive Efford: The procedure in the Bill allows the police to apply for an extension. I am merely trying to set out a mechanism that would not involve the person being named in public. The Minister may say that it does not actually mean that, and that there is a simple way round it. I cannot see it in the Bill, but the Minister will point out if I am in error. The points made by Government Members are legitimate, but—I repeat—they are legitimate concerns about the procedure that we would follow under the legislation. The Government may want to consider those issues further. It would concern many people if an innocent person who had not been before a court or convicted of anything were named in court by the police as someone whose DNA they want to retain.
The most disturbing thing about the legislation is that this entire discussion could be completely hypothetical, given that ACPO has said that it does not think there will be any of these applications. Effectively, we are talking about a three-year limit. That is peculiar because the Government have accepted in principle that there are situations in which that period should be more than three years, otherwise the measure would not be in the Bill. There are people whose data it is reasonable to retain for more than a three-year period, and there should be the ability to extend that. In Scotland, that period can be extended and there is no limit on the number of extensions. This legislation allows for just one extension. If that is the case, I go back to the point
If ACPO is telling us the truth—I have no reason to suggest that it is not—and this will actually happen despite there being the power to apply for extensions, we are talking about a three-year limit here, with no extension. ACPO says that it does not have the resources to analyse a list of 6 million items of data and come up with the individual records that it would find it desirable to keep. That means that we are talking about an effective three-year limit with no extensions. We must be clear about that, because that was the evidence presented to us by ACPO.
The other concern I have is that ACPO, perhaps under guidance from the DNA strategy board, may come up with a blanket approach. It might set the criteria by which it would apply for those extensions. In itself, it will be a problem for any individual who is arraigned in court for their biometric materials to be retained for an extended period, because everyone will know why they are there—the process will stigmatise them. I suggest that that process will not be used, and that it is more likely to be used if there were an arrangement where it could be agreed between individuals and minimise the number of cases that have to go before the court.
The process of applying for extensions seems fraught with problems, both if they are granted, and if they are applied for at all. ACPO says that they will not be used—they are not used in Scotland and will not be here—so we are talking about a three-year limit even for those cases where we would perhaps be alarmed that the data would be released after three years. There might only be a handful of them, as the hon. Member for Gillingham and Rainham said this morning, but even so we would potentially be preventing very serious crimes, so there is concern about that. There is also concern about the impact on the individuals should the police enter into this process.
I would be grateful if the Minister were to respond to my points. If I have just been wittering on and speaking complete rubbish for the past 20 minutes or so—he is my neighbour as an MP and is far too decent a chap to be rude to me—I apologise. However, if that is the process, we would all be concerned if a constituent of ours came to tell us that their name was going to be used in court in that way.
James Brokenshire: I thank the hon. Member for Eltham for his kind personal comments, and I certainly would not be unkind enough to say that he had been talking nonsense in that way. [ Interruption. ] I am sorry that I caused him to laugh because I know that that is not necessary good for his health either, even though he has his Strepsils with him. However, it can be dangerous to challenge the parliamentary draftsmen, as I think he perhaps did.
and I thought that was a way of discouraging people from going forward with their application. The court would be filmed and the recording used in a way that might discourage people from challenging or seeking to use the powers or rights. I suspect that that is a typographical error and that it should read “in camera,” but it is precisely for that reason that I am grateful that I have parliamentary counsel on this side to assist with drafting issues.
The amendments would provide alternative arrangements to replace the Scottish model for extending the retention of biometric material from unconvicted individuals with an opt-out system, in which if a person did not object to their material being retained for longer, the police could just retain it and would not have to make an application to the courts. Amendment 29 would add to that basic formula a requirement for guidance on the criteria for extended retention. Amendment 30 would provide that any hearings before the court may take place in camera—or “on camera”—and amendment 31 would enable the police to retain material pending the outcome of the court’s decision.
I shall first deal with the proposed opt-out mechanism. The Government consider that the judiciary’s involvement in the process in respect of every application to retain material for more than three years provides an appropriate independent check on the police’s power to retain material. Although we have some sympathy with the potential saving in police and court time that such a system might produce, we believe that the oversight provided by the courts is an important way of increasing public confidence in how the police use and retain DNA—public confidence is particularly relevant here. In addition, given that almost three years would have passed since the individual was arrested, I would have concerns that an individual might have their DNA retained for an extended period purely because they had moved house and the police were unable to contact them. Hon. Friends have made some important points about how that might operate, but it might simply be that someone has moved house, communication is not possible and there is a subsequent automatic retention. I would certainly not want indefinite retention by the back door to be almost created in that manner.
It might also be the case that far from reducing the administrative burden on the police, the approach would increase it, as it would require them to send a notification to all affected persons, advising them of their right to opt out. I am all for streamlining the process, but the amendments could have the opposite effect.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP): Last week in my constituency there was a horrendous attack on an elderly lady. I spoke to the police about it, and they said that they would want to have DNA retention for a longer period. I am curious to know what discussions the hon. Gentleman has had with the police. Have they said that they want a DNA bank retained for a longer period than the one that the coalition suggests, and if so, is he prepared to take that on board? From what the police tell me, they do want a longer period.
On the add-ons to the proposed opt-out system, in relation to amendment 29 it would not be appropriate for the Home Secretary to give guidance to members of the judiciary about how they exercise their functions. Such guidance might be seen to fetter their independence. However, I am happy to consider whether guidance to the police would be appropriate in such circumstances, and if so, who might give it. I point out that there is no such guidance in Scotland, where sheriffs have a general discretion when considering applications from the police.
Clive Efford: I always preface questions like this by saying, “I am not a lawyer”—why am I looking at the hon. Member for Northampton North?—but what is the difference between what is in the amendment, which the Minister says would mean the Secretary of State providing guidance to the judiciary, and the prescribed cases, where the Secretary of State would allow retention via the commissioner for the use and retention of biometric material? Do they not provide the same limitation on circumstances in which retention can be extended?
James Brokenshire: There is a big distinction between a commissioner and a court and, on the separation of powers, between the judiciary and a commissioner who may be appointed under statutes. I make that point to explain why the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is not appropriate in the context of the review that would be undertaken by a magistrates court. I am aware that there is a body of opinion that hearings before a district judge in those circumstances should not take place in open court, given that such individuals are innocent by definition, which I think is the key argument that the hon. Gentleman is advancing in his amendments.
We would normally expect such hearings to take place in private—in a closed court or in the judge’s chambers. However, the decision on whether to do that is for the judge hearing the case, and that would normally be provided for in the rules of the court, which are set by the judiciary, rather than in legislation. For those reasons, amendment 30 is not necessary, because of the separation of powers issues that I have alluded to.
Finally, on amendment 31, the police’s ability to retain material pending the outcome of an extension hearing is implicit in the clause, as any other outcome would render the proceedings redundant. Therefore, that amendment is also unnecessary. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Clive Efford: Will the Minister clarify the process that came up during our exchange? The procedure is that the police decide that they want to extend the retention of a piece of biometric information, but do they have to apply to the commissioner before they go to the court? Under the guidance from the Secretary of State to the commissioner on prescribed cases—for want of a better term—does the commissioner decide that the police may apply for that extension? Is that the correct procedure?
James Brokenshire: No, it is not. Just for clarification, the role of the commissioner in relation to sexual or violent crimes in cases where someone has been arrested but not charged is on the decision as to whether there should be an initial three-year retention period. In other words, the police have to make reference to the commissioner to have the right to retain material for that category of person—someone who has not been charged with an offence—for the initial three-year period. It is at the time of seeking a two-year extension that an application would have to be made to the court, whether in that class of case, or in cases of people who had been charged but not convicted of offences and where the initial three-year period had already been triggered. The police would therefore be applying to the court only for the two-year extension beyond the initial three-year period. In such circumstances, it would not be the role of the commissioner, purely that of the court, given our argument for the need for judicial oversight of the two-year extension.
Clive Efford: The commissioner is involved in the initial decision to retain but has no further involvement if the police want to consider an extension. That is curious—it would seem logical for the commissioner to reconsider whether an extension was appropriate. Many of the cases might fall at that point and not reach open court. Is there a specific reason why the commissioner is not involved at that stage?
James Brokenshire: Ultimately, it is a question of liberty at that point—with a two-year extension taking the total to five years, we believe that an appropriate check and safeguard is to have the case in court, for a decision at that time by the magistrate.
We have a tiered level of oversight for that specific group of those who have been arrested for but not charged with a sexual offence or a crime of violence, with the scrutiny of the commissioner and then, more generally, if there is to be a further extension from three to five years, determination by the judiciary. That is why we believe the safeguard to be the appropriate one in that situation.
Clive Efford: I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but my concerns remain. I shall not press the amendment to a Division, but I wonder whether a court procedure is proportionate in such a case, because the person has not committed any crime. I am reassured that the proceedings will take place behind closed doors, but it is something for someone to have their name taken before a magistrate, with the police making a case.
We are talking about the protection of people’s rights and, in this case, the rights of people who are innocent. Yes, there is an infringement of people’s civil liberties in the retention of their profile in the national DNA database—I accept that—but is that proportionate to being taken before a local magistrates court as suggested?
As I understand it, the process can take place without the person’s knowledge. I apologise if the flaw is in the drafting, but the intention was for the police to seek a response from the individuals concerned, not just to fire off a letter, pop into court and extend the retention of their DNA. If there is no response, of course some
That said, I hope the Government will take on board the concerns, give the issue more thought and see if there is a way of being less authoritarian with people on the process by which we seek the extension.
Jim Shannon: Last week in the papers—I think the Evening Standard—the headlines were about the gentleman who was caught for the vicious rapes and burglaries, and the case only happened because he was caught trying to burgle the house and the police had DNA that went back 17 years. Is that not an example of the need to have a larger DNA retention bank?
Clive Efford: We have been through that point in a great deal of detail, and we shall probably return to it as we proceed through more of the clauses. The hon. Gentleman expresses a concern about how much the changes in the Bill will limit the ability of the police to detect and prevent serious crime. That is the thrust of our arguments.
I was mistaken in what I indicated—we do want to press the amendment to a vote. I apologise for misleading you, Mr Caton, but then a celestial voice whispered in my ear, from somewhere, so we will be pressing for a Division.
Clive Efford: It has been a pleasure to debate this clause, which is probably one of the most controversial clauses in relation to DNA. The youthful Minister is an innocent-looking individual who hardly looks weathered enough to be a Member of Parliament. I am afraid, however, that he has fallen among a bad lot—the Liberals—and it is not good for him. It is making him do things that, instinctively, he would not normally do. We are concerned about him.
The issue is a matter of balance and, as the Minister said earlier, drawing the line in relation to what period we should retain people’s biometric details for. We say that it should be evidence-based. The previous Government did not go into power on a promise to introduce control
Clive Efford: I do not deny that there are people who are concerned about the DNA database. I prefaced my comments by saying that a balance needs to be struck. It is about where the line is drawn. The Minister referred to detection rates. In spite of the fact that the DNA database had grown, they are down to 32,000. That is a piece of evidence that suggests that the blanket approach to retaining DNA may not be the most effective and may make the database unwieldy. We need, however, to make that decision on the basis of evidence. The analysis of the evidence will prove to us, in light of experience, whether what is in the Bill is the best way to proceed, or whether DNA should be retained for a longer period.
The Minister referred to Professor Fraser’s analysis, which he undertook in 2008—the year after the three-year system was introduced in Scotland. There is a letter to the Chair of the Select Committee from the Home Office. There is no name at the bottom of the letter, which I have printed out from the parliamentary website, unfortunately, but it is presumably from a Home Office Minister:
“It has been suggested that the research carried out into the Scottish system (by Professor Fraser) did not uncover any evidence to suggest that the Scottish approach to retention had caused any detriment to the detection of…crime. However, that is to misunderstand this research which did not assess whether alternative systems would have been more effective. It was also unable to review how many serious crimes went undetected as the relevant DNA profiles had been deleted and, therefore, was not in a position to conclude whether there was any detriment to the detection of serious crime.”
That was the evidence that was presented to the Select Committee and calls into question the evidence base that is used in the impact assessment by the Government to support the proposal for three years.
My hon. Friend the Member for Darlington did a very detailed analysis—I hope that she will contribute to the debate—of the hazard rate analysis and how that tapers off, and the likelihood of people who have been arrested being re-arrested for a crime, and the length of time that can elapse between being arrested and when they commit a serious crime. Those are issues that we need to analyse in the light of hard evidence, and I suggest to the Minister that we do not have that evidence yet.
Clive Efford: It is true to say that some of the bold statements about civil liberties issues that were made before the election have boxed people into taking a position on certain issues. I would not normally pray in aid in these circumstances George Monbiot—not one of the greatest fans of the previous Labour Government and their legislative record, particularly relating to civil liberties—but he has an amusing article in The Guardian today pointing out the huge gaping holes in the Bill—what is laughingly called the freedom Bill. He welcomes how far it goes, but then points out the sorts of things that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington would no doubt want to see in the next Queen’s Speech for the coalition Government, in his No. 2 freedom Bill, which he mentioned on Second Reading.
James Brokenshire: I was particularly interested that the hon. Gentleman was quoting that article from The Guardian. Will he confirm whether Mr Monbiot welcomed the reform of the DNA database as part of the Bill?
Clive Efford: Mr Monbiot is bound to welcome any step in the right direction as assessed by him. However, the body of the article’s argument was that the sweeping statements that people have made about civil liberties, the Bill and how they were going to liberate everyone from the yoke of legislation under the Labour Government were a bit overblown.
Rehman Chishti: On the point about civil liberties, does the hon. Gentleman agree with the assertion made by the leader of his own party, which was that Labour was far too casual about civil liberties under the previous two Prime Ministers?
Every new leader has to assert themselves and set a new direction for their party. I think that the Home Secretary once said, “We were the nasty party.” She called the Conservatives the nasty party, and they had
When dealing with the clause, I was searching around for bits and pieces to help me make my argument. I came across this thing called the “Policeman’s Song” [Hon. Members: “Sing it.”] I will not sing it to you, Mr Caton—not that you would not be entertained if I did, but because I am not a good singer. One could interpret that to suggest that it fits in with what we are discussing, on the issue of balance. The lyrics say:
It is certainly not a happy one in relation to the Bill and the tools that are currently in the toolkit of the police in fighting crime. The lyrics suggest that there is a balance. We cannot jump to conclusions about people’s guilt or innocence, and there is a duty on us as MPs to strike that balance, but in doing so, not unreasonably diminish the ability of the police to carry out their duties. The Bill seeks to limit one of the most useful tools in the toolkit of the police, without an evidence base for doing so.
To return to the point that was made when we were debating the amendments, it may well be that the three-year period is the correct one, but there is no evidence to back it up at the moment. However, we would have the ability to produce that evidence by using the DNA database on a six-year basis and analysing whether there are any benefits in retaining DNA beyond three years for up to six years. That is the thrust of the argument, and the position that the Government were left in when the 2010 Act was passed.
As I said earlier, I did not start with a fixed view on the matter—new leader, new beginning—and I was able to review where we have stood on such issues and determine whether a six-year period or a three-year period is the correct one. The more I have looked into this, the more I see the problems of managing the process. There are civil liberties issues about the retention of DNA. There are organisations and private companies that will still retain DNA material that cannot be removed on their databases, although personal identification will be removed. Dr Wallace from GeneWatch said as much in his evidence in answer to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington—
Clive Efford: I beg your pardon. It is not that I need glasses, but I was not there for the evidence. I simply read the evidence. She said that there was concern about that material being retained. There is an issue of trust, and that needs to be monitored and overseen to ensure that the public can have confidence in what is being held and how. As for the detailed DNA information that the
The Bill, as I said earlier when I was poking fun at it, is called the Protection of Freedoms Bill, but we should change its name to the bits and pieces Bill—give a bit here, shave a bit off there, take a little bit back over there. It has certainly been over-hyped amid claims that the Bill means that all innocent people will have their DNA removed from the database. That is not true. We have had suggestions from the Deputy Prime Minister and great sweeping statements about how the Government will be sweeping away all the restrictions on people’s liberties. Even on Second Reading, the Secretary of State had to be pulled up by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), who warned her that she was suggesting that every innocent person would have their DNA removed from the database, and the Secretary of State had to accept that that was not the case. It goes back to the point that I made earlier when we were debating the first amendment. The way that people have approached this debate has often been inaccurate and has led to people misinterpreting how we are dealing with DNA profiles.
The Secretary of State, as the Minister has done, referred to the ability to retain DNA in certain circumstances. It will be interesting to tease out from the Minister what is behind the Government’s thinking and what those certain circumstances are. He has referred to vulnerable people, but what does that mean and how far do the Government intend to go in prescribing for the retention of DNA material? If we are to consider the Bill as the measure that wins freedom for people who otherwise might unfairly have their personal data retained on the national DNA database, we cannot go through it and then find that the Secretary of State decides to do something else. We really need some indication from the Government of just how far they intend to go with prescribing so that we know exactly what we are talking about. We may even want the Secretary of State to go further. There may be some crimes that she is not intending to include that some of us feel may need to be included.
I do not want to be pulled up by you again, Mr Caton, but we know that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington is planning the next Queen’s Speech and the protection of freedoms Bill No. 2. And we have some very powerful lobbying groups and individuals—[ Interruption. ] There is nothing wrong with that. I am sure that we in Labour will enjoy the spectacle of the Liberals drawing up the next Queen’s Speech for the coalition.
Nicola Blackwood: I just want to make the very small point at this stage that some of us on the Conservative Benches are also civil libertarians. It is not only the Liberal Democrats who are civil libertarians.
As I was saying, we have some very powerful lobbying groups who are also pressing us. We heard from the Information Commissioner that we should not have speculative searches and that the record of someone who has been arrested but not charged or cautioned should not even be on the police database. I am sure that the direction of travel for some of the people supporting the Bill goes further than many of us here might want to accept.
On the argument that there should be no speculative searches, there are some cases where people have been identified as a result of a speculative search. The case I referred to earlier was that of Abdul Aziz. He was arrested for a minor drugs offence and he would have been subjected to a speculative search, but his DNA would not have been retained. Five months later, he committed a very serious crime. The changes we are proposing to the Bill involve an issue that the public are greatly concerned about.
We will be losing some of this data for ever—that is the point. We have an opportunity here to do something that could prove to all of us, once and for all, how long we should retain DNA for. This limit will be a three-year limit because we have heard from ACPO that it is unlikely to be able to administer applications for extensions. Imposing a three-year limit will mean that we miss an opportunity, and once the data have gone, we have missed the opportunity for ever.
The Minister corrected me this morning regarding the conclusion of the Select Committee report on the DNA database. I went back and checked because I did not believe that I had read the conclusion incorrectly. I do not know what I have identified; however, the Minister read out the conclusion on the back page. I selected paragraph 37 from within the report. It says:
“Decisions on retention periods must balance public safety against individual privacy. The current situation of indefinite retention of the DNA profiles of those arrested but not convicted is impossible to defend in light of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights and unacceptable in principle. However, given the complexity of the issues and the conflicting evidence about what would be an appropriate length of time for retention, we are unable to recommend a specific period other than to say that we would regard three years as the minimum length of time for which such profiles should be retained.”
So, when I was quoting from the report this morning and talking about a “minimum” length of time, I was quoting paragraph 37 from within the body of the report. I knew that the Minister would not be misleading the Committee, and nor was I. However, we have highlighted a little anomaly in the drafting of that report. So we are both right: there you go—we can all go out for a drink together later on.
In conclusion, this limit is a three-year limit, effectively, because we know that ACPO will not be able to administer any extensions. It would be useful if the Minister clarified proscribing and the role of the commissioner. He has partially done so—the commissioner will be involved in the initial application for retention but not any extension—but what will the commissioner’s role be outside national security?
What is a vulnerable victim? Is it a child, a woman who has been sexually assaulted or an elderly or disabled person? The Minister indicated that the commissioner
Steve Baker: I support the clause. We have heard a great deal this afternoon about balance; in particular, the balance between evidence and principle has come out in hon. Members’ remarks. Consideration of that balance speaks very much to the nature of the clause. A lot of the talk has been about evidence, but it struck me that it has also been a conversation about counterfactuals. How many crimes will we not detect if we adopt the measure? I am not sure how one proves how many crimes have not been detected.
The hon. Member for Darlington complained that the measure might be political and not evidential, and she said it with considerable passion. For me, the hon. Lady ably demonstrated that we have adopted a kind of managerialism on the subject that is not driven by principle. It is a fear of consequences, perhaps, rather than what we stand for fundamentally.
If I remember correctly, the hon. Member for Glasgow North West mentioned the Scottish principle of “not proven”, which I would like to pick up. When the Minister talked about our commitment to innocent until proven guilty, which I welcome and fully support, I was reminded of the hon. Gentleman’s remarks. Pressure groups such as the Adam Smith Institute have written to us on this, and if we adopt the measure, in doing so we somehow pick up the Scottish idea of not proven. We charge someone, they are not convicted and yet we put them under the taint of suspicion by retaining their DNA. The hon. Lady mentioned criminologists and their notion that—forgive me if I misphrase this, I am only an engineer—the fundamental pointer to criminality is having been arrested.
The clause is a balance. It is already a balance between the principle of innocent until proven guilty and, knowing what the hon. Lady has told us, concern that we might not detect certain crimes. It is by no means a dogmatic application of principle, and I know that many will criticise it, but it heads in the right direction in what I could describe—without wishing to be overly pejorative—as a slightly neurotic atmosphere of concern. I believe that we should go further and be more principled. We should assert innocent until proven guilty. If we were to adopt the Scottish notion of not proven and have people living under the taint of suspicion simply because they
John Robertson: As someone who is also only an engineer, it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Gentleman. His concern about “not proven” is well founded. It solves a problem. It is not so much a case of, as he put it, somebody who is innocent being deemed guilty. In a lot of ways, it is the other way around. It is the case of somebody who is innocent being not proven and the person then always seen as guilty by a certain part of the population. There is a probability that he could be guilty and a probability that he could be innocent. It is something that I have always felt strongly about, and one of the few things that I think is better down south is that part of the law. Unfortunately, there is not much else. [ Laughter. ] I only say that in case someone from Scotland reads this. I have family back home and although I am not worried so much about others, I am worried about my family. To be serious for a second, I know no songs, so I shall just plod along with my speech as I see fit.
My hon. Friend the Member for Eltham mentioned public confidence, which is, more than anything else, what we are talking about: public confidence first in the law and, secondly in the Government. It does not matter whether I am a member of the Opposition or of the Government. The country is governed by the Government and, at the end of the day, no matter what we put together in the House, it will be the Government’s stamp on it; but we will all be associated with it one way or another, no matter whether we were in favour of it or against it. We have been elected to the House of Commons and we vote accordingly. Whether we win or lose a vote, we still have to stand by the result, so there has to be confidence in the Government, and I include everyone in that.
I do not believe there is confidence, because we are using flawed research. As my hon. Friend said when he talked about Professor Fraser, the evidence that we took in two days was much more expansive than Professor Fraser’s research and its conclusions. We have based the decision on a Scottish way of working that came from research that, although it might be disingenuous to call it flawed as a whole, is certainly flawed in relation to this Bill. There was not enough evidence to make decisions. The Government have to take an extra look at what they are doing, or we will end up with the not proven scenario to which the hon. Member for Wycombe referred.
The bodies who were not consulted included, of course, the police—the people who have to catch the criminals and help to get them convicted and into prison. If we do not talk to the people who actually have to deal with the law, how can we possibly have confidence in it? I believe that is the cornerstone of what my hon. Friend the Member for Eltham was saying and, to some extent, of what the Minister has been trying to say. I do not have confidence in the Bill. We cannot go forward with it knowing that we are using a set of rules and guidelines from somebody whose research did not cover all the bases, to use an American phrase.
I do not believe that all the bases were covered, so I honestly think that the Minister needs to look at the issue again. If he does not and the Bill goes to the
James Brokenshire: We have had an impassioned debate. I respect the views expressed by Members from both sides of the Committee. This country claims a pioneering role in the utilisation of DNA technology, which is something that we can be proud of. Two engineers have contributed to the debate, and the hon. Member for Glasgow North West takes the issue of technology and its development extremely seriously. He and I have had a number of discussions outside the House on technology-related matters, so I know of his passion for such facets and factors. In taking that pioneering role, however, we have a special responsibility to ensure that it is used in a way that strikes the right balance on what is permissible when it comes to potential interference in people’s private lives. That is at the core of this afternoon’s debate.
“we must always remember that British liberties were hard fought and hard won over hundreds of years. We should always take the greatest care in protecting them. And too often we seemed casual about them.”
I refer to that speech because the hon. Member for Eltham said that events took us in a particular direction or down a particular path. The Leader of the Opposition was right: we have to consider the basic principles and fundamentals of liberty when examining the decisions that we take. Perhaps belatedly, the Opposition recognise that they did not strike that balance correctly. I genuinely welcome that conversion. If we believe in liberty and its protection, we should welcome and celebrate all who recognise that fundamental aspect of our democratic rights.
It is in that context and on that balance that we took innocent until proven guilty as our fundamental starting point. The previous Government took the opposite view. They started at the other end, saying, “We want to protect everything; everything must be on a database, and we have to keep it there for ever and a day,” but without taking account of the question of liberty. In many ways, they were forced to change their mind as a consequence of various matters that arose, which is partly why we are debating the matter this afternoon.
One can analyse and re-analyse, but at some point one has to form a judgment. The Government have formed a judgment on the information and evidence afforded to us. It is a fair and reasonable judgment, based on analysis undertaken by the previous Government of experience in Scotland and the analysis in Professor Fraser’s report. Professor Fraser is an eminent specialist. Our conclusion is therefore reasonable and appropriate. Lord Bach, then at the Ministry of Justice, said that Professor Fraser had not uncovered
We heard such words from many Members in preceding debates on amendments to the clause. I do not want to go back over territory that we have already covered in great detail, but it is worth underlining those fundamental principles to which we all adhere.
“to suggest to the Crown Prosecution Service that someone should be charged. In most circumstances, they will need corroborative evidence, or they will need to take other factors into account.”—[Official Report, 15 November 2006; Vol. 453, c. 126.]
I previously highlighted the puncturing of the bubble inherent in the previous Government’s approach—that retaining ever more DNA would make us more effective and better protected, and that more crime would be solved. That clearly was not the experience, given the detection rates that we have seen.
Clive Efford: The Minister has said that on a number of occasions. In the early days of DNA processing, what he is saying is accurate but the 2010 Act did not take a blanket approach to the retention of DNA. It introduced a six-year limit. We have moved on from that position, and we are debating whether it is reasonable to set a three-year limit or a six-year limit, with the proviso that we assess its effectiveness.
James Brokenshire: I acknowledge that. I took part in discussions on the Crime and Security Bill during its passage through the House before the last general election, so I am familiar with the debate and a number of the points that we have been discussing. A number of comments made by the hon. Gentleman imply that in his view, we should be retaining evidence for a much longer period. If he is setting out the new Liberalism, or the change in approach of the previous Government and current Opposition—however one might like to characterise them—that view is not consistent. It is a question of whether we adhere to the fundamental liberties that were referred to by the Leader of the Opposition, and referred to this afternoon in the context of the judgments and decisions to be made.
Clive Efford: We do not suggest a length of time beyond six years. We do not propose six years because we think it is absolutely the right thing to do; as was said at the time of the 2010 Act, the provision should be reassessed with the information in place to determine whether it makes a significant difference to the detection and prevention of crime. If it does not, we can reduce the time period on the basis of empirical evidence derived from that process.
James Brokenshire: There has been an inherent approach by the Labour party to delay, defer, not make a decision, try and keep things as they are and maintain the status quo. A fundamental judgment must be made, which is why we have looked at the evidence in detail. There is some consensus on the period of three years for under-18s who are not convicted, albeit that we would look at the matter in a different way and would not retain evidence from those who had simply been arrested for a minor crime. There was an indication that a three-year period was appropriate in those circumstances, but there is an inherent confusion in the Opposition’s standpoint.
I will address the fair point raised about vulnerability, which I spoke about during the debate this morning. I am sure the hon. Gentleman has read the comments of the Home Secretary on Second Reading on the reserve power that we seek to adopt. As I indicated, we intend to bring that forward in secondary legislation following further discussions with ACPO to deal with a number of the issues about vulnerability highlighted by the hon. Gentleman. Although the Home Secretary gave a good explanation of the issues, I have reflected on the hon. Gentleman’s request for further clarity, and I will consider his understandable concern for a level of certainty in the approach. I recognise the point and assure the hon. Gentleman that I will reflect on it carefully. I will provide the Committee and the public as a whole with clarity about the provisions relating to the potential retention of the DNA profiles of those who have been arrested but not charged, and I have set out the limited circumstances that will be used to address those issues with the oversight of the commissioner.
We have had a fair and detailed discussion and I do not intend to rehearse or go back over the detailed points that have already been examined. [Hon. Members: “ Go on.”] I appreciate that Opposition Members may wish to delay and defer debate on this issue, but fundamentally it is a question of judgment and there is a line to be drawn. Based on the information and the evidence, we believe our proposals strike a fair and proportionate balance between public protection and the right of the individual, and we feel strongly that the provisions are appropriate.
Clive Efford: We tabled amendments, which were taken in an earlier group, suggesting that the retention period for arrest should be six years, and three years for someone under the age of 16. We feel that arrest should be the very high threshold, as set out in the Select
Steve Wright was a rapist in Cambridge who was put in prison in 2006. Three years later his DNA was discovered at the scene of at least one of the rapes. Under the proposed arrangements, it is possible that he would not have been in the system, because his previous crime was a minor one, for theft. The Minister may have checked the detail and may correct me, but the theft from his place of work of which Steve Wright was convicted would not, under the proposed regime, have resulted in his details being retained.
Abdul Azad was, as I mentioned earlier, released without charge after being arrested for violent disorder, and it is not clear whether under the proposed system his DNA would be held. He committed another crime five months later, and the earlier arrest for a minor crime would not have shown up in the system. Without empirical evidence showing that the proposed system will not impede the police or prevent them from investigating or detecting serious crime, we should retain DNA in such circumstances and consider the future position in the light of a detailed analysis of how that assists the police in their detection of crime.
We know that when the Select Committee considered all the options, it gave a great deal of thought to the threshold for retaining DNA. It concluded that arrest was a reasonable position, but I am sure that the Minister will want to say in his response that the Committee was concerned that the threshold for arrest should be higher and that the power should not be abused in any way. We support that view.
The issue, again, is the balance that we strike. How much should we rely on the evidence of re-arrest rates, and on the fact that people who have been arrested and detained at a police station are more likely to be re-arrested than most people? Is the measure the most effective way of targeting and using the database? I return to the point that we should not restrict the ways in which we can protect the public and investigate crime—we need evidence to back that up. Until we have conducted the analysis, we should not move forward in the way that the Bill suggests.
The Minister asked in a previous discussion why there was a three-year retention period for young people when those between the ages of 18 and 19 show a high propensity for crime. The reason for that is the recognition that young people should not be stigmatised for youthful exuberance or whatever it may be. It was a response to past debates and discussions about dealing with youth crime and the retention of biometric material. It was a response to people from within Parliament and outside it. As it stands, the clause will restrict the police’s ability to use the DNA database, and it does so without the empirical evidence to back that up. I shall be interested to hear the Minister’s response.
“It is important to note that the availability of DNA match intelligence may not have been causal in solving the crime as detections are achieved through integrated criminal investigation and not by forensic science alone.”
It is also worth pointing out to the hon. Gentleman that the clause should be read in conjunction with clause 5 and the subsequent clauses in that part. As he would see, when persons are convicted of a recordable offence, material may be retained indefinitely. It is a question, therefore, of which category people fall within. If someone has a conviction and is subsequently re-arrested and charged with a minor crime, clause 4 would apply. The general principle, however, is that DNA of people who are convicted of an offence will be retained indefinitely. I hope that that explanation will aid the hon. Gentleman and give clarity to his consideration of the clause.
It is worth saying that the clause delivers the second key protection of the Scottish model, in that it provides for the destruction of the DNA profile and fingerprints of anyone who has been arrested for or charged with but not subsequently convicted of a recordable offence that is not on the list of qualifying offences.
With clause 3, we have had a spirited debate on retention periods, and I recognise that, but as with retention periods there is a range of views on whether we should differentiate in retention policy between those arrested for serious offences and those arrested for more minor crimes.
That is what the Home Affairs Committee said on this aspect. However, the Joint Committee on Human Rights in the same Parliament, in its report of 23 February 2010, came to the opposite view, stating that it was appropriate. The European Court of Human Rights judgment on S. and Marper highlighted specifically the fact that
The judgement was that the previous Government’s approach of not looking at the seriousness of the offence was relevant in the blanket and indiscriminate retention to which the Court was referring. The Court obviously looked favourably on the approach sought by the Scottish model.
We find ourselves arriving at a position on which there is no consensus. The Government’s view, given the evidence, is that our conclusion is right and appropriate. Furthermore, the previous Government, in the Crime and Security Act 2010, made a distinction in a number of ways between serious and minor crime. That distinction was accepted and acknowledged by the previous Government in their approach to the preceding Bill.
There is a distinction between minor and more serious crimes but, if we were to draw a Venn diagram of the people committing those crimes, we would find a great deal of overlap: almost entirely, people committing serious crimes would fit within the circle for people committing more minor offences. The temptation is to see them as separate groups of people, but that is not the case. It seems sensible to retain the DNA of people arrested for more minor offences.
James Brokenshire: If we take a step back and return to some of the concerns about liberty that I was highlighting in a previous debate, we are saying clearly that those who are convicted—they have been to a court and found guilty of a crime—should have their DNA retained indefinitely, in essence reflecting the principle of innocent until proven guilty. In clause 4, we are saying that because our starting point is innocent until proven guilty, we are careful and cautious about how we approach those people who have never been convicted of a crime. That is why we are having the threshold of charging and are adding arrest protections.
Given what we have said about the significance of crimes of violence and of sexual offences, it is appropriate to identify them specifically, as we have through the Scottish model. That principle is reflected in the Bill and, indeed, was equally reflected in the 2010 Act.
I am going back a bit, to the reference the Minister made to the European Court judgment. I think the point was made earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington. The first arrest or offence is no indication of what crime might be committed later on, but the Government are suggesting that what the person is arrested for in the first instance is some indication of what crime they might commit on a second occasion. However, some evidence shows that not to be accurate.
James Brokenshire: I do not want to go over ground that has been well trod already this afternoon, but the hazard rate analysis indicated a higher propensity for reoffending in those specific classes within a year following arrest. So some evidence points in the other direction to that which he was taking.
There is, again, a difference of approach embodied in the arguments we have had today. We believe that this is a fair and justified approach, taking account of the issues of liberty and freedom that we have discussed at length. This important provision giving effect to the Scottish system should stand part of the Bill.
Clive Efford: The clause deals with people convicted of a crime outside England and Wales. We support the clause; it is obviously sensible. In the light of some of the high-profile crimes that have happened internationally, such as sex tourism and others, could we clarify how the process will operate? Will the Minister tell us how it will work? How will it be monitored? How are the individuals involved monitored? Is there a process by which the Home Office is notified of someone convicted? I am at a loss to know whether there is a system in place for a Government to notify a Government that one of their citizens has been arraigned before their courts. Is there a traffic light system indicating that a Welsh or English national is in court overseas? If there is a process—a concordat that countries have signed up to—do all countries co-operate? Do we have concerns about any countries not co-operating?
What is the mechanism for notifying the Home Office that those people might return to the UK, so that we can approach them and ask for biometric details? I assume it is the Home Office that would be involved. It is okay to put this in the Bill, but if people just fly back home and nobody knows—as in some high-profile cases we have seen of people who molest and abuse children—we want to know. We could be lulled into a false sense of security if there is no way for the mechanism to work and flag up that somebody who has committed a serious crime has returned to the country. Who is responsible for overseeing that? Who is responsible for ensuring and checking that when someone returns to the country or is in court and convicted overseas, the appropriate authorities are notified? Is it the local police?
I note that the police are engaged in the process of collecting data from individuals who have been in prison and whose sentences predate the DNA database, and those gaps in the system are being filled. Is it the police who will go around to those people? Will they be notified where they are, or will they be stopped at the point of entry? How will that operate? What is the process if the person does not co-operate? If a person returns home, and the police become aware that they have returned home and that they have had a conviction abroad, what is the process for obtaining those data if the Bill decrees that the police are entitled to take DNA, and they refuse to co-operate?
We agree with the intent on this issue. It would be helpful if the Minister could answer those points and give some indication as to how the requirements in the clause will work in practice. It is obviously a sensible thing to do. I note that there is a smaller but similar clause in the 2010 Act, but I would be interested to hear from the Minister how will it operate in practice.
John Robertson: I wonder whether I could ask a few other questions based on my hon. Friend’s contribution, but perhaps to go into more detail. Just one question off the top of my head—why is Northern Ireland not included? Northern Ireland appears with England and Wales in other parts of the Bill. I understand why Scotland is not included, but I wonder why Northern Ireland is not included here. I am sure that our colleague from the Democratic Unionist party, the hon. Member for Strangford, will want to know why they are not included. He probably knows—I do not know.
My hon. Friend the Member for Eltham talked about child abduction. We have great problems in locating children who have been stolen by a parent to another country. When a parent in such a case had DNA taken from them for some other reason—perhaps there was a minor case, one would assume, where a child had been taken with the husband before and the husband was arrested, fingerprinted or even had DNA taken from him—what would we do with that DNA? Would that DNA automatically have been destroyed, along with the fingerprints? Do we hold that kind of information in cases where parent abduction is a concern? For colleagues who have been involved in something like that, it is horrific for the parent who loses a child and who cannot get access to that child.
My follow-on question is: what is done to try and obtain DNA evidence from countries with whom we have access and contact? This may be topical, as it relates to Libya. There was a high-profile case of a child who was abducted from Scotland and ended up in Libya. What kind of contact would we have with the Libyans now in relation to that child abduction? Would such cases suddenly become more important and would there be follow-ups to that?
James Brokenshire: I am delighted that we are making such good progress that we are on to clause 6 already. To correct myself, that obviously strays somewhat more broadly and widely than clause 6. However, the point that the hon. Gentleman made about child abduction and child trafficking cases is very pertinent and fits into the issues of missing children. We are very focused on strengthening and supporting that work through CEOP, which already has good links in relation to missing children. There is further work that can be undertaken to address what is a very pertinent and relevant issue.
The Bill does not currently address Northern Ireland-related matters because such matters are still to be addressed through the Northern Ireland Government.
John Robertson: In connection with that, would Scotland come under a similar kind of connection? It has the separate law, obviously, but it is not a country outside the United Kingdom; therefore it should be brought in under the rules governing the Bill.
James Brokenshire: Clearly, there are differences in law that apply, but I will certainly look into it to see whether there is any distinction that might need to be drawn. I will certainly reflect on the point that the hon. Gentleman has helpfully raised, but obviously this Bill speaks to England and Wales. That is why it has been phrased in the way that it has.
Clause 6 needs to be read in conjunction with section 3 of the Crime and Security Act 2010, which came into force on 7 March 2011. It enables the police to take DNA and/or fingerprints from anyone convicted outside England and Wales of an offence that would have constituted a qualifying offence if committed within England and Wales. I hope I can reassure the Committee that section 3 of the 2010 Act, and therefore clause 6 of the Bill, apply only to convictions for serious crimes overseas, which would constitute a qualifying offence if committed in England and Wales as per the provisions in the Bill.
New section 63I of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 inserted by this clause provides that DNA profiles and fingerprints that have been obtained under section 3 of the previous Act—the 2010 Act—on the basis of an overseas conviction can be retained indefinitely. This is the same as the position under clause 5 of the Bill if the conviction had been in England and Wales. We think that is an important protection. The hon. Member for Eltham has seen that as an important step forward, and we welcome his support.
The notifications are co-ordinated through the ACPO criminal records office, which is often referred to as ACRO. It will receive notifications from overseas authorities as the UK central authority for the exchange of criminal records. That may also trigger sex offender notifications and so on. In addition, there will be deportations at the end of prison sentences and other ways in which information may otherwise be picked up. This is a mechanism by which information is exchanged and which is therefore directly relevant in terms of the ability to take DNA as per the previous Bill and now the powers to retain as contained in clause 6 of this Bill. With that explanation, I hope that the clause will stand part of the Bill.
Clive Efford: We are making very steady progress through the Bill. Parts of it are similar to the previous Bill and Act. There are certain similarities in the clause. The previous Act differentiated between people aged 17 and over and people aged 16 and under. Did the Government consider differentiating between younger criminals in that way? There is a great deal of concern.
Back in my younger days, I used to be a youth worker. I was also senior play leader on an adventure playground for a time. I understand fully that young people change. They can become involved in criminal activities through their peer group for various reasons. If they do not get on at school and spend too much time away from school, they may get up to all sorts of things that perhaps they should not and find themselves, at an early age, coming to the attention of the law. It is important that we do not allow young people to slip too easily into a situation where they could end up with a criminal record or have their details retained indefinitely or for a long time. It is important that we ensure proper safeguards for young people. Was any consideration given to that?
On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington made a good point about a 12-year-old who commits two minor offences finding that their details will be retained. That seems very young. I appreciate that it might have been in the 2010 Act as well, but it is still worth considering whether, at some point in our future consideration of the Bill, we should pay more attention to the effects on young people.
We have had numerous discussions about legislation introduced by the previous Government. Much of it has been criticised on youth justice grounds, particularly the use of antisocial behaviour orders, antisocial behaviour contracts, parental orders and so on. Some of that criticism is unjustified. Although I might be taking the libertarian route in terms of youth justice, I think that ASBOs have a bad press, some of it unjustified. They have been effective in preventing a lot of young people from going the step further that would have brought them to a criminal record or arrest. Steps can be taken to prevent someone from having to receive an ASBO. If one looks at the statistics—I know that the Minister pays attention to statistics; he has quoted a lot of them today—they work.
It is somewhat inevitable that the proportion of people who breach ASBOs will increase as they become more effectively targeted, because the people who get them are those who fail to be deterred by the measures introduced to prevent people from getting that far, such as antisocial behaviour contracts. I am sure that we have all seen that in our constituencies, including cases such as the one in mine where a young lad’s tag was “Asbo” because he had been given so many. He had been given every type of order on the statute books except a postal order, and he decided to adopt “Asbo” as his tag to thumb his nose at the authorities. We have all heard such stories, but we should not allow them to cloud our judgment on how we treat all young people. We should all remember that the young people who we see the most are those who cause problems within our communities. They stand out the most from the norm. The vast majority of young people are law-abiding.
It is a bit like the demonstration at the weekend. More than 400,000 marched perfectly peacefully in a carnival atmosphere, but a handful of people stole the news. We must always guard against—[ Interruption. ] The Liberals are pulling faces, but they would have been on that march in another set of circumstances. I will not digress, Mr Caton, because you will call me up for it. I will come back to the clause before us.
The issue is serious. It is about how we approach and treat young people. We have to consider it carefully, because we do not want it for very minor and simple crime. Let us face it—this is not always the case, and I would not want to criticise the police—at times an over-zealous or exasperated police officer might decide that arrest is appropriate in a particular case and a young person, for very minor offences, finds themselves getting two strikes and they’re out. We need to guard against that and carefully consider the contents of the Bill.
Have the Government given any consideration to stepped arrangements for age and the length of time that data will be retained for people under the age of 18? Are such arrangements under review with a view to introducing them?
I was quite struck by the comment that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington made on Second Reading. He said that a young person who commits two minor crimes may find their DNA being retained for a long period. I would like the Minister to consider that, because young people may easily be led to make severe mistakes. We would not want to legislate in a way that has a damaging effect on such young people for life.
John Robertson: I want to add a couple of points to those raised by my hon. Friend. Government Members know that the holding of DNA is not a problem for me, but I want to address the spirit of the Bill and where I think the Government are trying to go with it. At a time when we are trying to draw back from giving people custodial sentences, five years for a young person is quite a long time. I should have thought that such a sentence, particularly for a first offence, would be for a fairly substantive crime.
Also, depending on the judge, one person might receive a five-year sentence and somebody else might receive a four-year sentence for exactly the same crime. One person’s DNA will disappear five years after the sentence is finished, but the DNA of the person who got the extra year is kept indefinitely. That does not strike me as being fair—not for the same crime. Will the Minister comment on the differences between sentence time and the crime committed? Should we be looking not at the time of the sentence, but at the sentences themselves? If the sentence was for grievous bodily harm or for carrying a weapon of some description with intent to use it, people would expect a fairly high tariff of sentence. The indefinite holding of DNA might, therefore, be in order. I cannot imagine anything less than that getting a five-year sentence for a first offence. Even if the person was approaching his 18th birthday, I still doubt that they would get a five-year sentence for breaking and entering or a crime of that sort.
Should we not look at the actual crimes that these young people are committing and make the sentence in relation to DNA, as it were, fit the crime rather than
However, studies of criminological literature show us that the peak period of offending behaviour is between the ages of 12 and 19. Therefore, quite a dichotomy is being thrown up by potentially conflicting aspects: how to treat young people fairly and appropriately, recognising a number of points that Opposition Members have highlighted and the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington raised on Second Reading; and the view that the period between 12 and 19 is the peak period of offending.
We discussed the retention period for unconvicted juveniles when we were considering clauses 3 and 4. Our proposals are that the retention period for unconvicted juveniles should be the same as for adults, namely three years for those charged with serious crimes, and that there should be no retention of data for those suspected of minor crimes. As our proposals only permit retention from unconvicted individuals for short periods and in specific circumstances, we believe that they are just as appropriate for juveniles as for adults.
Clause 7 makes special provision for convicted juveniles. By virtue of clause 18, that group includes those who have accepted a reprimand or warning under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. We propose that juveniles who receive a warning, are reprimanded or convicted in a court and sentenced to a community punishment should, for a first minor offence, have their DNA and fingerprints retained for five years from the date that the material is taken.
Clause 7 also provides for juveniles who on first conviction in a court for a minor offence receive a sentence of immediate youth custody of up to five years to have their DNA profile and fingerprints retained for five years from the end of that sentence. Juveniles who are convicted of a qualifying offence, or who receive more than five years’ imprisonment for a non-qualifying offence, would have their DNA and fingerprints retained indefinitely, which would reflect the serious nature of the offence for which they have been convicted.
I genuinely do hear the points that have been made by hon. Members this afternoon. These proposals are intended to give young people “a second chance” and to allow them to sort themselves out after a brush with the law at a young age. The proposals are underpinned by a provision to retain material indefinitely following a second warning, reprimand or conviction.
There is a delicate and difficult balance to be struck here. We considered the proposals that were in the 2010 Bill. In essence, that Bill treated 16 and 17-year-olds differently from younger children. We felt that it was appropriate to consider whether someone was a juvenile or an adult and we felt that the dividing line should be at 18. Therefore, that was a reflection on some of the consideration of the 2010 Bill.
Clive Efford: There is a big difference between 11 and 12-year-olds and someone who is 18. An enormous amount of growing up takes place in the period between 11 or 12 and 18. It seems wrong to treat somebody of 11 or 12 the same as someone who is 17 and approaching 18.
James Brokenshire: That is an inherent part of setting an age for criminal responsibility. A line has to be drawn somewhere. I do not intend to stray, in this Committee, on to whether the line is set at an appropriate age. There is a wider debate that others may wish to put forward on that. We believe that there is a distinction between the treatment of children and the treatment of adults. That point was agreed by the hon. Gentleman and was reflected, albeit in a different way, in relation to the preceding Act. I should clarify, however, that all juveniles convicted of a qualifying offence, such as grievous bodily harm, will have their DNA held indefinitely, so there are certain qualifications. We would expect few juveniles to receive a sentence of five years or longer for a non-violent offence, but that is possible with drug trafficking or fraud. If the punishment is longer than five years, the offence is serious, and it is appropriate to reflect that in the way that the lines are drawn.
Clause 7 makes special provision for convicted juveniles. We believe that that is right and appropriate. I note the comments that have been made and that there are different views on getting the balance right, but we think that, after careful consideration of what has preceded, the provision fairly reflects the need to treat convicted juveniles and to give them a second chance where appropriate. It must, however, be a second chance; it cannot be a third, fourth, fifth or sixth chance. The line must be drawn appropriately. We feel that the clause does that while acknowledging the points that have been made about wanting to help someone who has perhaps sought to turn their life around and to put the things that they did as a young person behind them.
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