Written evidence from AT EASE
SUMMARY
[1] Contracts for under 18s. Progress by mistake.
Regress by intention
This year, 2011, some soldiers aged nineteen or twenty
will be able to give 12 months notice to leave full time Army
service. Others with similar length of service, of the same age
and in the same regiment will have to wait up to two years longer
to do the same. At the time of writing this has already caused
confusion, is likely to cause great resentment and damage morale
in all Army units with soldiers aged under 22.
[2] Unequal opportunity in recruitment
The haste with which 16 year olds are recruited straight
from school in Britain is contrasted with the requirement on applicants
from Commonwealth countries to prove that they have the means
to support themselves for up to 12 months in the UK, without permission
to work, as their application to join the British Army may take
that long to process.
[3] The Service Complaints System
The Armed Forces Act 2006 created the post of Service
Complaints Commissioner which started on 1 January 2008.
The Armed Forces Bill 2011 proposes adding independent
members to a Service Complaint Panels. The experience of AT EASE
does not indicate that these reforms will be sufficient to remedy
a complaints system described by the Service Complaints Commissioner
herself in 2010 as "not yet operating efficiently, effectively
or fairly". We ask the Committee to consider the example
of the Military Ombudsman system in other Western European countries.
[4] Life Imprisonment
The Armed Forces Act 2006 ruled that absence without
leave to avoid an active posting should be defined as desertion
and be punishable by a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
This measure was not mentioned in the Report of the Select Committee
on the Armed Forces Bill 2006 and appears to have been overlooked
by them. As this drastic measure was not discussed by the Select
Committee of 2006 before it became law, the Select Committee of
2011 may wish to consider the implications now.
[5] Conscientious Objection
The ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
has only sat once since before the start of the war in Afghanistan.
The result of that hearing on 17 December 2010 raises serious
questions about the correct definition of conscientious objection.
[6] Observations on previous Parliamentary
Reports
AT EASE has submitted evidence and observed the progress
of every Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill since 1986.
Attention is drawn to previous Parliamentary Reports especially
the Report of the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 1991
and the [post-Deepcut] Duty of Care Report 2005 both of
which are relevant to problems which remain unresolved today.
[7] References
[8] Statistics of reasons for contacting AT
EASE
[1] UNDER 18S
PROGRESS BY
MISTAKE. REGRESS
BY INTENTION
1.1 On 1 January 2008 an important reform was
announced but reversed on 6 August 2008. As the reversal cannot
be retrospective there are this year, 2011, different regulations
for young soldiers who joined within these dates and those who
joined just outside these dates.
1.2 The background has been of concern to previous
Parliamentary Committees. The anomaly that army recruits aged
less than 18 have to commit themselves to up to two years longer
minimum service than those aged over 18 was identified by the
Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 1991.
It is, in our view, reasonable to require those enlisting
as adults to commit themselves to a minimum of three or four years'
service. Whether the same should be expected of minors is more
doubtful. Perversely, those signing up before the age of 18 actually
sign up for longer: they must serve until their 18th birthday
and then the minimum period of adult service. [1]
The next Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill
in 1996 shared the concern of their predecessors on this point.
We found the justification for the difference in
the length of service for under-18 year olds and adults unconvincing.
[2]
We recommend that the working group considering the
position of under-18 year olds should give careful consideration
to the desirability of requiring minors to commit themselves to
a period of service no longer than that of adults. [3]
1.3 However the longer commitment for those aged
under 18 was not changed but in 1999 a year was added to the minimum
service for all age groups. So the earliest age at which soldiers
could give 12 months' notice became 21. That means they can leave
full time service aged 22. For those who join at 16 what we in
AT EASE formerly called "the five year trap" [4] became
the six year trap.
1.4 In January 2008 it was announced that minimum
service in the Army would be four years subject to 12 months prior
notice.[5] This applied to all age groups. This long awaited reform
was welcomed by AT EASE. It meant that recruits under 18 no longer
had to serve up to two years longer than adults. The unfair condition
criticised by the Select Committees in 1991 and 2001 had been
finally rectified.
1.5 It should be noted that in the RAF, the minimum
service, irrespective of age on joining, is still four years.
It is much easier for RAF recruits to understand their terms of
service and fairer to younger entrants.
1.6 However in August 2008 the Army reversed
the ruling of January 2008 and restored the obligation on soldiers
who had joined under-18 to serve four years from their 18th birthday
plus service from joining until their 18th birthday.[6] A progressive,
much needed reform had been treated as a clerical error and the
unjust status quo ante restored.
1.7 Because the change back could not be retrospective,
the recruits who had signed the attestation forms with the January
2008 regulations and taken the oath were and are not liable to
the August 2008 conditions. The soldiers who signed on in 2007
or 2008 will have completed three or more years of service during
the course of this year 2011. Those, of whatever age, who signed
on between 1 January 2008 and 5 August 2008 are eligible to give
12 months notice and leave in 2012. Those who were under 18 when
they signed on outside these dates are not.
1.8 Already AT EASE has had two enquiries from
soldiers who both signed on in January 2008 when they were under
18. One had contradictory responses from different Officers. One
Officer agreed he was entitled to leave in January 2012. Another
told him he had to wait until four years from his 18th birthday
like everyone else. Fortunately he had kept his original attestation
paper. The Officers have now taken further advice and agreed that
he can leave in January 2012. Since then another soldier in a
different Regiment, who also joined in January 2008 when he was
under 18 has, after several interviews, been given the wrong information
and told he has to serve four years from the age of 18. What is
very worrying is that, in his case, the wrong information is alleged
to have come from the Army personnel department in Glasgow which
means the wrong information may be going out to other units.
1.9 In units with the correct information, those
who joined when they were under-18 before January 2008 will be
told they have to wait longer before they can be released although
they have served longer than those entitled to leave between January
and August 2012. Not only is this inevitably going to cause resentment
and confusion in the ranks, it places the NCOs and Officers, who
have to administer the manning sections and explain the disparity,
in a very difficult position.
1.10 What is most regrettable about this whole
sorry confused situation is that the mistake was an improvement
and a step towards rectifying injustice. The correction was the
opposite.
1.11 One positive development was that in August
2008 a new attestation document for new recruits [7] was issued.
Having complained to previous Select Committees, about the lack
of clarity AT EASE is pleased to acknowledge that the new document
is an improvement. It does warn recruits about the minimum length
of service and extra time beyond that minimum which may be added
on if they do an education course. However there is still the
problem that impulsive, excited 16 year olds may not read the
whole or "take in" the implications. Parents can also
be confused. AT EASE still gets contacted by parents who think
soldiers can "buy themselves out" although this form
of discharge was ended in 1991 and is only available to soldiers
who joined before that date.
1.12 More recently there has been a similar development
in that another much needed reform has been announced by mistake.
1.13 On 10 January 2011 the Minister for Defence
Personnel, Welfare and Veterans, mistakenly stated in the House
of Commons in answer to an MP that, after serving 28 days, any
soldier could give fourteen days notice and leave up until the
age of 18.[8] Later an answer to another MP he gave a more correct
answer[9] that is that the right for minors to give 14 days notice
and leave expires six months after joining. Many are still only
16 when their right to give notice expires.
1.14 This incident demonstrates that the present
terms of contracts for the youngest recruits are very confusing.
If even a Government Minister could misunderstand them it is not
surprising that so many 16 year olds do not understand and miss
the six month deadline. The other reason that the Minister may
have thought that the right to give fourteen days notice and leave
continued until the 18th birthday may be that such a regulation
appears reasonable. It is what one would expect in a modern society
where 18 is the legal age of majority.
1.15 These are two examples where the mistaken
information represents what would be a much fairer system than
the present reality. It is sometimes argued that extending the
period of discharge as of right for young recruits is not necessary
because Commanding Officers have discretionary powers to discharge
unhappy minors who have "made their unhappiness known"
to their Commanding Officer.[10]
1.16 The Select Committee on the Armed Forces
Bill 2001 acknowledged the concern of their predecessors about
the terms of service [ but accepted assurances from the Director
General of Service Personnel Policy that change was not necessary
because Commanding Officers have discretionary powers to discharge
unhappy minors and he did not know of any case of a Commanding
Officer being difficult if an unhappy youngster wanted to leave
[11] The exact numbers of those who have left under the unhappy
minors provision is known because all discharges and the reason
for discharge have to be recorded. Refusals of requests do not
have to be recorded so their numbers are not known.
1.17 Young soldiers face a problem in how they
"make their unhappiness known" to their Commanding Officers.
A teenage private soldier can't just walk up to his Commanding
Officer and say he wants to leave the Army. Some demonstrate their
unhappiness in various ways of self harm including suicidal gestures,
deliberately injuring themselves, taking illegal drugs or going
AWOL.
The Parliamentary Defence Committee Report Duty of
Care 2005 stated:
We are concerned that the period of time available
for recruits to exercise their right to leave training
............is unnecessarily restrictive and may
lead to recruits going AWOL. We heard evidence of recruits
who wanted to leave the Army outside of this time
restriction who, having been refused permission to leave, went
AWOL. [12]
1.18 This echoes the finding of the MPs in the
1991 Select Committee who were told by soldiers serving sentences
at MCTC Colchester that they would not have gone AWOL if they
could have left legally. In the long experience of AT EASE most
soldiers who go AWOL would not have done so if they could have
got a discharge legally.
1.19 The Duty of Care 2005 investigation was
undertaken as a result of the deaths of four young soldiers at
Deepcut. Unfortunately it did not have as much influence on the
Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 2006 as we, in AT EASE,
had hoped. The Deepcut Review under Nicholas Blake QC was published
in 2006 [13] towards the end of the Select Committees deliberations.
We think it inappropriate to make recommendations
on the issues on which Mr Blake commented prior to the Government
response to the Deepcut Review. [14]
1.20 As the last Select Committee felt unable
to make recommendations on the issues arising from the Deepcut
tragedy, we appeal to the current Select Committee to consider
them now. They are very relevant to the present situation. What
happened at Deepcut demonstrated vividly that the discretionary
power of a Commanding Officer to discharge unhappy young soldiers
is not an adequate safety net. Some unhappy young soldiers who
were outside the six month window were refused permission to leave.
The four who died were not the only soldiers being abused and
humiliated. If the Commanding Officer had any knowledge of what
was going on he surely would have intervened to try to stop it.
1.21 We appeal to this Select Committee to propose
the following amendments.
- (1) That minimum service be counted from
the date of joining the Army, whatever the age at enlistment.
- (2) That all members of the Armed Forces
under the age of 18 have a right to give fourteen days notice
and leave.
[2] UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY
IN RECRUITMENT
2.1 The Select Committee on the Armed Forces
Bill 2001 endorsed a policy that is still actively followed today.
We believe it continues to be important to recruit
young people straight from school, including at the age of 16;
if they are not caught (sic) at this point, they are likely to
take up other careers and be permanently lost to the Armed Forces.
[15]
2.2 This policy requires that the recruitment
procedure has to minimise any delay between leaving school and
joining up. At present although recruits may not join the army
until they are 16 years old, they can start the application process
from the age of 15 and seven months [16]. Over hasty-decisions
made when young are major reasons given to AT EASE for wanting
to leave the Armed Forces, especially the Army.
2.3 By contrast AT EASE has recently received
enquiries from people from African countries who wish to join
the British Army. The recruitment procedure for them is very long.[17]
They have to travel to the UK at their own expense before being
considered. In order to be considered they must have a sponsor
who is resident in the UK. They do not have to live with the sponsor
but the sponsor must be responsible for contacting them while
they are in the UK. The applicant recruit and the sponsor are
warned that the recruitment assessment may take up to 12 months.
During that time they are not allowed to take paid employment
or to have recourse to public funds. On entry they have to prove
they have funds to support themselves for up to 12 months.
2.4 It is accepted that time spent on the recruitment
process may need to differ for recruits with different backgrounds
but both these extremes are, we submit, indefensible.
Please consider the following making the following
recommendations:
- (1) That the age at which applications to
join the Army can be first submitted be raised to 16 years old.
- (2) That the earliest date of joining the
Army be at least one month after leaving full time education.
- (3) That applicants from Commonwealth countries
undergo preliminary assessment in their own country and are only
invited to the UK if preliminary assessment indicates they are
likely to be accepted.
- (4) That, when in the UK, the final stages
of assessment and recruitment of Commonwealth applicants be carried
out as speedily as possible.
[3] THE SERVICE
COMPLAINTS SYSTEM
3.1 The post of Service Complaints Commissioner
was created by the Armed Forces Act 2006 and started on 1 January
2008.
In her latest report available at the time of writing,
the Commissioner said:
Despite improvements I cannot give an assurance that
the Service complaints system is yet working efficiently, effectively
or fairly.[18]
3.2 The experience of AT EASE over many years
is that the procedures in the UK have indeed been inefficient,
ineffective and unfair. As one Senior NCO put it "The Complaints
Procedure has been an absolute nightmare for me and my family".
3.3 The Military Ombudsman system used in several
other Western European countries is an example of a system that
is more efficient, effective and undeniably much more fair.
3.4 For instance in Germany [19] the Military
Ombudsman is a civil servant who is completely independent of
the Military. In every barracks the contact details are displayed.
It is a punishable offence for any Officer to suggest that a complainant
should withdraw. The Ombudsman has authority to investigate complaints
and to question all involved irrespective of rank. The Ombudsman
is able to come to a decision from a neutral position. If, for
instance, an Officer is cleared of an untrue allegation, it is
known that was the result of an independent investigation.
3.5 By contrast, amongst UK Forces, there is
a widespread belief that in any dispute or conflict of evidence
the more senior officers will always accept the version of the
most senior in rank involved. Some believe it is their duty to
do so. They think it would undermine authority and discipline
to do otherwise.
3.6 A basic flaw in the Redress of Grievance
system in the UK [19] is that the military are the judges in their
own case. Two or more service men or women are not allowed to
complain so it is always a solitary individual up against the
system. A complaint moves slowly up the Chain of Command. At each
level the complainant gets a written reply. If not satisfied he/she
has to write back stating reasons why the complaint should go
to the next level. In the experience of AT EASE most complainants
just give up at some point. They are then asked to sign that they
withdraw their complaint or are satisfied with the result. Both
original complainants and NCOs, at the lower levels of the Chain
of Command, who back complainants are sometimes intimidated into
withdrawing.
3.7 The creation of the post of a Service Complaints
Commissioner in the 2006 Armed Forces Act was welcomed by AT EASE
as a step in the right direction but we were dismayed that the
new Commissioner would have only two powers:
- (1) to refer back to the Chain of Command;
and
- (2) to be informed of the decision of the
Chain of Command. [20] This must be the most frustrating job in
public service.
3.8 In November 2007 AT EASE was informed that
the Commissioner Dr Susan Atkins would start her post on January
1st 2008. The letter from the MoD stated an aim of a transparent,
fair complaints system. It also stated Dr Atkins's credentials
which are very impressive. This gave us hope that, despite the
limited description of her role in the 2006 Armed Forces Act,
it was intended that she would have some real authority or influence.
We did not think such a highly qualified person would be employed
just to pass on messages.
3.9 A complaint on behalf of an AT EASE service
user was submitted to the new Commissioner as soon as she started.
We received a reply asking for further details which we sent.
Then it was referred to the Chain of Command. After that it became
apparent that nothing had changed. It was the same unfair procedure
as in the past. Even the forms, the terms used etc were unchanged.
The complainant had to continue with the unreformed Redress of
Grievance procedure. Such references as there were to the Commissioner
did not indicate that she was being respected as an independent
arbiter. At one point the complainant got a letter saying "You
complained to the Service Complaints Commissioner but the Army
were already dealing with it". As usual with the Redress
procedure it was more like an adversarial contest with the Chain
of Command on one side and the lone complainant on the other.
When he complained at the delay he was told that "some suggestions
of the Service Complaints Commissioner had been referred to the
Army's legal advisers". He was never told what the suggestions
were or what that legal advice was. In an adversarial dispute
like a civil action each side can keep their legal advice private.
However those entrusted to bring in a verdict such as Justices
in a Magistrates Court would not give legal advice to just one
side. The whole procedure took 21 months.
3.10 This experience leads AT EASE to agree with
the Commissioner's statement that the system is not efficient,
effective or fair. [21] We do not think that is in any the fault
of the Commissioner or her staff.
3.11 Section 20 of the Armed Forces Bill 2011
which is before you, proposes measures whereby independent persons
may be appointed to Service Complaint Panels. The three separate
systems of the branches of the Armed Forces will be merged.
3.12 The Panels would deal with the final stages
of an appeal. Many Service complainants give up in despair before
they reach that stage as has been noted by a SSAFA statement.
We believe that independent participation ideally
needs to be at all levels of the process, not just at the Service
Board Level, which is too inaccessible and in practice relatively
rarely attained. [22]
3.13 The merger of three unfair systems will
not make one fair one. What is proposed is to top and tail the
complaints system with token independent persons. The Service
Complaints Commissioner will receive complaints at the beginning
of the system and there will be some independent members of the
final panel for the minority of complainants who persevere to
the final stages.
3.14 Would-be complainants in the British Armed
Forces are not just malcontents with petty grudges. Lives might
have been saved in Deepcut, Iraq and Afghanistan if British troops
had the services available to other Western European troops.
3.15 We suggest an enquiry be set up to investigate
whether there is a need for an independent Military Ombudsman
in the UK, seeking advice from countries which have such systems.
[4] LIFE IMPRISONMENT
4.1 Section 8 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 defined
absence without leave with intent to avoid a particular relevant
active service posting as desertion. Relevant service was defined
in terms that may be applied to the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq. It ruled that desertion in such circumstances could be punished
with imprisonment which "may be for life"[23] This has
been the law since November 2009.
4.2 The Report of your predecessors in 2006 refers
to a "clause by clause consideration of the Bill". That
was not what happened in reality. This present Select Committee
on the Armed Forces Bill 2011 is asked to re-consider this measure
because it appears to have been overlooked by your predecessors
in 2006. Reading the Armed Forces Bill 2006, it is easy to miss
those four words "may be for life". It is not mentioned
in any of the 62 paragraphs of the Special Report of that Select
Committee [24]
4.3 Some MPs not on the Select Committee did
propose an amendment opposing life imprisonment and there was
a debate in the House of Commons which a small number of MPs attended.
After the division bell sounded, about 350 MPs who had not attended
the debate, arrived, voted and immediately left the Chamber. They
did not even wait to hear the result and could be heard talking
and laughing outside. The impression of observers was that those
MPs might not know and certainly did not care that they had voted
for life imprisonment for members of another occupation who were
absent from their place of work.
4.4 It is undeniable that absence without leave
is a huge problem and that numbers have grown during the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. You may wish to ask the MoD witnesses
for the current figures. What may be significant is that, during
previous wars, such as that in the Falklands and the Balkans,
the rate of absence without leave dropped. When there were media
reports about troops acting as peacekeepers in the Balkans AT
EASE was contacted by AWOL soldiers for help giving themselves
up.
4.5 That numbers of troops wish to avoid deployment
or return to Afghanistan is certainly a serious problem that needs
to be addressed. What is questionable is whether the threat of
the maximum punishment in our penal system will be the solution
to that problem.
4.6 In the experience of AT EASE, unwillingness
to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan is sometimes due to some form
of traumatic stress disorder or some form of conscientious objection.
A historical parallel indicates that the threat of maximum punishment
will not be a solution to either of these problems. During the
First World War 306 British soldiers were executed for desertion
or cowardice. The threat of the maximum penalty did not deter
conscientious objectors who were prepared to die rather than kill.
Nor did it enable traumatised soldiers to return to battle even
though their lives literally depended on doing so.
4.7 On 15 August 2006 the, then, Defence Secretary
announced a posthumous free pardon for those executed in the First
World War.[25] It is strange that in the same year the same Government
that recognised that these men should not have suffered the maximum
penalty, passed a law condemning their present day equivalents
to the present day maximum penalty.
Please consider recommending:
That Sections 8 (4a) and 8(5) of the Armed Forces
Act 2006, that permit a sentence of life imprisonment, be repealed.
[5] CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION
5.1 The experience is described of a serving
member of the Royal Navy with a genuine conscientious objection
to a posting to Afghanistan. He did not go absent without leave,
commit any offence or refuse any order. He scrupulously followed
the correct procedure in applying for a discharge as a conscientious
objector. He appeared before the Advisory Committee on Conscientious
Objectors on 17 December 2010.
5.2 This appeal hearing was very important because
it is the first and only such hearing to be held since several
years before the start of the current war in Afghanistan and recent
war in Iraq. Members of AT EASE had observed four ACCO appeal
hearings in the past and regarded them as fair procedures. We
regretted that ACCO had been inactive when it was most needed
so this hearing was very welcome.
5.3 The appellant, a Leading Medical Assistant
in the Royal Navy described the two main reasons why he had become
a conscientious objector during 2010.
Medical ethics
5.4 During his early training he was taught that
Royal Navy Medics must at all times observe the letter and spirit
of the Geneva Convention. He quoted the instructor. "Even
if your patient is an enemy soldier who has just killed your best
friend, you are medics. It is your duty to tend to his injuries".
He accepted these standards and served over five years in the
medical service of the Navy believing that he would be required
to uphold them in all circumstances.
5.5 In July 2010 he attended a briefing to prepare
him and other medics for posting to Afghanistan. He was shocked
that the instructions contradicted the ethical standards he had
previously been taught. He was told that injured UK and allied
troops should be given priority over civilian casualties who might
have to be sent away. He asked if this would apply to a seriously
injured Afghan child and was told it would.
5.6 Another Leading Medical Assistant with 12
years service testified that this was what they were told at the
briefing and that it had greatly upset the appellant.
Killing of civilians
5.7 After this briefing he tried to find out
more about what he would be involved in while serving in Afghanistan.
He asked colleagues who had served in Afghanistan and learned
he might be involved in firing a gun as well as medical duties.
He searched the internet for information about the war and was
horrified by reports of the scale and nature of killing civilians.
Finally the WikiLeaks films of deliberate killing of civilians
by allied troops and the knowledge that he might be ordered to
refuse treatment to civilians injured by his own side convinced
him that he could not take part. He said he felt that members
of the Forces who felt as he did had to "stand up and be
counted". He would have been willing to continue to serve
in the Royal Navy if he could do so and still object to the war
in Afghanistan. This is not possible. Serving members of the UK
Armed Forces have to be available for all deployments that may
be required. For that reason conscientious objections to specific
conflicts are allowed but the objectors have to apply to leave
the Armed Forces on those grounds.
The decision of the Advisory Committee on Conscientious
Objectors
5.8 This application was turned down on the grounds
that his objection was political rather than based on morals or
conscience. The Committee also reminded itself (and indeed wishes
to stress) that political objection to military service is not
a ground for discharge and that only objections based on moral
or conscientious grounds may be taken into account by the Committee
upon a serviceman's application for discharge from military service.
[26]
5.9 The "reminded" in this context
is puzzling because this appears to be a new ruling by new ACCO
members. In 1916 the UK Parliament decided that conscientious
objection could be recognised on any grounds that were genuinely
against the conscience of an individual. It was not just restricted
to religious grounds. There has not been an Act of Parliament
since then to overturn this.
5.10 Certainly cases of conscientious objection
on more recognisably political grounds than this were allowed
during the twentieth century. None of the Committee members at
previous hearings observed by AT EASE indicated that any particular
form of objection was disqualified so long as it was sincerely
held by that individual.
5.11 Because of its strict adherence to confidentiality,
AT EASE would not normally comment on an individual case but this
matter is already in the public domain as an ACCO hearing is in
public and has been reported in the press. Before this hearing,
AT EASE had for many years, on the basis of our previous observations
of ACCO hearings, advised conscientious objectors (including this
appellant) that they would get a fair hearing and a reasonable
result. Since 17 December 2010 we can no longer have that confidence.
5.12 This case has serious implications for other
members of the Armed Forces that this Select Committee is asked
to consider and clarify.
- [i] Two Leading Medical Assistants in the
Royal Navy have testified that they were given contradictory instructions
in basic training and in pre Afghanistan briefings. This Select
Committee is asked to consider which is correct. Is it the duty
of medical staff in the UK Armed Forces to treat casualties according
to medical criteria irrespective of race or occupation? Is it
the duty of medical staff in the UK Armed Forces to always treat
members of their own or allied Forces before civilian casualties
irrespective of severity of injury or need for immediate treatment?
These rules cannot both be correct. It is unfair to send any troops
into a conflict zone with confused or contradictory instructions.
- [ii] Should an objection based on medical
ethics be defined as a political objection or can it be a matter
of morals or conscience?
- [iii] Can an objection to taking part in
unjustified killing of civilians be a matter of morals or conscience?
- [iv] Can a political conviction be a matter
of morals or conscience?
[6] UNFINISHED
BUSINESS-
PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS
6.1 The fact that AT EASE has made submissions
to every Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill since 1986
may be described as "the triumph of hope over experience".
The Select Committee of 1991 was very conscientious. Members of
different political parties were united in trying to address the
problems arising from the contracts of young soldiers. [27] It
helped that some Members had young soldiers unable to leave the
Army amongst their constituents. The Committee visited MCTC Colchester
and interviewed inmates serving sentences for AWOL who told them
they would not have gone AWOL if there had been a legal way of
leaving the Forces.[28] This concurs with AT EASE experience.
It can confidently be predicted that, if Members of the 2011 Select
Committee did the same, they would get the same answers. Despite
stating several concerns [29] the only reform regarding under-18s
achieved by the 1991 Select Committee was that the minimum age
of recruitment was raised to 16 years old. Unfortunately instead
of making their recommendations as amendments to the Act, they
instructed the MoD to bring forward proposals within a year to
change the conditions for soldiers under 18.
6.2 AT EASE gave evidence to the 1996 Select
Committee that seventeen year old soldiers were being sent on
active service to the Balkans conflict in defiance of the strong
condemnation of that practice in the 1991 Report. There had also
been no reform of the contracts binding them into adulthood signed
by under- age recruits. We thought the Select Committee in 1996
would be outraged that the recommendations of their predecessors
had been ignored. Only one member of the 1996 Committee pursued
the question of what changes had occurred in response to the 1991
recommendations. He got an admission from a Military witness that
"nothing has happened". [30]
6.3 The 1991 Select Committee devoted considerable
time and attention to the issue of the contracts of young soldiers.
Subsequent Select Committees on the Armed Forces Bills were asked
to devote time and attention to matters less directly affecting
members of the Armed Forces. In 1996 it was the sale of the Royal
Naval College at Greenwich. In 2001 it was the change in regulations
of the Ministry of Defence Police.
6.4 In 2006 AT EASE hoped that the parliamentary
Defence Committee Report Duty of Care 2005 [31 ]which considered
some of the implications of the deaths of young soldiers at Deepcut
would influence the 2006 Select Committee on the Armed Forces.
The findings of the Duty of Care Report echo those of the Select
Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 1991 indicating that little
has changed since then.
6.5 In 2010 it was announced in Parliament that
this 2011 Armed Forces Bill would be modest because so much had
been achieved in 2006. It appears to be being rushed through so
that Members of this Select Committee will not have time to consider
the need for any reforms. Potential witnesses like AT EASE were
told in advance that there would not be time for any oral evidence
as the Select Committee must report by early March. It might be
justified to devote less time to the Armed Forces Bill 2011 if
there was evidence that there is now less need for considering
the situation of the Armed Forces. The indications are that there
is more not less need at the present time. Troops are dying and
suffering horrific injuries in a controversial war. The rate of
absence without leave is soaring. The Service Complaints Commissioner
appointed by the last Armed Forces Bill reports the complaints
system is not effective, efficient or fair. Respected charities
are complaining about the treatment of serving troops and veterans.
6.6 Previous Select Committees made the mistake
of thinking that issues would be dealt with elsewhere. The 1991
Select Committee asked the MoD to bring forward plans for changing
the conditions of under-18s within a year. It did not happen.
The 1996 Select Committee was told that a working group following
the Betts Review would consider the same topic. The Betts Review
did not deal with that subject and in 1999 a year was added to
minimum service. The 2006 Select Committee thought that the implications
of Deepcut would be studied by other Parliamentary bodies. We
ask this Select Committee not to assume that issues that have
been deferred and deferred can be left to a future "Armed
Forces Covenant" report.[32]
Please will this Select Committee re-negotiate with
your parliamentary colleagues so that you have time to give serious
outstanding issues the time and attention that is needed.
17 February 2011
REFERENCES
Under 18s Progress by mistake. Regress by intention
[1] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1991 page x 25
[2] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1996 page xv 41
[3] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1996 page xvi 42
[4] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1991 page x 25
[5] ARMY TERMS OF SERVICE REGULATIONS 2007 (SI
3382)
[6] ARMY TERMS OF SERVICE REGULATIONS 2007 (SI
1847)
[7] Army Form B271W Notice Paper-Regular Army-Full
Time
[8] Hansard HC deb 10 January 2011 c3w Reply
to Caroline Lucas MP
[9] Hansard Colum 27w 7 February 2011 Reply to
Fabian Hamilton MP
[10] ibid
[11] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 2001 page xxv 61
[12] Defence Committee 2005 Duty of Care Report
page 53. 103
[13] Nicholas Blake QC 2006 The Deepcut Review
published TSO
[14] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 2006 Page 54. 50
Unequal Opportunity in Recruitment
[15] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 2001 page xxvi 63
[16] http://www.army.mod.uk/join/20193.aspx
[17] Letter sent to Commonwealth applicants by
Army Personnel department
The Service Complaints System
[18] Dr Susan Atkins 20 March 2010 2nd Annual
Report of the Service Complaints Commissioner
[19] Andreas Prufert 2006. This is based on a
talk given to an AT EASE meeting by the, then, Secretary General
of EUROMIL
[20] Armed Forces Bill 2006.
[21] Dr Susan Atkins 2010 op cit
[22] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 2006 Ev.157
Life Imprisonment
[23] Armed Forces Act 2006 Section 8. Desertion
4(a)
[24] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 2006 pages 50-56
[25] Des Brown, Defence Secretary 15 August 2006.
Cited in The Economist 17 August 2006
Conscientious Objection
[26] T King, C M Lake and K Walton December 2010
Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objectors, Advice to Her Majesty's
Secretary of State for Defence.
Unfinished business-Previous Parliamentary Reports
[27] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1991
[28] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1991 page x 24
[29] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1991 pages x-xi 24-28
[30] Report of the Select Committee on the Armed
Forces Bill 1996 Keith Mains MP
[31] Defence Committee 2005 op cit
[32] Armed Forces Bill 2011 Armed Forces Covenant
Report 5 (1)
[8] STATISTICS
OF REASONS
FOR CONTACTING
AT EASE
SUMMARY OF AT EASE CASELOAD FOR SIX YEARS
TO 9 DECEMBER 2010
| By 1st "reason" code
| Total | In forces
| In (foreign forces) | Ex forces
| ?Joining | Civilian
| Unknown | Unknown (foreign forces)
|
| Total (all reasons) | 206
| 122 | 4 | 36
| 27 | 2 | 12
| 3 |
| Wants discharge | 48 |
47 | 1 | 0 | 0
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Info only | 32 | 6
| 0 | 1 | 23 |
1 | 1 | 0 |
| AWOL | 30 | 30
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ethical/political | 25
| 17 | 2 | 1 |
1 | 1 | 0 | 3
|
| Medical/Psych. | 24 |
6 | 1 | 15 | 1
| 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Involuntary discharge | 14
| 4 | 1 | 8 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 0
|
| Disciplinary | 8 |
1 | 0 | 5 | 0
| 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Family problem | 8 |
5 | 0 | 2 | 0
| 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Bullying | 4 | 2
| 0 | 1 | 0 |
0 | 1 | 0 |
| Gay | 1 | 1
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 11 | 3
| 0 | 3 | 2 |
0 | 3 | 0 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| By any "reason" code (up to four "reason" codes allowed per case)
| | | |
| Wants discharge | 73 |
70 | 1 | 0 | 1
| 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Medical/Psych. | 57 |
30 | 2 | 22 | 1
| 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Info only | 42 | 13
| 0 | 4 | 23 |
1 | 1 | 0 |
| AWOL | 33 | 33
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ethical/political | 32
| 22 | 2 | 3 |
1 | 1 | 0 | 3
|
| Disciplinary | 24 |
12 | 1 | 7 | 0
| 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Family problem | 17 |
12 | 0 | 3 | 1
| 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Involuntary discharge | 16
| 5 | 1 | 9 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 0
|
| Bullying | 14 | 11
| 1 | 1 | 0 |
0 | 1 | 0 |
| Gay | 2 | 1
| 0 | 1 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 31 | 17
| 1 | 8 | 2 |
0 | 3 | 0 |
| | | |
| | |
| | |
| Counts are of cases for six years to 9 Dec 2010 (by date of 1st contact)—earliest case 12 Dec 2004
|
| Cases known to relate primarily to service in foreign forces are counted separately
|
| 
