The Armed Forces Bill

AFB 02

Written evidence from The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers

Summary

1. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers ("the Coalition") welcomes the call for evidence issued by the Select Committee in relation to its consideration of the Armed Forces Bill. The Coalition is concerned that the current text of the Bill has failed to address recommendations repeatedly made to the government in the past by expert national and international committees to raise the minimum recruitment age to at least 18 years, and to take other measures in the interim to enhance the protection in place for the youngest recruits. The Coalition therefore requests that the Select Committee explicitly address the issue of the welfare of young recruits and the desirability of raising the minimum recruitment age in its consideration of the Armed Forces Bill.

2. The evidence presented in this submission contends that recruitment of under-18s:

· Is contrary to global best practice

· Undermines the international effective prohibition on deployment of children in hostilities

· Is inconsistent with the best interests of the child

· Exposes young recruits to greater risks than those faced by older recruits

· Is not necessary to meet the trained strength requirement

· Results in high levels of "wastage" and is a financially unsound policy

3. The Coalition recommends that the Ministry of Defence phase out recruitment of under-18s and introduce additional safeguards for the welfare of young recruits in the interim. As an immediate measure, the discretionary "unhappy minors" provision should be replaced with an extension of discharge as of right for all under-18s up until the date of their eighteenth birthday.

4. The Coalition would welcome the opportunity to provide further oral evidence to the Committee on this issue.

CONCERNS

I. Recruitment of under-18s is contrary to global best practice and undermines the effective prohibition on deployment of children in hostilities.

5. Until ten years ago the UK was still deploying under-18s into hostilities. They were deployed in the former Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf, and the Falklands. Since the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict came into force in 2002 (ratified by the UK in 2003), the routine deployment of under-18s into hostilities has been prohibited in international law. Such a practice now appears abhorrent to the public and policy makers alike and the UK now takes measures to prevent deployment of under-18s.

6. Recruits enlisting in the Army at 16 or 17 years of age have a right of discharge at the end of the first month of training and before sixth months have elapsed since enlistment. After this "cooling off" period has expired, they have no legal right to leave until age 22 (four years after age 18). The arrangements for minors joining the RAF and Navy/Marines differ but involve similarly long periods during which recruits have no legal right to leave. The lack of an ongoing right of discharge for under-18s means that young adults in the armed forces (those aged 18 to 22) continue to be legally bound by contracts they signed when still considered in law to be children. The 1991 Select Committee for the Armed Forces Bill recommended that these terms of service be changed and suggested extending the "window of opportunity" for discharge or giving young service personnel, upon reaching the age of 18, the opportunity to decide whether to continue in the armed forces or leave. [1]

7. There is a clear contradiction in recognising that under-18s should not be deployed into hostilities while continuing to recruit them under complex legally binding obligations which will allow them to be deployed as soon as they come of age. Although deployment is postponed by two years, the obligation to participate in hostilities becomes a reality when the recruit enlists at 16. Furthermore, the terms of enlistment are such that they remove the recruit’s right to reconsider or reconfirm their decision upon reaching the legal age of majority. In no other area of national law can an adult be similarly bound by a decision they made while legally a child.

8. As the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill highlighted in 1991, in the civilian world a person cannot sign a legal contract until the age of 18. There is therefore a particular illogicality in making an exception to allow a child to sign a contract of the severity and potentially life-endangering nature that is involved in joining the armed forces. Whilst a parent’s or guardian’s consent is required for enlistment, research has shown that many parents are under-informed about the full details of the commitment their child is entering into and have very minimal participation in the recruitment process. [2] Furthermore, if a child enters the armed forces technically as the result of their parent’s consent rather than their own, there is all the more reason to require that individual to provide consent in their own right once they reach legal majority at 18.

9. The Ministry of Defence has claimed that the "unhappy juniors" provision adequately redresses this problem. This provision grants commanding officers the discretionary power to discharge young recruits who express "clear unhappiness" at continuing in the armed forces before their eighteenth birthday. The Ministry has stated that it is "exceedingly rare" for such an individual to be refused permission to leave [3] and even that they are "aware of no cases where those under 18 who had expressed a wish to leave the services were unable to do so" [4] Yet the Ministry has also admitted that records are not kept on refused discharge requests so these statements cannot be verified. [5] If, however, these assertions are accurate and the Ministry does recognise the desirability of allowing all under-18 service personnel to leave the armed forces on request at any time before their eighteenth birthday, there is no reason not to make this provision a clear right.

10. The necessity for clarifying discharge as a right, rather than a discretionary privilege, for all under-18s is demonstrated by those instances in which young people continue to be denied requests for discharge. Independent organizations providing advice services for armed forces personnel such as At Ease and Daniel’s Trust have reported that they continue to receive calls from young recruits who have had serious difficulties in getting a discharge, or have had their discharge request refused. This indicates that the policy on "unhappy juniors" is not applied automatically or consistently, resulting in great distress for some young people. The fact that young recruits continue to go AWOL also indicates that not all those who wish to leave are able to do so through lawful means. [6] Making discharge an explicit right until the age of 18 would ensure that all young recruits have a clear understanding of the options open to them and that discharges are granted in a fair and consistent manner.

11. Requiring commanding officers to quantify a young recruit’s "unhappiness" puts them in a very difficult position. It is natural for them to want recruits to succeed and stay the course. They may also be under pressure to ensure that "wastage" is minimised by reducing the number of recruits who drop out of training. At the same time, if they try to encourage an unhappy young recruit to stay on they become personally and morally responsible for any ongoing distress. Most commanding officers do not have the psychiatric training required to make informed judgements regarding the depth and persistence of a recruit’s "unhappiness". Furthermore, attempts to support and encourage a young recruit to "soldier on" a while longer may result in the recruit passing the age of 18 years and 3 months and finding the grace period for discretionary discharge has expired. The soldier is then committed to a further four years in the armed forces.

12. An unintended but serious consequence of the "unhappy juniors" provision is that young recruits may feel under pressure to "prove" their unhappiness in order for their discharge request to be taken seriously, including through self-harming behaviour. A 2009 study published in the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps repeatedly made reference to the link between young soldiers wishing to leave the Army and suicidal behaviour. The study found that "some incidents of suicidal behaviour were a ‘last resort’ used to influence the chain of command to allow them to leave the Army." [7] One Community Psychiatric Nurse interviewed cited the example, apparently typical, of "a young, probably male, soldier who realized soon after enlisting that he had made a mistake, was unhappy, expressed that unhappiness but was frustrated in his attempts to leave. Continued to be unhappy, continued to be reassured that he would settle into it, that things would improve and then eventually became so desperate that [suicidal behaviour] was the only thing he could think of to express his unhappiness further." [8] This example was supported by an interview with a soldier who had exhibited suicidal behaviour. He stated that "he had thought self-harming could speed his leaving the Army". [9] Notably, of the ten soldiers interviewed in the study, six had enlisted while below the age of 18. The mental health service providers, who were predominantly serving Army personnel, repeatedly focused on making it easier for soldiers and trainees to leave the Army as their priority recommendation for reducing suicidal behaviour in Army personnel.

13. The number of states which have prohibited the recruitment of under-18s has grown steadily over the past decade, reaching 134 as of January 2011. [10] The UK is now one of fewer than 20 countries which enlist children into the armed forces from the lowest age permitted under the Optional Protocol – 16 years. No other country in the European Union, the Council of Europe or amongst the UN Security Council permanent member states recruits 16-year-olds. [11]

14. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child first expressed deep concern at the high levels of recruitment of under-18s in the UK (including the deliberate targeting of young people for recruitment) in 2002. [12] It called on the UK to increase its efforts to recruit persons aged over 18 years and to prioritize the recruitment of the oldest candidates amongst those who had not yet reached 18. [13] In 2008, the Committee repeated these recommendations and called on the UK to raise its recruitment age to 18. [14] Despite these explicit recommendations, in 2009/2010 just over 21 per cent of new armed forces recruits were aged below 18 years.

15. In 2005 the Defence Select Committee recommended that the Ministry of Defence look into raising the minimum recruitment age. In 2009, the Joint Committee on Human Rights unequivocally backed recommendations for the minimum recruitment age be raised to 18 years. [15]

16. The Expert of the Secretary–General of the United Nations on the impact of armed conflict on children, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF have all called for the minimum recruitment age to be raised to 18 years globally.

17. The Coalition submits that, in the same manner in which the UK moved to a position of not deploying under-18s in conflict, it is now time for it to join the growing international consensus against the recruitment of under-18s. As a matter of consistency and principle, the UK should take steps to phase out recruitment of under-18s.

II. Recruitment of under-18s is inconsistent with "the best interests of the child"

18. It is a fundamental principle of children’s rights (applicable to all those under the age of 18 years) that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. [16] In assessing the child’s best interests a balance is struck between the wishes of the young person concerned, their evolving capacity to assess risk and make informed decisions with far reaching consequences, and society’s responsibility to protect young people from possible harm, including taking on responsibilities for which they may not yet be fully prepared.

19. As a consequence, in the UK under-18s cannot inter alia: vote in local or general elections; serve on a jury; see their original birth certificate if they were adopted; get married without parental permission; buy, rent or view an 18-rated film or pornographic material; place a bet in a betting shop; buy fireworks, cigarettes, alcoholic drinks or liqueur chocolates; ride a motorbike above 125cc; drive a minibus or a lorry; get a tattoo; be an ambulance worker; join the police; or work behind a bar. These activities are restricted to under-18s due to the recognition that people below this age could be adversely psychologically affected by adult material for which they are not yet mature enough to deal with, or because they are unlikely to fully comprehend the nature of the commitment or risk they are undertaking. The Coalition submits that joining the armed forces should be restricted to those aged 18 and above for the same reasons.

20. Raising the minimum recruitment age to 18 would not deprive any young person of the opportunity to join the armed forces but would simply postpone it until the candidate reaches a more appropriate age. Delaying recruitment is likely to improve retention rates of recruits in training by screening out in advance those whose interest in the armed forces is merely a passing phase. Candidates who are genuinely committed to a career in the armed forces are unlikely to be deterred by a delay of two years.

21. In this regard it is also worth noting the findings of the most recent Ministry of Defence Recruit Trainee Survey, which demonstrates that recruits who enlist after age 18 enjoy and benefit from training more than the youngest recruits:

· Recruits aged 16 – 19 were more likely than older recruits to say they did not feel a sense of achievement at the end of Phase One training.

· Recruits aged 16-17 were more likely than other age groups to say that life in the Services was ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ than expected.

· Recruits aged 16-17 were more likely than older recruits to say they would probably not recommend the Service.

· Phase Two trainees aged 16-17 were less likely to agree that they benefited from their course compared to trainees over 20 years old. [17]

22. Advocates of recruitment of under-18s have cited the opportunities for training and education which it may provide. While such opportunities may exist, they do not eliminate the risks involved. While the risks faced by any person enlisting into the armed forces are substantial, evidence indicates that young recruits face more, not fewer, dangers than older recruits. This constitutes a further argument in favour of raising the recruitment age to a level which would cut out the most at-risk categories.

· Young recruits are at greater risk of death and serious injury upon deployment

23. Recruits who join the armed forces at the age of 16 can only enter a limited number of roles. These roles are primarily concentrated in the Infantry, the Royal Logistics Corps, the Royal Artillery, the Household Cavalry, the Royal Armoured Corps and other frontline roles.

24. In 2009/2010, 28 per cent of new Infantry recruits were aged under 18. [18] The Infantry has suffered the highest number of fatalities of any UK forces corps in Afghanistan in five of the seven years for which information was available, and the highest number of serious injuries in all three of the three years for which information was available. [19] In 2009 Infantry soldiers in Afghanistan were 13 times more likely to be killed than other armed forces personnel. [20] For the seven years in which information was available on Iraq, the Infantry suffered the highest number of fatalities on five occasions and was joint highest on the sixth. The Infantry suffered the highest number of serious injuries in Iraq in both of the years for which information was available. [21]

25. Bearing in mind that recruits who enlist aged 18 or younger must serve until age 22, it is also significant to note that since the beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan, 24 per cent of British fatalities have been aged under 22 years. [22] It is not known how many of them enlisted below the age of 18.

26. It is also significant that several of the roles open to the youngest male recruits, including those in the Household Cavalry/Royal Armoured Corps and Infantry, are prohibited to women. [23] This prohibition is based on the perception that male soldiers would be at risk of neglecting their mission if female soldiers were present as in the extreme physical, psychological and emotional situations they face, their "instinctive" concern for the women’s welfare would override all training and discipline.

27. The Coalition considers that if certain armed forces roles are prohibited to adult female recruits on the grounds that they entail the most extreme combat situations, for which special restrictions are justified, it is inconsistent for these roles to be open to recruits who have not yet reached the age of legal majority.

· Young recruits are at particular risk of bullying and harassment.

28. The inherent strains of armed forces life are further aggravated by the bullying and harassment which investigations and surveys - including those conducted by the Ministry of Defence and the former Defence Committee - have shown to be a widespread and continuing problem in the armed forces. [24] Statistics have shown that bullying in training establishments – where under-18s are most highly concentrated – is higher than among the Forces trained strength. [25]

29. In 2007 the Adult Learning Inspectorate found higher levels of bullying at the Army Foundation College in Harrogate (which is exclusively for under-18s) than any of the other Phase One training schools assessed. [26] In 2005, the Adult Learning Inspectorate found that rates of bullying at AFC Harrogate and Army Training Regiment Bassingbourn (also at the time under-18s only) were almost twice as high as at training centres containing older recruits.

30. According to a 2006 report on sexual harassment in the armed forces (commissioned by the Ministry of Defence) the youngest female recruits were significantly more at risk of experiencing "particularly upsetting" sexual harassment, including sexual assault, than older recruits. Across all Services and ages, 15 per cent of female personnel reported being the victim of such incidents. This figure rose to 23 per cent among women aged 16 to 18 – almost one in four. [27]

31. The most recent Recruit Trainee Survey found that Phase One recruits aged 16 - 17 were less likely than older recruits to know the procedure for making a complaint about bullying, leaving them particularly vulnerable. [28]

· Young recruits are at increased risk of suicide and self harm.

32. Between 1984 and 2009 male armed forces personnel aged under 20 years had a suicide rate 50% higher than males of the same age in the general population. [29] That the victims’ age was a risk factor in these deaths is evidenced by the fact that suicide rates for older armed forces personnel are significantly lower than rates amongst the equivalent general population. The 2009 study on suicidal behaviour among Army personnel (see above) repeatedly highlighted "concerns about recruitment and retention of young soldiers" (emphasis added). [30] The mental health service providers interviewed for the study "gave a consistent account of the context in which suicidal behaviour arose: young male recruits who experienced stress or crisis in the context of feeing unhappy about being in the Army." [31] The Deepcut Review also noted that "being young, under or about 18, and living 24/7 within the disciplined regime of an institution such as the Army is, itself, a significant factor indicative of risk [of self harm]." [32]

· Young recruits are at greater risk of developing PTSD

33. In 2007 the British Journal of Psychiatry published a study into childhood adversity and its effect on the health of male British military personnel. The study examined why relatively few military personnel develop combat-related psychiatric injuries, despite the traumatic experiences they endure. The study concluded that pre-enlistment vulnerability resulting from childhood adversity was an important risk factor for subsequent ill health including PTSD and self-harming behaviour. Pre-enlistment vulnerability was identified as more common among "young single men from lower ranks in the Army with low educational attainment" including those who "join up to ‘escape’ from adversity at home". [33] This is the predominant profile of the youngest recruits.

· Minimum service periods for young Army recruits are unfair

34. Recruits who join the Army aged under 18 have the right to leave after the first 28 days in training and before the end of the first six months. After the first six months, they have no right to leave until aged 22, regardless of how old they were when they joined. This means that recruits who sign up aged 16 must serve for two years longer than those who sign up aged 18 or older. There does not appear to be any principled or practical justification for this disparity.

35. Twenty years ago, the 1991 Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill criticised this policy and, on the understanding that the Ministry of Defence "accepts that change is due", recommended that the Ministry examine the terms of enlistment for under-18s and present proposals for change within 12 months. [34] No such proposals were presented. The 1996 Select Committee expressed concern that the terms of enlistment for under-18s were (still) inequitable and that the justifications given for this practice were unconvincing. [35] To date the Ministry of Defence has still not taken action to remedy this problem.

III. Recruitment of under-18s is not necessary to meet the trained strength and results in high levels of "wastage".

36. The Ministry of Defence has claimed that it is necessary to recruit under-18s in order to secure the necessary manpower and maintain current capabilities. [36] This argument does not address the requirement to ensure that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in any policy concerning young people. Furthermore, there are many countries which do not practise conscription or recruit under-18s that have armed forces equivalent in size, or larger than, those of the UK (measured by ratio of military personnel to general population). [37] This demonstrates that recruitment of under-18s in the UK is a policy choice rather than a military necessity.

37. Although figures for under-18 recruitment have decreased in the past ten years, under-18s are still deliberately targeted for recruitment. In 2006, the Ministry of Defence stated that, despite the decreasing ratio of 16 – 18 year olds in the UK population, it would continue to focus recruitment strategies on them "to secure similar levels of recruitment from a smaller target population". [38]

38. In contrast, the Ministry of Defence does not appear to have fully explored strategies to increase recruitment from other sectors of the population. For example, the percentage of female intake (of all ages) into the armed forces has fallen from 12 per cent ten years ago to just under nine per cent in 2009/2010 – less than half the number of under-18s.

39. Despite this dramatic and worsening gender imbalance the Ministry of Defence has stated that it "does not have any specific targets for recruiting women". [39] This is inconsistent with the requirements of Section 149(3)(c) of the 2010 Equality Act, which requires public bodies, which include the armed forces, to "encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic [e.g. sex] to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low."

40. Recruitment of under-18s results in high levels of "wastage" as they have a poor retention rate in training. In 2009, 4,675 16- and 17-year olds joined the armed forces but 1,485 left in the same year – equivalent to 32 per cent of those joining. [40] Combined, more 16- and 17-year olds left the armed forces in 2009/2010 than individuals from any other age group. The 2010 Recruit Trainee Survey found that at the end of both Phase One and Phase Two training recruits aged 16-17 were significantly more likely than recruits from other age groups to say they were leaving the Service and that training was not "what they expected". [41] Resources are therefore wasted on recruiting and training candidates who quickly drop out due to immature and unrealistic expectations of, or unsuitability for, a career in the armed forces.

41. Discharge rates of young service personnel are consistently and significantly higher than discharge rates of older staff. Within this pattern, there is a spike of discharges for personnel aged 22, which is the earliest age at which a recruit aged 18 or below at enlistment can request a discharge. Discharges of personnel aged 22 accounted for 7.4 per cent of all discharges in 2009. The only age group with a higher discharge rate was age 40 (7.7 per cent), which is the age at which a full service contract on the Open Engagement (now-discontinued) ends. The average discharge rate across all other ages from 23 to 39 is 2.2 per cent.

42. The disproportionately high percentage of armed forces personnel leaving the services at the age of 22 indicates one of two things. Either many unhappy young recruits are serving out their minimum term of service waiting to leave at the earliest opportunity, or many young recruits sign up with no intention of making a long term career in the armed forces. In the first case, the compulsory retention for up to six years of individuals who wish to leave is not in their best interests or beneficial to the general morale of their regiment. In the second case, expenditure on recruitment and training of large numbers of personnel who do not intend to make a long term commitment to the armed forces is a poor investment. In this regard it is worth considering that young people, who are still developing their interests and life plans, are generally more likely than adults to wish to change career.

43. In addition, whilst personnel who enlist at 16 and leave the Services at age 22 will have provided six years’ service, they will have been barred from deployment into hostilities for the first two years of their career. This makes them of less military value than an adult recruit who could have been deployed as soon as training ended. In this regard, recruiting only candidates aged 18 and above would increase current Infantry deployable strength alone by 3.6 per cent with no financial cost to the Ministry of Defence.

44. The 2006 National Audit Office report into recruitment and retention in the armed forces similarly found that "retention measures represent better value for money than the steps taken to recruit and train replacement personnel ... [W]e calculated that the Department spent £74 million to retain 2,500 trained people compared to an estimated cost of £189 million to recruit and train the equivalent number of replacement personnel to the end of Phase 1 training. In reality, the true costs of achieving equivalent replacement personnel will be significantly greater since individuals that have left the trained strength will have received higher levels of training and investment in their careers than those that have been recruited to the basic standard of capability on which we have based our calculations. In addition, the level of experience possessed by departing personnel cannot be replaced easily or quickly." [42]

45. The initial recruitment and training cost for a non-officer infantryman is £31,000. [43] Calculated at this minimum level, the expenditure on recruiting and training the 1,485 under-18 recruits who left the armed forces in 2010 is around £46 million. The minimum cost of basic training to replace the 1,370 armed forces personnel discharged in 2010 aged 22 would have been over £42 million. Note that these costs account for initial recruitment and training only and further training would be required to bring the new recruits up to the standard of those they were replacing.

46. When considering discharge rates of young recruits and personnel, it is also important to recall that the Report of the Task Force on the Military Covenant (September 2010) reported that the Early Service Leavers most likely to face difficulties (including homelessness or criminal activity) on returning to civilian life are those "who enter service with pre-existing problems, such as those from disadvantaged backgrounds, with a record of family unemployment and limited educational attainment". [44] The Task Force highlighted that the present coincidence of "buoyant recruiting" and possible reductions in overall Service Personnel strength in the coming year(s) presented an opportunity to raise the minimum entry requirements for recruitment. Doing so, it stated, could result in "a shift in the profile of recruits [which could] help mitigate the problems sometimes encountered by those with lower levels of education at later stages of their careers and on transition out of service." [45] The Coalition submits that raising the minimum recruitment age to 18 would facilitate this shift.

47. The Coalition believes that raising the recruitment age to 18 would lead to significant financial savings for the Ministry of Defence by decreasing wastage during training, reducing early outflow, increasing deployable strength, and reducing the number of vulnerable recruits who require additional expenditure on welfare services (both during and post-service).

Recommendations

48. The Coalition recommends that the Committee implement the recommendations of previous Armed Forces Bill Select Committees, the Defence Select Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child by amending the Armed Forces Bill to provide for:

· The phasing-in of a new minimum age of enlistment of 18 years; and in the interim

· An extended discharge as of right period for all young recruits up until their eighteenth birthday; and

· Minimum service periods for Army recruits aged under 18 to be reduced to four years or less.

49. Alternatively, the Coalition recommends that the Committee call on the Ministry of Defence to undertake, as a matter of priority, a feasibility study into means of phasing out the recruitment of under-18s from all three Services as quickly as possible. The Committee should also call on the Ministry to immediately amend relevant Army, Navy and RAF regulations to:

· Replace the "unhappy juniors" provision with an extended discharge as of right period for all young recruits up until their eighteenth birthday;

· Reduce the minimum service period for Army recruits aged under 18 so their minimum period of service is equivalent to or more favourable than that of adult recruits (four years or less);

· Ensure that all under-18 recruits are trained and accommodated separately from adults, with particular attention given to their specific needs and vulnerabilities as young people;

and

· Issue instructions to all three Service heads to prioritize recruitment of under-represented sectors of the adult population and to prioritize recruitment of the eldest amongst all potential recruits aged 18 or below.

1 February 2011