Localism

MEMORANDUM FROM THE METROPOLITAN POLICE AUTHORITY

(LOCO 53)

COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SELECT COMMITTEE

INVESTIGATION OF LOCALISM

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Introduction to the Metropolitan Police Authority

The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) was established in 2000 to provide oversight, transparency and accountability for policing in London by holding the commissioner rigorously to account for the delivery of an effective and efficient police service for all London’s communities. Met Forward sets out the Authority’s strategic mission, which is intended to guide the Metropolitan Police Service in tackling the issues that matter most to Londoners: fighting crime and reducing criminality; increasing confidence in policing; and giving us better value for money. The MPA is a functional body of the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the Mayor appoints the chair.

Executive Summary

In this response, we have defined localism as:

1. the principle by which power is devolved to individuals, communities and local bodies that operate at either local authority or pan-London level, through opportunities to directly influence decision-making and/or by providing local bodies delivering public services with significant discretion in determining the services they provide.

2. From the policing perspective it is important to understand the landscape and context within which these services are provided. The MPS covers an area of 620 square miles and a population of 7.2 million. The Service employs more than 32,500 officers together with about 14,200 police staff, 230 traffic wardens and 4,300 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), as well as almost 4000 volunteer police officers in the Metropolitan Special Constabulary.

3. The MPS is a London wide organisation with a range of specialist and national functions, such as diplomatic protection, counter-terrorism, serious and organised crime and marine and air support. In addition to these London wide responsibilities, the MPS delivers local policing services through the territorial policing structure, which is comprised of 32 operational command units, which are co-terminous with the boundaries of the 32 London boroughs. We know, however, that crime does not respect those boundaries and cross-border issues are a key concern for the MPA and the MPS. In the London context then, ‘local’ must therefore be understood at two different levels; ‘local’ as in the London borough and ‘local’ as in London wide. This necessitates an oversight body with the capacity to provide strategic direction and oversight across the entire police district to ensure the effective delivery of policing services that are responsive to the needs of those who visit, live and work in London. In addition, there is a role for such a body to bring together other criminal justice partners to meet all the challenges of policing and community safety in a complex and diverse city. The Authority has addressed these issues in its response to the Home Office consultation document ‘Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People’, which explores these issues in greater depth (see Appendix 1).

The main points of our submission are that:

· the move towards increased decentralisation is welcome. The MPA has for some time been proactively involved in supporting local decision-making and problem solving to tackle local policing concerns, but there must be recognition that for London, local cannot simply mean local authority level;

· a London wide oversight body for policing is required to ensure the MPS is delivering effective policing services to London and to also deliver more effective partnership working with the wider criminal justice system;

· localism provides a great deal of flexibility to ensure service provision is tailored to the needs of different communities, but this requires effective engagement, equality impact assessment and accountability mechanisms to be in place to ensure decisions meet the needs of the many, not the few, and are proportionate and non-discriminatory;

· effective partnership working requires effective and robust governance and decision-making processes and this will become even more important with increased decentralisation, which is to be accompanied by reduced inspection and performance regimes. Leadership, accountability and responsibility will need to be defined and communicated to stakeholders and to local people;

· this is not only a new way of working for those of us at the local level, it will also require a different approach from central government departments, which may not currently be appropriately structured to deal with the process of decentralisation;

· there are significant risks arising from the pressure to make immediate financial savings. The impending spending cuts will affect many of the partnership arrangements currently established locally and may encourage organisations to retreat from partnership working to look after their own interests. This may generate a negative impact on community confidence as well as fear of crime and our concern is that in the community safety context, the police service may come under increasing pressure to resolve this tension whilst still being obliged to deliver its own services within its own resource constraints.

Response to the specific questions

The extent to which decentralisation leads to more effective public service delivery; and what the limits are, or should be, of localism

4. Decentralisation has great potential to make public services more effective. Where more discretion and power is given to local people and bodies, they are able to make decisions which target the needs of local people more effectively. Decentralisation also allows local people to have much more influence over the decisions made in their name, which could bring some significant benefits for civil society as well as more engagement in local politics.

5. A fundamental element of decentralisation must be a mature approach to engagement and accountability. The concept relies on the assumption that all have equal access to the process and are motivated by the need to be representative; we know from our experience that this is not always the case. Such local accountability needs to be credible, having the powers and resources necessary to secure local influence, and legitimate, involving local people, led by people who are selected, or elected, by local people or groups.

6. Local authorities are well placed to provide this accountability through their oversight and scrutiny role (usually in partnership with other non-executive bodies in the locality, such as the police authority). Overview and scrutiny can also contribute to policy and service development. Recent changes, however, mean that it is now possible for local authorities to revert to the old committee structure, which could in our view, lead to reduced public accountability and engagement.

7. In London there is a need to also provide engagement and accountability at a more strategic level, which can only be achieved through bodies such as the MPA and the GLA. In London there are 32 boroughs within the MPS district all of whom have separate local accountability frameworks. However, the MPS must balance the need to police all of London against the need to provide policing services at the borough level. This requires effective pan-London oversight, which is currently provided through the MPA. The Authority has a strong track record in this area, delivering borough level engagement and accountability through the link member role and public CPEG meetings, and pan-London scrutiny and oversight through our committee structure and through targeted scrutiny work focussing on specific aspects of policing, such as gun crime, rape and civil liberties.

8. The limitations of localism include aspects of public policy making that require strategic direction and control, such as defence and foreign policy. There may also be circumstances where national or regional considerations will override local ones. This is particularly relevant in the policing context, where crime and community safety issues may cross borough boundaries and in the case of the MPS where its specialist and national functions will sometimes take precedence over local matters. For example, being responsible for the capital city, the MPS has significant public order responsibilities and such events (e.g. the Olympics), may at times require resources to be abstracted from borough policing to ensure an appropriate police presence.

9. The key principle is to balance competing interests within an understandable, and equitable, framework. Decentralisation can and will lead to significant variances in the nature of service delivery in different parts of the country. It may therefore be appropriate for Government to identify a core set of national minimum standards leaving others to the discretion of local people.

10. Local people and relevant stakeholders will need to be clear how the localism agenda fits in with the Government’s plans for the Big Society. The localism agenda is dependent on local communities being informed and responding to actual rather than perceived issues. Local policing has been consistently hampered by the problems this distinction causes. For example, perceptions and the fear of crime do not necessarily reflect the levels or types of actual crime at a local level. So again, without robust, inclusive and transparent decision-making decentralisation may fail to deliver.

The lessons for decentralisation from Total Place, and the potential to build on the work done under that initiative, particularly through place-based budgeting

11. The evidence from Total Place pilots and initiatives has been very encouraging. There are a number of initiatives that the MPA/MPS have also supported such as the crime and offender management strand of the Total Place pilot in Lewisham, and the Diamond Initiative, which was piloted in 6 London boroughs and aimed to tackle reoffending through a multi-agency partnership approach. These initiatives have provided clear evidence that single pot commissioning, i.e. place based budgeting not only saves money, but can also radically enhance service delivery.

12. The Authority has long supported the co-location of services within its estate, such as the Safer Sutton Partnership (based at Sutton Police Station), which has brought together the police community safety unit and the local authority safer communities team under single line management. This has brought the benefits of increased dialogue, better information sharing and improved performance management and delivery, which resulted in approximately £300k of savings in the first two years.

13. The Authority is developing this approach at the strategic level through the establishment of the London Crime Reduction Board, chaired by the Mayor of London and including the Chair of the MPA and representatives of London Councils. The Board will provide the political and strategic leadership for a senior officer multi-agency commissioning group comprised of the MPA, the MPS, London Councils, the GLA, London Probation and the Chief Executive London Committee.

14. It is clear that with the right freedoms there are opportunities to achieve considerable savings. However, given the pan-London responsibilities of the MPS, the Authority will still require the reassurance of ring-fenced budgets if it is to ensure the MPS delivers all its commitments across London;

The role of local government in a decentralised model of local public service delivery, and the extent to which localism can and should extend to other local agents

15. The fundamental principle of localism is for local delivery to be undertaken at a local level to meet the needs of local residents and this will require the identification and engagement of all the stakeholders and partners. The issue for policing is that whilst it must work in partnership with other agencies it is required to deliver some core services and must remain impartial and independent. Policing and policing oversight requires independence and impartiality if it is to provide community confidence and reassurance.

16. The practical application of decentralisation will therefore require police authorities to ensure increased negotiation, liaison and mutual understanding of needs and priorities. Leadership will be more complex because of the shared responsibility for service delivery in an area. In this environment effective governance, openness, transparency and accountability will need to be carefully planned, designed and delivered because it will require joint working between a variety of local partners, including the local community. Keeping the community engaged, confident and informed throughout this process will require considerable effort and commitment and the MPA and MPS have considerable experience in this area.

17. The Authority’s engagement structure consist of 32 community-led borough Community and Police Engagement Groups (CPEGs), which sit above and bring together the MPS’ Safer Neighbourhood Panels (SNPs) that work with the MPS’ ward-based policing teams to develop and hold the local team to account for ward priorities. Borough commanders and community safety partners are then accountable to the wider community through the public meetings of the CPEGs. These structures have enabled the Authority and the MPS to maintain an ongoing dialogue with communities, which supports the development of a more confident and informed community that is able to challenge and hold service providers to account. In addition, the MPA conducts an annual policing plan consultation exercise, which also supports the identification of public priorities and concerns for consideration through the strategic planning process.

The action which will be necessary on the part of Whitehall departments to achieve effective decentralised public service delivery

18. At the present time there appears to be little clarity regarding how central government will support the decentralisation process across all departments and the process will take considerable time to become embedded. Inspections and standards of practice have provided frameworks and protocols for local partnership performance and delivery and the removal of these processes will avoid an over prescriptive regime, but it may leave some local partners facing disproportionate expectations from local communities with regards to local delivery. For example, effective policing and the delivery of community safety requires partnership working amongst a range of stakeholders, including local authorities, probation and the health service. One of the key issues for the MPA is that should any one partner fail to provide an appropriate and responsive service for whatever reason, the police service should neither be held accountable for that nor be expected to fill the gap. It is therefore essential that central government departments develop a shared view of localism and of the desired outcomes so that all service providers are working towards the same goals. This could include priorities being developed on a cross-Government basis and/or the development of joint delivery units.

19. We have made the point about the need for effective engagement and accountability structures elsewhere in this response, but it is worth reiterating. Whilst efforts are being made to ensure the localism agenda provides greater local accountability, there must be some recognition of the need in London for strategic level oversight and engagement that brings together those local borough accountability mechanisms into one pan-London structure and our response to the Home Office consultation (see Appendix 1) expands on how we think this could work under the new Police and Crime Commissioner.

The impact of decentralisation on the achievement of savings in the cost of local public services and the effective targeting of cuts to those services

20. As mentioned above the potential of the Total Place approach to help deliver significant savings is clear. However, policing is obliged to deliver public reassurance, which requires taking a value-based approach to service delivery rather than focusing on cutting costs. A decentralised approach also requires all government departments and local agencies to share the same priorities, which is not necessarily the case at present. In the current period of spending reviews and cost cutting requirements the potential for individual bodies to retreat into organisational silos to find ways to make savings within their own budgets has increased considerably and this could lead to significant tension between different agencies.

21. Decentralisation will lead to the abolition of a number of strategic bodies, including the MPA. The rationale may be clear in the context of decentralising power and achieving savings, but in some cases there may be a valid argument for preserving such arrangements. Apart from the governance and accountability issues raised elsewhere in this response, the Authority has actively contributed to the development of responsive services, such as the Havens (rape crisis centres) and the Dangerous Dogs Unit, and to the delivery of significant savings within policing that could not have been delivered without pan-London oversight.

22. Effective decentralisation will help to deliver savings in the long term (as we have discussed). However, meaningful decentralisation will (like devolution) require time as it is a process, not an event. It has to be recognised that this time delay may impact on the availability of tangible evidence of benefits received, particularly to the public purse. The issue of sustainable benefits also needs to be taken into consideration and this will require careful planning, so that short term savings plans do not so significantly reduce capacity in local areas to the point that agencies are unable to manage and deliver on the additional responsibilities that decentralisation will bring.

23. For decentralisation to occur the process requires the pre-establishment of local awareness and local commitment by the community so that they are able to engage and participate in local decision-making effectively. This can be a time consuming and sometimes costly process. However, if accountability is approached intelligently, it can provide a powerful method for identifying savings and efficiencies in local services, based on independent research and the views of local people. The scrutiny process, for example, can provide an excellent opportunity for local agencies to engage in discussions with local people about plans for efficiency savings.

What, if any, arrangements for the oversight of local authority performance will be necessary to ensure effective local public service delivery.

24. There is logic to the principles set out and agreed between the Local Government Group and CLG around local self-regulation. Sector-owned improvement activity must be the means for enhancing performance. This is a continuous process that tends to be focused on peer review and it provides an effective way to share and promote good practice and positive working. It is predominantly a controlled exercise that is officer-led and does not normally directly involve local people. We would argue that this would be the weakness in this approach, which the Authority has addressed through its open committee structure and scrutiny and accountability processes, which enable continued public engagement and continuous learning and dissemination of good practice.

25. Government proposals, which may result in many authorities dispensing with their scrutiny functions in favour of a return to the committee system of governance, may not, in our view, support the decentralisation process. Even if structures and processes change the values of transparency, accountability and scrutiny must be paramount. The removal of the formal scrutiny function in some local authorities will lead to a significant mismatch between executive and backbench power. Strong, independent local accountability, led by elected members, is central to transparent decision-making and will only become more important as partnership working increases and central government inspection and oversight decreases.

26. The decentralisation of inspection and accountability may have some unintended consequences. The proposed structural changes in policing and health, for example, may fragment accountability, governance and improvement in local areas when it should be further joined up. One way to counter this effect would be through the provision of a sector or region based outcome-focussed management information regime. This would ensure that a minimum set of consistent, accessible and comparable datasets were collated at a certain level for the benefit of all the relevant stakeholders.

How effective and appropriate accountability can be achieved for expenditure on the delivery of local services, especially for that voted by Parliament rather than raised locally.

27. As an organisation with responsibility for a budget of £3.7 billion, we fully recognise the importance and value of financial transparency in ensuring public accountability for expenditure. The Government has also recognised this by requiring local authorities to publish items of expenditure over £500. We note, however, that not all local partners would be under the same obligations and would hope that this disparity would be considered within the Localism Bill. It should also be noted that such information will be open to different interpretations at the local level and that its success in delivering greater public accountability is based on the assumption that local people have the necessary skills, the time and the inclination to consider detailed expenditure figures. Furthermore, the provision of expenditure data will not in itself enable the kind of analysis that might provide confirmation that service delivery does not prejudice or disproportionately impact on particular communities and it may be less than useful without commensurate action to ensure that local people are aware of the processes through which to seek redress. Central inspection or accountability performance measures may help address this gap by assessing the quality of expenditure processes. Decentralising or relying on local measures will not provide this accountability process.

28. There is a need to be aware that in some respects the MPS is quite different to other service providers since it is obliged to provide policing services across the capital (i.e. across borough boundaries) and beyond, as well as delivering local neighbourhood policing services. In this context, local accountability may not always be possible or appropriate in some cases, such as counter terrorism and national security. While we appreciate the need for a culture of openness in the public sector as a crucial element of decentralisation, we believe it would be inappropriate for the police service to be directly accountable on some important matters. The Authority, therefore, provides this accountability and transparency through its oversight and scrutiny functions, some of which, such as the Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub-Committee, is quite rightly conducted behind closed doors. As such, the new requirements to publish expenditure in excess of £500 does not fully take into account the fact that policing is already much more accountable than many of its partner service providers.

29. A further issue for consideration is that the nature of policing is such that it can require large amounts of expenditure in the short term to address long term issues. Considerable effort will therefore be needed to ensure such information is appropriately contextualised at the local level to ensure this is fully appreciated by local communities. In addition, the complexity of policing is such that it receives funding from central government and through the local precept and is expected to deliver services which uphold the law, support rehabilitation and also prevent offending. Many of these activities will only impact directly on small numbers within the local community, and yet, the MPS may be held accountable to all residents who may have different expectations of local service provision.

Policing in the 21 st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People

Metropolitan Police Authority Response

1. This is the response of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) to the coalition Government’s plans for police reform, as set out in the paper entitled ‘Policing in the 21st Century: reconnecting police and the people’. That paper posed a number of specific questions at the end of each chapter. The MPA’s responses to these questions are set out at Annex A and further detail is provided at Annex B. This covering paper sets out general considerations regarding the way in which the Government’s proposed reforms might most effectively be implemented in London.

2. London is in a different position from the rest of country in terms of existing local government structures, providing a unique opportunity to put the structures envisaged within the Home Office paper into effect relatively simply. With fully functioning regional structures and an elected mayor in place, London can quickly adopt the principles of directly elected accountability for policing. The Greater London Assembly provides a ready-made scrutiny function, capable of ensuring open and transparent accountability, and providing the necessary checks and balances on the exercise of the Police and Crime Commissioner’s (PCC) functions.

3. London is also different in that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has a range of national and international responsibilities for which it will be necessary to put in place accountability mechanisms.

4. The MPA regards it as important that the principles of effective corporate governance and democratic accountability should be consistently applied throughout the country. These principles include: transparency, public accessibility of information, responsibility for community safety and criminal justice, independent scrutiny, value for money, management of risk, maintenance of probity and public accountability to the electorate. The cost of governance should not be seen as an overhead; governance is vital to manage risk, maintain probity, transparency and accountability to the electorate.

5. We would hope that the Bill presented to Parliament will be fundamentally enabling rather than prescriptive in respect of the ways in which reforms are made to work. In London, the Mayor should be the PCC, with a power to designate a nominated person to discharge the functions of this role. It is simply impracticable for the Mayor - with his or her many other responsibilities – personally to discharge all the responsibilities of the PCC. As the elected individual, responsibility and accountability should nonetheless remain ultimately with the Mayor. It is for consideration whether some functions, possibly including the selection and dismissal of the MPS Commissioner, should remain the responsibility of the Mayor, not to be delegated. To provide democratic legitimacy, the individual designated by the Mayor must be an elected politician and Assembly Members should be eligible. It is for consideration whether there should be a separate democratic process, or whether mayoral candidates might be required to nominate a "running mate" to be designated as the deputy PCC.

6. The MPA, in its short life, has made a significant impact on the way in which the MPS has shaped its priorities and conducted its business. Some of these achievements are set out later in this paper. It is important that the PCC in London, as elsewhere, has at the very least the same powers that police authorities currently possess, in order to ensure that they can be equally, if not more, effective. To this end, the PCC must be a legal entity with a range of powers and levers to guide and steer performance of the service, including:

· Setting the strategy

· Setting the priorities and performance outcome

· Setting the standard

· Holding and controlling the budget

· Owning the assets and contracts

· Owning and controlling the estate

· Owning the data

· Employing police staff

7. The PCC should have the capacity to delegate as appropriate the functions and responsibilities which pertain to him or her as the body corporate to the MPS Commissioner.

8. Given the scale of responsibilities in London, overseeing a budget of £3.6 billion and a workforce of over 52,000, it seems desirable that the PCC should have a non-executive advisory board, to be named the Mayor’s Police and Crime Commission, to support him or her. It is for consideration whether the Home Secretary should make an appointment to the Board to reflect his or her responsibilities for national and international policing functions of the MPS. Appointments of ‘Assistant Commissioners’ to the Commission should be a matter for the Mayor, subject to Nolan principles. Whilst again there should be no constraints on eligibility, any Mayor would be well advised to make appointments from those with appropriate expertise – potentially to include former independent members of the MPA - and to take the opportunity to ensure representative diversity in the oversight of London’s policing, including members of other tiers of London Government.

9. As far as is possible, the business of the Commission should be conducted openly and in public. The executive decision-making capacity of the PCC would be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, which requires publication of all documents unless exempt, including meeting minutes, under the publication scheme and provides individuals or organisations with the right to request information held by a public authority. There would need to be systems in place to respond to these and any requests made under the Data Protection Act.

10. Experience to date has demonstrated that it is essential to separate post hoc scrutiny from executive decision-making. As such, any Assembly Members on the PCP should not be eligible to be members of the Police and Crime Commission. The power structure within policing is complex and whilst there are pitfalls in seeking to be too prescriptive regarding such concepts as operational responsibility, it is necessary to provide checks and balances in the shape of independent executive control over police budgets and assets. Without the power to determine, as a matter of last resort, where resources are directed, the PCC’s capacity to ensure that the democratic mandate upon which he or she is elected can be adequately fulfilled will be constrained.

11. Similarly, it is important to avoid confusing the scrutiny function of the GLA panel with the executive decision-making capacity of the PCC. To ensure financial probity and the avoidance of conflicts of interest the PCC will require statutory officers (including a finance officer to fulfil the role of a s151 officer under current local authority legislation) separate to those performing similar roles within the GLA. He or she will also require the capacity to manage audit, risk, and assurance independently of the force. None of this need add to bureaucracy, and resource neutrality could be achieved through increased cost effectiveness resulting from the sharing of services. Under the proposed model some of the staff currently working in finance and estate management within the MPS might be deployed to work directly for the PCC.

Roles and responsibilities

12. In addition to the fundamental responsibilities of the PCC to set priorities and to control the budget, there are a number of functions that need to be discharged. The PCC should be able to make recommendations to The Queen regarding the appointment of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, taking into account the representations of the Home Secretary, and should have the power to dismiss the Commissioner. There should also be a requirement in place for the PCC to approve appointments made by the MPS Commissioner of Association of Police Chief Officers (ACPO officers) and senior police staff.

13. An independent element in the regulation of professional standards and conduct matters relating to ACPO officers is a matter of principle and a PCC role within this should be maintained. Linked to this is an argument for the PCC to have control over the system to respond to complaints and concerns about the quality of service throughout the police and it is our view that the complaints function currently carried out within the MPS should be transferred to the PCC. It is for consideration whether a national framework should be put in place to support and ensure equality of service across the country.

14. London is probably the most diverse city in the world, presenting huge opportunities as well as some policing challenges. The PCC should be given explicit duties to promote equalities, not just in terms of ensuring that the MPS is representative in its makeup, but also to make sure the policing response engages with, and meets the needs of, all Londoners.

15. To fulfil national and international responsibilities, the PCC should be a statutory member of any oversight board to be established for the National Crime Agency, and the Bill should enable the PCC to establish arrangements to oversee criminal justice and community safety joint working in London. A statutory duty should be placed upon the Mayor as PCC to make adequate arrangements for CT and protective services.

16. All of these roles and responsibilities require support staff with specialist skills in, for example, consultation with local people, planning, performance, finance, risk management, communications. Much of this exists currently and would need to be maintained and managed through the transition period so as not to lose the experience and expertise built over many years.

Scrutiny

17. Scrutiny of the performance and decision-making of the PCC should be conducted by a panel of the London Assembly (the Police and Crime Panel (PCP) in the consultation document). This panel should have appropriate powers and resources to enable it to fulfil its scrutiny role; that is, the Assembly's existing and agreed new powers in relation to the Mayor's budget, strategies, staff and information should also apply to the London Police and Crime Commissioner.     The Assembly should be empowered to summons information, the London Police and Crime Commissioner and senior officers from the MPS and other relevant bodies in London such as the City of London Police, and should receive papers sent to the London Police and Crime Commissioner. The Assembly would expect to refer matters to internal audit for investigation where appropriate, to confirm appointments to the Commission and to report the PCC to the Local Government Ombudsman for any alleged misconduct (not to the IPCC as envisaged in the consultation paper). The Assembly would also need appropriate resources to support its scrutiny function, including specialist audit and finance expertise.

18. All of this will ensure that the PCC can represent the public interest, hold the MPS Commissioner to account and ensure value for money, whilst allowing the police to get on with operational policing.

19. In the current statutory structure, the MPA is subject to the Members Code of Conduct and is required to have a standards committee with various statutory functions which include promoting and maintaining high standards of conduct by the members and co-opted members of the authority, and assisting members and co-opted members of the authority to observe the authority’s code of conduct. Although the standards regime is currently under review by government, we consider that it is vital that the PCC and PCP should be included in any new standards regime, whether that has a statutory or voluntary basis. Consideration needs to be given the role of the PCC and the role of the Mayor and any possible conflicts of interest, as well as the PCP. To ensure probity in standards and governance issues, a key role will be that of monitoring officer.

Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

20. We recommend that the legislation place a duty on the MPS Commissioner to support the PCC in the discharge of his or her statutory responsibilities. It should also confer on the PCC a power of direction over the Commissioner in the event that such support is not forthcoming. On a point of semantics, we are extremely concerned that the new arrangements will create significant confusion in the minds of Londoners about the respective roles of the Mayor and the police. To mitigate this confusion we propose that senior ranks in the Metropolitan Police should be renamed, (possibly as Chief of Police, Deputy Chief of Police, and Assistant Chief of Police, as or Director General of Police, Deputy Director of Police, and Assistant Director of Police), or that an alternative title for the Police and Crime Commissioner be devised.

Timing and transition

21. Whatever timings are proposed must take into account the Olympics and other major events planned in 2012. Transitional arrangements must be suitably robust to allow business to be conducted effectively during the run-up to the Olympic and Paralympic games and following the comprehensive spending review.

MPA Successes

22. Since the MPA was set up in 2000, its scrutiny, oversight and direction has achieved major improvements in policing and policing governance.

23. When the MPA assumed the responsibility for financial management of the MPS, it had fewer than five qualified accountants, and very poor financial governance. The pressure exerted by the Authority, and on occasion, the withholding of resources, has led to significantly improved governance, internal controls and a better skilled workforce. Overtime, whilst still an issue in some parts of the organisation, is now being addressed and procurement processes are significantly more robust.

24. The MPA has driven a change in culture to recognise and meet the needs of the diverse people of London, including ensuring that the MPS addressed the recommendations in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report. A focus on BME and female recruitment and a drive to employ PCSOs has changed the face of the organisation and helped to achieve policing by consent of local people. Examples of ensuring the MPS consider the impact on Londoners include the debate ahead of the introduction of Taser in 2004 and the development of the stop and search community monitoring network, which creates a forum for challenge and seeks to ensure stop and search is conducted in an appropriate manner.

25. The MPA developed Met Forward in April 2009, the three-year strategic mission to guide the work of the MPS. Recognised as an example of good practise in the recent joint HMIC /Audit Commission inspection of Police Authorities, it is under pinned by three strategic objectives - reducing crime and criminality, increasing public confidence in policing and providing value for money. Oversight and scrutiny of the programme is through the committee structure. Key outputs include improvements in the budget scrutiny process which is particularly relevant with increasing demands on public funding, greater focus on performance monitoring and service improvement.

26. The impact of MPA oversight of policing has changed the way policing services are provided and ensured they are effective and meet the needs of the users, including the development of the Havens (rape crisis centres), Safer Neighbourhood Teams and the Status Dogs Unit. The new Joint Engagement Meetings (JEMs) bring together all key local and pan London partners to problem solve local long-standing issues and allow the MPA Chair to identify areas of concern that need to be taken forward in other strategic pan London forums. These meetings could be developed further to allow public access, to provide greater local accountability. In respect of counter terrorism and protective services, the MPA has been at the forefront nationally in improving accountability in this area, from agreeing performance information to be discussed in open session to establishing national and local counter terrorism oversight arrangements.

27. The Authority has significantly improved information available to local people, including simplifying the presentation of crime data, webcasting police authority meetings and being at the forefront of local crime mapping.

28. Audit, risk and assurance is an area of intense focus resulting in improvement in areas of corporate controls, risk management and the prevention and detection of fraud. The MPA whistle blowers help line has resulted in identification of potential malpractice in MPS professionals and areas of non compliance and fraud, saving and recovering the public purse hundreds of thousands of pounds.

29. The MPA’s statutory Independent Custody Visitor (ICV) scheme is by far the largest in the country and is recognised as an innovative and positive example of volunteer management and cooperative partnership with the MPS.

30. It is vital that structures and processes to ensure the continuation of these and other successes and achievements of the MPA be built into the new arrangements for London.

Annex A: Response to Consultation Questions

Chapter 2

1. Will the proposed checks and balances set out in this Chapter provide effective but un-bureaucratic safeguards for the work of Commissioners, and are there further safeguards that should be considered?

2. What could be done to ensure that candidates for Commissioner come from a wide range of backgrounds, including from party political and independent standpoints?

· It is unlikely in London that any influence can realistically be brought to bear on the selection of candidates for the Mayoralty and hence the PCC.

· Without being overly prescriptive, legislation could provide that, in making appointments to the suggested advisory, non-executive body to support the PCC, the Mayor should have regard to a range of considerations for suitability, including diversity, experience, skills and representativeness.

3. How should Commissioners best work with the wider criminal justice and community safety partners who deliver the broad range of services that keep communities safe?

4. How might Commissioners best engage with their communities – individuals, businesses and voluntary organisations - at the neighbourhood level?

· To facilitate strategic engagement we propose the creation of shared borough engagement hubs with partners, building on the safer neighbourhood panels and community police engagement group structures, which will feed into an area level network aligned to the MPS' command areas.

· Mechanisms would need be put in place to provide appropriate support to the voluntary sector to ensure that they are able to contribute their views, advice and guidance effectively.

· Given the size and scale of the Metropolitan Police District it is impracticable to expect direct engagement by the PCC or his or her representatives at neighbourhood level. But there should be a duty on the PCC to ensure that the police are effectively engaging at this level. Fixed term appointments of 5-6 years for borough commanders might be considered to enable greater continuity in the relationships between the police and local people.

5. How can the Commissioner and the greater transparency of local information drive improvements in the most deprived and least safe neighbourhoods in their areas?

· Data which the public trust must be used effectively to target resources and effort where it is most needed. In practice this would mean providing local data, with an additional focus on the comparative data of the best and worst neighbourhoods.

· Relevant diversity data should be collated and monitored to ensure equality of access and the development of appropriately targeted services. This is also particularly important in the context of London’s diverse communities and their historical experiences and understanding of policing and community safety by different groups.

· Participatory budgeting would enable local people to influence the allocation of resources.

· Data provision and transparency should be a wider responsibility shared between the PCCs and community safety partnerships (CSPs).  In London, for example, we have worked with CSPs to improve public accountability by integrating CSPs into the borough community police engagement group structure, so that community safety information (data and information on local initiatives) is regularly provided to local people through an open forum and the community safety team are held to account for the services they provide.

6.
What information would help the public make judgements about their force and Commissioner, including the level of detail and comparability with other areas?

Chapter 3

7. Locally, what are examples of unnecessary bureaucracy within police forces and how can the service get rid of this?

8. How should forces ensure that information that local people feel is important is made available without creating a burdensome data recording process?

· Local people should decide on what information they require and how they receive it. Views can be sought through existing structures and greater engagement with the voluntary and community sectors.

· Stop and search data should continue to be collated to ensure that disproportionality issues are monitored and addressed.

· Consistency of data is important to ensure comparability

9. What information should HMIC use to support a more proportionate approach to their ‘public facing performance role’, while reducing burdens and avoiding de-facto targets?

· The MPS/MPA Met Standards work to recognise and reward excellent performance and efficiency could support this.

· This should be determined around a core of basic information sets across all forces, taking into account the collaboration required for regional and national issues.

10. How can ACPO change the culture of the police service to move away from compliance with detailed guidance to the use of professional judgement within a clear framework based around outcomes?

· Although ACPO must take the lead on this, much of the current bureaucracy and culture of the police service has been generated by ACPO, which is essentially a staff association representing chief police officers. It follows that the impetus for changing police culture must include a significant independent element and that PCCs have an important role to play.

· We support a move towards greater use of professional judgement, whilst not losing the command and control model, which is needed to ensure a consistent service and no abuse of police powers. The PCC needs to have the powers to work with officers to examine internal processes and doctrines which lead to unnecessary bureaucracy.

11. How can we share knowledge about policing techniques that cut crime without creating endless guidance?

· Knowledge can be shared by encouraging the creation of virtual forums and networks. The ‘crime reduction web’ was an example of a trusted, reliable source of guidance and ideas.

· It would help to have a single recognised tool to evaluate against a framework and then store good practice, for example the London Mayor’s Project Oracle.

· HMIC could assist with sharing best practice between forces as well as providing advice and support to PCCs.

Chapter 4

12. What policing functions should be delivered between forces acting collaboratively?

· We believe that all services could be considered for collaboration between forces. Support functions such as provision of uniforms, fleet management, crime management services, ISIT and procurement could be looked at initially, together with operational policing functions, such as mounted police and air support.

· Criminal justice partners and local authorities should be encouraged to work collaboratively with, and purchase services from, the police service, such as IT, procurement, transport, warehousing, language services, catering, etc.

· The legislation should not rule out collaboration of shared services with partners outside the police family, such as, in London, Transport for London.

13.
What are the principal obstacles to collaboration between forces or with other partners and how they can they be addressed?

· Multiplicity of funding streams, accounting and procurement processes are significant barriers. Such issues could be resolved by allocating the funding for partnership activity (over and above core budgets) to the PCC as the single responsible authority. This is the structure being proposed for the London Crime Reduction Board, which could be mirrored at the borough level.

· The unwillingness of Chief Constables to collaborate, given their preference to run their own services, may also be an issue which points to a need to give powers to the PCC to ensure this does happen.

14. Are there functions which need greater national co-ordination or which would make sense to organise and run nationally (while still being delivered locally)?

· Everything will benefit from national and regional co-ordination and information sharing. Nothing is demonstrably disadvantaged under the current arrangements but collaboration is always to be encouraged.

15. How can the police service take advantage of private sector expertise to improve value for money, for example in operational support, or back office functions shared between several forces, or with other public sector providers?

· Given the PCC’s personal responsibilities for ensuring value for money at the local level, he/she will want to ensure that the force is maximising all opportunities to drive effectiveness. The police service can tap into private sector expertise to look critically at the roles being undertaken by police officers in operational and business support functions and remove them from unnecessary administrative duties and routine tasks where their skills and powers are not properly used. Police staff should be used for time-consuming functions previously performed by officers.

· The MPS is a large enough force to manage or run services on behalf of other forces and should be encouraged to do so as part of a more innovative approach to shared services and/ or income generation.

· Business and management training are areas where forces could consider using the private sector to provide the service at both a local and national level, for example ACPO training, subject to minimum levels.

· PCCs should also be encouraged to assume some of the responsibilities currently being carried out by the NPIA.

16.
Alongside its focus on organised crime and border security, what functions might a new National Crime Agency deliver on behalf of police forces, and how should it be held to account?

· The NCA should be transparently accountable to an oversight body with full tripartite membership, including a statutory place for the London PCC in view of the significant links between the NCA and MPS.

· Transitional/ interim arrangements will be required for those operational functions of the NPIA that are transferred to the NCA during the intervening period of March 2012 and April 2013.

17. What arrangements should be in place in future to ensure that there is a sufficient pool of chief officers available, in particular for the most challenging leadership roles in the police service? Is there a role for other providers to provide training?

· A clear support and training structure to enable officers to have the capacity and capability to perform at a senior level is required. The emphasis should be on developing professional police leaders not just police leaders and there may be a role for the private sector to help develop and mentor senior leaders. Leadership skills could be developed working with armed forces and the emergency services to reduce costs and duplicated effort. Leadership is generic, not police specific.

· With the abolition of NPIA there will be an opportunity for forces to have a greater say regarding the recruitment, training and promotion of its officers as opposed to centrally imposed rules and regulations.

18. How can we rapidly increase the capability within the police service to become more business-like, with police leaders taking on a more prominent role to help drive necessary cultural change in delivering sustainable business process improvement?

Chapter 5

19. What more can the Government do to support the public to take a more active role in keeping neighbourhoods safe?

· Empower local people to take action, rather than just sitting on ‘talk shop’ committees.

· Sutton Council is one of the first pioneer ‘Innovation Areas’ bringing the Big Society to life. A number of new methods of engagement with local people and democratic involvement have been implemented and the success and learning from this should be shared.

· Provide better support to neighbourhood volunteers.

· Undertake a dedicated communications campaign regarding how to get involved.

· The Independent Custody Visitors scheme that police authorities currently operate is an excellent engagement activity, which provides direct public scrutiny at minimal cost and enables challenge and accountability, the big society in action.

20. How can the Government encourage more people to volunteer (including as special constables) and provide necessary incentives to encourage them to stay?

21.
What more can central Government do to make the criminal justice system more efficient?

· Ensure collaboration at the centre with external and private sector organisations.

· Encourage and support better end to end working between prevention, engagement and enforcement agencies.

· Ensure efficiency savings are redirected.

· Ensure all parties understand and deliver against their information sharing obligations. There is a potential danger in these difficult financial circumstances that individual organisations will retreat back to their own core issues so there is a need for a mechanism to keep organisations focussed on delivering together.

· Ensure all criminal justice agencies are working to the same targets.

· Support better monitoring of offenders who are out on licence.

22. What prescriptions from Government get in the way of effective local partnership working?

· The removal of the plethora of targets in favour of identified outcomes will be helpful provided those outcomes are shared and understood as the sum of the efforts of all agencies.

23. What else needs to be done to simplify and improve community safety and criminal justice work locally?

· Broadly speaking, the local structures should mirror those being developed on a London-wide basis, i.e. the community safety partnerships and borough criminal justice groups should come together in one single commissioning structure to ensure more efficient and effective delivery.

· In addition, given that the London PCC will be responsible for policing across 32 boroughs, there is a need for a range of mechanisms to ensure the PCC retains appropriate links to the borough level, both local authorities and local people. This will be achieved partly through links to London Councils and the local authority community safety portfolio holders. However, it will also be important to give the PCC a role on local community safety overview and scrutiny committees. Joint funding arrangements with the chair of the Local Criminal Justice Partnership to become a statutory partner on community safety partnerships (CSPs).

Annex B: Detailed comments and miscellaneous issues for consideration

Data Sets

October 2010