Football Governance

Written evidence submitted by the Wimbledon Independent Supporters Association (WISA) (FG 56)

Introduction

1. WISA is the Independent Supporte rs Association of supporters’ trust-owned AFC Wimbledon, the club formed following an FA Commission’s approval of Wimbledon Football Club’s move to Milton Keynes. We believe we have a unique insight into the abject failure of football governance in this country. WISA was formed in 1995 during the club’s exile at Crystal Palace’s Selhurst Park, ten miles away from their home in Plough Lane, London SW19. Club owner Sam Hammam (later owner of Cardiff City) had moved it there in 1991. WISA was created to meet a need for dialogue between the club and supporters, and in particular to campaign for a return home of the Club to its historic home borough of Merton.

Two years after its formation, WISA campaigned against the attempt to move Wimbledon Football Club to Dublin. But its biggest and most passionately-fought battle came with the Club’s proposed move to Milton Keynes. WISA came of age, inspiring and mobilising Wimbledon fans’ united opposition to the move in a determined and professionally-run campaign which caught the imagination of both the Club’s fans and football fans throughout the country.

It was during this campaign that WISA and Wimbledon supporters in general then created The Dons (Supporters) Trust, with the help of Supporters Direct.

1.1 In summary, WISA advocates the following:

1.2 Ownership of a club by its Supporters’ Trust is a far more appropriate model for ownership of a football club, as it properly protects the sporting, cultural and community characteristics of a football club, and provides for supporters to be consulted and balloted on key decisions affecting their club.

1.3 Football clubs would benefit from at least a mandatory presence of a supporter on the board. We believe that Supporters’ Trusts best fit this purpose.

1.4 The governance of football must be rebalanced in order for the leagues to be able to administer their competitions, and for The FA to regulate. The too often malign self-interest of the professional clubs, led by The Premier and Football Leagues, leads to an organisation riven with self-interest, incapable of properly regulating the game.

1.5 Implementation of the 2005 Burns Report in full, including independent non- executive directors on the Board of The FA; a truly independent Chair; a concomitant reduction of the influence of both Premier and Football Leagues and the FA Counties; and a reduction in the size of the FA Council itself, so as to create a ‘Parliament of Football’.

1.6 We also believe that, specifically in serious matters judged to be in the wider interests of football, these disputes must be ruled over by The FA, and take into account clearly the needs and wishes of all stakeholders in a club.

1.8 We believe that the path to a proper framework ensuring that football is run much more in the interests of the people who stick with it through thick and thin lies in active government intervention to ensure that our game is suitably regulated. Given the government’s annual contribution to The FA – a contribution funded by the taxpayer, many of whom are themselves supporters – this seems only fair.

2. Should football clubs in the UK be treated differently from other commercial organisations?

2.1 We believe that this issue is directly connected to the failures in governance on the part of the authorities, which we address in part 3 of this submission

2.3 Football clubs are sporting, cultural and community assets first, and must be treated as such. However there is a clear contradiction in their legal status as, in the main, private limited companies, the objective of which is to deliver a profit and be principally concerned with their shareholders. The case of Wimbledon Football Club over a number of years illustrates the need to properly address this contradiction.

2.2 Over the years, key decisions were made by directors and at most a handful of shareholders of the company that failed to even take into account the views of the supporters of the club, much less actually ballot or consult in any binding way.

2.3 The first instance of this failure was when Sam Hammam, owner of Wimbledon FC, was given permission by the Board of The Football League to move the Club to groundshare with Crystal Palace, citing the imminent introduction of all-seater stadia as the reason

2.4 The second instance of failure was in 1997, when The Premier League ruled that it had ‘no objections’ to the Club being moved to Dublin, as it was keen to ‘explore new markets’. This move was only scuppered by the intervention of the FAI (Football Association of Ireland) and FIFA. At no point did anyone from The Premier League or The FA intervene.

2.5 The most obvious instance of failure in the case of Wimbledon Football Club came to a head on the eve of the 2001/2002 season, when the owners and Chairman of the Club, Kjell Inge Rokke, Bjorn Gjelsten and Charles Koppel, announced they had signed a deal with the ‘Milton Keynes Stadium Consortium’ to ‘move’ the Club to Milton Keynes.

2.6 It is clear to us, and we believe to anyone who agrees with our view that football clubs are not merely private entities with shareholders, that Wimbledon Football Club operated almost exclusively as a private company, which on all key decisions properly consulted only shareholders.

2.7 As supporters of a club owned by its Supporters’ Trust, we believe this to be a far more appropriate model for ownership of a football club, as it properly protects the sporting, cultural and community characteristics of a football club, and provides for supporters to be consulted and balloted on key decisions affecting their club.

2.8 We also believe that all football clubs would benefit from at least a mandatory presence of a supporter on the board. We believe that Supporters’ Trusts best fit this purpose.

2.9 However, we also believe that the manner in which football is run, both by The FA and the Leagues themselves, desperately needs overhauling, and the better regulation of these essentially private entities.

3. Are football governance rules in England and Wales, and the governing bodies which set and apply them, fit for purpose?

3.1 The three incidents outlined in Section 2 illustrate the manifest failure at the most extreme end of the governing bodies of football to govern in the wider interests of football, and specifically of supporters.

3.2 In the case of the Club’s groundshare at Selhurst Park, although the move to all seater stadia was an acknowledged problem for clubs, there was also no such rule or guidance preventing Wimbledon from remaining at Plough Lane whilst a replacement was built, or a new site found – as has been the case with any number of clubs since then. Not only did The Football League fail to properly scrutinise the proposals, it also failed to attach any conditions to the groundshare, such as a new ground being built on the old site, or a new site being identified,. Thus Plough Lane never saw first team football again. It is this incident that can be seen as the precursor to the Club being moved to Milton Keynes by its shareholders.

3.3 The attempt by the Club’s shareholders to move it to Dublin was only scuppered by the intervention of the FAI (Football Association of Ireland) and purportedly, UEFA and FIFA. At no point did The Premier League intervene. Indeed it is our understanding that The Premier League actively wished the ‘exploration of new markets’. We are also not aware of any public intervention in the matter on the part of The FA.

3.4 In the case of the shareholders’ successful plan to move the Club to Milton Keynes, the Board of The Football League did, properly, refuse permission when the plans were formally presented. However the decision was subject to appeal by the shareholders. The Board’s verdict was overturned by an arbitration panel convened under FA rules. The panel consisted of then Arsenal Chairman David Dein, Charles Hollander QC, and York City Chairman and FA Council member Douglas Craig, who was later to sell York’s ground to a property developer, precipitating the demise of that club.

3.5 Following the matter’s return to the Board of The League, it was then agreed that an Independent Commission, under the rules of The FA (not ‘by’ The FA: this rule is provided to resolve disputes between parties within football) would be established. This Commission, made up of lawyer Raj Parker (Freshfields Solicitors), Steve Stride, Operations Director of Aston Villa, and Alan Turvey, FA Council Member and Chairman of the Ryman (Isthmian League), voted 2-1 in favour of permitting the ‘relocation’ (it is widely accepted that Alan Turvey was the single vote against, though he has never confirmed this).

3.6 The Commission’s report, riddled with contradictions and inaccuracies about the financial state of the Club, the consequences of such a precedent (i.e. the move) being set, even opined that the fans' vow to form their own club should the move be approved was "not in the wider interests of football". Although both WISA and The Dons (Supporters) Trust were called to present evidence, the clear understanding was that the two parties involved were The Football League and Wimbledon Football Club; the fans had no mandatory right to be heard, much less directly consulted. We urge members to read this report, which we have attached in the appendices to this submission (5.1) , as it underscores the points we are making in much of our submission.

3.7 As if this were not failure enough, the verdict and report itself was only announced following significant pressure being applied by Supporters Direct, the then Football Supporters Association and the National Federation of Football Supporters Clubs (the latter two now amalgamated as the FSF).

3.8 In The FA’s statement, despite being the regulators of the game in this country, it was made plain that they not only opposed the decision, but were unable to exercise their governing role: ‘ However, this [decision] is binding on everyone under the Football League rules - there is no appeal . ’ (Our emphasis). That was a failure of governance of astronomical proportions: how can a regulatory body be forced to approve something it knows is wrong, and is in fact contrary to the over-arching principles of the game (that clubs should not be franchised), because its own rules have been exploited to the letter by a small number of self-interested individuals? We suggest this is because of the excessive power held by the Professional Game in The FA (The Premier and Football Leagues). We have also included this statement in our appendices (5.2).

3.9 This was seen as a proprietorial dispute between The Football League and the shareholders of Wimbledon Football Club, not a crucial matter on which a regulator had to intervene, and on which the views of supporters were seen as a vital part.

3.10 The Football League and The Premier League are groups of shareholders in a private company who pursue their own interests, often against those of the wider game, and certainly against those of supporters. The FA is a body established, it is widely assumed, to govern the game in the best interests of the game. Yet because of the excessive influence over The FA by these private bodies, and the lack of any will to actively involve themselves by the counties/’National Game’, The FA is rendered impotent on even the most critical matters. In other words, there is no alignment of interests between the legal owners of a club, and the people who have invested far more in that club, emotionally and financially, relative to their own means – i.e. the supporters.

3.11 We believe that the governance of football must be rebalanced in order for the leagues to be able to administer their competitions, and for The FA to regulate. The too often malign self-interest of the professional clubs, led by The Premier and Football Leagues, leads, to paraphrase FA Chief Executive Ian Watmore on resigning in March last year, to an organisation riven with self-interest, incapable of properly regulating the game. Even the Sports Minister, Hugh Robertson, has described football as the ‘worst run sport in the country’.

3.12 The minimum requirement for change to the governance of The FA must be for the 2005 Burns Report to be implemented in full. This would include independent non-executive directors on the Board of the Association; a truly independent Chair; a concomitant reduction of the influence of both Premier and Football Leagues and the FA Counties; and a reduction in the size of the FA Council itself, so as to create a ‘Parliament of Football’. Only then would The FA even begin to resemble a body that could be regarded as ‘fit and proper’.

3.13 We also believe that, specifically in serious matters judged to be in the wider interests of football, these disputes must be ruled over by The FA, and take into account clearly the needs and wishes of all stakeholders in a club.

4. Is Government intervention justified and, if so, what form should it take?

4.1 If The FA is to perform an effective role as regulator of our national game, then it must be permitted – perhaps forced – to actively regulate on all major decisions such as Wimbledon Football Club’s move to Milton Keynes. That it was not able to intervene in such a critical case would not be permitted in almost any other area of regulation, for example in the media industry.

4.2 We believe that the path to a proper framework ensuring that football is run much more in the interests of the people who stick with it through thick and thin, whose only desire is the joy and the fun of having a club to support and to see it do well, lies in active government intervention to ensure that our game is suitably regulated. Given the government’s annual contribution to The FA – a contribution funded by the taxpayer, many of whom are themselves supporters – this seems only fair.

The game of football will not change on its own, and supporters -- however many take over their own clubs, or like us, start again from the bottom -- cannot on their own create the magnitude of change needed.

5. APPENDICES

5.1. FA Independent Commission of Inquiry: Summary of the Commission’s Decision

http://www.wisa.org.uk/cgi/l/articles/index.cgi?action=show&id=116

5.2. FA statement on decision of the Independent Commission

http://www.wisa.org.uk/cgi/l/articles/index.cgi?action=show&id=111

January 2011