Written evidence from Scientists for Global
Responsibility (SGR)
I. ABOUT SGR
1. SGR is an independent UK-based membership
organisation of about 1,000 natural and social scientists, engineers,
IT professionals and architects. Our aim is to promote science,
design and technology that contribute to peace, social justice,
and environmental sustainability.
2. Our interest in the Strategic Defence and
Security Review stems from our concerns about the use of science
and technology - and related expertise - in both helping to increase
security and/or undermine it. Hence, our comments will focus on
these areas.
II. CONSULTATION
PROCESS AND
SCOPE
3. We welcome the opportunity to input to the
SDSR, and related parliamentary inquiries. However, we note that
information on how and when to input has been sparse. This is
not consistent with government guidelines on the holding of public
consultations, and reflects poorly on the democratic accountability
of the new government. We hope that this does not mean that responses
from civil society will not be taken seriously.
4. We also note that the Defence Secretary has
excluded issues related to the UK's nuclear weapons systems from
this review. We fail to understand how a defence review can be
undertaken without consideration of the role of one of the main
weapons platforms. Our response will therefore cover this issue,
in the hope that the terms of reference of the review will be
revised.
III. SECURITY
STRATEGY - GENERAL
5. We welcome the shift within government policy
in recent years from a narrowly defined "defence strategy"
to a more broadly defined "security strategy". In particular,
we were pleased to see recognition in the 2008 National Security
Strategy of a wide range of "drivers of insecurity",
including poverty and environmental problems. SGR has long argued
for such a perspective. However, UK security and defence policy,
and associated spending, has unfortunately remained heavily orientated
towards maintaining and deploying large military forces, ready
and able to use "force projection" as deemed necessary.
6. The UK military budget is very large in global
terms. According to the respected Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, the UK ranks fourth in the world in terms
of absolute spending, and per head of population is twice as large
as Russia and more than 12 times greater than China. Per unit
of GDP, the UK spends well above the average for the European
members of NATO. If the UK decided to reduce military spending
to this average, it would lead to a cut in the region of 25%.
7. The justifications for maintaining such a
large budget - or indeed cutting it less than is proposed for
many other departments as part of the current government spending
review - we believe need to be urgently re-examined.
8. Firstly, the recent experiences of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated starkly the limitations
of relying on military force to achieve security objectives: high
numbers of casualties, both civilian and military; the inability
to achieve a "quick win" even through the use of overwhelming
forces; considerable damage to both the infrastructure and social
structures needed for a stable post-conflict society; the marked
increase in terrorism as a response to the use of military force;
and the huge economic costs.
9. Secondly, there is widespread agreement that
a military attack on the UK by regular armed forces is currently
extremely unlikely - the UK is safer from such a threat that at
any time in its history. While security analysts have identified
a range of potential future threats from regular armed forces,
it is extremely important to consider the likelihood of such threats,
and not give them undue priority over unconventional or non-military
security concerns - such as energy, food or water insecurity.
It is also essential that non-military approaches to tackling
such future problems are resourced properly. Acting early to tackle
the roots of insecurity - both in the UK and globally - should
be at the heart of the UK's security strategy.
10. SGR is very concerned that the UK's military
budget will be kept high on the justification of extremely low
probability future military threats from regular armed forces,
while other measures which are aimed at tackling much more likely
- but less conventional - security threats will remain under-resourced.
11. An example of this problem is the level of
financial and technical resources devoted to tackling the UK's
currently unsustainable consumption of natural resources. The
government has rightly recognised the importance of supporting
the transition to a low carbon economy. This has numerous security
benefits - including improving the UK's energy security and reducing
its contribution to climate change, itself a driver of insecurity.
However, we have serious doubts that the UK will achieve its targets
in this area without more finance being made available. Indeed,
the UK is a long way from achieving a sustainable level of consumption
for a wide range of natural resources, and this will inevitably
contribute to greater insecurity, both in the UK and internationally.
A major transfer of funding from military sources to support the
transition to sustainable consumption levels, we believe is justified.
IV. UK NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
12. The UK's Trident nuclear weapons system and
its potential successor have been excluded from this review. To
conduct a defence review without considering the role of one of
the major weapons platforms seems on the face of it to be deeply
flawed. However, this may be because the UK's continued deployment
of nuclear weapons is not driven by military strategy, but by
political strategy (i.e. to enhance the UK's political influence).
This has been most recently argued in Ritchie (2008). Further
evidence of this perspective is revealed by the Defence Secretary's
recent attempts to have Trident replacement paid for, not from
the defence budget, but out of central government funds.
13. Nevertheless, considering Trident and its
replacement in a military context, it is incapable of deterring
any of the realistic future threats that the UK may face such
as terrorism, social strife or conventional military threats.
Furthermore, nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction -
indiscriminate and highly dangerous (even for the user nation
due to the widespread environmental and health problems they create).
They can have no place in defence strategy of a rational nation.
The UK's continued maintenance of such weapons lends them political
legitimacy and - in the absence of a clear plan for complete disarmament
- undermines attempts to prevent the proliferation of such weapons,
further undermining UK security.
14. Taking these factors into consideration,
SGR believes that the UK should take immediate steps to abandon
its active deployment of nuclear weapons. It should take the Trident
submarines off patrol, place the warheads in secure land-based
storage and cancel the replacement system.
15. Furthermore, the expense of replacing Trident
and maintaining that replacement - currently estimated at £70-100
billion over the lifetime of the system - could provide much needed
funds to help enhance UK and global security in other ways (see
section III).
16. As part of the above steps, the current multi-billion
pound redevelopment of the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)
- whose purpose is likely to involve a nuclear warhead replacement
programme - should be halted. SGR believes that the focus of the
facility should move rapidly towards one based wholly on providing
technical expertise in support of nuclear disarmament, both in
the UK and globally.
V. CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS SYSTEMS
17. In launching the SDSR, the Defence Secretary
said that the review "will make a clean break from the military
and political mindset of Cold War politics". We welcome such
sentiments, but are concerned that they will not lead to the deep
cuts in expensive, offensive military technologies that are justified
if the UK moved much more towards security strategies based on
ideas such as "non-offensive defence" or "sustainable
security".
18. We therefore recommend that priorities for
cuts in conventional military technologies should include the
following. (These recommendations focus on early retirement of
some existing systems, and the cancellation of planned systems
on which construction has yet to begin or is in a very early stage.)
- ¾ Aircraft
carriers. Current plans to build the two
biggest aircraft carriers in British naval history are wedded
to Cold War-thinking. The capabilities of the first carrier, already
under construction, should be markedly scaled back - including
deep cuts to its proposed combat aircraft fleet - while the second
carrier should be cancelled.
- ¾ Submarines.
Submarines are highly expensive vessels with a strong offensive
capability. In addition to retiring the Vanguard-class which carries
Trident nuclear missiles and cancelling its successor, we also
advocate early retirement for the Trafalgar-class and Swiftsure-class,
and cancelling the final three Astute-class vessels.
- ¾ Frigates
and destroyers. We advocate early retirement
of many of the existing ships, and cuts in the commissioning of
the new Type-45 destroyers and plans for Type-26 frigates.
- ¾ Combat
aircraft. The UK has a huge fleet of combat
aircraft. We advocate early retirement of the over 100-strong
Tornado fleet, and deep cuts to the planned fleet of nearly 150
Typhoon fighter planes.
- ¾ Training
aircraft. Large reductions in the combat
fleet will allow for commensurate cuts in training aircraft.
- ¾ Tanks.
With over 300 tanks currently in service - another relic of the
Cold War - we advocate deep cuts here as well.
- ¾ Other
military equipment. Major cuts in a range
of other land, sea and air vehicles that have a strong offensive
capability will also be necessary. Vehicles which have particular
strengths for humanitarian work and disaster relief should, of
course, be protected from cuts.
19. In combination, SGR believes that cuts such
as these could save many billions of pounds per year, with a minimal
effect on UK security. They would also help reduce the Ministry
of Defence's massive budget deficit and bring the UK military
budget down to a level comparable to that seen across the rest
of Europe.
20. A further relevant aspect of this issue is
the sale of UK military equipment abroad, which can fuel insecurity.
In recent years, the UK has completed major sales of weapons systems
and expertise to countries with poor human rights records - e.g.
Saudi Arabia - and countries of concern for other reasons. For
example, the £700 million Hawk deal with India endorsed by
David Cameron in July 2010 raises serious concerns. It has increased
tensions between India and Pakistan, and could potentially fuel
a regional arms race. Indeed, given the high levels of poverty
in India (and Pakistan), and the recognition that poverty is a
driver of insecurity (see section III), is such a deal really
consistent with the UK security policies?
21. Of particular concern in this area is the
UK government's continued financial support for arms exports through
the UK Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation
(UK TI DSO).
22. SGR strongly recommends that the government
immediately enacts much tighter restrictions on arms exports,
and closes down the UK TI DSO.
VI. RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
23. The Ministry of Defence's current budget
for research and development is approximately £2.2 billion.
This is approximately 28% of all public R&D spending. SGR
believes this is unnecessarily high, and advocates cuts in this
budget before cuts in other publicly-funded R&D. Indeed, a
significant fraction of this budget is provided to the AWE. With
the cuts to AWE suggested in section IV, this would allow many
other civilian areas of R&D - which are of much greater benefit
to society - to be spared from being axed.
24. SGR believes some security-related R&D
should be expanded, including that which supports:
- ¾ monitoring
and verification of arms control and disarmament agreements;
- ¾ trust-building
activities between nations and peoples;
- ¾ non-violent
conflict resolution;
- ¾ understanding
and tackling the roots of conflict and insecurity;
- ¾ transition
to sustainable consumption of natural resources; and
- ¾ other
peace-building activities.
VII. OTHER ISSUES
25. Significant numbers of UK jobs are dependent
on the military/ defence sectors. However, all the options that
the government is currently considering for cut-backs will include
job losses. Because military industry is, by its nature, capital
intensive, job losses for a given spending cut are likely to be
lower than in many other areas of the economy. For example, a
recent study from the University of Massachusetts concluded that
per unit of spending, spending in the construction/ building insulation
sector creates more than 50% more jobs than military/ defence
spending, and public transport spending creates 130% more.
26. Some argue that UK military spending should
be preserved to help to maintain the manufacturing sector. However,
an increase in government assistance in sectors such as renewable
energy and energy efficiency should be given higher priority,
both to improve UK energy security and to reduce climate change,
itself a driver of insecurity.
VIII. CONCLUDING
COMMENTS
27. SGR's main recommendations are:
- ¾ Adopt
a security and defence strategy that prioritises tackling the
roots of conflict, with an emphasis on non-violent conflict resolution.
- ¾ Prioritise
the shift of UK society to a sustainable use of resources.
- ¾ Include
UK nuclear weapons in the SDSR, and abandon attempts to have any
aspect of their development or deployment funded from civilian
budgets.
- ¾ As
the first steps to complete nuclear disarmament, take the Trident
nuclear submarines off patrol, put the nuclear warheads in secure
storage, and cancel plans for a replacement.
- ¾ Cut
the total military budget by at least 25% in the short term, with
further cuts to follow. The priority for cuts should be major
military technology systems with an offensive capability.
- ¾ Enact
much tighter restrictions on arms exports, and close down the
UK TI DSO.
- ¾ Cut
the Ministry of Defence's R&D budget before cutting other
areas of publicly-funded R&D. This could largely be achieved
through cuts to the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
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6 September 2010
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