Further written evidence from DefenceSynergia
1. I am writing on behalf of my colleagues in
DefenceSynergia following your welcome and supportive response
of 3 August to our letter and paper of 19 July in respect of the
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).
2. I also wish to address a concern, often expressed
or hinted at in reaction to the SDSR, that the review has to be
entirely constrained by cash limits. No SDSR can reliably predict
future threats in great detail and timing so, what has to be decided
is the most versatile collection of capabilities necessary to
meet the range of threats that can be sensibly discerned and when
they are most likely to arise. We support this analysis but are
worried that if the SDSR is Treasury driven, then the resources
thereafter provided will be dictated and no evaluation of the
considered threats will make any difference to the outcome. It
would not be a genuine review and the government would be rightly
derided for avoiding proper consideration of our medium and long
term defence and security needs. Your committee is in the front
line to expose any contradictions both within the SDSR and the
measures taken in its implementation.
3. Surely, notwithstanding how difficult the
current financial circumstances, the protection of national sovereignty
and ultimate survival must take precedence over all other spending
considerations. Radical measures will have to be taken by the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and these will, no doubt, include reorganisation,
efficiency savings and probably a refreshed doctrine. But this
"new thinking" must chime with the UK's protection and
foreign policy aims. Should cash limits be allowed to dictate
future defence then it will be important for the Defence Select
Committee to draw out from the government that they are prepared
to deny the very evidence that an honest and unbiased SDSR should
provide.
4. I would like to submit our paper - "An
Approach to the Strategic Defence and Security Review" as
a template against which to judge the outcome and implementation
of the SDSR. This has been circulated but is attached for convenience.
5. I ask for the opportunity to give oral evidence
on our paper and on the following issues:
- a. Depending on decisions made over foreign
policy, the leadership and management of the Armed Forces must
be reshaped to ensure far greater efficiency in the procurement
and use of assets.
- b. Rethinking of required roles and doctrines
are vital since the current perception and actuality of the order
of battle is confused by having to assign current roles to a pretty
rigid tri service model, each element of which has an unshared,
unique culture.
- c. Given the relative trends in departmental
public expenditure over the last decade, the defence budget has
already yielded up more than its share of Treasury demanded savings
measures when a comparison is made between the relative achievements
of the major spending departments in this regard.
- d. Equipment cost inflation is greater for
defence systems in the inevitable race for military superiority
amongst nations. This factor must be taken into account when considering
the relative merits of alternative suppliers, the need for a "home"
defence industry and the best value for taxpayers' money.
- e. The defence industry should be an important
engine for "growth" in the economy since, not only does
it need to be ready for any required upsurge in production and
hence requiring a supportable stream of work to retain skills,
but it spawns technological "spin offs" which feed positively
into non military production.
- f. That the value of retaining a nuclear
deterrent in its most secure form is an intrinsic element of the
UK's foreign, defence and security strategy. This is not to keep
harking back to some "cold war" requirement but to recognise
a proliferation of such threats and to maintain our bargaining
influence in any future negotiations to reverse proliferation.
- g. Given the UK's responsibilities towards
overseas territories and friendly powers, an element of autonomous,
flexible and speedy expeditionary capability is essential.
- h. The UK is a trading nation dependant for
95% of her raw material requirements being supplied by sea. This
demands a concomitant contribution to maintaining freedom of use
in Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS). A presence of the UK's
naval outreach should be commensurate with expectations on our
freedom to trade.
- i. The defence of the UK from attack by air
- in whatever form this may emerge - is, arguably, a vital requirement.
- j. There is a very strong case, in terms
of efficiency, value for money and effectiveness for more "jointery"
between government departments. Although the FCO and DfID are
vital in this regard, the Home Office, Local Government &
Communities should become more closely involved where their interests
are directly affected.
6. Please use DefenceSynergia's website for the
detail required on our backgrounds and please communicate with
any of us, using our website contact details.
6 September 2010
|
