Written evidence from The Keep Our Future
Afloat Campaign Committee
1. THE KEEP
OUR FUTURE
AFLOAT CAMPAIGN
AND ITS
OBJECTIVES
1.1 The Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC)
is a trade union and local community campaign. Formed in 2004
in response to large scale redundancies at Barrow Shipyard, its
objectives are to:
- ¾ Sustain
and grow jobs in naval shipbuilding in NW England;
- ¾ Secure
full utilisation of the NW of England's shipbuilding assets and
the supply chain it maintains throughout the UK.
2. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
2.1 We welcome the new foreign policy and capability
led Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) process and advocate
that the SDSR invests in maritime capability.
2.2 Initial Gate approval for the successor submarine
project should be determined no later than 31 December 2010.
2.3 The successor submarine programme should
be funded as a national priority rather than wholly out of the
MoD budget.
2.4 Up to eight Astute class nuclear powered
submarines should be built at a steady drumbeat to ensure a smooth
transition into the successor.
2.5 Nuclear powered submarines give the UK unprecedented
utility and flexibility, but they cannot be in two places at once.
There should be no reduction in fleet size, to ensure capability
is retained and overhead costs are affordable.
2.6 The SDSR, and Defence Industrial Strategy
"2" which flows from it need to recognise that the programme
to build Astutes has been optimised in terms of its size and programme.
Any small disruption to the overall programme assumptions has
potential for a dramatic impact on the business which rapidly
becomes unsustainable from a SQEP skills perspective. Regenerating
submarine capability is hugely costly and difficult to do.
2.7 Diversification is difficult. The PA Management
Study 2003 on behalf of the Barrow Taskforce concluded that "the
value of one additional boat employing 2-3,000 people for 18-24
months is worth more to Barrow than any combination of diversification
possibilities".
3. OUR VIEWS
ECHO THOSE
OF UNITE
3.1 "Up to 13,000 jobs could be at risk
if Trident is delayed and any lengthy delay will mean that Britain
is in danger of losing the skills and ability to build such submarines".
- Source: UNITE Press Release, 30 July 2010.
4. THE FIRST
SEA LORD
4.1 Who recently said "maritime
capabilities are not a luxury, they are a necessity for a global
trading island with many overseas interests."[68]
5. AND THE
FOREIGN SECRETARY
5.1 KOFAC notes that the Foreign Secretary[69]
in July 2010 identified several priorities for UK foreign policy.
Maritime capability is crucially important if the UK is to:
- ¾ Extend
Britain's global reach and influence, inspiring other nations
and people using communications in a networked world and protecting
Britons abroad;
- ¾ Projecting
forces overseas instead of homeland based defence;
- ¾ Dealing
with widely dispersed, often difficult to access security threats.
KOFAC also welcomes the policy to:
- ¾ "Build
up bilateral relations and reinvigorate diplomacy in Latin America",
and is in agreement with "a modernised NATO Alliance and
an unbreakable alliance with the United States complemented by
partnerships with France and Germany". However, the UK should
clearly recognise that "we have underestimated the challenges
of operating in multinational operations in the past."[70]
6. PRINCIPLES
OF A
UK STRATEGIC DEFENCE
AND SECURITY
POLICY BEYOND
2010
6.1 KOFAC's views are as follows:
- ¾ A
foreign policy led SDSR must be adequately funded to be effective.
- ¾ We
need to win the war we are in (Afghanistan) and address future
threats by preventing and deterring conflicts whilst being prepared
to defeat adversaries.
- ¾ In
the future a need to sustain long-term maritime or air campaigns
could emerge.
- ¾ Britain
is a maritime nation, dependant on sea lanes for trade. Strong
maritime capability enables the UK to better guarantee security
of supply and address threats at distance.
- ¾ The
SDSR should define the kind of navy we need in years to come and
its key tasks which we see as being to protect safe passage of
our merchant fleet, move armed forces by sea and into the littoral
environment quickly and safely, use of vessels that can give hard
support on the ground and delivery of the strategic deterrent[71].
- ¾ The
defence industrial base should be regarded as a front line service
which provides high skilled jobs which offer, "high levels
of employment in some economically less well off parts of the
UK" - Source: Secretary of State for Defence identified
21 June 2010.
- ¾ The
MoD restructuring to reduce numbers improve efficiency should
be based on the three pillars of "strategy and policy,
the armed forces and procurement and estates"[72]
and a 10 year (2011-21) funding plan.
7. SPECIFICALLY
ON NUCLEAR
POWERED SUBMARINES,
7.1 KOFAC makes six key points as follows:
- ¾ The
unique capabilities of submarines must be exploited to the full
by the UK. They provide "the most sophisticated and flexible
weapons that we have to exercise sea control".[73]
- ¾ "Astute
submarines can deter almost any other navy from putting to sea
against us."[74]
- ¾ Only
submarines can for example safely conduct missions deep inside
an enemy's battle network. They are a strategic vital capability
for Britain.
- ¾ There
is "an enduring need for Britain to retain the capability
to design, build, operate, maintain and dispose of nuclear powered
submarines."[75]
- ¾ "As
long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a need to sustain safe,
secure and effective nuclear forces" ....
to "play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries
and reassuring allies".
- ¾ Britain
must commit to retain sovereignty over all aspects of the nuclear
powered submarine enterprise-design, construction and operation
to support such a strategic capability.
7.2 SDSR need to make it clear that the UK is
prepared to fund the nuclear submarine programme over the long
term to keep the unique capability it offers the Royal Navy and
to keep the submarine industrial base on which the capability
depends strong and vibrant.
7.3 The SDSR should commit the Government to
invest in nuclear submarine capabilities by:
- ¾ Funding
a steady drumbeat of submarine orders, one every 22-26 months
to replace aging submarines with 21st century capability. Stretching
out the drumbeat could put skills and capability at risk.
- ¾ uilding
up to eight Astutes and 4 successor submarines as part of future
maritime capability, with a follow on class of attack submarines
beyond 2030 to replace Astutes which have a reactor design life
of 25 years.
- ¾ Ensuring
a smooth transition of the Astute programme to development of
the successor strategic deterrent carrying programme.
- ¾ Retaining
a survivable strategic deterrent through a new submarine programme
designed to maintain undetectable continuously at sea patrols
by submarines.
- ¾ Funding
of the strategic deterrent capability as a national priority as
the ultimate guarantor of our national security and not wholly
seeking to have it funded out of the MoD's budget. It should not
be regarded as a financial burden.
- ¾ Perhaps
seek value for money savings on the strategic deterrent by delaying
Trident warhead or supporting infrastructure costs and prolonging
the life of existing missiles.
8. INDUSTRIAL
BASE ISSUES
8.1 "Defence Matters." Britain's
defence industrial base is a front line service as are the skills
within it. Both support the Armed Forces by providing them with
the capabilities they require to protect our national security
and deter threats.
8.2 Defence "represents high levels of
employment in some economically less well-off parts of the United
Kingdom" (Hansard 21 June 2010, Col. 53). Cumbria is
very defence dependent and the SDSR should recognise the significance
of defence spending as a means of helping improve wealth in remote
areas like Barrow.
8.3 Every job in defence creates 1.6 jobs elsewhere
in the economy. Investing in defence can help Britain's economic
recovery and can contribute significantly towards the Coalition
Government's policy to create a more balanced economy.
8.4 The SDSR must:
- ¾ Set
a consistent, realistic long term strategy for shaping the structure
and capabilities of the defence industrial base.
- ¾ Make
a clear statement of the industrial capability that the Coalition
Government wishes to keep onshore and what is needed to deliver
operational sovereignty.
- ¾ Create
conditions for a continuing supply of critical components and
that ensure that supply chains are not compromised by over reliance
on overseas suppliers.
- ¾ Ensure
critical skills are not lost.
8.5 In September 2010, Britain's Submarine Enterprise
has been optimised in terms of its size and programme such that
any small disruption to overall programme assumptions has the
potential for a dramatic impact on the business, which rapidly
becomes unsustainable from a skills retention perspective.
8.6 The National Audit Office has clearly documented
the effects of not building submarines for many years and the
atrophy of skills that result from a lack of submarine work. Work
load gaps continue to have an adverse impact on the Astute programme
beyond fabrication and build. Test, commissioning and entry into
service dates of fleet submarines are all impacted as well. The
National Audit Office's "The UK's Future Nuclear Deterrent
(HC 1115, 2007-2008) said "the time delay between the
construction of the Vanguard class submarines and the beginning
of the Astute programme meant that key skills and submarine building
experience had been lost."
8.7 The House of Commons Defence Select Committee
echoed this view observing that "if you don't exercise
your submarine design capability; if you don't exercise those
specialist submarine build techniques; in short, if you don't
build submarines regularly, you haemorrhage the capability to
build submarines very quickly and it costs more."[76]
8.8 Regenerating submarine capability is hugely
costly and difficult to do. Therefore a regular drumbeat of orders
is necessary.
8.9 The SDSR was launched in the knowledge that
the NAO Major Projects Report 2009 had identified
the following "slow of spend" policy increasing costs
in the submarine industrial base:
- ¾ "On
Astute Class submarines, the Department decided to slow the production
of boats 2-7, by delaying the delivery of boats 2-4 and deferring
the start of build of boats 5-7 which will lead to a net increase
in forecast costs of £400 million, arising as a result of
reducing expenditure by £139 million up to 2013-14. After
this time costs are forecast to increase by £539 million".
- ¾ "As
a result of the slippage on the Astute Class submarines, additional
costs of £38 million will be incurred to continue running
the existing, less capable, Trafalgar Class submarines, although
these costs should be at least partially offset by the savings
from not having to support the new Astute
Class. Further life extensions to the Trafalgar Class fleet are
not considered feasible".
- ¾ "The
decision to constrain expenditure during the four years commencing
2009-10 will slip the entry into service of each subsequent boat
by an average of nine months. This is forecast to leave a period
between 2015 and 2021 when there will be a shortfall of submarine
availability against the Department's stated requirement."
The SDSR should carefully consider whether the slowing
of programmes is in the best interest in retaining long-term capacity
and capability to afford and build future nuclear powered attack
submarines beyond the Astute class.
9. INDUSTRIAL
BASE OPPORTUNITIES
THAT THE
SUCCESSOR CREATES
9.1 It is important that the Initial Gate appraisal
of the successor submarine is completed by December 2010. This
will give industry clear visibility of forward commitment.
9.2 It is crucially important that the time tabling
of the design and build of the successor to the Vanguard class
is not "moved to the right", so as to open up a risk
of workload gaps which will put capabilities and skills that are
irreplaceable in the supply chain and shipyards at risk.
6 September 2010
68 First Sea Lord, 7 July 2010, RUSI Future Maritime
Operations Conference. Back
69
Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World, speech by the Foreign
Secretary, London 1 July 2010. Back
70
Adaptability and Partnership Green Paper, MoD February 2010. Back
71
Alison Seabeck MP, 21 June 2010 Hansard Col.76. Back
72
"The Need for Defence Reform", speech by Secretary of
State for Defence, 13 August 2010, RCIS, London. Back
73
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughhead, 17 June 2009,
BSBA. Back
74
Bernard Jenkin, MP for Harwich and North Essex, Hansard 21 June
2010 Col.74. Back
75
MoD Submarine Enterprise Collaborative Agreement Impact Assessment
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D929BC42-1968-4BD8-95E4-BE8CB71F576E/0/SecaImpactAssessmentFinalVersion.pdf.
"The capability provided by nuclear submarines is therefore
unique and of vital importance to national defence". Back
76
Lord Drayson, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, The Future
of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: The Manufacturing and
Skills Base, paras 57 and 59. Back
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