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The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy

NNS 35

Memorandum to the SDSR and the NSS Inquiry from the Ministry of Defence

1. Description of NSS and SDSR process and how it ensured that the NSS and SDSR are coherent documents.

The new National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) were developed in parallel. This allowed the findings of the NSS to feed directly into the SDSR decision-making process, and together set out the Government’s strategic decisions and priorities on security and defence. The NSS provides an assessment of the strategic context, Britain’s place in the world, and an analysis of the risks and opportunities we face. The SDSR sets out the ways and means to deliver the ends set out in the NSS. This includes identifying the forces and capabilities required to deliver those priorities. For the first time, the SDSR was developed as a cross-Departmental exercise, involving all the Departments contributing to national security through a range of capabilities including the Armed Forces, the UK’s overseas network, and some of its Official Development Assistance. The decision to publish them in short succession (18/19 October) allowed each to be given distinct consideration.

2. How will the effectiveness of National Security Council be assessed?

The National Security Council (NSC) is a Cabinet Committee. Like other Cabinet Committees its effectiveness is assessed by the Cabinet through the routine reporting of Council conclusions at each meeting. NSC discussions can also be elevated to Cabinet when issues require the broader collective attention of Cabinet or when outcomes of discussions are relevant to a wider audience. This has taken place on a number of occasions including before publication of the SDSR.

Oversight of policy operation, including of decisions reached by the NSC, is undertaken by Parliamentary Select Committees such as the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS). The JCNSS was reappointed in January 2011, chaired by the Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP. The Committee will be responsible for setting their timetable for assessment of the implementation and success of the SDSR and NSS. As Secretary to the NSC, the National Security Adviser (NSA) has provided evidence to a number of Select Committees on the effectiveness of the NSC.

3. Does the NSC have access to external advice from outside Government? How is it decided who should give this advice and how is the advice assessed?

NSC discussions are informed by the consideration of a full range of policy options including external advice from outside Government. This can be provided directly or through policy consultation by officials. In the case of Afghanistan policy a seminar was held at Chequers at which a range of subject matter experts were invited to give advice directly to Ministers before their consideration of overall strategy. Similarly, the NATO Secretary General was invited to brief the Council ahead of a meeting on the NATO Strategic Concept and reform.

The Government engaged a wide variety of parties when developing the NSS and SDSR. The Cabinet Office oversaw a strategic programme of stakeholder engagement that was conducted by a variety of Departments on both high level and more specific issues. Cross-party consensus was sought through Committees and through instruments such as Defence Debates. International partners (notably the US and France), academia, and the private sector were consulted regularly. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) consulted members of the Armed Forces and their families; key industrial partners on long-term equipment programme issues; the public sector; academic think tanks; non-governmental organisations; and partners and Allies on strategic policy issues.

The Government has also taken an active interest in continued public, academic and other debates that take place on the future of Defence. The NSA draws on a wide range of advice, and NSC papers are informed by external perspectives as well as official positions. Advice presented to Ministers in the NSC is considered in the NSC(Officials) meeting, chaired by the NSA. This coordinates Government policy across a wide range of national security issues and assesses how significant policy questions should be presented to Ministers. The NSC(Officials) meeting also coordinates the NSC forward work programme, which is agreed with the Prime Minister. The development of specific workstrands such as the Building Stability Overseas Strategy is informed by external advice: MOD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID) are currently running a number of consultations with world-leading experts from multilateral, non-governmental, and academic organisations on the UK’s role in and strategy for upstream prevention.

4. How does the NSC ensure a joined up approach across government and how is this implemented on the ground? Description of cross Government approach to NSS and SDSR. Procedure in case of dispute between departments.

The NSC provides the forum for collective decision-making across the full range of UK national security issues. Key departments with security-related functions are represented, including: FCO; HM Treasury; Home Office; MOD; Department for Energy and Climate Change; DFID; and the Cabinet Office. Cabinet Ministers in other Departments are invited to attend if an issue will impact their area. Senior Officials, including the Chief of Defence Staff, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and Agency Heads are also frequently invited to attend.

The discipline of systematic, weekly consideration of national security priorities in a Ministerial forum chaired by the Prime Minister drives a more coherent approach to collective consideration of strategy across Government Departments. The NSC ensures Ministers consider national security in the round not as separate blocs.

The NSC drives and monitors the implementation of the SDSR and NSS by lead Ministers, officials and Departments. Lead Ministers, accountable to the NSC, take responsibility for coordinating priority areas of work to deliver national security tasks. A series of inter-Departmental committees at senior official level also support and inform the NSC. They report to the NSC(Officials) meeting that meets weekly. The details of lead ministers, designated officials and bodies responsible for coordinating work on priority areas across all relevant departments, along with the NSC structure, are set out at Annex A.

Within individual D epartments, Secretaries of State also chair D epartmental boards that provide strategic leadership. They are responsible for developing the strategies for their D epartments in line with the Government’s overarching strategic agenda. Lead Min isters also have additional responsibility for coordinating across G overnment priority areas of work to deliver the national security tasks e.g. the D efence Secretary is lead Min ister for all D efence aspects of the S D SR. In the MO D , the D efence Strategy Group met regularly and was attended by the NSA and Min isters from other Government D epartments.

The National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office monitors progress on the SDSR and its officials seek to facilitate resolutions of differences of perspective between Departments through the NSC(Officials) group before they are put before the NSC.

In recent years cultural change has also promoted a steady improvement in cross- D epartmental working on security. The S D SR outlines how this will be further enhanced through the development of integrated strategies in key countries and regions, the expansion of Stabilisation Unit’s remit, including the establishment of Stabilisation Response Teams, closer cooperation of D epartmental strategy units , and on specific themes like horizon scanning.

5. List of actions / deliverables identified as arising from the NSS and SDSR. Identify priorities and how these were arrived at.

The SDSR identified a total of 225 commitments, which are clearly set out in the White Paper. SDSR delivery is managed through a system of lead Ministers, accountable to the NSC and responsible for overseeing the co-ordination of SDSR implementation in 10 priority areas. Ministers are supported by designated officials in the lead Departments. The 10 priority areas with their lead Ministers and officials are set out at Annex A. While responsibility for delivery rests with the lead Department concerned progress is monitored by the Cabinet Office SDSR Implementation Board and the NSC. The Cabinet Office SDSR Implementation Board is a cross-government group, chaired by the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office and attended by Director-level officials with expertise in the 10 priority areas from each of the lead departments. This includes the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the Department for International Development; the Home Office; the Ministry of Defence; the Department for Energy and Climate Change; the UK Border Agency; the Office for Cyber Security and Information Assurance; the Civil Contingencies Secretariat within the Cabinet Office. Other Government Departments are invited to attend Board meetings as required, where there interests are engaged.

The principal objective of the Board is to ensure the effective and timely delivery of the various commitments set out in the SDSR. In doing so it monitors progress in implementation across each of the 10 key policy areas, identifying and acting upon any risks or areas of concern. The Board also has a role in facilitating and encouraging as far as possible, a collective cross-government approach, not only in implementing specific policy commitments, but also in achieving overall progress in each of the main policy areas.

6. List of current defence initiatives / reviews / consultations. Deadlines for reporting. How these fit in with NSS and SDSR.

See Annex B.

7. Set out current defence planning assumptions and how they fit in with the NSS and SDSR.

Based on the adaptable posture the NSC agreed a set of eight cross-cutting National Security Tasks that link to the priorities set out in NSS, with more detailed Planning Guidelines on how they are to be achieved. These will drive detailed decisions by Departments over the next five years on how to prioritise resource allocation and capability development. They can be found at Annex C.

Within the overall framework of the National Security Tasks the contribution of the Armed Forces is further defined through Military Tasks, which describe what the Government may ask the Armed Forces to undertake; and through more detailed Defence Planning Assumptions about the size of the operations we plan to undertake, how often we might undertake them, how far away from permanent bases, with which partners and allies, and how soon we expect to recover from the effort involved. The seven Military Tasks are:

· defending the UK and its Overseas Territories

· providing strategic intelligence

· providing nuclear deterrence

· supporting civil emergency organisations in times of crisis

· defending our interests by projecting power strategically and through expeditionary interventions

· providing a defence contribution to UK influence

· providing security for stabilisation.

The new D efence Planning Assumptions envisage that the Armed Forces in the future will be sized and shaped to conduct:

· an enduring stabilisation operation at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime and air support as required, while also conducting:

· one non-enduring complex intervention (up to 2,000 personnel), and

· one non-enduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel);

or alternatively:

· three non-enduring operations if we were not already engaged in an enduring operation;

or:

· for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off

· intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003).

8. How will UK adapt to changing threats / unforeseen circumstances (bearing in mind capability gaps)? [what capability gaps will emerge due to the SDSR, including how these were assessed as part of the development of the strategies and what impact this may have on the UK’s defence planning assumptions and the ability to adapt to changing threats or unforeseen occurrences].

The Government is committed to conducting regular SDSRs. It will refresh the SDSR every parliament to ensure that the fundamental judgements remain right and that the changes it sets out are affordable. Between these reviews, the NSC monitors at the strategic level the latest assessments from the Joint Intelligence Committee, ensuring that our strategic approach is based on a shared understanding of the political, economic, and military context. This will include, for example, assessment of threats at source through a biannual review of the National Security Risks Assessment. We will also continue to place emphasis on developing adaptable capabilities in the maritime, land and air domains which contribute to the widest possible range of military scenarios. An annual mandate for cross-Whitehall horizon scanning, based on the NSC-agreed priorities, will ensure focus on key areas of concern, while allowing scope for consideration of new, emerging issues. We have also committed to reviewing the National Security Risk Assessment every two years.

The NSS also emphasises the importance of working upstream to reduce the likelihood of risks to the UK. To help bring stability to countries where the risks are high, our interests are most at stake, and where we know we can have an impact, we are significantly increasing our support to conflict prevention and poverty reduction, guided by regular updates of the Countries at Risk of Instability report.

The Government recognises it will have to manage greater risks in some areas due to reductions in capability. Mitigation of risk will take different forms in each case. In the case of Carrier Strike for example we will do so by: maintaining our strategic intelligence capability in order to identify new and emerging military risks; deepening partnerships to manage risks; preserving the ability to reconstitute our levels of military capability in areas which are currently low priority, such as heavy armour; and maintaining a minimum effective strategic deterrent.

9. Initial MoD assessment of gap in defence budget and how this was derived?

The gap in the Defence Budget is the estimated difference between the cost of the Defence programme and the MOD budget under the assumption that the budget would rise in line with inflation over the ten years 2011-12 to 2020-21. The figures are based on a number of assumptions including changes in fuel prices, foreign exchange rates, and Armed Forces pay awards. It will, therefore, change over time.

A figure of £38Bn was calculated before the SDSR. The SDSR announced substantial reductions to the planned force structure. The measures announced go a long way to eliminating this excess but it will take time to work through the consequences of the SDSR decisions and bring the Defence Budget back into balance.

10. Set out how SDSR means budget gap is resolved? What more needs to be done? What will happen if deficit not resolved?

The SDSR established the policy framework for our Armed Forces and the capabilities that they will need to meet future challenges and achieve success on future operations while safeguarding Afghanistan. The spending review set out the resources allocated to Defence for the implementation of the SDSR. This will enable us to bring D efence policy, plans, commitments and resources into better balance through our annual planning process.

The outcomes of the SDSR and the Spending Review form the basis of the Department’s annual Planning Round (PR11), which is still ongoing. The Planning Round looks out over 10 years. This process involves updating the estimated costs of the Department’s current activities and adjusting for the estimated costs and savings arising from the changes announced in the SDSR. Until this process is complete it is not possible to reliably estimate the size of any residual shortfall. The Planning Round process routinely re-prioritises the Defence programme to ensure that the Department lives within its budget PR11 is expected to conclude in spring 2011.

The Spending Review included ambitious, but achievable, targets for delivering non front-line and efficiency savings of some £4.3Bn over the next four years. We are working to deliver these.

As for the period beyond 2014/15, in announcing the SDSR, the Prime Minister was clear that his own strong view was there would need to be real terms growth in the Defence budget in the years beyond the current Spending Review to make this force structure affordable by 2020. As we are continuing to develop and refine our SDSR implementation plans it is not sensible to speculate about the overall cost of the future Defence programme. The Prime Minister has said that the Government is committed to the vision of 2020 and will make decisions accordingly.

11. Provide SDSR (NSS) implementation plan. [The role of the Ministry of Defence, including the Defence Reform Unit, and other Government departments, the National Security Council, the Armed Forces and other agencies in the development and implementation of the NSS and SDSR, including areas that stretch across Government such as the UK’s increased role in conflict prevention].

As set out in the SDSR lead Government Ministers, accountable to the NSC, are responsible for coordinating priority areas of work to deliver the national security tasks. They work with all Departments with a stake in the issue. They are supported by officials who lead work across Government and in partnership with others including the private sector, nongovernmental organisations , and international partners.

I mplementation of the S D SR at the strategic level is reviewed every six months by the Prime Min ister and N SC , supported by routine monitoring from the centre by the Cabinet Office Implementation Board. There is an annual statement on overall progress to Parliament and the public.

The implementation process will, where possible, draw on existing programme management functions to maximise their effectiveness, efficiency , and visibility . Wi thin the M O D t he implementation of the S D SR will be taken forward using the Strategy for D efence approach. This strategy (first published in October 2009) will be revised taking its priorities from the S D SR White Paper and the MO D ’s Business Plan . This will form the front end of the more detailed D efence Strategic D irection ( D S D ) document and will look out around 20 years provi ding detailed direction to the MO D on priorities for resource allocation. The D efence Plan will direct the near-term realisation of the vision articulated in D S D . Beneath this topmost level of direction, the outcome of S D SR will be delivered by a number of sub-strategies the key ones being the Royal Navy, the Army, the Royal Air Force, D efence Estates, Service Personnel, Civilian Workforce, Capability, Logistics, Acquisition, D E&S and Security Policy and Operations, noting that these may be adjusted in line with the D efence Reform Unit ’s findings).

Separately, the D efence Reform Unit will develop a new, more cost-effective model for the management of D efence with clear allocation of responsibility, authority and accountability. This will dovetail with the conclusions of the S D SR and contribute towards achieving some of the £4.3 non-front line savings identified in the S D SR.

The S D SR committed the UK G overnment to focusing on fragile and conflict-affected countries where the risks are high, our interests are most at stake , and where we know we can have an impact. To help bring stability to such countries we will increase significantly our support to conflict pr evention and poverty reduction. We will deliver this support through an integrated approach that brings together our diplomatic, development, D efence , and intelligence resources. Specifically, the Government will bring clearer direction with a greater focus on results through the new Building Stability Overseas Strategy t o be published in spring 2011. The strategy will aim to draw on lessons learned by international actors, donors , and fragile states themselves about what works best in these environments . The strategy will primarily focus on the actions that the UK should take to make a difference to building stability overseas and how we should do it. It will consider our broader approach to building stability not just stabilisation and will take a longer term perspective, focusing on how we can support inclusive politics, economic growth and stronger institutions better as the base for building stability and resilience. We will prioritise our support for D efence engagement and security sector reform. The strategy will not try to set out everything we could or should do but will focus on the key changes that we judge would make a significant difference to our impact.

It is currently being drafted by a cross-Whitehall team of officials who are consulting extensively with external experts so that the draft is informed by the latest thinking on conflict/instability

12. Process for assessing the NSS and SDSR. By whom and timescale? [how the implementation and success of the NSS and SDSR will be measured]

The NSC is responsible for NSS and SDSR delivery. The Cabinet Office leads the SDSR Implementation Board which reports to the NSC and meets regularly to monitor and assess the implementation of the NSS and SDSR. The NSC itself reports regularly to Cabinet. Oversight of the NSC (and all other Cabinet Committees) is undertaken by Parliamentary Select Committees, including the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.. Parliamentary oversight by the JCNSS is covered in more detail in our response to Question 2. The SDSR commits the Government to an annual public statement on overall progress.

13. How has the Govt communicated NSS and SDSR to public and armed forces? What was feedback? [the success of the Government in communicating the outcomes of the NSS and SDSR to the Armed Forces and the UK public, particularly in relation to current and future operations]

Throughout the development of the NSS and SDSR the Cabinet Office oversaw a strategic programme of stakeholder engagement including key strategic thinkers in the defence and security field, which was conducted by a variety of Departments on both high level and more specific issues. Cross-party consensus was sought through Committees and through instruments such as Defence Debates. International partners, academia, and the private sector were consulted regularly. The MOD consulted members of the Armed Forces and their families. Constructive feedback was gained from each stakeholder, which was fed into the development of both the NSS and SDSR.

The Government briefed key academics, journalists, and officials as part of a coordinated communications strategy at the time of the announcement to ensure that the outcomes of the NSS and SDSR were clearly communicated to the Armed Forces and the UK public. This was followed up by a series of speeches and interviews by Ministers and Senior Officials to discuss the intricacies of the SDSR and NSS.

Separately, the MOD communicated the outcomes of the SDSR down the chain of command of the Armed Forces including to forces on the front line in Afghanistan.

We are now committed to a period of ongoing discussions with trade unions, local councils, and relevant local interest groups to implement the conclusions of the SDSR.

This includes base closures and relocation of Defence personnel and ensure those affected are engaged in implementation plans.

The Government has received extensive feedback through a wide range of channels including Parliamentary and media commentary, surveys and reports conducted by a range of think tanks, academics and non-governmental organisations, and correspondence from members of the public both direct and through their Members of Parliament. The risk-based and integrated pan-Government nature of the SDSR has been generally welcomed. Reactions to specific measures, especially given the wider financial context, have inevitably been more mixed with most individual measures receiving a combination of criticism and commendation from different sources. We have not yet within that identified any particular common general themes emerging.

14. Timing of future SDSRs and planning. How will the NSS be updated and by whom? Can loss capabilities be regenerated?

The Government will publish an annual report of progress, for scrutiny by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the NSS, and is committed to producing a new NSS and SDSR in the next Parliament.

The NSS will accompany future SDSRs as part of the logical process of assessing and determining our risks, priorities, and capabilities. The process will be driven from the centre by the NSC through the NSA and Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat.

We will also refresh the National Security Risk Assessment biennially to ensure that our fundamental national security judgements remain right, that the changes we decide upon are affordable, and that our strategy provides the right basis on which to deliver security for the UK, its interests and people.

The SDSR makes clear that some capabilities will be on extended readiness and others will need to be regenerated and we will preserve the ability to reconstitute military capabilities. This will form part of our management of risk for those capabilities we will lose. Regeneration of capabilities in the event of a major shift in the strategic environment or threat we face will be kept under consideration.

The SDSR is a point of departure not the end of the line. We have set a path to 2020 and beyond with regular reviews every five years. The first period from 2010 to 2015 is a period of rebalancing our strategic direction. The period from 2015 to 2020 will be about regrowing capability and achieving our overall vision. For example, the withdrawal from service of Harrier means our carrier strike capability will be gapped. This has been a difficult decision that has not been taken lightly. It has been driven by the need to make economies over the short term and the fact that withdrawal of an aircraft type delivers greater savings than partial reductions. Re-establishment of the capability will be a challenge, but one that we judge to be manageable. This decision does not devalue the importance we attach to the future capability.

Annex A – SDSR Implementation

Details of lead ministers, designated officials and bodies responsible for coordinating work on priority areas across all relevant departments are as follows:

Membership and terms of reference of the National Security Council

and its sub-committees

National Security Council

Membership:

Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service (Chair) (The Rt Hon David Cameron MP)

Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council (Deputy Chair) (The Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP)

First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (The Rt Hon William Hague MP)

Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)

Secretary of State for the Home Department; and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)

Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)

Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)

Secretary of State for International Development (The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP)

Chief Secretary to the Treasury (The Rt Hon Danny Alexander MP)

Minister of State – Cabinet Office (The Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP)

Minister for Security (The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones)

Terms of Reference:

To consider matters relating to National Security, Foreign Policy, Defence, International Relations and Development, Resilience, Energy and Resource Security.

NSC (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)

Membership:

Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service (Chair) (The Rt Hon David Cameron MP)

Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council (Deputy Chair) (The Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP)

First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (The Rt Hon William Hague MP)

Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)

Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice (The Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP)

Secretary of State for the Home Department; and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)

Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)

Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (The Rt Hon Dr Vincent Cable MP)

Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)

Secretary of State for Health (The Rt Hon Andrew Lansley CBE MP)

Secretary of State for Education (The Rt Hon Michael Gove MP)

Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (The Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP)

Secretary of State for Transport (The Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP )

Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (The Rt Hon Caroline Spelman MP)

Secretary of State for International Development, (The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP)

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (The Rt Hon Owen Paterson MP)

Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport (The Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP)

Minister for Security (The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones)

(Restricted attendance for intelligence matters to: Prime Minister (Chair), Deputy Prime Minister (Deputy Chair), Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary of State for the Home Department, Secretary of State for Defence.)

Terms of Reference:

To consider issues relating to terrorism and other security threats, hazards, resilience and intelligence policy and the performance and resources of the security and intelligence agencies; and report as necessary to the National Security Council.

NSC (Nuclear)

Membership:

Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service (Chair) (The Rt Hon David Cameron MP)

Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council (Deputy Chair) (The Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP)

First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (The Rt Hon William Hague MP)

Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)

Secretary of State for the Home Department, and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)

Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)

Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)

Terms of Reference:

To consider issues relating to nuclear deterrence and security.

National Security Council (Emerging Powers)

Membership:

First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Chair)

(The Rt Hon William Hague MP)

Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Deputy Chair)

(The Rt Hon Dr Vincent Cable MP)

Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)

Secretary of State for the Home Department; and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)

Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)

Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)

Secretary of State for International Development (The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP)

Chief Secretary to the Treasury (The Rt Hon Danny Alexander MP)

Minister for Government Policy – Cabinet Office (The Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP)

Minister of State – Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Jeremy Browne MP)

Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism (The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones)

Terms of Reference:

To consider matters relating to the UK’s relationship with emerging international powers.

Annex B

A nnex C

National security tasks and planning guidelines

We will:

1. Identify and monitor national security risks and opportunities. To deliver this we require:

• a coordinated approach to early warning and horizon scanning

• strategic intelligence on potential threats to national security and opportunities for the UK to act

• coordinated analysis and assessment of the highest priorities

• investment in technologies to support the gathering of communications data vital for national security and law enforcement

• intelligence assets to support the core military, diplomatic and domestic security and resilience requirements set out below, and our economic prosperity.

2. Tackle at root the causes of instability. To deliver this we require:

• an effective international development programme making the optimal contribution to national security within its overall objective of poverty reduction, with the D epartment for International D evelopment focussing significantly more effort on priority national security and fragile states

• civilian and military stabilisation capabilities that can be deployed early together to help countries avoid crisis or deal with conflict

• targeted programmes in the UK , and in countries posing the greatest threat to the UK , to stop people becoming terrorists.

3. Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks. To deliver this we require:

• a D iplomatic Service that supports our key multilateral and bilateral relationships and the obligations that come from our status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a leading member of NATO, the EU and other international organisations

• a Foreign and Commonwealth Office-led global overseas network that focuses on safeguarding the UK ’s national security, building its prosperity, and supporting UK nationals around the world

• coordinated cross-government effort overseas to build the capacity of priority national security and fragile states to take increasing responsibility for their own stability

• strategic military power projection to enhance security, deter or contain potential threats, and support diplomacy.

4. Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to help tackle those who threaten the UK and our interests, including maintenance of underpinning technical expertise in key areas. To deliver this we require:

• law enforcement capability to investigate and where possible bring to justice terrorists and the most seriously harmful organised criminal groups impacting on the UK

• continuous development of the rules-based international system

• stronger multilateral approaches for countering proliferation and securing fissile material and expertise from malicious use

• retention of our chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear science and technology capabilities that contribute to counter-proliferation and our response to the potential use of such materials by terrorist or state actors.

5. Protect the UK and our interests at home, at our border and internationally, to address physical and electronic threats from state and non-state sources. To deliver this we require:

• a minimum effective nuclear deterrent

• secure borders

• security and intelligence services and police counter-terrorism capability to disrupt life-threatening terrorist threats to the UK

• military capabilities to help protect the UK from major terrorist attack

• an independent ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily

• investment in new and flexible capabilities such as cyber to meet emerging risks and threats.

6. Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability. Where necessary, intervene overseas, including the legal use of coercive force in support of the UK ’s vital interests, and to protect our overseas territories and people. To deliver this we require:

• an integrated approach to building stability overseas, bringing together better diplomatic, development, military and other national security tools

• Armed Forces capable of both stabilisation and intervention operations

• a civilian response scaled to support concurrency and scale of military operations

• the military ability to help evacuate UK citizens from crises overseas.

7. Provide resilience for the UK by being prepared for all kinds of emergencies, able to recover from shocks and to maintain essential services. To deliver this we require:

• security and resilience of the infrastructure most critical to keeping the country running (including nuclear facilities) against attack, damage or destruction

• crisis management capabilities able to anticipate and respond to a variety of major domestic emergencies and maintain the business of government

• resilient supply and distribution systems for essential services

• effective, well organised local response to emergencies in the UK , building on the capabilities of local responders, businesses and communities

• enhanced central government and Armed Forces planning, coordination and capabilities to help deal with the most serious emergencies.

8. Work in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger responses. To deliver this we require:

• collective security through NATO as the basis for territorial defence of the UK , and stability of our European neighbourhood, as well as an outward-facing EU that promotes security and prosperity

• our contribution to international military coalitions to focus on areas of comparative national advantage valued by key allies, especially the United States, such as our intelligence capabilities and highly capable elite forces

• greater sharing of military capabilities, technologies and programmes, and potentially more specialisation, working with key allies, including France, and based on appropriate formal guarantees where necessary

• a Defence Industrial and Technology policy that seeks to secure the independence of action we need for our Armed Forces, while allowing for increased numbers of off-the-shelf purchases and greater promotion of defence exports.