The strategic defence and security review and the national security strategy

Written evidence from the Church of England

1 The Church of England welcomes the opportunity to respond to the House of Commons’ Defence Select Committee’s inquiry into the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the National Security Strategy (NSS). The Mission and Public Affairs Council of the Church of England is the body responsible for overseeing research and comment on social and political issues on behalf of the Church. The Council comprises a representative group of bishops, clergy and lay people with interest and expertise in the relevant areas, and reports to the General Synod through the Archbishops’ Council.

2 We note that the Defence Committee is interested in examining whether the decisions taken by the Coalition Government truly fulfil the stated intention of the SDSR as "set(ting) out the ways and means to deliver the end set out in the National Security Strategy." In this submission we focus on the importance of clarity in articulating the global role the United Kingdom seeks to play and its implications for building up and retaining broad public support for the resourcing of the kind of defence effort - the ways and means - needed to fulfil that role.

3 This submission is informed by the Archbishops’ Council’s prior contribution to the Ministry of Defence’s Green Paper, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review, April 2010. This is available at http://www.churchofengland.org/media/45508/sdrsubmission.pdf. This submission also takes into account the Lord Bishop of Wakefield’s intervention in the House of Lords debate on the results of the SDSR, October 2010, and his subsequent contribution to the 27 January 2011 House of Lords debate that he introduced on the relationship between the SDSR and the Military Covenant.

4 In our response to the MoD’s Green Paper we explicitly welcomed the attempts to structure the debate around a wider effort to "determine the global role we wish to play" and the relative role of the armed forces and the resources we are willing to dedicate to them." In this submission we draw attention to the fact that the inherently difficult task of assessing ‘ways and means’ is rendered even more difficult when the all important question of the nature of the UK’s global role remains unanswered. Although the government has been following the correct sequence, with the NSS providing the framework for the SDSR, reviewing Britain’s defence must begin with a clear articulation of national purpose which takes into account not only how the world is now but also how the world is likely to change in the medium term. Ways and means for securing strategic objectives should then follow.

5 We acknowledge that the NSS attempts to provide a view for the future. We recognise that such attempts are always difficult and prone to error, prompting charges of crystal ball gazing. Unfortunately, in what was no doubt an attempt to be comprehensive the risk assessment methodology led to the inclusion of virtually every risk imaginable. The result was a rather crude matrix of broad threats and risks that is at odds with the more nuanced analysis set out in the report Global Strategic Trend – Out to 2040 that was produced by the MoD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.

6 In consequence there is a serious problem of ‘fit’ between the NSS and the SDSR: the former lacks an adequate strategic framework to enable an assessment. We are concerned by the absence of the type, intensity and number of military operations that the government believes the MoD should be able to mount if called upon. This, we suggest, is the reason for the controversies about particular decisions, such as – the carrier strike saga, the decommissioning of the Ark Royal and the withdrawal of NIMROD. The SDSR lacks the necessary strategic framework to render such decisions intelligible and, likely to be supported by the wider public. The lack of that framework has also fed the criticism that the SDSR was actually resource rather than strategy driven.

7 It was also unfortunate that the NSS and the SDSR were produced at such speed. This fed the popular impression that the common variable in both was the need to reach a financial settlement on defence within the timeframe of the overall Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). With such an uncertain economic background it was perhaps inevitable that the public debate that surrounded the 2010 defence review was dominated by reports of inter-service rivalry, departmental resource competition, the stresses of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and political uncertainty as to the future funding of Britain’s nuclear deterrent.

8 These contingent factors have diverted attention from the need to conduct an informed and responsible public debate about the UK’s global role through the first half of the 21st Century which would bring together aspirations and political and economic resources. That task still has to be done and we look to the new National Security Council to sponsor it and ensure that the much needed public debate on Britain’s strategic narrative is not crowded out by special interests. Her Majesty’s Government has a responsibility to ensure that in an age of uncertainty, where terrorist and cyber attacks are added to the traditional mix of threats to national security, the public understands and owns the strategic rationale for the defence and security response it is planning to provide. That public understanding and confidence is a pre-condition to an assessment of the ways and means necessary to make that response.

9 We very much regret therefore that after the General Election debate has moved straight to the question, "what sort of defence expenditure can the country afford" before achieving consensus on "what type of country do we want to be". The a priori question, what global role should the United Kingdom seeks to play, remains unanswered.

10 To what ends do we need to retain the capacity to project our military power beyond the British Isles? Should Britain be willing and able to intervene in situations similar to that in Sierra Leone or Kosovo? Are we willing to contribute troops in substantial numbers to UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in support of our objectives? Should we accept that we should only use military force in partnership with others – e.g. US or European partners? Or, should Britain retain sufficient capacity to provide for its own defence and the defence of its dependent territories? Should, or does, this mean retaining our national nuclear deterrent? What scale of resources are we prepared to divert from other desirable national objectives in order to achieve these national global objectives?

11 These are truly strategic questions of the first order that are so fundamental – touching as they do on matters of values and ethics - that debating and settling them cannot, indeed must not, be confined to the military or politicians only. Neither the NSS nor the SDSR have come near to answering them and that is a matter of grave concern given the uncertain future that we face as predicted by the MoD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.

12 These questions can only be answered by recourse to a more widespread debate about the identity of our country, its nature, its interests, its duties and its direction in a dark, volatile and troubled new world. It involves a discussion that extends beyond considerations of national interest and the narrow obligations of government to involve questions of national self-perception, international influence, national autonomy and moral purpose.

13 This debate needs to include not just matters regarding the recourse to armed force, but also consideration of what constitutes the acceptable, even just, use of force in war or other combat situations. We realise that the government is progressing beyond the dominant narrative of the past decade - namely Britain as a "force for good". Any new narrative must still make the case that British foreign and defence policy ought to be based on democratic and humanitarian values as well as national interest.

14 In conclusion, we recognize that it was always going to be hard to deliver a coherent, comprehensive and considered SDSR within the allotted timeframe. The creation of the NSC does provide a mechanism - if properly used - for a more integrated approach across government. The commitment to hold regular SDSRs within the context established by prior NSS reviews is the correct way to procedure. Despite these advances we hold that the government would be wise to stimulate a long overdue national conversation on the question of what sort of country do we want to be and that it would be advisable to do this well in advance of the next review period.

February 2011