The strategic defence and security review and the national security strategy
Written evidence from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Introduction
1
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) works for the elimination of British nuclear weapons and the abolition of nuclear weapons worldwide. We urge the government to cancel the replacement of Trident – whether a like-for-like system or any other nuclear weapons option - and to scrap the existing programme.
2
At the launch of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in June 2010, we condemned the exclusion of Trident for directly contradicting Liam Fox’s own stated aim of ‘saying goodbye to the Cold War’ and his assertion that nothing should be ruled out of consideration.
3
CND believes that by excluding Trident from the SDSR, the government’s attempts to assess and plan strategically for the changed security circumstances that Britain faces were rendered partial and inadequate. However, we were pleased to note that whilst the SDSR, gave no strategic consideration as to the need or otherwise for the UK to possess nuclear weapons, nevertheless it announced reductions in warhead numbers and missile tubes on replacement submarines and a delay to the Main Gate decision point.
4
We were also pleased to note that the National Security Strategy, published the day before the SDSR, confirmed the government’s view that the threat of nuclear warfare has receded and has been assessed as a Tier Two threat, below coastal erosion and cyber warfare. However, we regret the Ministry of Defence’s apparent unwillingness to fully consider the implications of this threat reduction for Britain’s security needs and in particular the need or otherwise for the possession of nuclear weapons and their opportunity costs with regard to other defence spending.
5
CND welcomed the view expressed in the National Security Strategy that the threat of ‘An attack on the UK or its Oversees Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons … was judged to be low likelihood.’ But the continued refusal to reconsider the role of Trident therefore suggests that the desire to keep it is based on political rather than military considerations.
6
CND welcomed the announcement of a delay to the Main Gate decision, but is particularly concerned by subsequent announcements that significant purchases for construction will be made ahead of the Main Gate decision on whether or not to replace Trident. Such purchases do not have parliamentary authority and will undermine the decision-making process with regard to Trident replacement.
7
CND urges the Ministry of Defence and other relevant government departments to use this time to carry out a full review of the strategic role of nuclear weapons in relation to our defence and security requirements, and to assess the opportunity cost of nuclear weapons for defence and other vital areas of government spending.
8
CND urges the government to facilitate a full and informed parliamentary and public debate on the need or otherwise for nuclear weapons, prior to the Main Gate decision point.
The National Security Strategy
9
The introduction to the National Security Strategy expressly states the changed security circumstances the UK now faces, from the ‘Soviet armies arrayed across half of Europe and the constant threat of nuclear confrontation between the superpowers’ to what is now a ‘different and more complex range of threats from a myriad of sources.’
Further on, it states ‘Twenty years after the Berlin Wall came down, the equipment we have available is still too rooted in a Cold War mind-set’
10
The conclusion of the Strategic Context for the document states, ‘During the Cold War we faced an existential threat from a state adversary through largely predictable military or nuclear means. We no longer face such predictable threats.’
11
It is as a result of these changed circumstances that state-on-state nuclear warfare is not regarded as one of the UK’s highest priority security concerns in the Strategy. Those listed in Tier One are international terrorism; hostile attacks on UK cyber space; a major accident or natural hazard; and an international military crisis between states, drawing in the UK.
12
The document placed the threat of nuclear warfare in Tier Two, stating, ‘An attack on the UK or its Oversees Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons … was judged to be low likelihood.’
This is the supposed scenario in which it is foreseen that Trident would be used.
13
It is worth noting that whilst the NSS states ‘Government departments dealing with national security cannot be exempt from these [financial] pressures’, those threats listed in Tier One do not receive greater financial resources and, in some cases, significantly less than those related to state-on-state nuclear warfare – specifically Trident.
14
The NSS does state that ‘although some risks have been judged as being of higher priority than others, this does not automatically mean greater resources must be allocated to them. This is because some capabilities are inherently more costly than others.’ However this pre-supposes that the cost and utility of equipment required to deal with each threat is considered as part of the process of allocating resources. With Trident this was not the case.
15
That the NSS has identified such a large number of significant risks above the threat of state-on-state nuclear warfare, makes the go-ahead for Trident replacement seem like an exceptionally expensive after-thought, lacking in any genuine rationale.
16
In launching this year’s Review, the Ministry of Defence stated that the SDSR should be linked to foreign policy requirements, but doing so requires it to consider any impact upon international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and nuclear non-proliferation treaty commitments in particular.
17
Following the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague stated that the new government had sought ‘specific forward action plans to strengthen implementation of the treaty's non-proliferation and disarmament provisions.’
The Conference’s Final Agreement called on all nuclear-weapon states "to undertake concrete disarmament efforts."
18
The Ministry of Defence should be asked to clarify how its assessment of the threat of state-on-state nuclear warfare influences the action it takes on implementing commitments under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and how it has co-operated with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in this regard.
The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review
19
The SDSR criticises the previous government for its failure to ‘face up to the new security realities of the post Cold War world’ and cites in particular, military hardware such as the Army’s tanks in Germany, and the Navy’s increasingly expensive surface ships but fails to extend the same realities to Trident.
20
Given the conclusions of both the 2008 and 2010 National Security Strategies, that the threat of state-on-state nuclear warfare has diminished, it appears increasingly evident that the refusal to consider Trident is a political rather than a military decision.
21
The operational announcements regarding Trident and its replacement, including the reduction in warhead numbers and missile tubes on future submarines are to be welcomed. The reduction in warhead numbers announced in December 2006 and in October’s SDSR mean the UK will have reduced an operational stockpile from almost 200 to 120 – a process that can only give greater confidence to the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.
22
Similarly the delay until 2016 of the Main Gate decision in the acquisition process and proposed construction of the submarines is welcome in that it affords time for a longer, more comprehensive debate.
23
However, whilst we welcome the delay in Main Gate, the significance of that decision point is now in question, given the recent announcement by the Defence Secretary that certain long-lead items will be purchased prior to its publication.
24
On 7th December 2010, the Defence Secretary re-affirmed ‘The decision to proceed with the Vanguard replacement submarines, including the Common Missile Compartment, will not be taken until the main gate decision point, which the Strategic Defence and Security Review confirmed is now planned for the next Parliament.’
25
However, on 31st March at Defence Questions, the Defence Secretary stated, ‘We are currently considering the initial gate business case for the successor submarine and, as part of the next phase of work, we would expect to purchase some long-lead items so that the first boat can be delivered in 2028.’ In response to a Freedom of Information request, the Ministry stated such long-lead purchases would include, ‘items for both Propulsion and the rest of the submarine’ for Boat 1, and that ’Long Lead items for Boats 2 to 3 relate to Propulsion.’
26
The Ministry of Defence should be asked to explain the basis on which significant long-lead purchases will be made prior to the Main Gate decision, given that these purchases will be made without parliamentary authority and that MPs may choose not to replace Trident at that formal decision point.
27
The Ministry of Defence should rapidly commence a full review of the strategic role of nuclear weapons in relation to our defence and security requirements and the Government should facilitate a full and informed parliamentary and public debate on the need or otherwise for nuclear weapons, prior to the Main Gate decision point.
Initial Gate expenditure and the Value for Money Review
28
CND has been informed that the Ministry of Defence engaged in a Value for Money Review of the Trident replacement programme as part of the SDSR.
29
The cost savings announced in the SDSR, whilst welcome, are a small proportion of the overall project costs, amounting to £750 million in the Spending Review period and £1.2bn over the next 10 years. The larger figure equates to less than 1.6% of the lifetime cost of the system.
30
CND is concerned that there has been some misrepresentation of savings to be made. The Comprehensive Spending Review refers to ‘reductions in expenditure of … around £3.2 billion over the next ten years’.
[11]
However, the SDSR describes it as ‘saving approximately £1.2 billion and deferring spending of up to £2 billion from the next 10 years.’
[12]
31
CND regrets that the information on Trident spending in the SDSR did not provide more detailed information on where savings would be made and believe that the detail of the review should be published in full. CND welcomes a report in The Guardian that the Opposition’s Shadow Defence Secretary has said, ‘I urge the government to publish the value-for-money report immediately.’
[13]
32
CND further regrets that over a number of months the Ministry of Defence has refused to answer Parliamentary Questions relating to future expenditure on Trident, stating that such figures will be dependent on the Initial Gate report. CND is concerned that detailed information on costs prior to Initial Gate and expenditure flowing from it, including purchases for construction ahead of Main Gate, should be transparent.
33
The Minister for the Armed Forces stated in September 2010 that Initial Gate would be published ‘probably at the tail end of this year but, if not, in the very early part of next’ but the date of publication for Initial Gate remains unknown.
34
CND believes that the Ministry of Defence should ensure far greater transparency with regard to expenditure on the Trident replacement programme, particularly in light of spending cuts being made elsewhere, and should provide disaggregated information on:
·
Expenditure to date, including contracts agreed, on submarine design, propulsion and the common missile compartment;
·
Full details of planned annual expenditure and contracts for the assessment phase ahead of Main Gate;
·
The latest assessment of costs for the entire construction programme and lifetime maintenance costs of the replacement submarines; and
·
Costs of dismantling the existing Vanguard submarines.
Conclusions
35
CND urges the Defence Committee to:
·
Call on the Ministry of Defence to carry out a full review of the strategic role of nuclear weapons in relation to our defence and security requirements, in this Parliament.
·
Ask the Ministry of Defence to clarify how its assessment of the threat of state-on-state nuclear warfare influences the action it takes on implementing commitments under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and how it has co-operated with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in this regard.
·
Ask
the Ministry of Defence to explain the basis on which significant long-lead purchases will be made prior to the Main Gate decision, given that these purchases will be made without parliamentary authority and that MPs may choose not to replace Trident at that Main Gate decision point.
·
Ask the government to facilitate a full and informed parliamentary and public debate on the need or otherwise for nuclear weapons, prior to the Main Gate decision point.
·
Ask the Ministry of Defence to be more transparent with regard to expenditure, including disaggregated spending since 2007, future budgets and contracts.
February 2011
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