The strategic defence and security review and the national security strategy
Written evidence from the Fleet Air Arm Officers’ Association
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1.
In a reply to a letter to the Prime Minister dated 10 November 2010, an officer in the MoD stated "The Government has made it clear that the SDSR was a point of departure not the end of the line." (Sec (EC) 06-06 dated 14 January 2011). That assurance, coming as it does with the authority of the Prime Minister, is very welcome in its clear implication that the decisions for the future of the defence of the realm are open to discussion and will not be as peremptory as those of the recent review.
1.2.
This submission will therefore address the issues which the Fleet Air Arm Officers' Association believe merit further attention rather than those decided in the recent review albeit that review appeared to us to be seriously distorted and to have resulted in a dangerous imbalance for the future.
1.3.
The First Sea Lord has commented that "With the exception of the gap we are taking in our ability to fly fast jets from aircraft carriers, we will continue to be operationally committed around the world much as we are now."
1.4.
We believe that the implicit expectation that the Royal Navy will be easily able to regenerate the skill which will be lost is dangerously short sighted. In order to redress that mistaken view our submission will address three main strands
1.4.1.
The need to complete and commission the Queen Elizabeth Class ships
1.4.2.
The need to provide those ships with appropriate aircraft
1.4.3.
The need to maintain the skills and experience necessary to operating those ships and their embarked squadrons.
2.
THE SHIPS.
2.1.
The case for the Queen Elizabeth Class ships has been well rehearsed and we will therefore touch only briefly upon the main (but sometimes overlooked) aspects of the case.
2.2.
Not just warships – these vessels will provide the British Government with multi capable platforms under sovereign control able to project influence world wide in many scenarios:
2.2.1.
Military intervention and deterrence
2.2.2.
Political power projection in times of tension and peace
2.2.3.
A deployable distant sophisticated command and control hub
2.2.4.
Disaster relief
2.2.5.
Emergency evacuation
2.2.6.
Supporting international initiatives
2.3.
The ability of the ships to operate in any part of the world by day or night and in all weathers without the need for prior arrangement or permission allows the UK Government a freedom of action or response unrivalled by any other military asset.
2.4.
In a BBC report on 31 January of this year, Nick Childs reported, "When British troops in Helmand need air support, it doesn't only come from airfields within Afghanistan itself - it may come from a floating runway 500 miles away. That runway is a US Navy aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea,"
2.5.
Rear Admiral Mark D. Guadagnini USN said, "Over 75% of the close air support missions we have flown from the carrier in the past three months have been in direct support of the UK Marines and forces in Helmand province," He went on to describe the fixed wing carrier as "the mobile artillery for the coalition forces," "We can operate day, night, in bad weather, 24-hours-a-day if necessary. We bring the logistics capability to be able to surge for a long time." "Something can happen to any of the runways anywhere in theatre, so they might be prevented from operating, but we can still operate in international waters wherever we want to go."
3.
THE AIRCRAFT
3.1.
Operational deployments of RN squadrons and aircraft have been almost continuous since the Falklands War. They have taken place in every part of the world including operations against drug runners in the Caribbean, two Gulf wars, flying Combat Air Patrols in Kosovo/Balkans and, more recently, airlifting Paras and Marines into Sierra Leone and continuous operational deployments to Afghanistan
3.2.
The Naval Strike Wing of Joint Force Harrier deployed to Afghanistan in early October 2007. Working from Kandahar Airfield. The wing contributed directly to the international air component supporting the International Security Assistance Force. Although capable of supporting tasks throughout the nation, the aircraft were mainly used in direct support of British Forces deployed in Helmand Province.
3.3.
On this occasion as on many previous, the wing demonstrated the ability of naval aircraft, air and ground crews to deploy to any theatre and to operate from land or sea with equal facility.
3.4.
On 21 January of this year the Ministry Od Defence announced that, "Sailors and Royal Marines from 847 Naval Air Squadron are preparing to return to the front line in Afghanistan. Around 50 personnel are deploying to operate the new Lynx Mk9A battlefield helicopter. They will be supporting British forces in Helmand province, as well as Coalition and Afghan allies."
3.5.
The squadron has previously deployed to Helmand province in September 2008. They will be called upon to conduct reconnaissance, convoy escort, airborne command and control, and fire support directing artillery and fast jets, whilst the squadron's engineers and support personnel work to ensure the aircraft remain available around the clock in the gruelling Afghan environment.
3.6.
In December 2010, 857 Naval Air Squadron has handed over responsibility for Sea King airborne surveillance and control duties in Helmand province, Afghanistan, to 854 Naval Air Squadron. Both squadrons are based at Royal Naval Air Station Culdrose and take it in turns to deploy to Camp Bastion in southern Afghanistan.
3.7.
Commander Pat Douglas, the Sea King Force Commander, said: "854 Naval Air Squadron are trained and ready to continue with this important task. 857 Naval Air Squadron will now return home for a well-earned period of rest and can do so safe in the knowledge that they have made a positive difference in this ongoing campaign."
3.8.
The squadrons operate the Mk7 Sea King Airborne Surveillance and Control helicopter and were originally assigned to operate from aircraft carriers to provide airborne early warning as the ‘eyes of the fleet’.
3.9.
In Afghanistan, some 450 miles (720km) from the sea, the squadron aircraft are employed in the vital task of land surveillance.
3.10.
Turning to the future, the original choice of aircraft to replace the Harrier was the Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F35B.
3.11.
On 6th January 2011, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said, "The Joint Strike Fighter program received special scrutiny given its substantial cost, on-going development issues, and its central place in the future of U.S. military aviation. In short, two of the JSF variants, the Air Force version and the Navy’s carrier based version, are proceeding satisfactorily. By comparison, the Marine Corps’ short take-off and vertical landing variant is experiencing significant testing problems. These issues may lead to a redesign of the aircraft’s structure and propulsion – changes that could add yet more weight and more cost to an aircraft that has little capacity to absorb more of either. As a result, I am placing the STOVL variant on the equivalent of a two-year probation. If we cannot fix this variant during this time frame and get it back on track in terms of performance, cost and schedule, then I believe it should be cancelled. We will also move the development of the Marine variant to the back of the overall JSF production sequence. And to fill the gap created from the slip in the JSF production schedule, we will buy more Navy F/A-18s."
3.12.
The decision to equip the RN carriers to operate the F35C (the US Navy variant) rather than the F35B (STVOL) variant is, in our view, fully justified by the uncertainty of the cost and timescale for delivery of the F35B aircraft. However, the cost of the F35C continues to give cause for concern and the decision by the US Department of Defense to purchase additional F18 Super Hornets is seen as indicative of a similar concern by our allies.
3.13.
The US House of Representative version of the 2010 Defense Authorization Bill advises, ". . .the USAF to consider adopting Super Hornets in order to avoid a gap in the nation's air defences while the JSF ramps up."
3.14.
We believe that an analysis of the cost benefits of equipping the new ships with the Super Hornet could result in very significant savings with little loss of capability. On 1 August 2010, The Sunday Times reported, "The British government (is) considering buying the Super Hornet for its Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. . . It is claimed that this would save the UK defence budget about £10 billion."
3.15.
The Super Hornet aircraft is currently operational with the USN, is being purchased by Australia and is under consideration by Denmark, Brazil, India, Greece and Malaysia.
3.16.
Whilst much of our concern is with the gap in fixed wing naval aviation capability there is also an important case to be made for the continuation of the Joint Helicopter Command and its RN component the Commando Helicopter Force made up of 845 Naval Air Squadron (Sea King HC.4 helicopters) 846 Naval Air Squadron (Sea King HC.4/HAS.6) 847 Naval Air Squadron (Lynx AH7 helicopters) and 848 Naval Air Squadron (Sea King HC.4 helicopters).
3.17.
For 2 years the Commando Helicopter Force (CHF) Sea Kings have been flying operations in Afghanistan, mainly from Kandahar Airfield, with elements also based at Camp Bastion. Most missions are over the volatile Helmand region, 80 miles to the West of Kandahar. Regional Command (South) readily call on ‘Jungly‘ aircraft because of their rapid response time and increased lift capability, which has earned them the reputation for reliability in the face of adversity.
3.18.
With a role that is primarily in support of 3 Commando Brigade’s Royal Marines and a motto ‘ Across All Boundaries’ CHF is well suited and trained for operations in Afghanistan. The men and women of the Naval Air Squadrons are trained to operate their aircraft outside the maritime environment, facing many extremes be it from the heat and dust of an Afghan summer to the cold, harsh environment of an arctic winter.
3.19.
With the increased tempo of operations, the Royal Navy’s support helicopters have an enduring and critical role to play in Afghanistan; notably during the run-up to the Presidential Elections when both 845 and 846 Naval Air Squadrons successfully satisfied the surge in demand for aircraft.
3.20.
The preservation of the skills of CHF is key to current operations in Afghanistan and the their ability to deliver a variety of tasks including but not limited to emergency evacuation, disaster relief, special forces intervention and support of British troops on the ground wherever they may be engaged.
3.21.
The need for this force to be able to embark in and operate effectively from any available vessel at short notice is key to its flexible operational success. The early decommissioning of Ark Royal will undoubtedly prove an obstacle to CHF flexibility removing as it will a major operating platform.
3.22.
Thus, it is important that, in the gapped period until the Queen Elizabeth is commissioned, arrangements be put in place to allow the CHF to continue to practice and develop the skills which make it such a potent and flexible asset.
3.23.
We therefore welcome the MOD assurance that, "Commando Helicopter Force will remain a part of the Fleet Air Arm and as an element of the Joint Helicopter Command of the British Armed Forces; it will continue to provide helicopter support to 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and other elements from land and sea."
4.
THE SKILLS
4.1.
Operating a multi-functional mix of fixed and rotary wing aircraft on a mobile platform remote from established support systems in all weathers, by day and night calls for a very special mix of skills. Skills which the Fleet Air Arm have developed and led over many decades. These skills are by no means limited to the aircrews. Rather the environment calls for the training and maintenance of a team combining the skills of ship and aircraft handling with high levels of integrated technical support.
4.2.
To provide the flexibility offered by the platform, the carrier must be able to operate independently in a wide range of scenarios, each of which call for a different set of skills. The requirements of disaster relief are similar to those of an emergency evacuation but quite different to the needs of a distant operation in support of British troops. A well worked up ship and air group are able to meet this diversity of tasking and to provide the flexibility which such expenditure demands.
4.3.
The effect of the decision to decommission Ark Royal and 800 Naval Air Squadron early will leave a considerable gap during which these perishable skills will certainly be degraded, if not lost. Recovery of the capability is not simply a matter of providing the equipment and an opportunity to practice; rather it is an organic developmental process.
4.4.
Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review stated, "Alliances and partnerships will remain a fundamental part of our approach to defence and security . . . Maintaining and building constructive and reciprocal bilateral relationships across all aspects of national security can enhance capability and maximise efficiency."
4.5.
In order to minimise the adverse effects of the gap, we strongly recommend that sufficient Fleet Air Arm personnel be seconded to the United States Navy where it is hoped that they will be able to retain and develop the necessary skills to quickly provide the UK Government with the full range of capabilities which the new ships and aircraft can provide.
4.6.
Much has been written about services amalgamation as a cost reduction measure. This approach has some superficial attraction but has, at its heart the mistaken belief that all defence arms can be unified without loss of function or capability. This is as mistaken as the notion that the amalgamation of local and national government could achieve savings without loss of local democratic accountability. Each of the services has different but overlapping roles with specialist functions which require quite different skill sets.
4.7.
One example of the often unobserved differences is that the requirements of a multi capable Royal Navy have led to a ‘harmony’ policy in that service which separates families for longer period than in either of the other two services. This long standing difference is part of the ethos of the Royal Navy and the Fleet Air Arm and is not a cause of stress for the service. It also contributes greatly to the flexibility of the carrier task group concept.
4.8.
The need for Naval Commanders to understand and integrate air power into their planning has been evident since Taranto, Pearl Harbour and the Falklands campaign. It is therefore important that the structure of the Royal Navy should include men and women at every level who have spent time and been trained and exposed to the requirements of an integrated air capability.
4.9.
The gap in practicing those skills and retaining an expertise built on generations of experience needs the same attention. We therefore propose that arrangements be made to second a wide range of naval personnel from all branches of the service to allied navies who operate air assets in order to continue to develop and build upon the current skills base.
4.10.
"The delivery of air power from the sea offers the Joint Commander the inherent strengths of the maritime:- poise, reach and manoeuvre to intervene at a time and place of political choice and to project power, both at sea and against the land"
February 2011
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