The strategic defence and security review and the national security strategy

Written evidence from World Vision UK

World Vision is a child focused Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedicated to working with children, their families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice. We are the world’s biggest local charity, working in 100 countries and to improve the lives of 100 million people worldwide. We have three million supporters and employ 40,000 locally based staff, 97% of whom are nationals of the country in which they work.

World Vision believes the best way to change the life of a child is to change the world in which they live. We see children and their communities as active participants in shaping a better future, empowering them to find sustainable solutions to poverty.

World Vision welcomes this opportunity to provide written evidence to the Defence Select Committee on the Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy. Our evidence is based on our experience of operating with ordinary people in some of the most difficult contexts, often contexts where UK national interest is at stake and influential on the ground.

In addition to this written evidence we have sent the committee our report into civil military cooperation, entitled "Principled Pragmatism: NGO engagement with armed actors". [1]

1. The humanitarian case for conflict prevention

1.1. World Vision has welcomed the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and National Security Strategy (NSS), especially the emphasis on conflict prevention and policy coherence. Prevention of conflict is vital to ensuring the security and saving the lives of highly vulnerable populations. The cost of conflict prevention makes financial sense as it is estimated that for every £1 spent on conflict prevention £2,000 is spent on military intervention. [2] However, this financial cost does not take into account the human cost of war both directly and indirectly; the deaths due to conflict both devastate families and communities and often leave countries without some of the most economically productive populations. The indirect costs of conflict are felt most acutely by children due to increase in diseases, lack of availability to health services, disruption in schooling and increased vulnerability to abuse and exploitation. An increased focus on fragile states will allow the UK to target development interventions in those countries furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

1.2. The Review reflects the trend of most Western governments to merge their development, democratic, and diplomatic objectives under a broader national security objective. It is crucial, however, that a distinction is made for humanitarian activities. Humanitarian intervention and activities must be driven by the humanitarian imperative, and be delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. Merging diverse interests into one national security objective may challenge this independence and result in humanitarian agencies having a limited impact in reducing extreme poverty which would undermine the Government’s commitment to poverty reduction. In a world where very few NGOs are perceived to be neutral by the beneficiary population, the need for good policy thinking cannot be overstated. The UK Government’s policy in relation to national security must support coherence for international development across Whitehall, whilst ensuring that poverty reduction continues to be the sole reference point for determining where the UK’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) budget is spent.

1.3. The NSS commits DFID to "focusing significantly more effort on priority national security and fragile states". This could result in reduction of often highly effective conflict prevention programmes in other fragile states. Already 51% of OECD member states ODA to fragile states is directed at just 6 countries. Increased focus on UK national security priority countries risks exacerbating the unequal distribution of aid to fragile states.

1.3.1. Since 9/11, the UK has very significantly increased aid allocations to those countries on the frontline in the war against terror, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and more recently Pakistan. In 2002, neither Afghanistan nor Iraq was in the top 20 largest recipients of bilateral ODA. In 2003-04, Iraq was the largest single recipient of bilateral aid, whilst by 2006 Afghanistan was the third largest recipient.

1.3.2. The politicisation of ODA has a detrimental effect on both the beneficiary population and the reputation of NGOs as well as donor Governments and their implementing partners. For example, in Afghanistan, aid is being concentrated in Helmand Province where UK military interests are best served; there are examples of where aid has been used in some situations as a ‘clean up’ of military aims as in Iraq or as a ‘carrot’ as in Darfur by providing economic incentive to the government engaging with the peace process at the time. In these fragile contexts, the UK’s national interest is best served when development and humanitarian policy is not defined by military and foreign policy objectives, but rather the humanitarian principles of impartiality and independence and concentrated at the root causes of instability and fragility, which lead to conflict.

1.4. Aid must be directed appropriately, as inequitable distribution can exacerbate or create instability within a conflict setting. Despite commitments to long term predictable aid, donors have continued to have an ad hoc approach to aid to fragile states, often due to political or governance concerns. [3] Therefore, development policy should mitigate against political uncertainty in fragile states, by utilising a mixture of context appropriate aid instruments and by depoliticising aid. World Vision underscores the need for context specific engagement, as stated in the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. [4] Preventative action goes beyond institutions and military security. Conflict prevention is best realised through an understanding of people’s rights. ODA should focus on securing the conditions where civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights can be protected and fulfilled for all citizens, especially children.

Recommendations

1. Whilst coordination is welcome, aid should be given on the basis of need and in accordance with the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.

2. The Government’s policy and resource allocation decisions for aid must be taken as laid out in the International Development Act (2001), with the overall objective of poverty reduction. Aid allocation must be consistent with ODA definitions if it is to be counted as part of the UK Government’s 0.7% commitment.

3. The Government, particularly the MoD, FCO and DFID, should continue to support conflict prevention activities in a range of fragile states beyond where there is an immediate military purpose.

4. The Government should increase funding to the Conflict Prevention Pool, and direct funding to programmes in fragile states beyond Afghanistan.

2. Impact of military on humanitarian space

2.1. While Afghanistan faces many of the issues of a fragile state, it is a very different context to many other fragile states which exist. Afghanistan should therefore not form the sole guide for policy in fragile contexts. World Vision is concerned that the SDSR and NSS are too led by Afghanistan, and do not take other contexts sufficiently into consideration. Whilst factors such as the "War on Terror" and the Comprehensive Approach are clearly components of fragile state policy, it is important that UK policy should be broadened beyond the fragile states which have an immediate impact on the UK’s national security. Contexts such as Sudan and Somalia must be addressed as their fragility causes humanitarian disaster which has an impact on the people of these countries, the region and longer term for all countries with an interest in peace and stability.

2.2. Ministry of Defence (MoD) guidance suggests that there are two ways of operating the Comprehensive Approach: fully co-ordinated and regulated activity with all parties working to a single plan; and more limited co-ordination to ensure that the activities of different agencies do not conflict. However, alignment between humanitarian and military actors can often undermine the work of humanitarian organisations. Humanitarian objectives are inextricably linked to impartiality and independence; therefore there needs to be careful consideration of the role of military operations alongside humanitarian organisations. Humanitarian actors are often targets, even from people within the communities they have come to serve [5] and military actors increasingly encroaching on this terrain are leading to an increase in security incidents targeted at humanitarian agencies. [6]

2.3. Research from the Overseas Development Institute shows that attacks against humanitarian workers have increased in the last few years, particularly in places such as Afghanistan where there is a heavy military presence. Whilst many reasons are given for this, such as humanitarian workers being mistaken for the military by their attackers, it is clear that increased understanding and respect for each other’s operational realities is welcome. [7]

2.4. Our research shows that positive engagement between NGOs and the military can increase humanitarian space, for example by NGOs providing training to military personnel on key issues such as civilian protection. Where the military remain unaware of the implications of its action upon NGOs, humanitarian space shrinks and both NGOs and civilians are worse off. For more information please see "Principled Pragmatism". [8]

Recommendations

1. There needs to be significant resources given to developing an understanding between military and civilian actors at an operational level.

2. UK Government departments involved in implementing the SDSR and NSS should include civilian input in national security policy formulation in Whitehall as well as policy implementation abroad.

February 2011