The strategic defence and security review and the national security strategy
Written evidence from Medact
1. Responding to the request for information on how the NSS and SDSR relate to each other as strategic and coherent documents.
1.1a The NSS assessment of ‘an attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons’ as a Tier Two risk is inconsistent with the strategic and economic importance given by the SDSR to maintaining the Trident nuclear weapons system. Moreover, whilst the NSS identifies possible CBRN use by non-state actors as a Tier One threat, it is generally accepted that Trident would not deter any such attack. If, as the NSS itself says, the UK does not currently face a
‘
major state military threat
,’ Trident replacement is thus totally unnecessary and will furthermore severely damage the ability of the government to fulfil its other defence and security goals-not least that of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons.
1.1b The NSS considers nuclear proliferation to be ‘a growing danger’; the SDSR emphasises that government direction ‘over our strategic counter proliferation priorities’ will be strengthened with a new counter proliferation committee. The absence here of any similar consideration of the importance of nuclear disarmament is regrettable. Whilst we welcome the announcement of nuclear warhead and missile reductions, if non-nuclear weapon states perceive that nuclear weapon states (such as the UK) remain convinced that nuclear weapons are essential for their security, the incentive for these states to acquire nuclear weapons will rise. The most effective method of countering proliferation would therefore be for the UK to commit itself to scrapping the Trident nuclear weapons system entirely.
1.1c The NSS anticipates that, in future, ‘international decision making will be wider and potentially more multilateral.’ In this regard, an international, legally binding agreement outlawing and eliminating nuclear weapons is supported by 140 states. Such an agreement would realise the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s disarmament goals. The UK should therefore contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and multilateral diplomacy by signalling its support for negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
1.1d The NSS states that ‘an economic deficit is also a security deficit,’ yet the SDSR continues to advocate massive expenditure on Trident at a time of cuts to public services and rising income inequality in the UK. Scrapping Trident could improve the British public’s economic security and social well-being. The resources saved from not replacing Trident could be spent on healthcare and education, with military-industrial skills converted to produce civilian goods, such as green technology and renewable energy.
2. Request for information on the role of government departments in the UK’s ‘increased role in conflict prevention’.
2.1 The NSS refers to the need to ‘help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability’. The SDSR refers to ‘development’ as an integral way of doing this with ‘a civilian response scaled to support concurrency and scale of military operations.’ We assume that ‘development’ includes humanitarian assistance.
Tying humanitarian assistance (and development) to military response removes a key aspect of conflict prevention. Humanitarian assistance, post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, and development assistance can all contribute to conflict prevention if provided in an impartial and independent manner. If they are tied to military action they have the potential to put both civilians and parties to the conflict at greater risk as the provision of this assistance becomes integral to military strategy. This is precisely why international guidelines such as the Sphere Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Assistance which the UK Government has supported in the past stress the need for impartiality in humanitarian assistance and the recognition of humanitarian principles including impartiality.
2.2 The NSS says it will ‘tackle the root causes of instability’. The SDSR states that the UK international development programme will make ‘the optimal contribution to national security within its overall objective of poverty reduction’. We submit that poverty reduction in itself is a conflict reducing measure, and confining it within a national security policy will reduce its potential effectiveness.
2.3 The NSS states that it will ‘Enforce domestic laws and strengthen international norms to help tackle those who threaten the UK and our interests,’ whilst the SDSR states that it will implement this by a ‘continuous development of the rules-based international system.’ We urge the government to explicitly build its security strategy on international humanitarian law and international human rights law, which both the NSS and SDSR currently only mention in relation to the UK’s military actions abroad.
2.4 We commend the planned increase in funding the Conflict Prevention Pool to around £300 million by 2014/15 and the stated support to long-term conflict prevention and stabilisation programmes in security sector reform, justice and institution building which we regard as essential in establishing fair and accountable societies. However we feel strongly that it is essential to recognise that addressing global health problems through the lens of national security, rather than through measures of need, will both distort health priorities and reduce their potential to contribute to conflict prevention.
3. Other comments
3.1 We suggest the remarks relating to problems having been inherited from the previous government are inappropriate in security strategy documents. National security should not be a playground for party politics.
3.2 We consider inaccurate the description in the SDSR that the UK has an ‘independent nuclear deterrent.’ It is has been conclusively demonstrated that the UK's nuclear weapons absolutely depend on continued US technical and political support so that, in former Prime Minister Tony Blair's words, it is 'inconceivable we would use our nuclear deterrent alone, without the US.'
4 Future Consultations
We welcome the opportunity to suggest areas for more detailed consideration in the future and would be very interested to take part in consultation / discussions on the following:
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the securitisation of global health and the consequences for conflict prevention and international humanitarian law
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how both disarmament and proliferation can be addressed through multilateral talks towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention
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addressing the root causes of conflict and implications for the national security strategy.
About Medact
Medact is a membership organisation of health professionals and the UK affiliate of the International Physicians Against Nuclear War and the People’s Health Movement.
February 2011
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