The Strategic Defence and Security Review and The National Security Strategy

NNS 46

Written evidence from Bernard Jenkin MP

However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.
Winston Churchill

1. NSS and SDSR were unstrategic

The National Security Strategy (NSS) was less a basis for a dynamic strategy than a static policy document, based on assumptions about ‘known unknowns’. It was therefore an inadequate strategic basis for the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

SDSR was also therefore based on assumptions that the future was predictable (most notably in the decision for the UK to take a ten year gap in its carrier strike capability, but also in other key capabilities). Rather than leaving UK defence stronger, SDSR reduced deployable military capability by one third. The decision to delay the renewal of Trident until after the next election also makes little strategic sense and leaves the future of the nuclear deterrent open to question. This decision appears to have been driven by coalition politics, while others have been driven by cost considerations and inter-service rivalry. There is little evidence that these decisions were driven by a coherent national strategy.

2. There is a lack of strategic thinking at the heart of government

NSS and SDSR demonstrated a lack of thinking about national strategy at the heart of Government. There is a strategic mismatch between the Government’s foreign policy ambitions for the UK and the reduced capabilities entailed by SDSR.

The Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) found in our Report 'Who does UK national strategy?' that Whitehall has fallen out of the habit of strategic thinking and lacks the capacity for national strategy. PASC recommends:

· Ministers should invest more time and energy into strategic leadership;

· The Government should create of a ‘community of strategic thinkers’ across Whitehall, to provide ministers with the capacity for strategic analysis and assessment, which in time could become a new national strategic assessment agency;

· The National Security Council’s remit should encompass National Strategy;

· Greater emphasis should be placed on strategic studies and training both within Whitehall and in academia;

· Parliament’s Joint Committee on National Security Strategy should extend its remit to include National Strategy;

· Ideally, a small central budget should be established to fund central coordination of departmental contributions to National Strategy.

3. There have been numerous strategic shocks since SDSR

There have been numerous strategic shocks since the SDSR, including economic crises in the Eurozone, the flaring up of the conflict in Korea, the wave of revolutions across the Middle East and now the conflict in Libya. None of these could have been foreseen at the time of NSS and SDSR, which have both been rendered out of date. These shocks show how the assumption in the SDSR that the next ten years, or even the ‘short term’, was in any way predictable was flawed. Rather than trying to judge what risks we can take over the next ten years, SDSR should have left the UK with more flexibility and capabilities to respond to unpredictable global shocks.

4. The SDSR is being reopened

The question is not whether SDSR will be reopened, but whether the Government is willing to admit that it is being reopened. This has been implicitly recognised in a number of recent developments.

First, there was the decision to delay the retirement of the Nimrod R1 reconnaissance planes so that they could be used in Libya.

This was followed by the agreement on funding between the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence, under which the MoD was given a reprieve from its funding gap for this year, also an indication that defence funding is under review.

In addition to this agreement, it was reported that the Prime Minister was directly involved in reviewing defence decisions, with a defence source reportedly saying; "The debate is live. The Prime Minister is very much part of it. There's a lot of objective thinking going on." [1] It was also reported that there was concern within the Government at the ‘dip’ in military capabilities which the UK will have to sustain prior to the full implementation of ‘Force 2020’ under current arrangements, with the same defence source saying: "The vision for 2020 is not bad but the question is, can we take the risk of the dip to get there? The uncertain world we envisaged [at the end of the decade] is here now." This ‘debate’ and process of ‘objective thinking’ is a welcome development, but this must be a genuine and broad review if it is to have positive consequences for UK defence.

Current operations in Libya have also called into question the cost effectiveness of deploying a long-range bomber (Tornado GR4) and fighter (Typhoon F2) for operations which could have been carried out by carrier-based aircraft designed for a close air support role (Harrier GR9). A recent press report suggested that RAF operations in Libya cost £30 million per week, compared to an estimated £40 million annual cost of operating the Harrier fleet from an aircraft carrier. [2] Whether or not the cost difference is as dramatic as this, it should be investigated. It would be facile to say that Libya "proves" the need for Harrier, but it has exposed the lack of dedicated close air support capability in just a few months after the withdrawal of GR9.

A willingness to revisit and revise decisions is an essential component of good strategy. The Government needs to apply this flexibility to a wider range of decisions in SDSR.

5. Under Planning Round 11, judgments are already being revisited

Until the recent agreement between the Treasury and the MoD, further cuts in capability were being considered in addition to those set out in SDSR as part of Planning Round 11. An MoD spokesman said: "SDSR implementation work is ongoing and the MoD is also undertaking its annual planning round. This is used routinely to look forward over ten years and ensure the Department's commitments are in line with available resources. We keep a range of options under consideration at all times regarding future capabilities, but no final decisions have been made." [3] PR11 and future planning rounds must therefore include strategic judgments about changing threats and priorities. These judgments must include the possibility of recovering capabilities rather than only allowing the option of reducing them further.

6. CSR must be balanced with other strategic priorities: part of a national strategy

It is often said that re-opening SDSR would require reopening CSR. This would suggest that defence by its very nature, however much circumstances may alter, is to remain a matter of secondary importance. Clearly, deficit reduction is a strategic imperative, but it is not the only strategic imperative. It is a matter of how priorities are decided. Under CSR, issues like pensions, the NHS, schools, overseas aid (including £1.2 billion to prosperous India) and the UK’s net contribution to the EU (up more than 200 % over five years) have been accorded higher priority than Defence. CSR, the National Security Strategy and SDSR need to be placed together in a unified strategic context: a National Strategy (as recommended by the Public Administration Select Committee). Spending decisions should be balanced accordingly. The government should not be afraid to question whether core Defence spending can be safely limited to less than two % of GDP (the lowest since the 1930s). Low levels of defence spending in Europe have rested on the premise that the United States would underwrite any military operation required to secure European security interests.

Does this remain a safe assumption, or do countries like the UK need to start to provide more for our own defence and security? Is US reluctance to become involved with Libya yet another strategic shock we have yet fully to acknowledge? Events of the past six months should preclude leaving previous ten-year assumptions unchallenged and spending priorities may therefore need to be adjusted to reflect changed strategic circumstances. Failure to consider the need to adjust strategy in the light of changed strategic circumstances would be a failure to think strategically.

7. Plans need to be made for the post-2015 defence spending increases

The Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary have made clear that they believe that defence spending will need to increase in real terms after 2015 in order to meet the targets of 'Force 2020'. Without increased defence spending, the MOD will be unable to deliver even the reduced capabilities set out in SDSR. This requires preparation. However, the Cabinet Office Minister for Government Policy was unwilling to describe increased defence spending from 2015 as Government policy. Is this something which the Government is planning for or is it just another "aspiration"? Is an increase in defence spending something which is built into ten year planning assumptions? If the Government is not planning for increased spending, then this is in danger of becoming an empty promise and a gamble with the UK's future capabilities. For the proposals for increased defence spending to be taken seriously, the Government needs to do the planning in advance, so that future spending is put to maximum effect.

29 April 2011