The role and performance of Ofsted - Education Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by Mr and Mrs Dominic Williams

1.  We are parents of two girls, both now in secondary school. In this submission, we draw on our experience of the Independent Schools Inspectorate, a body inspected by Ofsted. We then go on to address the wider questions raised by the Select Committee about Ofsted's role. In so doing, we are able to draw on previous experience of Ofsted as an inspector of state schools. We have also taken the trouble to read a wider range material relating to the inspections process.

2.  Although the relevant government department is now the Department for Education, the events we outline occurred prior to May 2010, so we refer throughout to DCSF, the Department for Children, Schools and Families.

Recommendations

3.  The role of DfE should in future be limited to standard setting. It should not be able to intervene with or direct inspecting bodies.

4.  Ofsted should not be responsible for inspecting other inspection bodies.

5.  The Independent Schools Inspectorate should be replaced by a genuinely independent body with no conflict of interest.

6.  Inspecting bodies should have an explicit duty of care to parents and pupils and should be liable for their negligence.

7.  Inspecting bodies should report to school governors, not to DfE, and governors should assume responsibility for compliance with educational and safeguarding standards, including warranting that they have disclosed all relevant information to the inspection team - in the same way as they assume responsibility for the school's financial affairs.

8.  This could mean that inspections were carried out by independent private sector bodies.

9.  Complaints about both individual matters and about standards compliance would both be addressed in the first instance to the governors and then to an independent supervisory body (which could be a reformed and fit for purpose Ofsted), which would have the power to take disciplinary action against the school.

10.  In order to prevent governors obstructing the process, any complaint to them would be copied to and logged by the independent body which would automatically intervene if the complaint was not resolved within a fixed time limit.

11.  All complaints should be dealt with in accordance with the rules of natural justice, in particular both sides should have the right to hear the other side's case.

12.   Any report produced by the independent body would be made publicly available.

13.  As is now the case, complainants would have the right to seek judicial review of a decision or to pursue a claim in damages where appropriate. This new system would not impact on their rights.

OUR EXPERIENCE

14.   In 2007-08, our daughter was a pupil in Year 7 of North London Collegiate School (NLCS), an independent school for girls. Our daughter's year at NLCS was ruined by disruptive behaviour, bullying and poor discipline from two girls in her class. The school had admitted the two girls knowing that they had disciplinary problems and they rapidly ran out of control. It started in the first term and worsened during the year, culminating in an incident where the girls urinated on their seats in a lesson - and ultimately one girl was obliged to leave the school. Although the school knew it had problems controlling the two girls, it did not realise that this was having a wider impact on other girls.

15.  This behaviour had a corrosive effect on the whole form, but our daughter, coming from a small state school, bore the brunt. It took us some months to realise why she hated school so much, but when we did, we complained to the school. It was clear to us that the school was out of its depth. Senior staff were extremely confident in their ability to manage pupils, but actually were inadequately trained and ill-informed. After we complained, the headmistress had to write to all the parents to find out what else had been going on. Staff were unaware of best practice in anti-bullying policy (as set out by DCSF); we had to tell them what was expected.

16.  In particular, the school failed to publish and enforce its anti bullying policy as required. There was an unintentionally comic meeting early on at NLCS in which we asked to see the school's anti-bullying policy. At first a deputy headmistress teacher told us it was in the pupils' handbook, then that it was in the parents' handbook, then she eventually remembered it was in the staff handbook in her desk - no one had access to it except staff. We asked why it was not published to parents and another deputy headmistress told us it was because "it could encourage people to think we have a problem".

17.  Meanwhile, while our daughter was there, NLCS was subject to an inspection by the Independent Schools Inspectorate. The inspection took place during the spring term, at the height of the bullying and disruptive behaviour. The report was published in summer 2008 and said that the school complied with all regulations, pastoral care was excellent, staff were well trained, there was no disruptive behaviour or bullying and everything was perfect. The report was materially inaccurate.

18.  We made a formal complaint about the report, initially to the chair of the school governors (who refused to discuss the matter) and then to ISI. Neither the school nor ISI has ever disputed that our account of events was essentially correct. The school's defence (as we discovered from an FOI request) was that "the information given on our website was found by the inspectors to fulfil the regulatory requirements" (ie it was the inspectors' fault for not spotting the failing). ISI's defence was that it was only responsible for checking that schools had policies; it made no effect to check whether they were adequately published or enforced.

19.  After we complained, ISI made significant changes in its procedures. It has rewritten most of its inspection handbook. It now checks to see policies are being published and implemented. It has also updated its anti bullying requirements and made governors check to see policies are implemented effectively - so our complaint appears to have had some impact.

20.  ISI had a second defence - its complaints procedure. It said that our complaint was out of time, because it was made more than six months after the inspection date. However, the report was not published until five months after the inspection and, as we pointed out, it would be difficult for us to complain about a report before it had been written and published. Moreover, ISI reports were published undated; give no contact details for the ISI (not even an address); and make no mention of a complaints procedure. In other words, ISI did not have an adequate procedure for handling complaints.

21.  Meanwhile, acting on instructions from DCSF, ISI asked to the school to set out its arrangements for publicising its procedures. After a lengthy delay during which the school took legal advice, it replied in April 2009, saying that the inspection had approved the school's arrangements at the time and its anti-bullying policy was (now) published on its website - which by then, a year after the ISI inspection, was true. So, again, our actions had led to an improvement in the quality of pastoral care.

22.  ISI claimed throughout to be acting under instruction from DCSF. So, from June 2009 to May 2010, we tried to obtain details of the correspondence between ISI and DCSF using an FOI request:

—  DCSF first denied that any such correspondence existed; we were able to prove this was untrue.

—  In September 2009, DCSF staff said they were too busy to comply with the FOI statutory deadlines (which require a reply within 20 days) and they were going on holiday.

—  Next, we made a formal complaint to the department -which then ignored its own published complaints procedure and referred the matter to a senior member of staff who admitted she had known about the problem all along, but had no intention of complying with the Act yet. The complaint was then referred back to the person about whom we were complaining.

—  In October the department formally declined our request, again contravening the Act. We asked for a review, as the Act allows. The review was organised by the person who made the original decision.

—  From November 2009 to May 2010 DCSF claimed that the decision was being reviewed by an unknown set of people with an unknown brief who were contacting unknown third parties about unspecified matters and who would reach a decision at some unspecified future point.

—  Finally in May 2010, we made a follow up request asking for the name(s)of the review panel, the date they were appointed, the third parties they had consulted and so on.

—  Rather than reply to this request, DCSF released the relevant correspondence between itself and ISI. Perhaps coincidentally, there was a change of government at this time.

—  The department has not published the information in the list of FOI disclosures on its website, on the grounds that it is not new or of general interest.

23.  In another apparent coincidence, in early 2010 we approached a national newspaper with our story. We did not realise that the newspaper had nominated NLCS as its "School of the Year". The newspaper did not publish our story, but shortly afterwards ISI published a radically improved complaints procedure and the school published an updated and improved anti- bullying policy.

24.  However, ISI has refused to amend its inspection report, even though it knows it is materially inaccurate, and the school makes prominent mention of it in its publicity material, knowing it is untrue.

25.  So, our experience of ISI reveals not just a single instance of a sloppy inspection, but systematic failings in ISI's inspection and complaints procedures that were readily apparent to us as laymen but were only addressed after we complained - and refused to let the matter rest.

26.  What was Ofsted's role in driving this improvement in standards? Nothing, as far as we can tell. Although we as laymen could see the deficiencies in ISI procedures, Ofsted apparently could not. Moreover, in theory, Ofsted should have been made aware of the problems - both by ISI and DCSF. Yet Ofsted said in its "Annual report on the quality of ISI inspections and reports 2007-08" that it had looked at 21 inspection reports, of which 18 were good and 3 satisfactory. It said "A comprehensive framework and handbook underpin the inspection regime" and "The ISI has good systems for monitoring the quality of its inspections and reports."

27.  Ofsted is the dog that never barked.

28.  If this were an isolated occurrence, it would be bad enough. However, it appears that there are a number of occasions where ISI has published a positive report on a school which has subsequently turned out to be dangerously inaccurate. St Benedict's School, Ealing seems to the most serious recent case, in which ISI has had to withdraw a complimentary report about the school, because it was untrue. However, Ofsted continues to write approving annual reports for ISI. Any qualifications expressed appear to be reactions to weaknesses revealed by a third party, not by spotted by Ofsted. Something is amiss.

CONCLUSIONS

29.  The first weakness in the inspection system, now well understood, is the excessive concern with process rather than outcomes. Inspections have become a box-ticking exercise rather than focusing on the quality of teaching and pastoral care. This is compounded by the deluge of legislation, standards, advice, best practice, guidance and so on, issuing from government. Standards for the independent sector are generally not statutory (and are weaker than those applied to state sector schools), creating further confusion.

30.  The second issue is the overlap in accountability among the various bodies, all of whom can (and do) argue that if they have ticked their own boxes, they are not responsible for anything that goes wrong. In the case of independent schools, there is a direct relationship between DCSF and ISI that excludes Ofsted - so Ofsted can argue that it has carried out its job by looking at a set of inspection reports, even if the ISI has systematic weaknesses.

31.  The inspection system also became politicised under the previous government. Instead of being a way of ensuring diverse schools met common standards of quality, it became an instrument to ensure all schools conformed to a rigid policy template. DCSF evidently exercised a great deal of control over Ofsted and ISI on all kinds of matters and appears to have had a decisive role in dealing (or not dealing) with our complaints about ISI procedures. The problem is that civil servants are concerned with general policy, not with individual circumstances; they are flexible and sensitive to opinion; they put departmental loyalty above free flow of information; they are not rewarded for being controversial, forthright or decisive. It is the job of civil servants to cover up and smooth over problems, not to highlight them to the public. These are exactly the wrong characteristics for making a fuss when something has gone wrong and therefore exactly the wrong characteristics for people in charge of a rigorous school inspection system.

32.  The inspection bodies also suffer from group think and lack the independence to act as effective scrutineers. The Permanent Secretary of DCSF was the former head of Ofsted. ISI inspections are usually led by former Ofsted inspectors. Ofsted acts both as an inspection body for schools and as an inspection body for other school inspection bodies. Because Ofsted reports on ISI, it means that any criticisms of ISI are also criticisms of Ofsted. It is not hard to see why these bodies instinctively close ranks to protect each other when challenged - and why parents and pupils appear to have a much better track record of bringing weaknesses in schools to light than Ofsted.

33.  The situation for ISI is worse because, apart form former Ofsted staff, the inspection teams are largely made up of senior staff from other private schools. They all inspect each other, which must make it very difficult for inspection teams to be impartial. Moreover, it appears that that the ISI is owned and funded by the Independent Schools Council via a levy on members. It is not an independent schools inspectorate, it is an inspectorate of independent schools.

34.  There is also an awkward overlap between systematic issues, which are the responsibility of the inspecting bodies, and individual complaints which are a matter for the school and its proprietors or governing body. In reality, the two usually happen in tandem, but, as we discovered, the argument that the inspectorate cannot deal with individual cases is frequently used by them as an excuse for inaction. Equally, governors argue (as they did in our case) that if they have passed an inspection, their actions in a particular case are immune from challenge. This is likely to cause particular problems with new types of schools, if they are perceived as publicly accountable but actually are self governing.

35.  There is also a great lack of clarity about the Freedom of Information Act and how it applies to the various bodies.

36.  It is not at all clear what benefit there is in having such an elaborate and costly public sector inspection apparatus that is run for the benefit of government, not for the benefit of parents and pupils. It failed us, as it has failed many parents and children.

RECOMMENDATIONS

37.  The role of DfE should in future be limited to standard setting. It should not be able to intervene with or direct inspecting bodies.

38.  Ofsted should not be responsible for inspecting other inspection bodies.

39.  The Independent Schools Inspectorate should be replaced by a genuinely independent body with no conflict of interest.

40.  Inspecting bodies should have an explicit duty of care to parents and pupils and should be liable for their negligence.

41.  Inspecting bodies should report to school governors, not to DfE, and governors should assume responsibility for compliance with educational and safeguarding standards, including warranting that they have disclosed all relevant information to the inspection team - in the same way as they assume responsibility for the school's financial affairs.

42.  This could mean that inspections were carried out by independent private sector bodies.

43.  Complaints about both individual matters and about standards compliance would both be addressed in the first instance to the governors and then to an independent supervisory body (which could be a reformed and fit for purpose Ofsted), which would have the power to take disciplinary action against the school.

44.  In order to prevent governors obstructing the process, any complaint to them would be copied to and logged by the independent body which would automatically intervene if the complaint was not resolved within a fixed time limit.

45.  All complaints should be dealt with in accordance with the rules of natural justice, in particular both sides should have the right to hear the other side's case.

46.   Any report produced by the independent body would be made publicly available.

47.  As is now the case, complainants would have the right to seek judicial review of a decision or to pursue a claim in damages where appropriate. This new system would not impact on their rights.

October 2010


 
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