Memorandum submitted by Research Councils
UK
INTRODUCTION
1. Research Councils UK (RCUK) is a strategic partnership
set up to champion the research supported by the seven UK Research
Councils. RCUK was established in 2002 to enable the Councils
to work together more effectively to enhance the overall impact
and effectiveness of their research, training and innovation activities,
contributing to the delivery of the Government's objectives for
science and innovation. Further details are available at www.rcuk.ac.uk.
2. This evidence is submitted by RCUK on behalf of
the Research Councils listed below and represents their independent
views. It does not include or necessarily reflect the views of
the Science and Research Group in the Department for Business,
Innovation, and Skills (BIS). The submission is made on behalf
of the following Councils::
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).
3. NERC's comments are based on input from by the
following research centres and individuals: the British Geological
Survey (BGS), the National Oceanography Centre (NOC), the Scottish
Association for Marine Science (SAMS), the Sea Mammal Research
Unit (SMRU), the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), and NERC Natural
Hazards Theme Leader, Professor John Rees. For more information
on NERC's research and collaborative centres and science themes
visit the NERC website www.nerc.ac.uk.
4. Following responses to specific questions, Annex
A outlines the need to establish a longer-term deep-water observatory
in the west of Shetland in order to meet the high level objectives
of the UK and Devolved Governments' Our seas - A Shared Resource[1].
Information on previous survey work and how NOC and BGS could
continue to work with industry to survey the area in the future
is provided.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
¾ The
west of Shetland region is physically a very different environment
to the Gulf of Mexico, so environmental impact of a deep water
spill in this area would be different, in many aspects.
¾ A regulatory
system could be enacted to compel companies to develop a shared-
deep-water rapid response system to cap wells, and the levels
of insurance cover companies are obliged to have could be increased.
¾ The
UK's regulatory system is robust but could be improved, though
there is a limit to which increased regulation can be implemented
and effective.
¾ Scenarios
which may reduce the need to exploit deepwater reserves during
the transition to a low carbon economy are discussed. However,
given our current reliance on oil and gas, such exploitation may
be necessary.
¾ Under
free market regulations the contribution of deepwater reserves
to security of supply may be limited, though there may be some
economic benefits of exploitation.
RESPONSES TO
QUESTIONS
1. What are the implications of the Gulf of Mexico
oil spill for deepwater drilling in UK?
Environmental implications
1.1 The spill appears to have had a significant
environmental impact on the Gulf of Mexico (GoM), but the overall
scale of the impact is not yet apparent and may not be for many
years. Environmental impacts may not easily translate to the UK
as the physical environment and ecology of deep waters off Shetland
is significantly different to that encountered in the GoM:
(a) Geological differences - The seafloor geology
of the UK shelf to the west of the Shetlands region is complex,
with ridges and other features that would strongly influence the
direction of dispersion of any releases.
(b) Temperature - The deep bottom water off Shetland
is colder than that at a similar depth in the GoM, the surface
temperature is also less than in the Gulf region (9-10 degrees
C in winter, much cooler than the Gulf's summer temperature of
over 30 degrees C). Consequently, there is less potential for
evaporation of lighter hydrocarbon fractions, so a winter spill
in the region will experience a slower biological decay and lower
evaporative loss.
(c) Oceanographic conditions - The Shetland region
is significant in terms of global ocean circulation so significant
spills would not be as contained as in the Gulf, though the dispersion
into deep open-ocean would be similar. The wave climate off Shetland
is rougher though GoM storms are much larger and experience greater
extremes in Hurricane season, which cause a complete shutdown
of exploration, production and any remedial work on spills.
(d) Ecology - Extreme temperature ranges in the
Shetland area are very important in regulating the distribution
of animal life on the seafloor and in the water column. Though
considerable work has been done on seafloor - or "benthic"
- communities, they are less well understood with respect to the
water column and how the deep sea ecosystem varies over time.
There are gaps in knowledge around the toxicology of cold deep
water organisms and their reactions to chemical and drilling muds
used by the industry. Gaps in our knowledge are particularly significant
given the water column supports some of the most commercially-important
fish stocks in the UK eg North Atlantic mackerel and monkfish.
In addition, the region is an important migratory route for marine
mammals moving between the northern seas in the summer to temperate/tropical
Atlantic waters in the winter.
1.2 It must be emphasised that there are significant
dangers inherent in drilling on all parts of the UK Continental
Shelf (UKCS), not just in deep water. A spill in any depth of
water could occur as a consequence of exploration, appraisal or
development drilling, or as a result of oil production on the
UKCS. Indeed, there are often greater technical challenges in
some of the relatively shallow water areas of the UKCS where the
target reservoirs are under higher than normal heat and pressure
eg in high pressure high temperature (HTHP) fields. However, despite
these dangers, the record in the UKCS is very good.
Managerial and public perception implications
1.3 The BP experience in the GoM has already
had the noticeable effect of tightening practices within drilling
companies operating worldwide, which will, for as long as these
improved practices continue, make all drilling safer.
1.4 There is a clear need for industry to develop
a system of jointly coping with deep-water problems on the UKCS.
A group of four GoM operating companies has already begun to develop
their own rapid response plan whereby they are committing US $1
billion to create a rapid-response system to deal with deep-water
spills in the GoM. This voluntary effort includes building modular
containment equipment that will be kept on standby for emergency
use. Their initial financing of $250 million each will be used
to build a set of containment equipment, like underwater systems
and pipelines, which will be able to deal with a variety of deepwater
problems and can be deployed rapidly in the event of a spill.
It would be sensible to consider, perhaps through legislation,
the development of a similar system for the deep waters of the
UKCS.
1.5 All companies operating on the UKCS are obliged
to have insurance cover to offset the costs of cleaning up oil
spills. The required levels of this cover could be reviewed.
1.6 A significant implication for deepwater drilling
in the UK is public perception. The public view, enforced by both
the media and US commentators, is that this is the US' - even
the World's - worst environmental disaster. As more information
has become available a better assessment of the impact has been
derived it has become clear this is not the case. The majority
of the major NGO's have put forward a realistic picture of the
situation and NOC scientists have been involved in numerous public
debates on radio, television, in open public meetings and online
and in general there has been little disagreement over the core
facts.
2. To what extent is the existing UK safety
and environmental regulatory regime fit for purpose?
2.1 The UK/European safety and regulatory regime
is better established than that for the US. A large magnitude
oil spill would not respect national borders around the North
Sea and Shetlands, as such, there is a strong European interest
resulting in tighter regulations and response. Regulations and
working practices have evolved over the last 40 years based on
a close working relationship between the offshore oil and gas
sector and the relevant Government departments, and are arguably
more stringent and better adhered to than in the GoM. Many pioneering
deep-sea methodologies and technologies were initially developed
and deployed in UK waters, in close collaboration with DTI (now
BIS). The UK Health and Safety regime for offshore drilling was
improved markedly in the wake of the Piper Alpha disaster and
Government and industry efforts have continued to produce improvements
in safety systems since. The UK system is now regarded as one
of the safest operating systems in the world. However, no system
is fool-proof nor beyond improvement.
2.2 It is understood that, in the wake of the
GoM disaster, the HSE plans to increase the number of safety inspectors
and the number of safety inspections of offshore installations,
both of which are to be welcomed.
2.3 Daily operational reports should be produced
by all operators and should be studied by responsible HSE staff
to ensure that best practices are adhered to and that previously-agreed
operational plans are implemented. However, it is impractical
to expect HSE inspectors to be able necessarily to identify when
short cuts have been taken; it would not be feasible, practical
or desirable to monitor all communications between the various
operational elements on a drilling rig to ensure that issues have
been fully identified and correctly acted upon.
2.4 HMG already operates a system whereby potential
operating companies undergo a rigorous vetting process to ensure
that they are capable of conducting their offshore operations
safely, thoroughly and effectively.
2.5 The UK regime takes into account requirements
of treaties such as OSPAR and the evolving integrated European
Marine and Maritime policy frameworks, however, currently the
oil and gas sector lies outside of the remit of the Marine and
Coastal Access Act, 2009. This omission leads to a situation where
offshore wind, wave and tidal energy installations (and associated
cables etc) are looked at in a holistic manner but oil and gas
platforms are treated separately. A strong case could be made
to bring all offshore activities under the same regulatory regime.
2.6 There are still issues over where emergency
control centres are established once an incident takes place but
generally the regime is healthy. The recently established Marine
Management Organisation will be working closely with the Marine
and Coastguard Agency to further develop oil spill response and
management systems. Critically the UK has in place the Secretary
of States Representative for Maritime Salvage and Intervention
(SOSREP)[2];
a key role that did not have an equivalent in the initial stages
of the GoM incident.
2.7 Safety and environmental legislation should
draw on the best available and impartial science. High quality,
high resolution seabed and habitat maps are necessary for the
progress of science and effective, integrated management of the
seas using ecosystem-based approaches. NERC is underpinning the
provision of such resources through support for National
Capability[3]
and programmes (past and present) of strategic earth science and
marine research, in particular at the NOC, BGS and SAMS. One example
is the recently launched UK Marine Environmental Mapping Programme
(MAREMAP) project[4].
MAREMAP is a new NERC initiative that will lead to an improved
understanding of the marine environment around the UK. It is coordinated
by the NOC, BGS and SAMS, in partnership with University of Southampton
and Channel Coastal Observatory.
2.8 As well as informing the regulatory process,
the capacity NERC supports is vital in times of emergency. A number
of NERC scientists have been approached to advise the US regulatory
authorities and others in the aftermath of the Gulf incident.
3. What are the hazards and risks of deepwater
drilling to the west of Shetland?
3.1 The hazards of deepwater drilling to the west
of Shetland are the same as drilling in any area of the continental
shelf, though maybe less so than in places where there are known
issues of high pressure and high temperature reservoirs. The greatest
degree of danger lies in exploration of the unknown. As more wells
are drilled in the deeper-water areas, so understanding of both
the exploration setting and of the hazards to be encountered will
increase.
3.2 There are known sea-bed hazards west of Shetland,
such as slump scars and mass flow slides, that are well documented
and for which industry already takes account when designing offshore
drilling campaigns.
3.3 There is always a hazard when operations
are conducted at depths below which divers can operate. In such
circumstances it is necessary to rely on remotely operated vehicles
(ROVs). ROVs have been used in the offshore industry for many
years, and are effective tools for working at depth. However,
they have their limitations. Clearly, as the GoM experience has
demonstrated, operating equipment at great depths is difficult,
and not all readily available mechanical systems are capable of
operating at great depths. A shortage of supply of such equipment
could provide a potential to increase hazard.
3.4 Potential penetration of shallow methane
hydrate deposits may affect the technical specification of the
well and its casing eg due to thermal effects on the setting of
concrete structures. There is a large difference between the risks
of drilling versus those encountered once production is underway
with well-established wellheads. Methane hydrate deposits are
commonplace in the cold, deep waters of the North East Atlantic
and may be detected locally by seismic survey techniques. Care
must be taken to avoid introducing heat or rapid pressure changes
during drilling and cementing activities to prevent physically
destabilizing surrounding sediments. This can cause loss of integrity
of sea-floor infrastructure, triggering submarine landslides or
out-gassing of deposits and associated risk of explosion. In future
these methane hydrates may themselves become an important source
of fuel though no hydrates have been found in UK waters in drilling
thus far. Research is underway to learn more about how they can
be safely exploited, but for now they remain a hazard in sub-sea
- especially cold water - development.
3.5 Extreme weather conditions in the West of
Shetland present a hazard. Storms tend to be longer lived than
the more violent hurricanes of the Gulf. Drilling activities are
timed to avoid the worst Atlantic storms but unintended oil release
from drill-ships or platforms severely damaged by heavy seas could
occur. Persistent heavy weather would delay emergency responses.
3.6 Deep water installations west of Shetland
typically use an automated seabed structure to collect oil and
gas which is then pumped to a floating storage unit eg a modified
oil tanker, on the surface. Potentially an accident or terrorist
attack on the floating production system could lead to an oil
spill. Damage to seafloor wellheads would require a deliberate
act of sabotage, or the sinking of a heavy structure (such as
a large ship or floating platform) directly onto the wellhead.
4. Is deepwater oil and gas production necessary
during the UK's transition to a low carbon economy?
4.1 The UKERC Energy 2050[5]
report examined scenarios exploring all dimensions of the possible
development of the UK energy system through to 2050. The report
examined scenarios to a) deliver reliable energy to consumers
while b) meeting the UK's legal commitment to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 80% by 2050 (as prescribed by the 2008 UK Climate
Change Act). Scenarios fulfilling these criteria involved a significant
reduction in demand for oil (up to 95%) and gas (up to 85%) based
on 2005 levels. In the interim years the UK demand for oil and
gas reduces whilst still being significant.
4.2 Within the UKERC 2050 scenarios there is
significant variation in the rate and scale of demand reduction
of oil and gas between different scenarios. Both oil and gas demand
tend to decline more slowly when the carbon ambition is lower
or when low-carbon technologies are delayed in deployment. Conversely,
the fastest rate of decline in oil and gas demand arises when
the carbon ambition is highest, when energy system resilience
is prioritised and in scenarios when people adopt low-carbon lifestyles.
For example, in a resilient low-carbon energy system scenario
both oil and gas demand is approximately halved by 2030.
4.3 Reducing demand for oil and gas may further
reduce the necessity for deepwater oil and gas production by reducing
the UK's sensitivity to global shortages in these commodities.
The UKERC Energy 2050 study represents a UK-centric view, but
of course oil and gas markets are global.
4.4 Whilst the UKERC 2050 study demonstrates
the potential for a decline in the demand for oil and gas, it
should be noted that oil and gas currently provide 75% of the
UK's total primary energy, and the UKCS satisfies about 2-3 of
the UK's primary energy demand. It is predicted that in 2020,
70% of the primary energy in the UK will still come from oil and
gas[6],
even if the 20% target for renewable energy is met. The UKCS has
the potential to satisfy half of the UK's oil and gas demand in
2020 if investment is sustained.
Peak oil as a driver of necessity
4.5 In 2009 the UKERC Technology and Policy Assessment
team produced a report on Global Oil Depletion[7].
The report argues that conventional oil production is likely to
peak before 2030, with a significant risk of a peak before 2020.
A peak in conventional oil production is expected to be followed
by a year on year decline in oil production of over 4%. This is
likely to drive increased interest in harder to exploit oil (such
as deepwater oil) and the exploitation of unconventional oil and
gas resources such as tar sands and gas hydrates. However, a peak
in oil production may also drive technology development in alternatives
to oil such as biofuels, coal to liquid technology and increasing
electrification of energy services (such as transport and heat).
4.6 At the global level, Shell has produced scenarios
looking at the future development of the energy system[8].
In the two scenarios (scramble and blueprint) oil demand reaches
a plateau in the 2020s and declines slowly afterwards. However,
in neither of these scenarios are climate change goals met.
Market impacts of exploiting deepwater oil and gas
4.7 In the short term, preventing the exploitation
of deepwater oil and may be welcomed by OPEC through its effect
on oil price. In the longer run, high oil prices will result in
a faster transition to a low carbon economy. However, economic
studies show that a high oil price is a poor substitute to a high
carbon price as a driver of de-carbonisation.
4.8 In terms of gas production, a quicker decline
in UK gas production leads to more rapid UK integration into (and
dependence on) the global market, potentially driving transition
to a low carbon economy. If gas discoveries are made in deep waters
off the UK, the UK would essentially exit the liquified natural
gas (LNG) market, just as shale gas exploitation has driven the
US out of the LNG market.
4.9 The question of whether climate policies will
boost or depress gas demand and therefore the necessity of exploitation
of deepwater reserves is uncertain: it will probably boost it
in electricity generation and depress it in industrial and residential
sectors.
5. To what extent would deepwater oil and
gas resources contribute to the UK's security of supply?
Limiting factors
5.1 Annex B summarises a recent Society of Petroleum
Engineers article (2009)[9]
which attempts to quantify the size of deep water hydrocarbon
(oil and gas) resources across the globe. It suggests that the
likely speed and volume of future deep water production is unlikely
to arrest decline in existing production, or reduce the growing
imports needed to fill the gap between supply and demand.
5.2 Under current oil market regulations it is
difficult to see how deepwater oil will significantly improve
security of supply over oil produced elsewhere in Europe. Since
the UK operates a free market the oil will be sold in contracts
on the global market. Protectionist policy is unlikely in the
short to medium term, although a supply shock may change that.
5.3 Under IEA and EU rules, UK is committed to
sharing available oil with partners in the event of major disruption
so West of Shetland oil will not be in any way reserved for the
UK. However, West of Shetland could be seen as the UK's contribution
to collective security.
5.4 Given these considerations, reducing demand
is arguably the best way to significantly improve security of
supply with aggressive low-carbon roll-out a necessity.
Benefits of exploitation
5.5 Given the method used by the IEA and others
to calculate future oil production, oil yet to be found and known
oil fields yet to be developed are already accounted for. This
includes deep water. If we were not to produce the resource known
in UK waters then future projections would need to be revised
and global future demand similarly reduced to deal with supply
imbalance. Any future scenarios relying on IEA reference scenario
will be necessarily affected.
5.6 Increased supply from deepwater sites, while
unlikely to arrest the continuing decline in production, could
reduce the rate of growth of imports. Although it is unlikely
that as many resources will be found in deepwater as have already
been exploited in the North Sea, future exploitation of gas hydrates
could form a valuable component of the UK's long-term energy supply.
5.7 It is forecast that some 17% of the UK's
remaining oil and gas reserves lie under waters to the west of
Shetland. The remainder of the UKCS is classified as mature basin,
and has a declining production curve profile. Potential revenue
for exploitation may therefore prove valuable to the treasury
and the UK economy.
5.8 In a global market, the west of Shetland
will add to supply and put some downward pressure on global prices.
In the event of a major disruption, having more supply in the
hands of independent oil companies will ease the effects.
September 2010
Annex A
EXISTING ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEYS OF THE SEA
BED OFF SHETLAND AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING SURVEY CAPABILITY
1. To ensure any prospective industrial operations
in west of Shetland meet the UK's High Level Marine Objectives
outlined in the UK and Devolved Governments' Our seas - A Shared
Resource1, operating companies and regulatory authorities
must have the means to observe and monitor the condition of the
marine environment. A great deal could be done collectively to
instrument the region, using the tools and platforms already in
place and available to the industrial and marine communities.
The following paragraphs outline previous survey work and how
surveys could be maintained and developed in the future.
PREVIOUS SURVEYS
2. In 1996 the Atlantic Frontier Environmental
Network (AFEN), a consortium of oil and gas exploration companies,
working with then the Southampton Oceanography Centre (now NOC),
commissioned a large-scale regional survey of the West of Shetland
seabed environment. This industry driven survey adopted a new
ethos: to work collectivity to make a strategic regional assessment
rather than site-by-site specific assessments, and developed a
new approach drawing on the experience of the industry, its regulators,
industry contractors and the academic community. The practical
conduct of the survey used the NERC ship RRS Charles Darwin and
drew on a range of NERC developed technology and techniques for
seabed survey, sampling and visualization. These seabed survey
tools were operated in an integrated fashion, the sidescan sonar
mapping guiding the seabed sampling and visualization, which in
turn fed back ground-truthing data for the improved interpretation
of the sidescan sonar data.
3. In 1998 AFEN commissioned a further survey,
including areas north and west of Shetland and areas in the Rockall
Trough. The general concept and approach of the AFEN surveys was
then taken forward by the DTI with a survey of the Wyville Thomson
Ridge and central axis of the Faroe-Shetland Channel in 1999.
The DTI surveys continued with work during 2000 and the completion
of SEA4 field work with the 2002 survey to the north of Shetland.
Southampton Oceanography Centre was involved throughout.
4. Following the AFEN and DTI surveys, the SEA4
area is undoubtedly the most extensively studied deep-sea area
in the world. These surveys were undertaken prior to any industrial
development in the region and importantly, all of these studies
have been carried out using common approaches and techniques throughout.
The resultant dataset of biological and supporting environmental
information is a unique resource for the study of deep-sea ecology
and is the more interesting for the complex and varied environmental
setting of the SEA4 area.
5. Critically the results of the AFEN and DTI
studies have long been public domain and widely disseminated and
a number of scientific journal articles relating to the Faroe-Shetland
Channel have been published[10],[11],[12],[13].
Our understanding of the region is also enhanced by one of the
longest time series of measurements of hydrography maintained
by Marine Scotland (formerly Fisheries Research Service) and by
regular physical mapping eg of the Ellet
Line, undertaken by SAMS and the NOC as part of NERC national
capability, within the strategic marine research programme Oceans
2025 (2007-2012). NERC supported research at NOC on deep sea benthic
biology, NOC capability for strategic environmental assessments
and seabed mapping and SAMS Northern Seas Programme has built
on this base. NOC is now regarded as a leading European player
in this sphere eg in its lead of large European research projects
such as HERMES and its successor HERMOINE; however, there is no
routine biological mapping of the region.
6. BGS undertook a detailed research project
(Westen Frontiers Association) on the geohazards associated with
exploration in the Faroe-Shetland Basin with a focus on shallow
geohazards, such as slope stability. This work was undertaken
in collaboration with all the operators on the Atlantic Margin.
Results of the work are both published and held by operators.
This work did not include evaluation of deeper hazards such as
over-pressured reservoirs, where the operators have the knowledge
from their own work.
MAINTAINING SURVEY
CAPABILITY
7. There is a great deal that could be done collectively
to instrument the region, using the tools and platforms already
in the region and available to the industrial and marine communities.
The AFEN model of industrial and academic collaboration could
be a good model for the institutional framework for further work.
The opportunity to build observation and long term monitoring
capacity into the design of the oil field infrastructure from
the outset should not be missed. Alternately, if a drilling moratorium
were to be established it would be vital to ensure that the region
remained open to researchers - Government, academic and industrial.
8. Whilst a repeat of the AFEN surveys would
be desirable scientifically, it would be extremely expensive.
However, it should be possible to design a good comparator survey,
with the support of the industry that might be undertaken within
one or more research cruises. Such cruises could also help plug
gaps in the knowledge in the light of the Gulf Experience and
in relation to smaller marine fauna. Very different fauna exist
in the Northern Rockall and the Faroe Shetland channel regions
and it would be important to ensure that both are addressed and
that work is done to identify "target organisms" - indicator
species such as scavenging amphipods that are easily acquired
and tested for toxicology impacts.
9. NOC would be well placed to work with the
industry in specifying and designing such a long term observatory
and along with the SAMS, inform the planning of research in the
region. NOC, in close collaboration with key players in the oil
and gas industry, runs the "Scientific and Environmental
ROV Partnership using Existing Industrial Technology" (SERPENT)
project which aims to make cutting-edge industrial ROV technology
and data more accessible to the world's science community, share
knowledge and progress deep-sea research. The programme interacts
with science and conservation groups globally to communicate the
project to the public, increasing the awareness of our fragile
marine resources. The project has a growing network of UK and
global partners. Observations are made to within 200m of the drill
sites, focusing on the degree of disturbance.
10. NOC is currently a partner in the Deep-ocean
Environmental Long-term Observatory System (DELOS) project led
by the University of Aberdeen. This could also provide a model
for developments in the Shetland region. The DELOS project aim
is to increase understanding of the deep water areas BP are gradually
extending into off Angola, and provide long term environmental
monitoring to enhance deep sea scientific research.
Annex B
A NOTE ON UK DEEP WATER OIL RESOURCE
1. A recent Society of Petroleum Engineers article
(2009) attempts to quantify the size of deep water hydrocarbon
(oil and gas) resources across the globe. This resource is estimated
at 11.9 billion tonnes oil equivalent (TOE) in 2007. Of this 15%
(or about 1.8 billion TOE) was discovered in Europe and of that
only 25% approximately was located in the UK (450 million TOE
approx). Of this only 237 million TOE is oil.
2. Global production of oil in 2009 was 3820.5
million tonnes while 1P[14],[15]remaining
reserves stood at 181.7 billion tonnes. UK consumption in 2009
was 74.4 million tonnes. Therefore, in terms of global demand
the UK deep water resource is small. It does amount to approx
3 years of domestic consumption. It is not, however, likely to
be reserved for the domestic market unless the market regime is
changed.
3. Global average lag time between discovery
and production for deep water is approximately 80 months. However,
Europe has a significantly greater lag than the global average,
at approximately 116 months. This means that access to this deep
water oil will be delayed and protracted, minimising the resources
impact on global supplies significantly.
1 http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/marine/legislation/hlmo-sharedseas.htm
Back
2
http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga-environmental/mcga-dops_cp_sosrep_role.htm
Back
3
http://www.nerc.ac.uk/research/capability/
Back
4
http://www.noc.soton.ac.uk/shmg/maremap
Back
5
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/sport/tiki-index.php?page=Energy+2050+Overview Back
6
"Section 2: Industry at a Glance" in the Economic Report
2010 published by UK Oil and Gas, July 2010, see:
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/publications/viewpub.cfm?frmPubID=375
Back
7
http://www.ukerc.ac.ukupport/Global%20Oil%20Depletion Back
8
http://www.shell.com/home/ntent/aboutsll/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/
Back
9
"Worldwide Deepwater Petroleum Exploration and Development
Prospectivity: Comparative Analysis of Efforts and Outcomes"
Authors: Omowumi O. Iledare, SPE. Louisiana State University
SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, 4-7 October 2009,
New Orleans, Louisiana.
Back
10 Narayanaswamy
B &, Bett BJ (in subm) Macrobenthic biomass relations in the
Faroe-Shetland Channel: an Arctic-Atlantic boundary environment.
PLoS ONE. Back
11
Narayanaswamy BE, Bett BJ & Hughes DJ (2010) Deep-water macrofaunal
diversity in the Faroe-Shetland region (NE Atlantic): a margin
subject to an unusual thermal regime. Marine Ecology Special
Issue. 31: 237-246.
doi:10.1111/j.1439-0485.2010.00360.x Back
12
Narayanaswamy BE, Bett BJ & Gage JD (2005) Ecology of bathyal
polychaete fauna at an Arctic-Atlantic boundary (Faroe-Shetland
Channel, North-east Atlantic). Marine Biology Research
1: 20-32. Back
13
Narayanaswamy BE. (2000) Macrofaunal Ecology of the West Shetland
Slope PhD thesis - University of Southampton.
Back
14
1P is a measure of Proven reserves. Back
15
Though not stated the SPE is likely to be using a 1P definition
of reserves. Back
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