5 The need for new capacity and the
climate change implications
67. The Government believes that the need for new
energy infrastructure is so acute that it will not be necessary
to consider in detail whether there is a demonstrable need for
each individual proposed development. Part 3 of EN-1 establishes
the "need case" for new Nationally Significant Infrastructure
Projects (NSIPs) for energy in England and Wales. It sets out
the national need for:
- new electricity infrastructure
projects, including renewable, nuclear and fossil fuel electricity
generation;
- new electricity network infrastructure;
- nationally significant gas infrastructure; and
- new nationally significant oil infrastructure
projects.
The revised need case
68. Our predecessors recommended that the Government
should strengthen the need case set out in EN-1.[88]
Since the original draft NPS, the need case in EN-1 has been revisited
in line with this recommendation, both in terms of the period
covered by the Government's assessment and the level of need.
The revised NPS extends the need assessment, which previously
focused on the period up to 2025, to take into account the up-to-date
modelling and DECC's Pathways to 2050 analysis. The revised
NPS also tightened the assessment of need for new gas capacity,
in line with the Committee's recommendation.[89]
DECC's central projection for UK gas demand in 2020 is now around
70 billion cubic metres (bcm) per annum compared with around 85
bcm in 2010. [90]
However, on central assumptions about domestic gas production
and use, net import demand for gas is now estimated to rise from
around 31 bcm in 2010 to 37 bcm in 2020 and 53 bcm in 2025.[91]
69. The Committee heard different views on the robustness
of the revised need case. RenewableUK welcomed the expression
of need for renewables in the NPSs.[92]
On the other hand, Friends of the Earth thought that the need
case was far off the mark.[93]
The following two sections explore two issues highlighted to use
as remaining outstanding in the Government's handling of the need
case.
RELATIVE NEED
70. EN-1 sets out a static need case: the need for
individual infrastructure projects is assessed against the overall
need case set out in EN-1 without regard to the amount of capacity
already consented or under construction. Or, as CPRE put it, "'need'
is still, for the purposes of the IPC, considered to be a simple,
monolithic 'need: yes' or 'need: no'".[94]
71. Part 3 of the EN-1 points to several challenges
that the UK must face in order to achieve energy security as well
as climate change mitigation. These including the need to replace
capacity that is ageing or due to be closed under the EU Large
Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) and the need to bolster capacity
to balance an increase in the supply of energy from intermittent
renewables alongside increasing demand.[95]
Current generating capacity is roughly 85 GW and 22 GW is expected
to be taken offline by 2020.[96]
Alongside this capacity challenge, the UK is committed to producing
at least 15% of its electricity from renewables by 2020 and to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050 under
the Climate Change Act 2008.
72. In response to these challenges, EN-1 includes
an assessment of the generating capacity that will be required
over the next decade and a half.
Figure 1: Generating capacity requirements, according
to EN-1
Current generating capacity
| 85 GW |
Requirement by 2025 |
113 GW |
Of which new build |
59 GW |
Renewables to meet UK renewables targets
| 33 GW |
Other capacity required
| 26 GW |
Renewables already under construction
| 2 GW |
Non-renewables already under construction
| 8 GW |
Balance expected of non-renewables
| 18 GW |
Source: Revised Draft Overarching National Policy
Statement for Energy (EN-1)
73. According
to EN-1, the IPC should gauge applications for development consent
for energy infrastructure "on the basis that the need for
those types of infrastructure has been demonstrated by the Government
and that this need is urgent".[97]
The requirements summarised in Figure 1 form the basis of that
assessment of urgent need. However, witnesses argued that individual
applications should be assessed not on these figures alone, but
on the basis of these figures relative to the amount of
new capacity already in the pipeline.[98]
CPRE argued that the IPC and MIPU and ultimately the Secretary
of State should be aware of infrastructure projects that are already
underway when considering whether to consent to another application.
This would mean that the assessment of need for new capacity would
become less as more projects are approved. [99]
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE
74. A number of witnesses focused on carbon capture
and storage (CCS) as an important tool in the UK's efforts to
meet its greenhouse gas emissions targets by reducing the emissions
into the atmosphere of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel generating
plants (i.e. coal-fired and gas-fired power stations and perhaps
also biomass-powered plant). The emissions would not be reduced
by CCS, but the gases would be captured and stored indefinitely.
The Minister of State, Charles Hendry MP, told the Committee that
the Government "are putting a great deal of resource into
making sure it does work, but the plan B can be a range of alternatives".
These included biomass, gas, pump storage and "other technologies
that can come in to take up the slack".[100]
Friends of the Earth also claimed that it would be possible to
decarbonise the economy without CCS using "more energy efficiency,
greater renewables than the Government are saying, greater decentralised
energy, a real effort put into storage technologies and interconnectors
with Europe [... and] there would have to be some role for using
unabated gas plant at peak times".[101]
75. The NPSs place a significant emphasis on CCS
and carbon capture readiness (CCR). The revised draft overarching
NPS (EN-1) clarifies that all combustion power stations of at
least 300 MW capacity will be required to be Carbon Capture Ready
(CCR). The Government plans to introduce an Emissions Performance
Standard (EPS) to prevent new coal-fired power stations from being
built without CCS.[102]
This is a significant undertaking, because coal remains a relatively
cheap and abundant energy source that is easy to store, making
it an important part of the UK's energy mix, in terms of both
affordability and security of supply. The Minister, Charles Hendry
MP, told us in our inquiry on EPSs that "We see an important
role for coal [...] We have 60 plus years of coal supplies which
are readily accessible [...] we think this is an area where we
should be leading, and therefore we think that actually provides
a great opportunity for a renaissance of coal in the UK".[103]
Section 4.7 of EN-1 describes CCS as an "emerging technology",
but makes little reference to any commercial and technological
uncertainties associated with carbon capture.[104]
76. However, Peter Atherton of Citigroup Global Markets
told the Committee that it is "clear from what's happened
with the UK process that [investment in CCS] is unattractive to
most companies".[105]
When asked about the second, third and fourth CCS demonstration
projects that the Government intended to support, he went on to
tell the Committee that "There is no evidence that the major,
UK-based facilities have any appetite to build those three; that
is for sure".[106]
We examine the market for investment in energy infrastructure
in paragraphs 96-105 below.
77. We conclude that there is a worrying lack
of contingency arrangements should key technologies, such as carbon
capture and storage, not prove viable. Without carbon capture
and storage, the effort required to meet our energy security and
climate change targets would be almost insurmountable. We recommend
that section 4.7 of EN-1 should include clearer recognition that
carbon capture and storage is economically and technically unproven
and that it should lay out a contingency plan for decarbonising
the economy without carbon capture and storage.
CARBON IMPLICATIONS OF A NEW DASH
FOR GAS
78. Estimates in EN-1 indicate that 59 GW of new
build may be required by 2025 [see Figure 1]. EN-1 says that "the
Government would like a significant proportion of this balance
to be filled by new low carbon generation", but it is ultimately
left up to the market to determine what kind of energy is brought
forward.[107] Friends
of the Earth argued that the way in which the need case in the
revised draft NPSs is formulated could lead to a "new dash
for gas", similar to the rush toward the use of natural gas
in the 1990s after UK energy markets were liberalised, because
of the relative cheapness of natural gas and the speed with which
gas-fired capacity can be brought online.[108]
They claimed that on top of a substantial amount of gas
already in the pipeline, there was a further 20 GW of potential
gas capacity being considered by the IPC already.[109]
This capacity, if built, could meet all the projected need and
leave little room for the development of renewables.
79. In order to mitigate the risk that new conventional
generation would crowd out renewables, the previous Committee
recommended that "A potential future option could be the
introduction of a hierarchy of preferred generation technologies
to guide more directly the IPC's decision-making".[110]
The Government did not agree with this recommendation, responding
that "The implementation of the Planning Act 2008 [...] does
not represent a departure from the established view that the development
of new infrastructure is a market-led process," and that
the NPSs did not constitute "a move towards setting detailed
targets for the construction of particular types of infrastructure".[111]
When we asked witnesses about their view of the argument that
the implementation of a hierarchy of technologies would be more
costly than a market-led process, Simon Bullock of Friends of
the Earth responded that "I believe that the Minister, in
his evidence, stated that it would be. I don't see any evidence
from him that that would be the case".[112]
80. We recognise that gas will continue to play a
role in the UK energy mix. Gas plant provides low-cost, flexible
generation that can be brought online quickly and reliably. Limited
generation by unabated gas may be important at times of peak demand
in order to balance an increasing amount of intermittent generation
from renewable sources. A dash for gas, however, would have considerable
implications for the UK's climate change mitigation targets, especially
in the event that CCS does not become commercially or technologically
viable. Unabated, a new supercritical gas power stationan
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plantwould
emit approximately 350 grams of carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour
(gCO2/KWh).[113] The
Committee on Climate Change has suggested that there is limited
scope for investment in unabated gas capacity beyond 2020 in their
recommendations for the fourth carbon budget under the Climate
Change Act.[114] According
to their analysis, the carbon intensity of the whole energy sector
needs to be less than 70 gCO2/kWh by 2030.[115]
81. In order to mitigate the risk of a second dash
for gas, witnesses recommended that the NPSs should include an
interim goal of decarbonising the electricity sector by 2030.
This is in line with the advice Committee on Climate Change that
the sector should be substantially decarbonised by 2030.[116]
As Friends of the Earth made clear: "It is the total emissions
under the curve over the whole 40 years between now and 2050 that
matter, not just the end point".[117]
This means that way the UK responds to the need case in
EN-1 will have an impact on climate change. The objective of decarbonisation
of the electricity sector by 2030, said Friends of the Earth "gives
a clear steer that we need to be decarbonising really fast through
the 2020s and that some generating mixes would not be compatible
with that target".[118]
The Minister told the Committee that "[
] we would expect
the system to be substantially decarbonised by 2030".[119]
He acknowledged that much of the effort required to achieve this
goal would be made through other policies, such as electricity
market reform, and not through the NPSs.[120]
82. In their response to the previous Committee's
Report, the Government stated that it would "be watching
both the flow of applications for consent to the IPC and the outcome
of those cases to determine whether they are in line with the
expectations about future infrastructure development on which
the NPS policies were based".[121]
83. We welcome the Government's acceptance that
the assessment of need for a project application should not be
made in isolation from an awareness of projects already complete,
underway or consented. However, we believe that this approach
should be incorporated in the overarching National Policy Statement,
EN-1, and not relegated to an assurance in the Government's response
document. The IPC and MIPU should have a duty to provide the Secretary
of State with the information necessary to make his decision on
each application. During the transitional period in which the
IPC is the decision-maker, it is important that it should also
have regard to the flow of projects and capacity already consented.
84. We are concerned by the risk that the NPS
need case may have a perverse impact on the development of new
capacity, by encouraging too much new gas plant. We recognise
the continuing importance of gas-fired generation in the UK but
are worried that, as drafted, the NPSs could lead to a second
"dash for gas". This would make it very difficult for
the UK to meet its renewable energy and greenhouse gas emissions
reduction targets, especially if carbon capture and storage does
not prove viable in the short term. To avoid this contingency,
in deciding individual applications, the Secretary of State must
take into account the volume and kind of capacity already consented
or under construction.
85. We remain adamant that the recommendation
of the Committee on Climate Change that the electricity sector
should be substantially decarbonised by 2030 should be set out
in EN-1 as an explicit goal for consideration in planning applications.
Nuclear energy and radioactive
waste
86. The draft nuclear NPS (EN-6) was revised by the
Government and now lists eight sites (as opposed to the ten in
the original draft) that the Government deems to be potentially
suitable for the deployment of new nuclear power stations before
the end of 2025.[122]
The Government believes that these identified sites could be used
for 16 GW of new nuclear power (with some sites hosting more than
one plant) and that the industry is keen to invest in new plant.[123]
There are currently three consortia interested in investing in
new-build nuclear.[124]
EDF Energy plans to build four new nuclear plants in the UK, with
the first two at Hinkley Point, followed by two at Sizewell, subject
to the right investment framework being in place. Centrica are
partners in the project (the 80/20 joint venture), though EDF
will run the reactors.[125]
Each of these European Pressurised Water Reactors (EPR)
will generate around 1,600 MW of electricity.[126]
E.ON has formed a joint venture with RWE npower to develop new
nuclear power stations in the UK. Their current aim is to be operating
their first new power station in the UK by around 2020.[127]
ScottishPower and Scottish and Southern Energy also plan to construct
new nuclear power plants in the UK. Last year, the consortium
acquired a purchase option on the Sellafield site from the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority. The partners are currently preparing
a detailed plan to install a new nuclear plant on this site with
a capacity of 3,600 MW.[128]
87. With new nuclear power stations taking approximately
six years to build, the very earliest that a new power station
could be brought online would be 2018.[129]
Three sites in the original NPS (Dungeness, Braystones and Kirkstanton)
have since been confirmed as unsuitable.
88. In addition, the Government has committed itself
to finding a long-term "geological disposal facility".
It is committed to making the voluntarist and partnership approach
to site selection work through the Managing Radioactive Waste
Safely (MRWS) process. It will establish a reconfigured Geological
Disposal Implementation Board to be a high profile oversight group,
chaired by DECC Ministers and involving key stakeholders. An executive
steering group has also been established, chaired by the Chief
Executive of the Office for Nuclear Development, to provide leadership
and oversight of geological disposal and hold the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority (NDA) to account as the implementation body responsible
for delivery.[130]
89. The Minister told us that:
We are very committed to the approach of the previous
Government, who took a voluntarist approach to finding a community
prepared to host this. That, inevitably, is a gentle process.
There have been three expressions of interest from within Cumbriatwo
from district councils and one from the county counciland
we are taking those forward.[131]
The nuclear NPS states that the Government has satisfied
itself that:
- geological disposal of higher
activity radioactive waste, including waste from new nuclear power
stations, is technically achievable;
- a suitable site can be identified for the geological
disposal of higher activity radioactive waste; and
- safe, secure and environmentally acceptable interim
storage arrangements will be available until a geological disposal
facility can accept the waste. [132]
90. Therefore, the Government has decided that it
has adequately addressed the question of whether effective arrangements
will exist to manage and dispose of the waste that will be produced
from new nuclear power stations and that the IPC should not consider
this further.[133]
91. The Government's Response to the previous Committee's
report stated that "On the basis of the NDA's current indicative
timetable, a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) is expected to
be available to take spent fuel from new nuclear power stations
from around 2130".[134]
According to the Government's new high-level timeline, the possible
first consignment of legacy waste to a facility will be in 2040.[135]
92. However, we received evidence that cast doubts
on the Government's belief that a geological disposal facility
would be identified and made operational by 2130. According to
the Stop Hinkley Campaign, international experience is not as
advanced as the Government suggests: as Friends of the Earth pointed
out, there wasn't an operational geological disposal repository
anywhere in the world.[136]
Sweden, widely cited as an exemplary model, has not even got to
the stage of receiving regulatory approval for its plans. Whilst
there have been expressions of interest, the UK does not have
a clear volunteer "host" community for a geological
disposal site or a confirmed geological formation.
93. In response to the previous Committee's recommendations,
the Government revised the nuclear NPS so that it clarified the
onsite facilities necessary to manage radioactive waste. It also
reviewed the estimate that 160 years of on-site storage might
be needed before waste could be transferred to the long-term storage
site. However, with waste being stored for 50 years after the
end of the nuclear power station's life (an operational lifetime
being around 60 years), on-site storage would still need to be
found for 110 years. Friends of the Earth were concerned that
the Government appeared to be accepting the risk associated with
interim storage of radioactive waste on sites such as Sizewell
where there was chance of flooding over the next 120 years.[137]
94. Whilst we acknowledge the changes that the
Government has made to the nuclear NPS, it must make clear that
interim storage facilities for up to 110 years of radioactive
waste will be necessary for new build nuclear plant.
95. We welcome the arrangements to set milestones
for the work to identify a Geological Disposal Facility for the
long-term storage of radioactive waste. We conclude that the Government
should continue to report progress made by the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority towards identifying a facility, including providing
us with copies of the annual report to be published on milestones
reached.
Investment in new capacity
96. DECC has estimated that £200bn will be needed
to meet supply and sustainability targets by 2020 as demand grows
and a large amount of ageing plant is taken offline. Estimates
from other sources are higher. For example, the report The
1trn decaderevisited, calculated that UK investments
for renewal of utility infrastructure (including water) would
require 320bn to meet government environmental targets and
replace/renew the asset base (this equates to £220bn compared
to the Government's estimate of £200bn investment required).[138]
The report argued that roughly 10bn was invested each year
currently, but it calculated that the UK would face a shortfall
in investment of 139bn in investment in utilities (including
water) in the next decade.[139]
The report also drew attention to possible problems with skills,
organisational capacity and supply chain hold-ups for investment
in new UK capacity. The supply chain difficulties were attested
by the witnesses in our one-off evidence session with the "Big
Six" generating companies, who pointed to a skills shortage
in the nuclear industry in particular.[140]
Peter Haslam of the Nuclear Industry Association, on the other
hand, told us that there was a strong skills base in the UK which
would transfer between decommissioning sites and new build sites.
He also referred to Government initiatives such as the National
Skills Academy for Nuclear which intended to improve the skills
base.[141]
97. The NPSs are intended to help deliver that investment
by streamlining the planning process for major infrastructure
projects and providing certainty for investors. The Minister told
the Committee that:
[
] the United Kingdom is now one of the most
interesting places in the world for new nuclear. One can look
at the companies keen to build here and without subsidy, and we
hope that that is going to be a key part of the mix going forward.[142]
He continued:
I think that the thoroughness with which [the NPSs]
address those issues gives investors a significant amount of security.
Investors know which factors may be considered to be material,
and which factors will not be considered to be relevant to an
application. We have sought to do that in order to give that degree
of security and structure.[143]
98. Jane Smith, on behalf of the UK Business Council
for Sustainable Energy, and Peter Haslam, of the Nuclear Industry
Association, agreed that the NPSs would be key in providing a
stable, long-term policy framework to attract investment.[144]
Peter Haslam argued that it was vital to have long-term planning
policy for the nuclear industry and that the NPSs, together with
the expected electricity market reforms, would enable projects
to go through on time without undue delay (unlike, for example,
Sizewell B which had suffered significant delays in the planning
process).[145]
99. However, other witnesses painted a different
picture to us. Malcolm Chilton of Covanta Energy Ltd, representing
the Renewable Energy Association believed that the NPSs would
"probably improve matters slightly", but that it was
difficult to attract bank funding for renewable projects at the
moment and that investors would first be assessing the interim
arrangements whilst the new system bedded in.[146]
Matt Thomson of the Royal Town Planning Institute questioned whether
"from a planning perspective", the revised NPSs would
provide greater certainty for energy investors. He thought that
the weakness with NPSs as they stood was that they did not provide
guidance on how decision makers should weigh up proposals for
energy infrastructure against competing uses for the land.[147]
100. The UK has signed up to the EU Renewable Energy
Directive, which includes a UK target of 15% of energy from renewables
by 2020. Under the Climate Change Act 2008, UK emissions must
be reduced by at least 80% by 2050, compared to 1990 levels. According
to EN-1, all commercial scale (at or over 300 MW) combustion power
stations have to be constructed Carbon Capture Ready (CCR) and
new coal-fired power stations are required to demonstrate Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS) on at least 300 MW of the proposed generating
capacity. The Government plans to introduce an Emissions Performance
Standard (EPS) to prevent coal-fired power stations from being
built without CCS. EN-1 now notes that new coal-fired power stations
will need to meet the EPS.[148]
101. The complete chain of CCS has yet to be demonstrated
at commercial scale on a power station. Whilst there is optimism
that the technology involved in CCS will be effective, very little
is known about the costs of CCS. There is uncertainty about the
future deployment of CCS and whether this will be achieved economically.
The Government is supporting the cost of four commercial-scale
CCS demonstration projects. The Government has committed £1bn
to the first project at Longannet. Only Scottish Power is left
in the competition for this project.[149]
102. Peter Atherton, one of the authors of The
1trn decaderevisited, told the Committee that
the UK was attractive to investors due to the support mechanisms
for renewables and because the governments in other European countries
had revised subsidies for renewables (for example Germany, Spain
and Czech Republic). However, investors were wary of the political
risk of the UK government being unable to maintain its current
policy position and then following others on the continent in
withdrawing subsidies in the future.[150]
In addition, due to difficulties in the utilities sector in the
last 18 months, many companies had far less investment capacity
today than they would have had previously. Mr Atherton felt that
whilst the NPSs would be "part of the mix", investors
were more interested in risk-reward: the construction risks and
power price risks.[151]
He believed that, due to the UK's infrastructure needs, companies
were being challenged to roll out "frontier" technologies
such as CCS, new nuclear and offshore wind "far faster than
they would naturally do them".[152]
103. Whilst the first contract for a demonstration
CCS plant is being awarded, Mr Atherton told us that there was
"no evidence that the major UK-based facilities have any
appetite" to build the other three CCS plants that the Government
desired.[153] Whilst
there were projects on CCS taking place around the world, Mr Atherton
told us that companies were struggling to find an economic way
to do it in the UK.[154]
He believed that the most straightforward way for the Government
to increase investment in an unproved technology such as CCS would
be for the Government to create a regulated asset and transfer
the commercial risk from the developer to the consumer/taxpayer.[155]
104. On the subject of new nuclear build, Peter Haslam
and Jane Smith thought that the NPSs and electricity market reform
would encourage the necessary level of investment to get 16 GW
of new nuclear online by 2025 as envisaged by the Minister.[156]
Peter Atherton disagreed and argued that it would be "extraordinarily
unlikely and extraordinarily challenging" due to five risks
discouraging investors: planning, construction, power price, operation
and decommissioning with the greatest risks of these being construction
and power price, especially in the UK where the private sector
was being asked to take on those risks alone.[157]
105. We conclude that whilst the NPSs could encourage
long-term investment in essential energy infrastructure, investors
may find the commercial risks of new technologies in particular
too high. Consequently the level of investment in new energy infrastructure
will not be sufficient to meet our energy security and environmental
targets. Mechanisms within electricity market reform such as capacity
payments and "contracts for difference" will be vital
in ensuring there is adequate private sector investment in the
UK's energy market. As part of our inquiry into electricity market
reform we will call on the Government to set out how it will encourage
the investment of at least £200billion over the next decade.
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