Conclusions and recommendations
Changes to the Planning Act 2008 and Parliamentary
scrutiny
1. We
welcome the improvements that have been made to the Appraisals
of Sustainability since the publication of the first draft NPSs,
but we note the continuing dissatisfaction in some quarters. We
recommend that to avoid charges of non-compliance in the future,
the Government publish guidelines on how, in carrying out Appraisals
of Sustainability for future NPSs, it intends to ensure fulfilment
of the requirements of the Strategic Environmental Assessment
Directive. It should then consult separately on this statement
of principles and practice. For the present, we consider that
the Appraisals of Sustainability will pass muster. (Paragraph
28)
2. We recognise that
on this occasion a foreshortened period for scrutiny was acceptable,
given that the draft Statements had been subject to full scrutiny
by our predecessor Committee. However, we reassert the general
expectation that the period of parliamentary scrutiny follows
the public consultation period. (Paragraph 33)
3. We welcome the
ratification procedure set out in the Localism Bill for adding
a formal stage of parliamentary ratification before a Statement
can be finally designated. We note, however, that the proposal
is for a form of modified negative resolution procedure. Consequently,
there is no guarantee that the House will vote on each individual
National Policy Statement, although it is always open to the government
to ensure a vote, and, under the new procedures for backbench
business a committee or an individual Member could request one.
We are not persuaded that this entirely fulfils the Minister's
assurances to us, though we can also see the possibility of cases
where a full vote on a relatively minor revision seems excessive.
We would expect the Backbench Business Committee to give a sympathetic
hearing to any request for a debate and vote on an NPS in circumstances
where the government of the day appeared to be trying to avoid
one. (Paragraph 36)
4. We believe that
although early ratification of the energy NPSs has some advantages
completing the process in advance of the decisions on electricity
market reform, the passage of the Localism Bill and the determination
of the new planning framework could fail to provide the coherence
and certainty that are part of the fundamental rationale for NPSs
in the first place. (Paragraph 39)
5. We recommend that
the Government makes sufficient time for a full day's debate on
the revised draft NPSs, centred on EN-1 (with perhaps a four to
six hour debate), but with a business motion providing time for
an individual debate or at least an individual decision on each
of the technology-specific NPSs. We urge the Chair to consider,
where practicable, the scope for consideration of reasoned amendments
on each Statement where these constitute a detailed rather than
principled ground for rejection. We further recommend strongly
that there is provision in a business motion for a separate vote
on each of the six energy NPSs. (Paragraph 45)
6. We recommend that
the Localism Bill should set out explicit criteria against which
the Secretary of State may choose to exercise his or her discretion
in deciding a planning application against the advice of the IPC
or MIPU. This decision should rest with the Secretary of State
for Energy and Climate Change. In addition, the Secretary of State
should be required to publish his or her reasons for going against
the advice of the IPC or MIPU. (Paragraph 50)
7. We conclude that
the potential hiatus between the designation of any NPSs and the
transfer of decision-making powers away from the IPC provides
a further reason why the ratification process should be timed
to follow royal assent to the Localism Bill so that all future
planning applications are decided by the same statutory authority.
(Paragraph 51)
NPSs and the planning system
8. The
Government has set out on important, but potentially disruptive
or even conflicting, reforms of the planning system in relative
isolation from one another. We conclude that the National Planning
Framework could provide strategic spatial direction to the National
Policy Statements. The various changes to the planning system
must be complementary. We therefore recommend that the development
of the National Planning Framework and the National Infrastructure
Plan, and the enactment of the Localism Bill, should be coordinated.
The Localism Bill should not be enacted until the national planning
framework and the national infrastructure plan are completed and
active. (Paragraph 60)
9. We recommend that
the NPS on transmission networks should revert to the formula
that the Holford Rules are the "basis of the approach"
toward cables. We further recommend that in some areas the situating
of cables underground is necessary to reduce the visual impacts
of energy networks infrastructure. These areas should include,
but not be limited to, National Parks and Areas of Outstanding
Natural Beauty. This should be qualified by recognition that particular
economic or environmental circumstances could make the placing
of cables underground impractical in certain areas. (Paragraph
66)
The need for new capacity and the climate change
implications
10. We
conclude that there is a worrying lack of contingency arrangements
should key technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, not
prove viable. Without carbon capture and storage, the effort required
to meet our energy security and climate change targets would be
almost insurmountable. We recommend that section 4.7 of EN-1 should
include clearer recognition that carbon capture and storage is
economically and technically unproven and that it should lay out
a contingency plan for decarbonising the economy without carbon
capture and storage. (Paragraph 77)
11. We welcome the
Government's acceptance that the assessment of need for a project
application should not be made in isolation from an awareness
of projects already complete, underway or consented. However,
we believe that this approach should be incorporated in the overarching
National Policy Statement, EN-1, and not relegated to an assurance
in the Government's response document. The IPC and MIPU should
have a duty to provide the Secretary of State with the information
necessary to make his decision on each application. During the
transitional period in which the IPC is the decision-maker, it
is important that it should also have regard to the flow of projects
and capacity already consented. (Paragraph 83)
12. We are concerned
by the risk that the NPS need case may have a perverse impact
on the development of new capacity, by encouraging too much new
gas plant. We recognise the continuing importance of gas-fired
generation in the UK but are worried that, as drafted, the NPSs
could lead to a second "dash for gas". This would make
it very difficult for the UK to meet its renewable energy and
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, especially if carbon
capture and storage does not prove viable in the short term. To
avoid this contingency, in deciding individual applications, the
Secretary of State must take into account the volume and kind
of capacity already consented or under construction. (Paragraph
84)
13. We remain adamant
that the recommendation of the Committee on Climate Change that
the electricity sector should be substantially decarbonised by
2030 should be set out in EN-1 as an explicit goal for consideration
in planning applications. (Paragraph 85)
14. Whilst we acknowledge
the changes that the Government has made to the nuclear NPS, it
must make clear that interim storage facilities for up to 110
years of radioactive waste will be necessary for new build nuclear
plant. (Paragraph 94)
15. We welcome the
arrangements to set milestones for the work to identify a Geological
Disposal Facility for the long-term storage of radioactive waste.
We conclude that the Government should continue to report progress
made by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority towards identifying
a facility, including providing us with copies of the annual report
to be published on milestones reached. (Paragraph 95)
16. We conclude that
whilst the NPSs could encourage long-term investment in essential
energy infrastructure, investors may find the commercial risks
of new technologies in particular too high. Consequently the level
of investment in new energy infrastructure will not be sufficient
to meet our energy security and environmental targets. Mechanisms
within electricity market reform such as capacity payments and
"contracts for difference" will be vital in ensuring
there is adequate private sector investment in the UK's energy
market. As part of our inquiry into electricity market reform
we will call on the Government to set out how it will encourage
the investment of at least £200billion over the next decade.
(Paragraph 105)
17. We recommend that
the timing of the NPSs and other significant planning policy developments
should be coordinated. In particular, the NPSs must be in harmony
with the changes introduced in the National Planning Framework
and in the Electricity Market Reform process. Ill-timing could
create uncertainty rather than certainty for new energy infrastructure
investment. To this end delaying ratification of the NPSs for
a few months would allow them to be coordinated with the other
significant planning reforms underway Furthermore, the ratification
procedure needs to ensure that consent for the NPSs is real and
detailed, not just a symbolic vote on a take it or leave it basis.
(Paragraph 110)
18. Under new arrangements,
the Minister will be able to decide against the advice of the
MIPC or the IPC. We recommend that the Government publishes criteria
against which the Secretary of State may choose to exercise his
or her discretion and the reasons for going against the advice
of the IPC or MIPU in individual cases. This matters not just
for this Parliament but for decades and even centuries to come,
as there are very long-term consequences of decisions on energy
policy taken now. It is vital that this issue is addressed or
much of the anticipated gain of the NPS system may be squandered
by the reintroduction of political uncertainty in a field where
investment planning horizons are twenty or more years ahead. (Paragraph
111)
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