22 ESDP: Piracy off the coast of
Somalia
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| Council Decision amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast
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| Legal base | Articles 28 and 43 (2) EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 23 July 2010
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| Previous Committee Reports | None; but see (31174) 16450/09: HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 19 (9 December 2009); (30982) —: HC 19- xxvii (2008-09), chapter 29 (14 October 2009); also see (30724) — and (30728)—: HC 19 xxiii (2008-09), chapter 9 (8 July 2009) and (30341) —, (30348) — and (30349) —: HC 19-iv (2008-09) chapter 17 (21 January 2009); (30400) 13989/08: HC 16-xxxvi (2007-08), chapter 17 (26 November 2008) and HC 16-xxxii (2007-08), chapter 10 (22 October 2008); and (29953)—: HC16-xxx (2007-08), chapter 19 (8 October 2008)
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| Discussed in Council | To be determined
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
22.1 In response to growing international concern over the
problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1816 (2008) in June
which encouraged "States interested in the use of commercial
maritime routes off the coast of Somalia, to increase and coordinate
their efforts to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea".
Then, on 7 October 2008, the Security Council unanimously adopted
UNSCR 1838, which was initiated by France and co-sponsored by
19 countries (Belgium, Croatia, the US, UK, Italy, Panama, Canada,
Denmark, Spain, Greece, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Norway, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Korea and Singapore).
22.2 The previous Committee's reports set out
the history of the European Union's endeavours to address this
problem, leading to the creation of the first ESDP naval operation,
Operation Atalanta, and subsequent developments.[99]
22.3 These include, in January 2009, an Explanatory
Memorandum from the then Minister for Europe, giving "an
overview on decisions made to facilitate the progress of Operation
Atalanta" and incorporating a Joint Action launching the
operation and two Council Decisions on Status of Force Agreements
with both the Somali Republic and Djibouti.
22.4 Subsequent reports have covered:
— an
exchange of letters between the EU and Kenya that give the right
to enter and freedom of movement within the territory (including
territorial waters and airspace) of Kenya "strictly limited
to the necessities of the operation";
— a further EU-Kenya agreement on the handover
of pirates for trial;
— a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with
the Seychelles, allowing the EU to freely enter territory (including
territorial waters and airspace) of the Republic of the Seychelles
and the right to detain pirates in the Republic of the Seychelles
waters;
— an agreement to allow the transfer of
persons detained by EUNAVFOR in connection with armed robbery
and associated seized property to the Seychelles for the purpose
of investigation and prosecution;
— information on attempted and successful
attacks with regard to the year to 9 June 2009, noting that the
ratio of successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden had reduced from
1 in 3 at the end of 2008 to about 1 in 8 for most of the year
to date and 1 in 11 in May, but also that these international
effort may have had effect of pushing pirates to operation further
South East including in Seychelles waters;
— a new piracy resolution (UNSCR 1851)
adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 2008, which called
for the establishment of an International Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), and gave details of the work
upon which the CGPCS had embarked;
— agreement in May that, having reached
Initial Operation Capacity (IOC) on 13 December 2008 and being
intended to last until 13 December 2009, Operation Atalanta should
be extended for a further 12 months;
— the previous Minister for Europe's views
on the achievements, failings and lessons learned so far in the
mission's first year, which said that a more detailed review would
be undertaken at the end of ATALANTA's first year in December
2009;
— action the Government and the EU had
taken during the year of operation to address the root causes
of the immediate problem;
— a Council Decision extending Operation
Atalanta until 13 December 2010 and amendments to the existing
Joint Action to include:
- monitoring of fishing activities
off the coast in Somalia;
- the need for Operation Atalanta to liaise and
cooperate with international bodies working in the region;
- assisting the Somali authorities by sharing information
on fishing activities;
- a Council Decision establishing an EU Training
Mission for Somalia, to provide (in Uganda) training for Somali
security forces.[100]
The Council Decision
22.5 The 14 June 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
agreed to extend the Area of Operations for Operation Atalanta.
The new Area of Operations will extend to longitude 65° East
and latitude 15° South. Annex A to the Minister for Europe's
(David Lidington) Explanatory Memorandum of 23 July 2010 shows
both the current and proposed Areas of Operation.
22.6 The Minister explains that:
— Operation
Atalanta's success in reducing the number of successful pirate
attacks in the critical Gulf of Aden trade artery has resulted
in some displacement of pirate activity into the wider Somali
Basin and Indian Ocean;
— attacks have taken place as far as 1300
nautical miles off the coast of Somalia;
— in order to best address and target the
increasing area of pirate activity, EU Member States agreed that
a larger Area of Operations is needed;
— the new Area of Operations will provide
EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) with the command and control authority
to operate in the larger area only if there is an attack or intelligence
of pirate activity there;
— it will also allow for the application
of current Rules of Engagement in the larger area;
— it does not mean that EUNAVFOR will increase
its patrolling area, or require extra forces in order to cover
the larger Area of Operations.
The Government's view
22.7 The Minister says that, although pirate
attacks continue to plague merchant shipping, the actual number
of successful attacks has reduced significantly, especially in
the critical Gulf of Aden transit artery. The international community
has, he say, shown unity and resolve in tackling piracy, the EU
mission having ensured safe passage of over 300,000 tonnes of
food aid to Somalia.
22.8 He continues as follows:
"However the threat of piracy has not diminished
and it continues to pose a threat to international shipping. Whilst
pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden has been dramatically reduced,
we have seen an increase in pirate attacks in the much broader
Somali basin.
"In light of the increasing area of pirate activity
and the continued level of pirate attacks, Ministers agreed at
the Foreign Affairs Council on 14 June 2010, to support the Operation
Commander's recommendation that Operation Atalanta's mandate be
extended by a further two years until December 2012. This extension
will allow the Operation to generate assets and personnel and
their deployment more strategically. At this stage, this is a
political agreement and formal scrutiny will not be required until
later in 2010, when a Council Decision is agreed. We will ensure
the Committees of both Houses are given as much opportunity as
possible to scrutinise the proposed Council Decision when it becomes
available."
22.9 In the meantime, the Minister notes that
the UK continues to provide a significant direct contribution
to a number of international efforts to counter piracy, including
the Operation commander, Operation headquarters and the planned
allocation of a frigate in early 2011 to Operation ATALANTA; provision
of a frigate and Deputy Commander to the Combined Maritime Forces'
(CMF) presence in the region; provision of a frigate and recent
task force command of NATO's Operation OCEAN SHIELD; and leading
a Working Group within the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast
of Somalia (CGPCS) with lead responsibility for operational naval
coordination and regional capability development.
22.10 The Minister also describes the cost of
the EU's Operation Atalanta to the UK as "very limited":
"Command structures for EU-led operations are
funded by all Member States through common costs. This year, Operation
Atalanta's common costs, including the headquarters, total €9.4M;
the UK contributes €0.5M. The level of the first call for
2010 equates to less than 50% of the overall agreed budget, therefore
a further call for funds would if required be received as a result
of the mid-year review process in July. Extending the area of
operations will have a negligible effect on the overall cost of
the operation to the UK."
22.11 Finally, the Minister says that the document
will agreed by written procedure.
Conclusion
22.12 No questions arise from this document,
which we now clear.
22.13 Looking ahead, when the Minister submits
the next Council Decision later this year, we ask that the Minister
ensures that his Explanatory Memorandum covers not just the Council
Decision itself, but also issues raised in the previous Committee's
most recent report.[101]
There, they referred again to a relevant letter published by "The
Times" on 5 December 2009 from the Prime Minister of the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, which they reproduced
at Annex 1 to their Report, and in which he called for:
— help
in the restoration of both effective government and the training
of national security forces required to secure peace and enforce
laws;
— restoring and enforcing Somalia's
economic exclusion zone "so that Somalia can use its vast
potential wealth in fish, oil and gas to fund its own future";
— a large scale civil affairs programme
to train Somalia's young people and establish legitimate commercial
livelihoods.
22.14 Though there has been a response to
his request for help in the training of Somalia's national security
forces, it is not clear to what extent the other two are being
effectively addressed.
22.15 We therefore ask the Minister addresses
these issues in his Explanatory Memorandum and provides information
concerning any reviews of Operation Atlanta's effectiveness, together
with his views about progress thus far and on the best way forward.
99 See headnote. Back
100
See (31259) -: HC 5-vii (2009-10), chapter 2 (20 January 2010)
and the subsequent the European Committee debate at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmgeneral/euro/100308/100308s01.htm. Back
101
See (31174) 16450/09: HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 19 (9 December
2009). Back
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