25 EU and Georgia: EU Monitoring
Mission
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(31738)
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(b)
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Council Decision amending Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP establishing a civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) monitoring mission in Georgia
Council Decision amending Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia
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| Legal base | Articles 28 and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | (a) EM of 28 June 2010
(b) EM of 23 July 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (30749) —: HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 9 (15 July 2009) and (29944) —: HC 16-xxx (2007-08), chapter 18 (8 October 2008)
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| To be discussed in Council | 26 July 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
To be determined
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
25.1 Two years ago, the then Minister for Europe (Mr Jim Murphy)
began his 12 September 2008 Explanatory Memorandum on what became
the present Joint Action by noting that:
"on 7 August Georgian Armed Forces attacked Tshskinvali [sic],
the de facto 'capital' of South Ossetia. Russian armed forces
reacted with massive force, widely condemned as disproportionate,
including by the EU, NATO and G7 Foreign Ministers. Fighting continued
between 8 and 12 August, when the EU and Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) brokered a ceasefire."
25.2 He went on to say that the ceasefire, known as the 6-point
Agreement, contained the principles that:
— the
parties not to resort to the use of force;
— the parties to stop all military actions
for good;
— the parties to allow free access for
humanitarian aid;
— Georgian armed forces to return to their
places of usual permanent deployment;
— Russian armed forces to withdraw to the
line they occupied before the start of military actions. Until
such time as an international mechanism is created, Russian peacekeeping
forces to implement additional security measures;
— the parties to engage in international
discussions on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
25.3 The then Minister noted, however, that:
"Despite this plan, on 26 August Russia unilaterally
recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and
refused to withdraw its forces from Georgia. The European Council
on 1 September unanimously condemned this, and expressed its grave
concern about the consequences of the conflict and Russia's disproportionate
military action."
25.4 He then noted that, on 8 September, President
Sarkozy, EU Commission President Barroso and then EU High Representative
Solana travelled to Moscow "to press Russia to abide by its
commitments." He went on to say that:
"They secured agreement to a supplementary set
of commitments to the six point Agreement, giving detail on implementation
and specifying timelines. The EU committed to deploying at least
200 observers into the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia
by 1 October. Russia would then have 10 days to withdraw its forces
to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities."
Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP
25.5 Against this background, this Joint Action
established a civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
monitoring mission in Georgia, called EUMM Georgia. The then Minister
explained that the mission established would:
— monitor
the Parties' actions, including full compliance with the 6-point
Agreement and subsequent implementing measures;
— deploy on a country-wide basis throughout
Georgia, and aim to contribute to stabilisation, normalisation
and confidence-building;
— also help to inform European policy in
support of a durable political solution for Georgia;
— begin deployment in September, with the
operational phase beginning no later than 1 October, in line with
the 8 September agreement.
25.6 The Mission's tasks would, he said, include:
— stabilisation:
monitoring, analysing and reporting on compliance with the 6-point
Agreement, including troop withdrawals, freedom of movement and
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law;
— normalisation: monitoring, analysing
and reporting on the normalisation of civil governance, including
the rule of law, public order, security of transport links, energy
infrastructure and utilities, and return of Internally Displaced
Persons and refugees;
— confidence-building: contributing to
reducing tensions, including through liaison and facilitation
of contacts between parties;
— informing the EU's role in connection
with the negotiations that will start in Geneva on 15 October
on future international presences in Georgia.
25.7 The then Minister welcomed the Joint Action
and endorsed its tasks. He explained that Member States were clear
that the mission should deploy throughout Georgia, including South
Ossetia and Abkhazia; the initial priority was to meet the EU's
commitment to put 200 monitors into the zones adjacent to South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, but the mission would expand its area of
deployment as soon as possible; co-ordination with other international
actors would be important — the OSCE had 8 military monitors
deployed to South Ossetia, and was negotiating on the deployment
of a further 100, while the UN Observer Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG)
— an unarmed military observation mission of around 150
personnel — was the lead international presence in Abkhazia
and in the adjacent area as defined under its mandate; the EU
mission would bring civilian monitoring expertise.
25.8 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the then Minister explained that funding for common costs (mission
headquarters, in-country transport, office equipment etc) would
be met from the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget, to
which the UK currently contributed approximately 17%; with a projected
budget for the first 12 months of € 31.5 million, the UK
would contribute approximately €5.4 million Euros (then £4.3
million); plus 20 personnel, the funding for which would come
from the Whitehall Peacekeeping Budget.
25.9 Finally, the then Minister said that the
Joint Action would be adopted at the General Affairs and External
Relations Council on 15 September.
25.10 In an accompanying letter of 12 September
2008, the then Minister explained that the need to deploy the
200 EU monitors by 1 October to the zones adjacent to South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, as agreed in Moscow on 8 September, had obliged
him to over-ride Parliamentary scrutiny in this instance. The
previous Committee accepted the Minister's explanation in these
circumstances, and cleared the document.[111]
25.11 The mission mandate was due to expire on
15 September 2009. In her accompanying Explanatory Memorandum
of 8 July 2009, the then Minister for Europe (Baroness Kinnock
of Holyhead) said that, in the previous few months, "the
international community's footprint" in Georgia had been
significantly diminished. The OSCE monitoring mission had ceased
operations following Russia's refusal to join consensus on renewing
the mandate. In June, Russia had also vetoed the renewal of the
mandate of the UN Monitoring Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and it
was in the process of drawing down. This left EUMM as the only
remaining international monitoring mission in Georgia, with implications
for its future security and operations. It was, the then Minister
said, even more important that the mission remained, "both
as a means to reduce tensions between all parties to the August
2008 conflict and as a sign of engagement from the international
community." As the only international mission, EUMM's presence
was "vital to ensure that the parties abide by the Sarkozy/Medvedev
agreement." This supported the UK objective of conflict prevention.
The then Government had "successfully argued that the mission's
mandate should be renewed largely unchanged" as it was "both
comprehensive and flexible, leaving the option for EUMM to adjust
operations to cover tasks previously carried out by UNOMIG, as
appropriate."
25.12 The then Minister went on to note that
EUMM Georgia had had "a positive impact" since deployment
("more than 3000 patrols, including night patrols, monitoring
incidents and maintaining visibility along the administrative
boundary lines with South Ossetia and Abkhazia"); this had
helped to defuse tensions and prevent a return to large-scale
conflict. It had also been successful in building confidence,
including negotiating two Memoranda of Understanding with the
Georgian Ministries of Interior and Defence to increase transparency
and to limit the number of forces and weapons in the areas neighbouring
the two breakaway regions. The mission had also put resources
into building a strong relationship with the Georgian community
and helped to create the conditions for the return of around 30,000
Internally Displaced Persons. The mission continued to engage
as far as possible with the Russian government and the de facto
South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities, which had had some success,
especially through the establishment of local Incident Prevention
and Response Mechanisms, as mandated by the Geneva talks. But
the mission had still not been granted access to South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, which impeded the ability of the mission to carry
out its mandate in full. The UK continued to press Russia and
the breakaway regions to allow the mission access throughout the
territory of Georgia.
25.13 Turning to the Financial Implications,
and recalling that the mission is funded from the CFSP budget,
to which the UK contributed approximately 17%, the then Minister
said:
"This covers the mission's running costs (HQ,
in country transport and office equipment etc) to support the
Sarkovy/Medvedev agreement to have at least 200 monitors on the
ground. Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP provided a financial reference
amount of €37,100,000 to cover the expenditure related to
the Mission until 14 September 2009.
"It has been proposed that the additional funds
required by EUMM Georgia to cover operational expenditure until
14 September 2010 be added to the above commitment: this addition,
covering a period of 12 months, amounts to €12.5 million,
making the budget for the full EUMM Georgia operation to 14 September
2010 a total of €49.6 million. This additional commitment
should be made in two stages, with €9 million to be committed
after the adoption of the related Joint Action and the remaining
amount in 2010, subject to proof of the financial needs for the
operation. The proposed financial reference amount is currently
being discussed in Brussels.
"The UK has 11 secondees in the mission, funded
through the Tri-departmental (FCO, MOD and DfID) Conflict Prevention
Pool."
25.14 Finally, the then Minister said that the
Joint Action to extend the mission's mandate would be adopted
at the 27 July 2009 General Affairs and External Relations Council.
The previous Committee's assessment
25.15 At the Extraordinary European Council meeting
on 1 September 2008, in response to Russian actions, the Council
had suspended negotiations with Russia on a new EU Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) and decided to conduct a comprehensive
review of EU-Russia relations, which would continue up to the
next EU-Russia Summit in Nice on 14 November 2008, and would (in
the words of Mr Murphy) "allow us to take a considered decision
about the future of EU-Russia relations." By the time that
Summit came, the Council had decided to resume negotiations on
the PCA, though the then Minister for Europe (Caroline Flint)
told the previous Committee that this did not denote "business
as usual" or "a turning of the page on Georgia";
the then Government would "continue to insist on full implementation
of the ceasefire agreements and their cooperation in the ceasefire
talks".
25.16 In clearing the document, the previous
Committee noted that:
— the
past six months seemed to have been a case of a different sort
of "business as usual", with large parts of the EU deprived
of energy supplies in the height of winter and, then, Russia welcoming
a new US President by staging the largest military exercise in
the north Caucasus since the end of the cold war;
— a PCA presupposed the possibility of
"win/win"; Russia instead continued to see relations
on the basis of zero sum and "divide and rule", with
some EU Member States seemingly only too happy to oblige if it
guaranteed them energy supplies;
— in this particular context, EUMM Georgia
had fallen foul of this wider context of power politics;
— it was nonetheless, as the then Minister
said, the only show in a volatile town.[112]
The Council Decision of July 2010
25.17 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 28 June
2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) explains that:
—
this Council Decision would increase EUMM Georgia's financial
reference amount of the European Union Monitoring Mission by €2.5
million, to cover shortfalls in the budget required to cover mission
activities until the end of the current mandate on 14 September
2010;
— without it, the mission would run out
of funding at the end of July, which was not in the interests
of the UK or the region;
— the additional funding would be used
to cover unexpected changes in staffing costs (the majority of
the funding increase), due to:
- an increase in per diems
(the daily fee paid to all mission staff from the CFSP budget),
which had been brought about by a combination of the depreciation
of the Euro against the US dollar and the reference being UN US
dollar-denominated per diem;
- a higher level of staff deployment than originally
estimated;
- an increase in the number of monitoring patrols
and communications equipment.
25.18 A small proportion of this increase, the
Minister further explains, will fund 29 additional local staff,
which includes ten interpreters, required to ensure that all patrols
have interpreters on hand; and 18 cleaners and support staff,
who were previously contracted, but whom the mission has had to
bring in line with European Commission regulations and local conditions.
25.19 The Minister also explains that:
- the cost to the UK will be
around €340,000 (£290,000), based on the UK's 13.6 %
contribution to the overall 2010 EU budget (which includes the
CFSP budget);
- the UK currently provides funding for 14 personnel
in the Mission.
The Minister's letter of 20 July 2010
25.20 Noting that: the Committee was not formed
as anticipated when he submitted his Explanatory Memorandum; the
document had still not cleared scrutiny at the time of writing;
if the additional funding was not agreed at the 26 July Foreign
Affairs Council the mission would run out of money and cease to
function, the Minister says that "for pressing operational
reasons" he proposes to agree this Decision at that Council.
The further Council Decision
25.21 This Council Decision extends the EUMM
Georgia mandate for one year until 14 September 2011, as well
as setting out €26.6 million of funding for this period.
25.22 In his accompanying Explanatory Memorandum
of 23 July 2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) says
that the Decision:
"makes minimal changes to the mandate of the
mission and EUMM will continue to monitor the terms of the 12
August and 8 September 2008 ceasefire agreements and implementing
measures, and contribute to the long term stability of Georgia
and the South Caucasus as a whole."
25.23 He also notes that the detailed planning
documents which underpin the Council Decision have been revised
to include "the following minor changes to deepen mission
engagement":
- creation of a fact finding
team to assist in the investigation of alleged incidents, particularly
on the administrative boundary lines;
- language to reflect the mission's work building
mutual confidence between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
and
- language to reflect specific work on confidence
building.
The Government's view
25.24 The Minister goes on to comment as follows:
"Ever since it deployed in September 2008 to
monitor the implementation of the Agreements of 12 August and
8 September 2008, EUMM has contributed significantly to the overall
EU effort towards conflict resolution in Georgia. The stability
along the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia has improved and the mission's involvement in Incident
Prevention and Resolution Mechanisms continues to defuse tensions
over minor incidents before they have the opportunity to escalate.
Moreover, the significance of EUMM has increased as the only international
monitoring presence in the area, following the withdrawal of the
UN and OSCE missions in June 2009.
"The Government supports the extension of the
mandate for one year as the EUMM plays an invaluable role preventing
conflict and improving the long-term stability of Georgia and
the region. The mission serves as a reminder that the EU considers
the status quo in Georgia to be unacceptable. Further, the one
year mandate extension also maintains international attention
on the conflict.
"The UK has consistently pushed for Russia to
meet its commitments outlined in the Sarkozy-Medvedev Agreements,
including access for EUMM to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However,
despite the mission continuing its 'knocking on the door' policy,
access has not been granted with the breakaway territories. The
mission therefore remains unable to fulfil its mandate and its
'normalisation' activities have had less success than hoped. The
Operations Plan, which underpins the Council Decision, sets out
how the mission will work to build mutual confidence, and create
favourable conditions for engagement between Georgia, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Further, as part of its work on confidence
building, language has been updated in the Operations Plan to
reflect EUMM's role as a facilitator between the de facto authorities
and the Georgian Government, to resolve issues and incidents related
to freedom of movement across the ABLs.
"To have increased impact, it is essential that
the mission deepens its engagement in theatre. The creation of
a fact finding team, which will be composed of existing staff
with detective and forensic expertise to monitor cases of detentions
and disappearances on an ad-hoc basis in the breakaway territories,
will increase the depth of EUMM's work on stabilisation. Allegations
of arbitrary detentions by both sides have been a source of tension
in the past 12 months, so this is a welcome move by EUMM. It is
vital that the mission continues to coordinate with the various
international players in theatre, and the Operations Plan sets
out greater coordination with the EU delegation."
25.25 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says:
- with the UK contributing 13.6
per cent to the overall EU budget in 2010 (which budget includes
the CFSP budget), and assuming that this is indicative of the
UK contribution to the CFSP component, the cost to the UK of the
€26.6 million extension over the one-year period will be
around €3.6 million (£2.96 million);
- in discussions on the mission's budget, "officials
have pushed for more realistic budget planning, including greater
accuracy and discipline in budget management; and
- the UK currently provides funding for 14 personnel
in the Mission.
25.26 Finally, the Minster says that this Council
Decision has been delayed, pending Parliamentary scrutiny; that
it may be adopted by written procedure (as there are no Councils
before existing funding runs out on 14 September) during the Parliamentary
Recess; and that "officials are currently negotiating the
exact date."
25.27 The Council Decision was in fact adopted
by the 26 July 2010 Foreign Affairs Council.[113]
Conclusion
25.28 No questions arise on either Council
Decision, which we now clear.
25.29 We are again reporting them to the House
because of the widespread interest in the situation in the north
Caucasus.
25.30 In so doing, we express our disappointment
that, having written to the Committee to explain why he felt obliged
to agree to the adoption of the first Council Decision at the
26 July FAC, the Minister did not do likewise in connection with
the much more important second Council Decision. Nonetheless,
on this occasion and in the circumstances he describes, we do
not object to the Minister's course of action in agreeing to their
adoption.
111 See headnote: (29944) -: HC 16-xxx (2007-08), chapter
18 (8 October 2008). Back
112
See headnote: (30749) - : HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 9 (15
July 2009). Back
113
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/115971.pdf
for details. For further information on EUMM Georgia, see http://www.eumm.eu/.
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