18 EU restrictive measures against the
Republic of Guinea
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| Draft Council Decision modifying certain restrictive measures in respect of Guinea
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 8 October 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (31404)—: HC 5-xiv (2009-10) chapter 4 (17 March 2010); also see (31133) —: HC 5-ii (2009-10), chapter 10, (25 November 2009); (30721) 11429/09 —: HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 8 (15 July 2009) and (26227) 16041/04, (29544) 7499/08 and (30446) 6543/09: HC 19-x (2008-09), chapters 7 and 8 (11 March 2009)
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| To be discussed in Council | October 2010
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
18.1 Under Article 96 of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the
EU and 77 ACP countries, either party may invite the other for
consultations if it considers that the other has failed to respect
the "essential" political elements in Article 9: human
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, or to provide
good governance. Strengthening this political dimension was one
of the main changes introduced in the 2005 revision of the Agreement.
18.2 At the end of 2003, the Commission proposed
such consultations with the government of the Republic of Guinea
(GOG), having attempted for the previous two years to resolve
various democratic shortcomings through normal Article 8 political
dialogue, but without success.
18.3 The previous Committee took a particular interest
in the Article 96 process in Guinea because the undertakings given
by the GOG were all in areas in which success, or failure, might
well have much wider lessons, or repercussions, and not just for
the Cotonou Process but also ESDP: a number of other ACP countries
were similarly challenged, against a background in which the inter-relationship
between development, security and good governance was now widely
acknowledged. As it noted, the Cotonou Agreement is clear: respect
for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are
essential elements of the partnership, with the Commission characterising
the revision of the political components in 2005 as "strengthening
the political dimension by placing greater emphasis on effective
dialogue and results"; against the yardstick set out in those
last four words, they found it difficult to find much persuasive
evidence that the Article 96 process had, to use the then Minister
for Europe's words, led to the Cotonou provisions being taken
seriously — after over five years of Article 96 engagement,
Guinea seemed to be no nearer than it was then to a functioning
democratic and law-based society.[74]
18.4 Subsequent developments are set out in the Report
referred to above and those referred to therein.[75]
As these Reports note, a bloodless coup took place on 23 December
2008, following the death of the then President after a long illness,
when a military junta calling itself the National Council for
Democracy and Development (NCDD) seized power and its leader,
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, declared himself President. In response,
further Article 96 consultations were initiated; subsequently,
the Commission proposed that they be closed, and a staged process
initiated whereby, in return for measured progress towards, and
the holding of, "free and transparent" elections, normal
relations would be restored.
18.5 The then Minister for Europe (Baroness Kinnock
of Holyhead) supported this proposal, arguing that it was important
that the EU played a constructive role in assisting Guinea's transition
to constitutional order and democracy. She was, however, concerned
that the "broadly encouraging undertakings" offered
during the Article 96 consultations had "not been followed
up by action": she thought it wise that the Commission had
proposed that the EU continued to monitor the situation closely
over a period of 24 months, with a regular review at least once
every six months, and had reserved the right to amend the "appropriate
measures" in the light of the interim authorities' implementation
of the commitments they had entered into.
18.6 Then, on 28 September 2009, unarmed opposition
supporters, protesting at Captain Dadis Camara's intention to
run for President next year (despite having forsworn this when
he seized power) were killed by soldiers in the capital, Conakry.
This was condemned by the EU, the US, the AU and ECOWAS; the latter
two took the lead to resolve the political crisis and prevent
further violence.
18.7 Against this background, the 26-27 October General
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) adopted Common
Position 2009/788/CFSP imposing an arms embargo and travel restrictions
targeting members of the military junta and individuals associated
with them who were responsible for the violent repression of 28
September or the political stalemate in the country. The EU thus
intended both to bolster any AU/ECOWAS sanctions on Guinea and
send a coordinated and strong message that it condemned the violent
crackdown.
18.8 In his Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the
draft Common Position, the then Minister of Europe (Chris Bryant)
said that in view of the lack of progress made by the military
junta following repeated calls to restore the rule of law, he
strongly agreed that restrictive measures were necessary to reaffirm
those calls, and as "a sign of international resolve and
support to ECOWAS and AU efforts to mediate." The Common
Position applied for 12 months, the then Minister said, but the
EU intended to review the measures in the coming months against
any steps taken by the military junta to restore the rule of law,
and "if no positive steps have been taken, the EU will consider
imposing further restrictive measures."
The previous Committee's assessment
18.9 In clearing the document, the previous Committee
said that it could not avoid wondering nonetheless how effective
the Common Position was likely to be. Guinea is the world's largest
bauxite exporter and has significant deposits of gold, diamond,
uranium and iron ore — resources that allowed Lansana Conte,
the former dictator, to survive periods of international isolation;
and its oil prospects had recently drawn attention after discoveries
in nearby countries such as Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone,
leading (according to media reports) to oil and minerals deals
being under negotiation between Guinea's military government and
the China International Fund, who would provide the lion's share
of finance for about $7bn worth of projects, ranging from power-generation
to the creation of an airline.
18.10 Noting that two EU courses of action —
this Common Position and the action taken under the Cotonou Agreement
— were to be reviewed in the coming months, with the likelihood
that further action would be proposed under one or the other,
or both, the previous Committee asked that, when any Explanatory
Memorandum was put forward on such subsequent action, the Minister
concerned should ensure that it included his views on this wider
perspective of China's activity in the country and the region,
and its impact on the effectiveness of EU action.
18.11 In a subsequent Explanatory Memorandum of 11
March 2010, the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Ivan Lewis) explained that in view of what he said was
tangible progress recently made under mediator President Compaore
towards the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea, the
Council of the European Union had now agreed that, as a gesture
of goodwill, the EU travel ban should be lifted on four individuals.
18.12 After reviewing the events leading up to last
September, when "156 peaceful protestors were killed and
there were reports of mass rapes and other human rights atrocities",
the then Minister went on to say that these events and the resultant
UN Secretary General's Commission of Inquiry report had dictated
the UK and the international community's response to Guinea. The
report clearly identified Dadis Camara and other leading figures
in the Guinean regime as responsible for events on 28 September.
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court was currently
examining the situation in Guinea; the Deputy Prosecutor had visited
Guinea in February 2010 and described the events around 28 September
2009 as crimes against humanity.
18.13 He also reported that on 3 December 2009 Dadis
Camara had been shot in the head by his Aide de Camp, Toumba Diakite,
during an argument about responsibility for the massacre on 28
September; had been taken to Morocco for treatment; and was later
moved to Burkina Faso where he was likely to remain.
18.14 He then went on to outline the political process,
whereby the AU and ECOWAS, working with appointed mediator, President
Compaore of Burkina Faso, had taken the lead in attempts to resolve
the political crisis and prevent further violence and appointed
Sekouba Konate as interim President. An Agreement was signed in
Ouagadougou on 15 January 2010 agreeing to the establishment of
a unity transitional government. Jean-Marie Dore had been sworn
in as interim Prime Minister on 26 January and his cabinet —
a coalition of 10 NCDD members and opposition members— sworn
in on 15 February. The Agreement provided an excellent opportunity
to restore constitutional rule in Guinea. Interim President Konate
announced on 6 March that Presidential elections would be held
on 27 June 2010. The UK, along with EU partners, was now keen
to recognise progress under the transition and favoured lifting
the EU travel ban on four individuals who had been helpful in
brokering the Ouagadougou Agreement and putting the transitional
process in place: Interim President Sekouba Konate; Mamadou Toto
Camara (Minister of Security); Lieutenant Colonel Keletigui Faro
(Minister of Agriculture) and Kabine Komara (previously Prime
Minister).
18.15 The then Minister concluded by noting that
the proposal was due to be adopted by written procedure at the
Council on 25 March 2010.
The previous Committee's assessment
18.16 The previous Committee said that, though the
way in which the main obstacle to progress had been removed was
hardly the sort of transition process that the Council would have
had in mind, the rest of what the Minister described appeared
to warrant the relaxation of the measures in the way proposed.
18.17 In clearing the proposal, it took the opportunity
to remind the then Minister of its earlier request for his assessment
of the impact of Chinese activity in Guinea and more widely on
EU efforts to encourage and bolster democratic development (c.f.
paragraph 18.10 above) and ask that, the next time any change
is proposed to either this Common Position or to the action taken
under the Cotonou Agreement, this is provided along with the evidence
justifying the proposal.
The draft Council Decision
18.18 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 8 October
2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) says that progress
has been seen: a first round of Presidential elections took place
in June under Interim President Sekouba Konate; no single candidate
won outright; the second round due to take place in September
had been postponed; this is now scheduled for 24 October.
18.19 Against this background, Member States were
agreed that restrictive measures should be kept in place until
the electoral process is complete and a democratically elected
government is in place.
The Government's view
18.20 The Minister assesses that the measures in
place "send a strong signal that the EU expects the election
process to be completed satisfactorily and a democratic government
put in place."
18.21 As with his predecessors, he also notes that
the Common Position, which applies for a period of 12 months,
"will be continually under review in the coming months once
the election process has been completed", and says that "if
the election process has not been completed or a democratic government
is not in place the EU will consider imposing further restrictive
measures."
Conclusion
18.22 The jury thus continues to be out with regard
to the effectiveness of these and the related Cotonou Agreement
measures.
18.23 We now clear the document.
18.24 In so doing, we reiterate our predecessors'
request: that when any further action is proposed, either in this
context or that of the Cotonou Agreement, any Explanatory Memorandum
on such subsequent action should include the Minister's views
on the wider perspective of China's activity in the country and
the region, and its impact on the effectiveness of EU action.
74 (26227) 16041/04 and (29544) 7499/08; see headnote. Back
75
(31133) -: HC 5-ii (2009-10), chapter 10 (25 November 2009) and
(30721) 11429/09: HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 8 (15 July 2009);
see headnote. Back
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