16 ESDP: Piracy off the coast of Somalia
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| Draft Council Decision amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast
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| Legal base | Articles 28 and 43(2) EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 19 November 2010
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 428-vii (2010-11), chapter 4 (10 November 2010); also see (31809) —: HC 428-ii (2010-11), chapter 22 (15 September 2010); also see (31174) 16450/09: HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 19 (9 December 2009); (30982) —: HC 19- xxvii (2008-09), chapter 29 (14 October 2009); also see (30724) — and (30728)—: HC 19 xxiii (2008-09), chapter 9 (8 July 2009) and (30341) —, (30348) — and (30349) —: HC 19-iv (2008-09), chapter 17 (21 January 2009); (30400) 13989/08: HC 16-xxxvi (2007-08), chapter 17 (26 November 2008) and HC 16-xxxii (2007-08), chapter 10 (22 October 2008); and (29953)—: HC16-xxx (2007-08), chapter 19 (8 October 2008)
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| Discussed in Council | Before 26 November 2010
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
16.1 Operation Atalanta was established on 8 December 2008, via
Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, as an EU Naval Force to
counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. It is the first EU maritime
operation and aims to protect World Food programme humanitarian
deliveries and to deter and disrupt pirate attacks on other vulnerable
shipping. The story thus far is set out in our previous Report[75]
and those of our predecessors.[76]
Most recently, the Committee cleared an extension of its area
of operation, reflecting the operation's success in displacing
at least some of the pirates from the Gulf area to further south.[77]
16.2 Given the continuing high level of pirate attacks,
EU Ministers agreed at the 14 June Foreign Affairs Council to
support the Operation Commander's recommendation that Operation
Atalanta's mandate be extended by a further two years, until December
2012. This Council Decision implements that agreement.
The draft Council Decision
16.3 The draft Council Decision extends Operation
Atalanta until 12 December 2012.
16.4 In addition, the Minister of Europe (David Lidington)
said in his Explanatory Memorandum of 8 November 2010 that lessons
learnt thus far highlighted the requirement for two technical
amendments to Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP — the collection
of personal data, such as fingerprints, of apprehended persons
with a view to tracing their identity and enhancing possible prosecution;
and allowing EU classified information to be shared with partners
in theatre, when deemed necessary.
16.5 With regard to the first of the proposed changes,
the draft Council Decision says:
"In Article 2, the following paragraphs shall
be added:
"(g) collect data concerning persons referred
to in paragraph (e) above related to characteristics likely to
assist in their identification, including any specific objective
physical characteristics not subject to change such as dactyloscopic
data;
"(h) for the purpose of circulating the
data via INTERPOL's channels and checking it against INTERPOL
's databases, transmit to the National Central Bureau (NCB) of
the International Criminal Police Organisation — INTERPOL
located in the Member State where the Operational Headquarters
is stationed in accordance with arrangements to be concluded between
the Operation Commander and the Head of the NCB, the following
data:
"— personal data concerning persons
referred to in paragraph (e) above related to characteristics
likely to assist in their identification, namely any specific
objective physical characteristics not subject to change, such
as dactyloscopic data, as well as the following particulars, with
the exclusion of other personal data: surname, maiden name, given
names and any alias or assumed name; date and place of birth,
nationality; sex, place of residence, profession and whereabouts;
driving licenses, identification documents and passport data;
"— data related to the equipment
used by such persons."
16.6 With regard to the second proposed change, the
draft Council Decision says:
"(d) In Article 15, the following paragraph
3 shall be added:
"3. The High Representative is hereby authorised
to release to third States and international organisations present
in the area of operation classified EU information and documents
generated for the purposes of the EU operation at the level RESTREINT
UE, where such release at theatre level is necessary for operational
reasons, in accordance with the Council's security regulations."
16.7 After outlining the general situation and the
UK contribution in the same terms as in earlier Explanatory Memoranda
relating to changes dealt with in our and our predecessors' previous
Reports, and adding the welcome news that the EU mission has now
ensured safe passage of over 400,000 tonnes of food aid to Somalia,
the Minister said that:
—
regional judicial and penal capacity space was at premium placing
pressure on Operation Atalanta only to pursue prosecutions where
there was a high likelihood of success;
— whilst the Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was supporting the efforts of the
UN Office of Drugs and Crime to enhance regional capacity, the
collection of personal data, e.g. fingerprints, of suspected persons
and transmission to INTERPOL's forensic database would strengthen
the operation's ability to successfully prosecute pirates;
— this information would only be collated
in accordance with national and international law;
— the ability to share EU classified information
in theatre, when deemed necessary, would enhance awareness between
partners participating in counter-piracy, benefitting operations
as a whole.
16.8 The Minister also said that, with regard to
the Financial Implications:
— common
costs for the operation — €8.3 Million in the previous
year — are met by all EU Member States, and are paid through
contributions by Member States via the "ATHENA" financial
mechanism based on the GDP of each nation;
— other costs would be met by the participating
nations;
— the UK's previous contribution of £1.29
million per annum was expected to remain broadly consistent if
the mandate was extended and would be funded from HMG's Peace
Keeping budget.
Our assessment
16.9 We had no wish to hold up the extension of Operation
Atalanta's mandate, given the importance of the threat to international
stability that it is endeavouring to tackle. But there were some
ambiguities that we felt needed clarifying.
16.10 First, we asked what was meant by dactyloscopic
data? And what other data might be collected and transmitted to
INTERPOL? Would this include an apprehended suspected pirate's
DNA?
16.11 Secondly, we asked what was meant by the statement
that "this information would only be collated in accordance
with national and international law"? Whose national law?
And which international law? Would the individuals concerned be
obliged to provide the information specified in the proposed changes?
Or, if there were no element of compulsion, what purpose would
be served by a provision, compliance with which by the apprehended
person or persons was purely voluntary?
16.12 We also noted that, once again, there was no
response to the request for comments concerning the 5 December
2009 open letter from the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal
Government, which the previous Committee had drawn to the then
Minister for Europe's attention several months ago, and about
which the Committee had reminded the Minister in its Report of
15 September. In addition to help in the restoration of both effective
government and the training of national security forces required
to secure peace and enforce laws, to which there had been a response,
that letter called for the restoration and enforcement of Somalia's
economic exclusion zone "so that Somalia can use its vast
potential wealth in fish, oil and gas to fund its own future"
and a large scale civil affairs programme to train Somalia's young
people and establish legitimate commercial livelihoods. Nor did
his Explanatory Memorandum contain any information concerning
any reviews of Operation Atalanta's effectiveness, or his views
about progress thus far and on the best way forward. At the very
least, we felt that it would be helpful for the House to have
some sense of what activity was being undertaken by the EU or
other parts of the international community to solve the underlying
problems outlined in the Somali Prime Minister's letter, and what
success Operation Atalanta had had beyond the generalities in
the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum.
16.13 In the meantime, we retained the document under
scrutiny.
The Minister's letter of 19 November 2010
16.14 In his letter, the Minister for Europe (David
Lidington) says that he will take each question in turn, which
he does as follows:
DATA COLLECTION:
"We have used final negotiations in Brussels
to clarify the ambiguities in the previous draft. The final version
(attached) is now much clearer on these points. The previous reference
to "dactyloscopic data" — i.e. fingerprint records
— has been removed. EUNAVFOR will only be permitted to collect
the following personal information:
- maiden name / given name /
alias
- date of birth / place of birth
- nationality and gender
- driving license and ID documentation
- where necessary other characteristics likely
to assist in identification e.g. photographs and fingerprints.
The technical amendment explicitly does not allow
the collection of any form of DNA data."
APPLICABLE LAW:
"The reference to 'applicable law' (replacing
'national and international law') was inserted into the document
to make it clear that there must be a legal basis to undertake
certain actions. However for any specific action by Operation
Atalanta, different national and supernational laws may apply,
depending on the activity of the suspected pirates, as well as
the precise nature, action, geographical location and jurisdiction
involved.
"The term 'applicable law' therefore clarifies
that, whatever action is undertaken by the EU Operation, it must
always be consistent with existing laws at all times.
"The Commander of an EUNAVFOR vessel operating
in international waters, like police officers in the UK, cannot
compel suspects to share their personal information. I therefore
agree if a suspected pirated refused to share their information
the amendment would have little added value. However changing
the mandate would allow EUNAVFOR the ability to act as a conduit,
if an individual was willing to share their information with international
organisations such as Interpol, Europol and the UN Eritrea/Somalia
Monitoring Group.
EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION ATALANTA
"I attach for your information the response
given by Lord Howell on the floor of the House of Lords on 10
November 2010 providing the Government's response during the House
of Lord's debate on Operation Atalanta.[78]
This sets out our assessment of the success of the Operation in
delivering its mandate to protect World Food Programme vessels
delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; protecting
shipping assisting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
and protecting other vulnerable vessels sailing in the Gulf of
Aden and off the Somali coast.
"Other reviews of Operation Atalanta's effectiveness
are underway within the EU. The Operation Commander's input to
the Seven Month Review of Operation Atalanta was presented to
the EU Military Committee on 20 September, and the Political and
Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels on 21 September providing
an initial assessment of the success of the Operation. Whilst
the actual report is classified, its main recommendations were
those highlighted in the amending Joint Action. We expect to receive
the High Representative's report on the review later this
month ahead of another PSC discussion, and will ensure officials
circulate a copy of the report and the Government's
opinions on it to the Committees.
Other activity on Somalia
"The international counter-piracy effort is
co-ordinated primarily by the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which includes more than 50 organisations
and countries, including EU, NATO, UN, the International Maritime
Organisation, the African Union, Arab League, Interpol, representatives
of the shipping industry, the commanders of the military operations,
the Transitional Federal Government and other regional countries
and the key Flag States (eg Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands,
Bahamas). Although the chairmanship of the CGPCS rotates between
member countries, the UK chairs the key working group on operational/military
co-ordination and regional capability development, the US the
working group on industry self protection, with Denmark leading
important work on legal aspects and Egypt chairing a working group
on strategic communications and messaging.
"The CGPCS endorsed the key recommendations
of a UK-led needs assessment report included supporting legal,
judicial and penal structures in the region, including within
Somalia. The report also highlighted the need for the establishment
of an exclusive economic zone for Somalia to provide a basis for
law enforcement in Somali waters. The CGPCS is taking forward
this sensitive work in consultation with representatives of the
various entities in Somalia. This should enable fisheries licensing
to begin, supporting alternative livelihoods, and training and
equipping of regional maritime police/coastguards.
"In relation to establishing civil affairs programmes
and legitimate commercial livelihoods the
international community supports Somalia through the United Nations,
the European Union and through bilateral contributions. The United
Nations takes the lead internationally on Somalia, working with
international and regional actors, including the EU. The United
Nations Political Office for Somalia aims to create the necessary
political and security conditions in Somalia for increased international
engagement. A new UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
for Somalia, Dr. Augustine Mahiga, was recently appointed and
is leading work to develop a UN political strategy which
will drive the coordination and coherence of the international
effort.
"The European
Union is contributing significantly in Somalia, leading the anti-piracy
task force and providing €35.5M Euros of funding for AMISOM.
The EU has provided development aid for security worth €13.3
million for rule of law since 2003. The European Commission has
provided development aid worth €278 million since 2003. This
is primarily focused on the following sectors: governance and
security; social sectors; and agriculture, livestock, food security
and early warning.
"The EU Training Mission (EUTM) for Somalia,
supported by the UK and the US, is a one year programme that contributes
to strengthening the Somali Security Forces through the provision
of military training, including the deployment of 2 UK military
personnel. The mission is however time-limited (one year). Currently
2,000 troops are being trained in Uganda focusing on initial training,
for units up to and including platoon level to complement the
existing training programmes.
"The International
Contact Group on Somalia, which last met in Madrid in September,
brings the international community together to discuss political,
security, humanitarian, development and piracy issues. There was
increased recognition at the last meeting that political reconciliation
and embedding local and regional areas of stability to complement
the transitional process in Mogadishu is a central part of building
Somalia from the community-level up. The role of the private sector
as a potential force for stability and progress was also recognised.
"The importance of all of these activities was
highlighted in the UN Secretary General's recent report (S/2010/556)
on piracy off the Coast of Somalia (attached).[79]
I hope this provides the Committee with a sense of the range of
activity underway to complement direct counter-piracy operations
off the Coast of Somalia, and addressing its underlying issues."
Conclusion
16.15 We are grateful to the Minister for the
further information concerning the draft Council Decision, which
we now clear.
16.16 In doing so, we are also drawing the information
concerning the wider context to the attention of the House.
Annex: Statement by the Minister
of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)
"My Lords, I think that the Government have
already indicated in their response that they welcome the committee's
report on the counter-piracy operations by the EU off the coast
of Somalia and its support for our efforts to tackle piracy. I
would go further than that. Listening to this debate, I feel proud
to be a Member of your Lordships' House. The report has promoted
an enormous range of very valuable thoughts. I possibly disagree
with my noble friend Lord Hamilton, who seemed to be having a
bit of a bad day with this report. I recognise that no report
is perfect and no report can produce a whole string of solutions-nor
is my speech going to produce such a string of solutions to the
colossal problems that we face, which go far deeper than the phenomenon
of piracy itself.
"The report contains extremely valuable insights
and promotes a debate such as the one we that have had this afternoon,
which in turn will hold the Government to account, as it is intended
to, and sharpen and focus our policies as we grapple with this
problem. I want to leave no doubt at all that we take the menace
of Somali piracy extremely seriously and believe that it is vital
to play a leading role in the international efforts to counter
this threat. The situation is full of dangers and I hope that
there is no suggestion of any complacency, despite the fact that
there have been successes and solid advances, which I shall enumerate
in my speech.
"The efforts so far have been achieved not only
militarily, through our command of the EU counterpiracy operations
and our contribution to other naval operations in the area, but
also by the strong political leadership that this country has
provided within the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,
whose co-ordinating efforts from Northwood and Bahrain have been
referred to. The UK has substantial economic interests in protecting
freedom of navigation on the seas in this area, as throughout
the world. My noble friend Lord Selkirk and the noble Lord, Lord
Brett, are quite right that this problem could directly affect
the maritime flows of oil and other crucial commodities, which
provide a network that in a sense is just as important as the
cybernetwork that people are coming to realise is the other vital
latticework and web holding together our entire global prosperity.
"We must be realistic, as many noble Lords were
this afternoon, including my noble and gallant friend Lord Inge
and the noble Lord, Lord Sewel: there are no quick fixes and it
will be a very long haul. I am very grateful for the broad support
for Operation Atalanta that the noble Lord, Lord Brett, on behalf
of the Opposition offered this evening. To use a phrase that I
am afraid has slight political connotations, we are all in this
one together. We must work resolutely together to maximise the
contribution and do more.
"It must be remembered that Operation Atalanta
was set up with two tasks in mind. One was to protect World Food
Programme vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons in
Somalia, as well as protecting shipping assisting the African
Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. These escorts have helped the
delivery of more than 500,000 metric tonnes of food to Somalia,
feeding on average more than 1.35 million Somalis each day. Atalanta
has also ensured a continuous flow of supplies to the African
Union Mission for Somalia. I should say to my noble friend Lord
Avebury, who raised this matter, that the plan is to enlarge AMISOM
to 8,000 and then 12,000 personnel. We will then be able to contemplate
a much more ambitious programme on land. So far none of the ships
in that continuous flow of supplies has been hijacked while being
supported by Operation Atalanta. We must not talk about winning,
success and victory, but we can talk about a most satisfactory
degree of containment of the situation and a genuine advance from
an otherwise deteriorating pattern.
"The second task of Atalanta is, of course,
to deter and disrupt attacks on vulnerable shipping in the region.
Working closely with the other international operations, the EU
naval force has had significant success in deterring and disrupting
pirate activity in the critical Gulf of Aden trade artery. I have
been asked at several stages whether things are getting better
or worse. Activities and disruption in the Gulf of Aden are down
this year, but activities and disruption in the much larger area
off Somalia in the Indian Ocean are somewhat up. Overall, the
balance is slightly down in terms of numbers of incidents, although
more people have, I am afraid, been involved.
"The reference to EU-NAVFOR looking out for
shipping that is vulnerable is deliberate. Most of the 20,000
merchant ships that go through the Gulf of Aden each year need
little or no protection. Ships with high freeboard, travelling
at reasonable speed, with lookouts deployed properly and with
physical barriers erected against pirate boarding, should be safe
from attack. The military operations have made it clear from the
start that the first line of defence against pirates is adherence
to common-sense self-defence measures. That should be obvious.
It is a pity that it is not more obvious to some ship operators.
"The big industry associations have been critical
allies in getting this message across-and we have to get it across.
It is thanks to their close work with EU-NAVFOR and with the other
military operations that we have industry-agreed best management
practice for all ships active in the region between Suez and India.
I pay tribute to all the seafarers and companies that stick closely
to these guidelines and therefore reduce the risk both to themselves
and to the military. I also share the frustration of the military
at the numbers-it may be as high as one in five, or 20 per cent-that
still consider compliance with these measures as optional. It
is staggering, frankly, that some ships go through this area without
even bothering to post lookouts and that the first notice that
the military get of a hijack is to hear the words, "There
is a pirate on the bridge", by when, of course, it is very
nearly too late. We are there to support the shipping industry,
but we need its support, too.
"My noble friend Lord Hamilton said that brisk
retaliation by armed private security on ships, opening fire at
approaching pirates, would be the answer. There are problems with
that. The British Chamber of Shipping is cautious about that on
the grounds of jurisdiction and the escalation of violence and
so on. Of course, there is the question of vessel protection detachments,
which I shall come to in a moment and to which I think my noble
and gallant friend Lord Inge was referring, but there are difficulties
that realistically and carefully one must face. If there are to
be armed personnel on ships, put there by the military through
these various methods, they have to be properly trained and advised,
as my noble and gallant friend Lord Inge rightly said.
"Operation Atalanta has delivered substantial
success — I do use that word — in its efforts. Through
its direct military efforts, but also through its innovative approach
in co-ordinating closely with industry and Governments, it has
substantially reduced the risk of successful hijack in the Gulf
of Aden. It has pioneered the use of the internationally recognised
transit corridor and its partnership with industry associations,
about which several noble Lords asked, has pushed hard the need
for compliance with that best management practice. EU-NAVFOR has
also worked with Egypt and the Suez Canal Authority to pass on
information on best management practice to all ships going through
the canal. It is noteworthy that every recent successful hijack
in the Gulf of Aden has been the result, not surprisingly, of
non-compliance shipping.
"Successfully combating this piracy infection
in the wider Indian Ocean is a much more demanding task. There
are 1.5 million square miles to cover-an area larger than the
Mediterranean-and ensuring the same protection as in the Gulf
of Aden would require hundreds of warships, which no country has
today. However, the volume of trade is, of course, much lower
and the practical and effective approach being taken by EU-NAVFOR
in monitoring pirate action groups and disrupting their efforts
has delivered positive results. To date, more than 60 pirate attacks
have been successfully disrupted as a result of EU operations.
The Government commend these proactive efforts most highly.
"I have suggested that, to do much more, the
operation needs more assets; indeed, several of your Lordships
have reinforced that obvious point. The commanders have said that
they have sufficient assets to achieve their mandate, narrowly
drawn, but quite rightly they want to do more. The Government
have supported actively, including through our leadership in the
contact group, the need for specific additional assets. Top of
this list has been aerial surveillance assets, about which several
of your Lordships made comments, but the Government are also trying
to help to provide more oil tankers, more helicopter-capable warships
and a greater use of military vessel protection detachments, as
I mentioned.
"Let me deal with some of these issues more
specifically, as noble Lords did in their speeches. On aerial
surveillance, France, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and Sweden are
already providing maritime patrol aircraft coverage, but much
more would certainly be welcome. The UK, it is true, is no longer
able to provide support in this area, but we have been engaged
in discussion with partners to provide more and to help in support
with basing over this enormous area. I would like to single out
the generous support of the Government of Japan, who in addition
to sending warships have also deployed three maritime patrol aircraft,
which make a vital contribution, supplying data to all the multinational
operations. I was asked by my noble friends Lord Selkirk and Lord
Avebury about UAVs. The UK has none of these. There are some in
the coalition, but I cannot comment on details for security reasons.
"The UK is providing oil tanker support, a point
that the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, raised, and we are discussing
with partners whether they can do more, maximising the time that
warships can stay on station. The Government are grateful in particular
for the provision by the Government of Saudi Arabia of a tanker.
Helicopter-capable ships are also essential, as helicopters are
usually the first means of response and deterrence. I cite as
an example the deployment by the Netherlands of a landing ship
rather than a frigate, which has made a substantial contribution.
"I want to enlarge on what I said about vessel
protection detachments. This means putting marine or other military
personnel aboard a vulnerable vessel. They can help to ensure
its security without the need for a frigate in close proximity,
which, of course, can then free up the frigate for wider counter-piracy
duties. There is a growing list of partners keen and willing to
make their contribution in this way, in the most part partners
who are unable to send warships. The use of VPDs both broadens
the coalition and makes best use of the warships deployed-I think
that that was the point that my noble and gallant friend Lord
Inge rightly and perceptively made.
"Several of your Lordships mentioned the insurance
industry, which is obviously important as well. There has been
constant dialogue, through the contact group, with the insurance
industry and the Government welcome the announcement at the working
group meeting on 21 October-only the other day-by representatives
of the insurance industry that they will require higher premiums
for vehicles that are not seen to be complying with best management
practice. We look forward to hearing a lot more about the impact
of this development in practice, but it clearly makes sense, as
it begins to introduce into the whole insurance pattern incentives
to get real and to organise properly and in compliance with best
management practice, rather than floating through serenely in
a cavalier manner. That must be an advance.
"In its report, the committee highlighted the
fact that the World Food Programme's use of small slow ships contravened
the advice given to the shipping industry-a point that the noble
Lord, Lord Sewel, and others raised. The programme has a dilemma:
it wishes to maximise the food that it delivers, but the bigger,
better and more modern the ships it has to charter, the more money
goes on the ships rather than on the food. It is wrong, though,
for military support to be unduly skewed to the protection of
these deliveries if they can be done by other, better means. Negotiations
are going on between the military operations, the United Nations
and the World Food Programme to do better. I welcome the fact
that these discussions include, once again, the greater use of
vessel protection detachments. I am also pleased by discussions
with other multinational and national operations to enable them
to share the burden of these duties and therefore enable EU-NAVFOR
to pursue its much wider mandate. Indeed, I welcome the fact that
convoys have now been carried out by Russian ships, with NATO
interests helping in this area, too, again reinforcing the impressive
nature, almost unmatched in recent times, maybe even in wartime,
of the co-ordination going on between the different navies and
naval detachments of the world.
"I turn to the legal issues that were raised
by several noble Lords. I make it clear that the UK will always
prosecute pirates wherever there is a chance of success and I
know that that is also the intent of the EU-NAVFOR naval commanders.
We are grateful for the support of industry in helping to provide
the witnesses who are essential to prosecute these cases.
"On a point that the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich,
raised, the UK and the EU are also providing technical and financial
support to Kenya, the Seychelles, Somalia and soon, I hope, others,
in order to support work in developing courts and prisons to accept
more pirates. I suppose that in the longer term one would look
to places that are relatively calm, such as Somaliland-in contrast
to Somalia-for developments of that kind.
"Mr Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of the United
Nations, has talked about some international facilities such as
courts and prisons for dealing with pirates. Negotiations on an
EU handover agreement with Mauritius, which the noble Lord, Lord
Anderson, asked about, are now at an advanced stage and I expect
renewed discussions to begin with Tanzania shortly. Of course
there is a question over whether these countries have the capacity
for these things-some concerns were expressed in Kenya-but nevertheless
prosecutions have been carried out. I think that some are going
on while I stand here. There are currently over 130 pirates in
prison, of whom to date 54 have been successfully prosecuted and
convicted, following the handover from counterpiracy operations.
The eight pirates detained by HMS Cumberland in November 2008-that
is a couple of years ago-are now serving 20 years in Kenyan prisons
for piracy. That is a deterrent.
"I turn to the other major theme of the debate,
spoken about perceptively by many of your Lordships, which is
embraced in the words "root causes". There is wide acceptance
that piracy off Somalia will not be stopped until the problems
of lawlessness and instability within Somalia are addressed, a
point correctly made by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, my noble friend
Lord Avebury, the noble Lord, Lord Williams, and the noble Earl,
Lord Sandwich. Foreign Office and DfID ministerial colleagues
are working with African leaders and Foreign Ministers to ensure
that a long-term solution for Somalia is found. That is, naturally,
what one would say, but of course it embraces a huge challenge.
It is important not just to stop piracy-that is not all that we
are talking about-but to curb the much wider threats that emanate
from Somalia towards British interests. Most notably, that includes
terrorism-al-Qaeda-related, no doubt-but also includes the trafficking
of people, weapons and drugs, and threatening the destabilisation
of the wider region.
"As the noble Lord, Lord Williams, said in a
very interesting contribution, al-Shabaab may well be benefiting
from that. Certainly, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda appear to have links.
Then again, such is the complexity of the Somali situation that
al-Shabaab may actually be working against the pirates. There
was one report that they have cleared out the port of Eyl-for
the benefit of Hansard, that is spelt E Y L-which was a
pirate nest and from which the pirates have now fled. It is a
complicated situation, but what can definitely be said is that
many of these evil developments, including terrorism, are flourishing
in that unsettled area.
"Finding solutions inside Somalia and in the
region is therefore essential. The UK has played an important
role in mapping a way forward through its leadership of the contact
group working group on capability development. The contact group
has agreed a needs assessment report, assembled by a UK-led team,
making clear the key priorities for action. This is the outline
of the plan for which many noble Lords today have rightly called.
The Government also welcome the results of the Mauritius regional
ministerial meeting on maritime security on 7 October, which agreed
a strategy and action plan broadly consistent with the contact
group assessment. Inside Somalia, it will be important to continue
the work to support the development of good governance through
the transitional federal Government.
"I know that the time limit is being pointed
to, but there have been so many fascinating points that it would
be impertinent not to refer to some of them. I move into the final
phase by saying that it is obviously important to support economic
development in coastal regions and to support community and religious
leaders in continuing to speak out against the pirates, saying
that what they are doing not only is morally wrong, obviously,
but is distorting and destroying the economies of many coastal
areas and delaying the establishment of law and order. The regional
action plan agreed recently includes a request to the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development to take forward work inside Somalia to
address piracy at its roots. This is correct and welcome.
"I shall talk briefly about tackling financial
flows, where the money goes and so on. I am afraid that the money
disappears into lavish living — a Mercedes, new weapons,
drugs and all sorts of other things — but we are working
closely with international partners, as well as supporting the
work of Interpol, Europol, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and
the Financial Action Task Force towards the tracing and recovery
of the illicit gains of piracy. We are also working with regional
partners to develop effective anti-money-laundering legislation
and action to enhance our ability to prosecute the financiers
of piracy.
"The UK pays no ransom — that is absolutely
against UK government policy — and we strongly counsel third
parties against doing so. Obviously, though, if they are foreigners
or non-British nationals, we do not have any direct influence.
"The Government agree with the committee's report
of the continuing high value of Operation Atalanta. The Foreign
Secretary has agreed with his European counterparts that, subject
to scrutiny requirements of both Houses, the operation should
be extended for a further two years, with Northwood continuing
to act as the operation HQ and the UK continuing to provide the
commander. The Government hope that this can shortly be agreed.
The task ahead is tough. This is a serious danger globally and
to our national interest and we intend to pursue it with all possible
vigour."
75 See headnote: HC428-vii (2010-11), chapter 22 (10
November 2010). Back
76
See headnote. Back
77
See headnote: (31809) -: HC 428-ii (2010-11), chapter (15 September
2010). Back
78
Reproduced at the Annex to this chapter of our Report. Back
79
Available at http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/S-2010-556%20(27OCT10).pdf. Back
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