11 European Security and Defence Policy
and Guinea-Bissau
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| Council Decision amending and extending Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU)
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| Legal base | Article 28 and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 4 October 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 56 (8 September 2010); also see (31072) —: HC 19-xxx (2008-09), chapter 6 (4 November 2009); (30551) — HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 12 (29 April 2009); and (29349) — : HC 16-ix (2007-08), chapter 12 (23 January 2008)
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| Discussed in Council | 25 May 2010 Competitiveness Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested (reported on 8 September 2010)
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Background
11.1 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office website paints a troubled
and unhappy picture of Guinea-Bissau's move to independence, via
a protracted guerrilla war and then Portugal's own 1974 "carnation
revolution": firstly, one-party rule, then a coup in 1980
which "began a pattern of military coups and instability,
which has persisted until quite recently". That coup was
led by Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, who became the first
directly-elected President in 1994, after the acceptance of multi-party
democracy in 1991 (a presidential democracy which allows for multiparty
politics and an elected national assembly).
11.2 The period from 1998 to 2004 was notable for
a further coup attempt; protracted stalemate between loyalist
and rebel forces; the intervention of troops from neighbouring
Senegal and Guinea, as well as from the regional peacekeeping
force, ECOMOG; elections in December 1999 and January 2000; and
the eventual election of opposition leader Kumba Yala in February
2000.
11.3 The first half of this present decade then consisted
of further manifestations of unresolved tensions between the government
and the military hierarchy: a further attempted military rebellion;
subsequent rule by President Yala "characterised by chronic
political instability"; his eventual deposition in a bloodless
coup in September 2003 supported by all political parties, including
Yala's own; the installation of a businessman as interim President;
and legislative elections in March 2004 in which no party came
out with an overall majority.
11.4 A further period of political turmoil followed
the June 2005 presidential elections, following which ex-President
Vieira eventually emerged as the winner in a close finish, and
was sworn in as President on 1 October; including ex-president
Yala's return from exile in late 2006; and culminating in the
collapse of the government coalition in March 2007. After a stand-off
the opposition leader Martinho N'Dafa Kabi became Prime Minister
in April, and the political situation in the country steadied.
The mandate of the legislature ended on April 21st 2008. The President
then passed a temporary constitutional amendment allowing the
continuation of the legislature until further elections could
take place. These occurred on 16 November 2008 and resulted in
a new Prime Minister, Carlos Gomez Junior, being appointed in
January 2009. Following the March 2009 assassination of President
Viera, presidential elections were held in June 2009 and resulted
in the election of the currently serving President, Malam Bacai
Sanhá. The entry (which was last reviewed on 1 July 2010)
closes as follows:
"Media reports have bought to public attention
a growing problem of drug trafficking via Guinea-Bissau. Drugs
coming from Latin America are being smuggled to Europe via the
country, taking advantage of the mangrove swamps and jagged coastline,
and the poor capacity of the government to deal with the problem.
On 9 April the current Air Force head, Ibraima Papa Camara, and
former navy chief Bubo Na Tchuto were named "drug kingpins"
by the US. Bubo Na Tchuto's political influence in Guinea-Bissau
remains apparent."[73]
Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP
11.5 The then Committee cleared the Joint Action
in January 2008. It established EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, which was
to be launched in May 2008 and last for 12 months. The preamble
noted that the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa
and Europe was a key strategic priority of the Joint Africa-EU
Strategy adopted in December 2007, and that security sector reform
(SSR) in Guinea-Bissau was essential for the country's stability
and sustainable development.
11.6 The Mission's tasks include:
- advising and contributing to
the development of detailed resizing/restructuring plans for the
armed forces;
- assisting in the development of an underpinning
doctrine for employment of the Armed Forces, including the areas
of command, control and logistic support, and mainstreaming the
counter narcotics effort;
- supporting the development of detailed plans
for the restructuring of police bodies into four services;
- advising on the planning and development of an
effective criminal investigations capacity.
11.7 In April 2009, the then Committee cleared a
"no cost" six-month extension until 30 November 2009;
and a further, very-low-cost six-month extension until 31 May
2010. As our recent Report notes, there had continued to be political
distractions, but also the election of a new President and an
indication "that the Mission will receive the necessary political
support over the next six months to complete the tasks set out
in its current mandate." The then Minister for Europe supported
the extension: it stemmed, he explained, from a recent review
and would enable the EU to: "reach a better understanding
of plans by the wider International Community (notably the Economic
Community of West African States and the UN) to increase their
presence in Guinea-Bissau; conclude the mission's existing work;
and "build bridges towards further implementation in the
future." The extension "should be used by the Mission
to complete the tasks of its current mandate (without taking on
any additional ones) and to prepare the conditions for engagement
by another SSR actor in the future." There was to be a strategic
review on the future of EU engagement in Guinea-Bissau, which
would be submitted to the Political and Security Committee[74]
by the end of January 2010. The review would focus on "where,
amongst other International Community interventions, the EU can
add most value to stabilisation efforts in Guinea-Bissau in the
future [and] …form the basis for making an informed judgement
about any subsequent EU engagement in Guinea-Bissau after the
end of the mandate of the Mission."
11.8 Three years after the first commitment by the
then Guinea-Bissau authorities to security sector reform, there
was a strong sense of disillusionment running through the then
Minister's comments, and of this being the last chance for the
latest President and government. But the EU had yet to lose patience
with an ESDP mission and cut its losses. In clearing that latest
extension, the then Committee therefore asked the then Minister
to write with information about the outcome of the review and
the PSC's assessment and recommendations, ahead of any final determination
about what form any further EU involvement might or might not
take.
The Council Decision
11.9 Nothing was heard from him. Instead, in an Explanatory
Memorandum of 21 May 2010, the new Minister for Europe (David
Lidington) said that a further four-month extension had
been proposed in response to a military mutiny that took place
in Guinea-Bissau on 1 April. It was:
"intended to demonstrate strong EU support to
the weakened civilian government of Guinea-Bissau, allow the government
time to reassert its authority over the military, while allowing
time for the EU to reach a decision on whether the conditions
exist for longer term CSDP engagement."
11.10 The Minister's position is set out in detail
in our previous Report. In essence, this further extension would
add €630,000 to the total expenditure of €7.13 million
so far. One measure of progress would be the extent to which the
Guinea-Bissau government met the demands set out in an EU démarche
following the 1 April military mutiny, viz:
- the immediate and unconditional
liberation of the Armed Forces Chief and all of the other personnel
detained in violation of the law;
- the establishment of the legal responsibility
of and disciplinary measures against those found to be responsible
for the incidents of 1 April and the putting into place of a framework
for the continuation of the reforms;
- the affirmation of the primacy of the civilian
authorities and the legitimate democratic authorities; and
- a guarantee of the respect for all parts of the
Vienna Convention and diplomatic immunity.
11.11 The Minister seemed not to hold great hopes
for a positive outcome. The size of the mission would reduced,
which he said was "an explicit acknowledgement that, until
the current situation is resolved, there is little chance of the
Mission achieving success, but this approach maintains a CSDP
foothold in-country". Guinea-Bissau's own development, security
and stability would, he judged, be damaged if the Mission were
pulled out immediately. But "there should be a period of
reflection in order to re-assess conditions on the ground before
making a more informed decision on the future of CSDP engagement".
So, there would be a further review of engagement two months into
the proposed four month extension to consider whether the EU should
launch a new mission after 30 September 2010. If conditions on
the ground had not improved and made serious Security Sector Reform
unlikely, then the Minister believed the EU should consider closing
the mission.
Our assessment
11.12 We felt that it was for others to judge whether
or not this was the right approach, given how much had been spent
and how little had been achieved.
11.13 For our part, we noted that the Committee had
heard nothing from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about developments
since last November, despite its request to the previous Minister
to write with information about the outcome of the January 2010
review and the PSC's assessment and recommendations, ahead of
any final determination about what form any further EU involvement
might or might not take.
11.14 Instead, a further review of engagement was
now in prospect, two months into the proposed four month extension,
to consider whether the EU should launch a new mission after 30
September 2010. In addition to clearing the document, we therefore
also asked the new Minister to let us know the outcome and his
views, so that we are not again presented with scrutinising a
fait accompli.[75]
The Minister's letter of 4 October 2010
11.15 The Minister begins by rehearsing some of the
background. He recalls that the PSC's January strategic review
stated that, at the time, the Guinea-Bissau authorities were committed
to taking forward security sector reform (SSR) but lacked the
capacity to do so; and also mentioned that there were gaps in
the international coverage of SSR, in particular reform of the
military structures, which the EU might usefully fill. Member
State working groups then considered the issue in more detail
and concluded that because of the illegal drug trafficking and
organised crime in West Africa and Guinea-Bissau, it was of strategic
importance to the EU to continue the SSR effort through a CSDP
mission. However, Member States were clear that the mission could
only continue and have a chance of success if the Guinea-Bissau
authorities demonstrated tangible and clear commitment to SSR,
specifically by the adoption of the organic laws by the Guinea-Bissau
Parliament which the mission had helped to draft. On this basis,
the EU began planning for a new CSDP mission to be deployed from
1 June 2010. The new mission was to be smaller than EUSSR Guinea-Bissau,
have a greater emphasis on military reform and a more direct coordination
with the UN.
11.16 However, the Minister notes, planning for the
new CSDP mission was brought to a halt by a military mutiny in
Guinea-Bissau. He continues as follows:
"On 1 April 2010, rogue elements of the Guinea-Bissau
military, led by the Deputy Chief of Defence (Major General Indjai),
unlawfully detained the Chief of Defence (CHOD) Captain Jose Zamora
Induta and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. The Prime Minister
was later released but Major General Indjai remains CHOD and no
assurances been provided regarding the safety of Captain José
Zamora Induta who remains under detention.
"In order to encourage a return to democratic
oversight after the mutiny, the EU issued a demarche to the Guinea-Bissau
Government which set out the conditions that would need to be
met in order for CSDP engagement to continue. These conditions
included the unconditional release of the detained CHOD and the
prosecution of those responsible for the events of 1 April. Regretfully
the Guinea-Bissau Government was unable to meet these conditions
and the former Deputy Chief of Defence has since been appointed
formally by the Guinea-Bissau President as CHOD."
11.17 As a result, the Minister then says: a second
EU strategic review was undertaken and presented to the PSC on
9 July; it concluded that conditions in country would not enable
the new CSDP mission to take real steps towards SSR and recommended
that EUSSR Guinea-Bissau be closed from 30 September; and the
PSC agreed with this conclusion:
"The Government supported the decision to close
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau. The deployment of a new mission would have
meant EU personnel working with individuals that had engaged in
unconstitutional activity. This would have cast doubt on the credibility
of any SSR work undertaken. Crucially, the events of 1 April brought
into question the commitment of the local authorities to meaningful
SSR, without which a new mission would have struggled to have
the necessary impact. Although EUSSR Guinea-Bissau will be closed,
the EU will be exploring alternative ways of remaining engaged
in Guinea-Bissau in order to avoid abandoning Guinea-Bissau at
a critical time. The UK position in any future discussions on
this issue will be to ensure that continued engagement is effective
and represents good value for money."
Conclusion
11.18 There can be little doubt that this is
the right course of action. We again leave it to others to judge
the utility of this exercise hitherto.
11.19 We look forward to hearing from the Minister
in due course, should ways of remaining engaged in Guinea-Bissau
necessitate a further Council Decision.
11.20 In the meantime, we are reporting the end
of this chapter because of the interest in the House in European
Security and Defence Policy.
73 See FCO Country Profile at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-saharan-africa/guinea-bissau?profile=politics&pg=7. Back
74
The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations
who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and
the Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered
by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU.
Back
75
See headnote: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 56 (8 September 2010).
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