12 EU restrictive measures against Côte
d'Ivoire
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| Draft Council Decision extending and amending Common Position 2004/852/CFSP on restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM and Minister's letter of 22 October 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (27131) 16033/05: HC 34-xv (18 January 2006), chapter 15 (18 January 2006) and HC 38-i (2004-05) chapter 24 (1 December 2004)
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| To be discussed in Council | 25 October 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared, but further information requested
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Background
12.1 As the previous Committee's earlier Report notes, the Kimberley
Process is a joint government, international diamond industry
and civil society initiative to stem the flow of "conflict
diamonds" — rough diamonds that are used by rebel movements
to finance wars against legitimate governments and which are generally
regarded as having contributed to devastating conflicts in countries
such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Sierra Leone. According to the KP website, the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) imposes extensive requirements
on its members to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds
as "conflict-free", and as of December 2009, the KP
had 49 members, representing 75 countries, with the European Community
and its Member States counting as an individual participant.[76]
12.2 That same earlier Report also noted that a serious
political and military crisis had beset the Côte d'Ivoire
since September 2002, with the EU having repeatedly expressed
concern at subsequent human rights violations by both sides, chiefly
prior to the signing of the Linas Marcoussis peace agreement (LMA)
in January 2003 but also subsequently. The LMA agreement identified
reforms that needed to take place to ensure an end to violence.
However, the agreement was not signed by either the President
or Government of Côte d'Ivoire (GCI). In July 2003, all
sides signed a new Agreement — Accra III — but in
November 2003 the GCI breached the ceasefire and crossed a UN-held
line to attack the northern rebels in contravention of UN Security
Council Resolution 1528. In April 2004 a UN mission (UNOCI) was
established, with the French 'Licorne' force taking the role of
rapid deployment support. In November 2004 government forces attempted
to attack the Forces Nouvelles (FN) across the cease-fire
line. On 6 November, government planes bombed French positions,
killing nine French peacekeepers; the French retaliated by destroying
the Ivorian air force. Riots ensued across Abidjan, targeting
French nationals and the French army; around 8,000 French nationals
were evacuated or subsequently left.
EU Common Position 2004/852/CFSP
12.3 In November 2004 the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 1572 (2004) imposing
an arms embargo against Côte d'Ivoire with immediate effect.
The resolution also imposed a travel ban and an assets freeze
against individuals who constitute a threat to the peace and reconciliation
process, to come into force on 15 December 2004. The African Union,
in a statement on 14 November 2004, gave its full support to the
resolution. The first EU Common Position implemented the terms
of resolution 1572 across the European Union. In addition, it
prohibited the supply of equipment which might be used for internal
repression. It was cleared by the then Committee on 1 December
2004 and agreed at the 13 December 2004 General Affairs and External
Relations Council.[77]
12.4 The criteria for lifting the arms embargo and
restrictive measures was full implementation of the LMA and Accra
agreements, i.e. demobilisation, disarmament and resettlement
(DDR) of combatants as well as free, fair and credible elections.
These criteria had not been met. Therefore, on 15 December 2005
the UNSC agreed resolution 1643 to renew all the above measures
(save the assets freeze, which was not time-specific and does
not require renewal).
12.5 UNSCR 1643 included the addition of a ban on
the import of all rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire. From
the outset, in November 2002, the GCI suspended itself from the
KPCS, and any diamond exports from Côte d'Ivoire were treated
as illicit by all other KPCS participants. However, there was
evidence that Côte d'Ivoire diamonds were being smuggled
to neighbouring states who were not KPCS participants —
e.g., Mali — where they were able to enter the legitimate
trade, despite the fact that Kimberley Process participants are
supposed to encompass 99.8% of the international diamond trade
and none is supposed to buy from or sell to non-KPCS participants.
The purchase of Ivoirean diamonds also contributed to regional
instability by providing an important income for the FN, who controlled
some of the largest mines and also extracted revenues from road-blocks
near the border areas, where natural resources, including diamonds,
left the country. The November 2005 Kimberley Process Meeting
concluded that the ongoing production of rough diamonds in Côte
d'Ivoire, and the possible introduction of such illicit diamonds
into the legitimate diamond trade, threatened the integrity and
credibility of the whole KPCS. By making diamonds from Côte
d'Ivoire illicit in international law, it was hoped that the UN
ban would reinforce the Kimberley Process and assist its planned
investigation into the production capacity of the Ivoirean diamond
trade.
12.6 At that time, the then Minister for Europe
(Douglas Alexander) noted that, under Article 11 of the Treaty
on European Union, one of the objectives of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy was "to preserve peace and strengthen
international security, in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter" and that the EU's implementation
of UN Security Council Resolution 1643 was crucial to the furthering
of this aim. The then Government supported the renewal of the
sanctions and the addition of a diamond ban as part of a broader
strategy to establish lasting peace and security in Côte
d'Ivoire, judged that the diamond ban would only affect those
associated with the illegal diamond trade, and would not result
in the negative humanitarian effects that a ban on legal commodity
exports, such as cocoa, might have.[78]
The previous Committee's assessment
12.7 As the then Minister for Europe made clear,
the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire was little improved,
and illicit diamond smuggling there appeared not only to be stoking
the fires of instability but also to be threatening the integrity
and credibility of the whole Kimberley Process. With the overcoming
of such threats to the peace and security being crucial to the
successful implementation of the recently agreed EU Strategy on
Africa, the previous Committee judged it appropriate to draw the
extension, in scope as well as duration, of the Common Position
to the attention of the House.
Subsequent developments
12.8 A series of negotiations followed, involving,
at different points, the mediation efforts of France, Ghana, South
Africa and the African Union. An international contact group met
monthly to discuss the problem from November 2005 to February
2007. Various formulations of unity governments were tried, offering
ministerial posts to former rebels from the FN and political opposition.
No progress was made during this time on the two key issues —
disarmament of the former rebels and other militia, and the identification
of the population and establishment of credible and accepted electoral
lists.
12.9 In March 2007 a new agreement was signed between
the President and the leader of the New Forces, Guillaume Soro,
under the mediation of Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore —
the Ouagadougou Accords — under which Soro became Prime
Minister. The formal division between the rebel-held north and
the government south ended and the country was officially re-united
in April 2007. But significant progress has yet to be made on
re-integrating the rebel forces into the army, or on the national
identification process, and the Ouagadougou accord has had to
be supplemented by a further agreement in November 2007.
The proposed extension and amendment of Common
Position 2004/852/CFSP
12.10 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 22 October
2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) says that:
— Côte
d'Ivoire is, after five years and six postponements, still on
track to hold Presidential elections on 31 October 2010;
— the outcome remains uncertain and there
is a high risk of demonstrations turning violent during and after
this period; and
— the Ivorian security forces currently
have little or no capacity to deal with protests using non-lethal
equipment.
12.11 Recalling the elements of the Common Position
thus far, the Minister explains that:
— UNSCR
1946 was adopted on 15 October 2010 renewing sanctions for a period
of six months;
— the arms embargo allows, where agreed
by the UN Sanctions Committee, the supply of non-lethal equipment
intended solely to enable the Ivorian security forces to use only
appropriate and proportionate force while maintaining public order.
12.12 The Minister continues as follows:
"France intends to supply non-lethal crowd control
equipment to Cote d'Ivoire, but cannot do so legally until the
EU Council Decision and then subsequently the Council Regulations
are brought into line with UNSCR 1946. We and other Member States
support the French action in this case.
"In order for the Ivorian security forces to
receive this crowd control equipment for use during the electoral
process the Council Decision must be adopted by 25 October 2010.
Once the Council Decision is adopted, the Council Regulation (the
legal act giving effect to the Council Decision in the EU) will
need to be amended and then adopted quickly thereafter. Failure
to adopt both Decision and Regulation will mean that non-lethal
crowd control equipment will not be available to the Ivorian security
forces during the electoral process. Due to the process involved
it is likely that any such equipment will not be available to
the Ivorians in time for the first round of elections on 31 October,
but if the changes are agreed and adopted then it should be available
to them before the planned second round of elections on 28 November."
The Government's view
12.13 The Minister reiterates his support for the
renewal of the restrictive measures and the exemption on the arms
embargo to allow the supply of non-lethal equipment for the purpose
of crowd control.
12.14 He goes on to say that, due to the pressing
need for the Ivorian security forces to have this equipment during
the imminent electoral process, the Council Decision needs to
be adopted as soon as is possible, and continues as follows:
"I regret that it has been necessary to override
parliamentary scrutiny in order to adopt the Council Decision
and I further regret that this will, in due course, be necessary
again, in respect of the Council Regulation. If we did not override
parliamentary scrutiny in regard to this matter then the Council
Decision and Regulation would not be adopted in time for the Ivorian
security forces to be equipped with non-lethal crowd control equipment."
The Minister's letter of 22 October 2010
12.15 The Minister's separate letter to the Committee
chairman adds nothing of substance to his Explanatory Memorandum
other than to say that:
"the responsibility to keep your Committee informed
on issues concerning sanctions is something I take seriously and
the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably
unavoidable due to the timing of the UN resolution renewal and
the imminent election date in Cote d'Ivoire."
Conclusion
12.16 We are reporting this development to the
House because we think that it should be aware of this change
of policy. We accept that, the change to the UN resolution not
having been made until 15 October, it was not possible for the
Minister to have submitted the proposal in time for our meeting
on 20 October, and therefore do not object to his having over-ridden
scrutiny on this occasion and in these circumstances. Though unhappy
with the quality of the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum, we
have no wish to intervene in the process, and accordingly clear
the document.
12.17 Our unhappiness stems from the Minister's
failure properly to explain important aspects of the proposal.
We note that the exception to the arms embargo is for "non-lethal
equipment intended solely to enable the Ivorian security forces
to use only appropriate and proportionate force while maintaining
public order". We also note that the Ivorian security forces
currently have little or no capacity to deal with protests using
non-lethal equipment. This presumably also means that those forces
have little or no experience of using such equipment, let alone
appropriately or proportionally. Yet the Minister provides no
information about what equipment is to be supplied, and how its
non-lethality is to be guaranteed; nor any indication of how the
Ivorian security services are to be trained in its proper use;
nor about the general political situation in Côte d'Ivoire
and the likelihood of the equipment having to be used during the
elections; nor what is to happen to the equipment once the elections
are over. It seems that this decision, no doubt at the UN as well
as within the EU, has been driven by France. Given recent history
in the Côte d'Ivoire, this is unsurprising. But the EU as
a whole is involved, and would be criticised should matters not
turn out as planned. All in all, the impression given by the Minister's
Explanatory Memorandum is that it was as last minute and hurried
as this whole exercise appears to have been.
12.18 We would accordingly be grateful if the
Minister would write to us with this information, and also ensure
that further such changes to sanctions regimes are fully explained
in the way that this one has not been.
76 For further information on the Kimberley Process,
see http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/. Back
77
See headnote: HC 38-i (2004-05) chapter 24 (1 December 2004). Back
78
Côte d'Ivoire's economy is based on the export of cash crops.
It is the largest producer of cocoa in the world, producing 40%
of global supply, and the fifth largest producer of robusta coffee.
It is estimated that 650,000 farmers work solely in the cocoa
sector, which represents 40% of GDP and 60% of export revenues.
The economy has expanded into agro-industry and the manufacture
of consumer goods for domestic and regional markets. The conflict
had a negative effect on the economy. Back
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