10 CFSP: EU support for the Democratic
Republic of Congo
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(31916)
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| Draft Council Decision amending and extending the mandate of the European Union security sector reform (SSR) mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC DRC)
Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2010/329/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD CONGO)
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| Legal base | Articles 28 and 43 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 4 October 2010
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 428-ii (2010-11), chapter 26 (15 September 2010) and (31692) —: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 59 (8 September 2010); also see (30992) —: HC 19-xxviii (2008-09), chapter 13 (21 October 2009); (30900) —: HC 19-xxvii (2008-09), chapter 26, (14 October 2009); (30686 ) 10358/09: HC 19-xx (2008-09), chapter 7 (17 June 2009) and (30667) —: HC 19-xviii (2008-09), chapter 21 (3 June 2009); also see (29722) — and (29734) —: HC 16 xxiv (2007-08), chapters 6 and 14 (18 June 2008), and (28650) —, (28651) —: HC 41-xxiii (2006-07), chapter 19 (6 June 2007)
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| Discussed in Council | 20 September 2010
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared (decision reported on 15 September 2010); further information now provided
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Background
10.1 Following elections in the DRC in 2006, two Joint Actions
were agreed by the Council on 12 June 2007, which aimed:
— to
establish a police mission leading on Security Sector Reform and
its justice interface in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL
DRC);
— via a new and revised mandate, to build
on the progress made during the previous two years and continue
to contribute to the integration of the different armed factions
in the DRC, and assist Congolese efforts to reconstruct the army
(EUSEC RD Congo).
10.2 The previous Committee's consideration of
subsequent amendments involved several exchanges of correspondence
with various FCO Ministers. A common concern has been
that members of the security sector are the perpetrators of what
previous Ministers of Europe regularly described as "a large
proportion of violent crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
including rape and human rights violations." The previous
Committee tried on several occasions to elicit more accurate information
about this, and to ascertain why it seemed to be so difficult
to include a measured level of their involvement in these crimes
as a benchmark against which then to measure these Missions' progress.
The then Ministers' responses are detailed in our predecessor's
earlier Reports.[19]
10.3 On 8 September 2010, at its first meeting,
the Committee cleared a Council Decision to extend EUPOL's mandate
for a further three months, at a cost of a further €2 million.
As the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) said in his 10 June
Explanatory Memorandum, the DRC remained a focus of international
attention because of the potential for conflict not least caused
by the poor humanitarian situation in most of the country. The
Congolese police and justice sectors remained weak. Impunity for
major crimes, including rape and murder, was common with justice
rarely delivered for victims. Without international assistance
parts of the DRC could slide back into a state of conflict which
would destabilise the wider region. Security sector reform (SSR)
was, therefore, a high priority for the international community.
But over the last 12 months EUPOL RD CONGO had struggled to fully
achieve its mandate. Despite this, the Minister supported a three
month extension until 30 September 2010. Among many international
actors involved, who were not always coordinated effectively,
the key player was the UN Peacekeeping Mission to the DRC (MONUC).
The way forward for MONUC was being discussed.[20]
The three month extension would allow for a more informed decision
then to be taken on the longer term future of EUPOL RD CONGO.
The Council Secretariat were also to undertake a strategic review
of EU engagement in the DRC this summer to look at EU coherence,
including between EUPOL RD CONGO and the separate and "better
performing" EUSEC RD CONGO. It will look to assess the effectiveness
of EU activity so far and identify areas where the EU can add
most value in the future. If the strategic review failed to identify
an area where continued CSDP engagement in police reform can add
sufficient value going forward, the Minister would push to close
EUPOL RD CONGO.[21]
The first Council Decision
10.4 This Council Decision replaces the Council
Decision 2009/709/CFSP to provide the legal basis for a two-year
extension to EUSEC DRC from 1 October 2010 until 30 September
2012.
10.5 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 9 June
2010, the Minister for Europe said that the mission's main tasks
would be to continue the work of the previous mandate, namely:
— implementing
the biometric census project to accurately identify the correct
number of Congolese soldiers across the country;
— continuing the introduction of military
ID cards to further FARDC battalions which are helping to identify
legitimate soldiers;
— continuing the chain of payments projects
which is designed to ensure that soldiers are paid correctly and
therefore reduce the levels of financial corruption;
— support the opening of military training
schools in Kinshasa and Kananga as well as the development of
training programmes for FADRC officials; and
— helping the Congolese introduce and implement
policies that will promote human rights and prevent sexual violence.
10.6 The Minister noted that, despite the end
of the Second Congo War in 2003, various militia groups remained
active in the eastern DRC and the Congolese military (FARDC) lacked
the capacity to remove them and fully stabilise the eastern provinces.
With the DRC bordering nine other countries this instability had
the potential to affect the wider Great Lakes region. A more effective
and capable FARDC would aid the DRC to stabilise the key eastern
regions and reduce the possibility that the country will slide
back into conflict; improve the level of Congolese governance
over their territory; and improve the relationship between the
Congolese population and the FARDC by ensuring that members of
the Armed Forces are held accountable for criminal activity. Security
sector reform in the DRC was a long term process and the two-year
extension to EUSEC DRC would allow the mission continue and build
on the good work it had undertaken so far. The crucial reform
projects it was delivering to professionalise the Congolese Army
were helping reduce the levels of corruption and fraud; the two-year
extension would allow for longer term planning and implementation.
The amount allocated to cover the two-year extension was €12.6
million, with a UK contribution of approximately €1.7 million.
The second Council Decision
10.7 In his separate Explanatory Memorandum of
9 September 2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) said
that, under this proposed twelve month extension, EUPOL RD CONGO
would be refocused towards the implementation of smaller specific
projects against a set of clearly defined tasks, and that these
would be delivered through training programmes for the Congolese
National Police (PNC):
— mentoring,
monitoring and advising key PNC personnel to take forward the
implementation of the reform process;
— supporting the Audit Police Service to
strengthen its operational capacity in order to provide Congolese
citizens and authorities with a key instrument of democratic control
over the PNC;
— mentoring and advising the criminal police
in Kinshasa to improve standards and their capability to effectively
prevent and investigate crimes;
— supporting the professional development
of senior PNC officials with a view to improving their leadership
and management skills;
— supporting the development of a coherent
PNC policy against sexual violence; and
— helping create and monitor specialised
units within the PNC to fight against sexual violence.
10.8 The Minister put the proposal in much the
same context as he did in June (c.f. paragraph 10.6 above). He
explained that over the last twelve months EUPOL RD CONGO had
experienced difficulties implementing the tasks in its mandate.
Constant understaffing has limited the scale and impact of the
work it had been able to take forward. In addition, the reform
tasks in the mission's previous mandate were focused at the strategic
level, while the SSR requirements in the DRC had moved into an
implementation phase. The Government's explicit starting point
for the negotiations was, therefore, that it would only agree
to a new mission if it was smaller and focused on a set of clearly
defined and achievable tasks that dovetailed effectively with
the rest of the international effort. Importantly, the mission's
tasks would be supported by a set of measurable benchmarks of
progress which would help inform the Member States when they considered
a review of the mission's activity, which the Council Secretariat
would be required to produce this report six months into the new
mandate period. The UK had pushed hard to reduce the size of the
mission on efficiency grounds, but also in an effort to help address
the persistent understaffing that the mission experienced previously.
The new mission would be reduced from 60 to 49 international staff.
Deployment in the eastern provinces had been scaled back to include
only an eight person antenna in Goma. Deployments in Bukavu and
proposed deployments in Lubumbashi had been removed; this would
ensure that the mission retained some form of engagement in the
key eastern provinces (where the majority of acts of sexual violence
crimes were committed) but also addressed the fact that under
the previous mandate the mission struggled to make an impact in
the east in a crowded international landscape. The eight person
antenna in Goma would focus on taking forward work to address
sexual and gender based violence in the east. The mission's head
quarters would remain in Kinshasa.
10.9 The Minister went on to explain that the
financial reference amount for the extension had not yet been
agreed, but he expect the costs to be less than under the previous
mandate (noting that a three month extension under the last mandate
cost €2.02 million).
Our assessment
10.10 The impression, a year ago, was that a
greater emphasis was being place on SGBV and, by implication,
tackling the part of security forces in it; the impression now,
we felt, was that it had slipped down the scale of priorities
or, at best, has marked time. We therefore asked the Minister:
— what
the level of SGBV now was;
— what the level of security forces' participation
in it was, and if this was any improvement on earlier years; and
— what had happened with regard to the
provision of legal advice to the victims.
10.11 We also noted that there is still no mention
of the findings of any of the reviews talked about by both previous
Ministers for Europe and he himself— he having said the
review of the MONUC (now MONUSCO) mandate would be central to
determining how to take EUPOL forward. We therefore asked:
— what
the outcome was of the MONUC/MONUSCO review mandate, and how the
refocusing of EUPOL reflected this;
— what the findings of the Council Secretariat
review of the two missions were, and in particular what area or
areas it identified where continued CFSP engagement in police
reform would add sufficient value to warrant EUPOL's continuation;
— what "clearly defined and achievable
tasks" were discerned, and how they dovetailed effectively
with the rest of the international effort;
— what the rest of that international effort
consisted of;
— what the benchmarks were against which
progress was to be measured.
10.12 Looking further ahead, we asked the Minister
to write in six month's time with information about what had been
achieved vis à vis the benchmarks and his views
on the outcome thus far and the prospects for the future.
10.13 On the financial aspects, we noted that
spending on EUSEC RD Congo will now reach $39.5 million.
10.14 We also noted the lack of financial information
on EUPOL RD Congo. When he wrote to the Committee once the financial
reference amount was agreed, we asked the Minister to explain
why it was possible to agree one financial reference amount but
not the other; and to provide information on what the total expenditure
on EUPOL had been thus far.
10.15 In the meantime, we cleared the Council
Decisions.[22]
The Minister's letter of 4 October 2010
10.16 The Minister's detailed response is set
out in the Annex to this chapter of our Report in three main sections:
— review
of EU engagement in the DRC;
— the UN mission MONUSCO;
— Sexual Violence & Wider Engagement.
10.17 The Minister also notes that:
— the
budget announced for the twelve month extension to EUPOL DRC is
€6.4 million and was presented to Member States on 13 September;
— the reason for the delay in the release
of the budget was the prolonged negotiations that took place as
a result of UK efforts to refocus EUPOL DRC's mandate;
— negotiations on the extension to EUSEC
DRC did not take as long and is the reason why the budget for
EUSEC DRC was able to be released earlier than the budget for
EUPOL DRC;
— the total expenditure for EUPOL DRC to
date is €19.57 million (which excludes the €6.4 million
for the upcoming extension) and is broken down as follows:
- 01/07/07 — 30/06/08 (12
month extension): €5.5 million;
- 01/07/08 — 31/10/09 (16 month extension):
€6.9 million;
- 01/11/09 — 30/06/10 (8 month extension):
€5.15 million;
- 01/07/10 — 30/09/10 (3 month extension):
€2.02 million.
Conclusion
10.18 We are grateful to the Minister for
this information, which demonstrates the uphill — and, we
suspect, solitary, and thus all the more commendable — battle
the UK has had to reach this point, notwithstanding the €60
million spent thus far on these two missions.
10.19 The extremely difficult operational
context is evident. And there is no gainsaying the need for stability
and the rule of law in the DRC. We can but hope that, given the
level of expenditure thus far, the next review will be able to
show some signs of more definitive results than hitherto.
Annex Review of EU engagement
in the DRC
"A strategic review of EU engagement in the
DRC was released on 21 June. The review was intended to provide
an assessment of the effectiveness of EU engagement to allow an
informed decision to be taken on the direction of future engagement.
The review concluded that CSDP engagement had been successful
and recommended that the two missions (EUSEC DRC and EUPOL DRC)
were both extended for two years with similar mandates. The review
advised that future EU activity should be more transparent, measurable
and concentrated on the implementation of the SSR process.
"With regards to EUPOL DRC, the review concluded
that the mission had been successful, but in HMG's view it did
not identify a convincing case that a new mission would add value
to the wider international effort to reform the security sector
in the DRC. The Government's view was that, whilst EUPOL DRC had
made a positive impact in the first year to 18 months of operations,
it was now struggling to fulfil its strategic level mandate. A
continuation along previous lines would have made little difference
to reform of the Congolese National Police (PNC). In the following
negotiations, against strong opposition from other Member States,
the UK argued hard to focus EUPOL DRC on more targeted projects
and interventions, to ensure that it coordinated more effectively
with the rest of the international effort and realised some efficiencies
in its staffing and administration. As a result, EUPOL DRC was
refocused on the following four headline objectives:
1. supporting the SSR process with a particular
emphasis on the reform of the Congolese Police (PNC) and its interaction
with the judiciary;
2. supporting the implementation of Police Reform
and the improvement of the PNC's operational capacity and accountability
through mentoring monitoring and advising (MMA) activities;
3. enhancing the knowledge and capacity of PNC
senior officials, trainers and training systems through the provision
of strategic training courses;
4. supporting the fight against sexual violence
and impunity.
"Under these objectives the mission will take
forward the following tasks;
- Contributing to enhancing the
links between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice
with a view to increasing levels of co-operation and understanding
between the two Ministries.
- Providing advice on the design and implementation
of an adequate organisational structure for the PNC and supporting
data collection activities in order to establish a complete census
of police officers.
- Mentoring, monitoring and advising PNC personnel
to assist with the implementation of the reform process and improve
the PNC's capability to prevent and investigate serious crimes.
- Supporting the professional development of senior
PNC officials with a view to improving their leadership and management
skills.
- Supporting the development of a coherent policy
for the PNC against SGBV.
- Helping create specialised units within the PNC
to fight against sexual violence, crimes related to children.
"The extensive mission planning documents set
out further detail on the sub-tasks to be completed in each of
these areas. In addition, the UK extracted commitments, set out
in the mission's Operations Plan agreed in Brussels on 17 September,
to establish benchmarks for the mission activities against which
progress would be measured at the six month review stage and when
considering whether to renew the mandate in 12 months time. The
benchmarks will be elaborated by the new Head of Mission, who
is soon to be appointed, as part of his mission implementation
plan. The Government has made clear that we expect to see benchmarks
that are not only quantitative input measures, e.g. the number
of police officers trained, but look to establish the qualitative
outcomes of the mission's efforts. These benchmarks will be built
around the following success criteria agreed for the mission:
- relevant legislation and policies,
reflecting the conceptual and doctrinal framework underpinning
the police reform process (e.g. in the fields of human resources,
operations, administration and logistics), are adopted and start
to be implemented;
- relevant PNC structures coherent with the objectives
of the mission are designed and start to be implemented;
- the census of the PNC, aimed at obtaining a precise
picture of the number of Police Officers, is launched and progresses
successfully towards completion;
- the crime investigation operational capability
of the PNC in Kinshasa is enhanced and able to operate with a
minimum efficiency;
- significant improvement of the overall functioning
of criminal investigation is achieved;
- higher professional standards and better overall
performance across the criminal justice sector (e.g. more investigations
leading to successful prosecutions) are perceivable;
- a sufficient number of police trainers are trained
in order to build capacity inside the PNC to improve significantly
their skills; and
- a coherent policy against sexual violence and
impunity in the PNC is developed.
The UN mission — MONUSCO
"The Committee also asked about the outcome
of the discussions on the MONUC/MONUSCO mandate and how the changes
to EUPOL DRC reflect this. The new UN peacekeeping mission in
the DRC is now known as MONUSCO and works closely with the
United Nations Country Team and international community as it
takes on a greater peace-building role. The mission's activities
focus on stabilisation and peace consolidation with the Congolese
Government and other international partners, predominantly in
the areas of security and judicial reform. The new UN mandate
includes support for the eventual deployment of trained PNC officials
to maintain rule of law in areas currently secured by the military.
It has the overall coordination role of international efforts
on SSR in the DRC.
"MONUSCO is by far the largest single player
on SSR in the DRC so the Government is clear that EUPOL DRC must
coordinate effectively with this mission. The UK identified that
EUPOL DRC would add most value to the UN effort by providing assistance
with the training and mentoring of senior PNC officials. The tasks
under the new mandate should help improve the leadership skills
of senior Congolese police officers so that good practice can
be cascaded down the chain of command. EUPOL DRC's follow up and
mentoring activities will also help to ensure that Congolese officials
implement the lessons they have learnt. There is of course no
guarantee that the changes made to EUPOL DRC's mandate will ensure
the mission has the impact we desire going forward. The mission
may still struggle to recruit suitably qualified personnel, though
UK efforts to reduce the size of the mission should help. The
first report of the new SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary
General) Roger Meece is due by 11 October 2010 and should
provide an early indication of MONUSCO's progress towards achieving
a coordinated approach in-country. We will continue to monitor
EUPOL DRC's progress under its own new mandate in the coming months
to assess the mission's progress.
The Democratic Republic of Congo — Sexual
Violence & Wider Engagement
"Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in
the DRC remains high. It is estimated that one woman is raped
every two hours in the province of South Kivu. In 2009 the UNFPA
(United Nations Population Fund) reported that over 200,000 women
and girls were assaulted over the last thirteen years and in one
particular incident that took place in August this year around
500 women were attacked and raped by armed rebels near the town
of Kibua.
"As mentioned in my previous correspondence,
a large proportion of the reported SGBV crimes are committed
by members of the Congolese national army (FARDC). Since its creation
in 2003, the FARDC has been one of the main perpetrators of sexual
violence in the DRC. Army commanders frequently fail to stop SGBV
crimes committed by soldiers under their command and punish those
responsible. Although other armed groups also commit acts of SGBV,
the sheer size of the FARDC and its deployment throughout the
whole country makes it one of the largest perpetrators. In 2007,
the UN found that 54 percent of all sexual violence cases reported
in the first six months of the year were committed by FARDC soldiers
and between January and May 2009, Human Rights Watch documented
143 cases of rape by army soldiers in North Kivu.
"To date there has not been any attempt to collect
data systematically on the extent of the problem and there are,
therefore, no authoritative figures. Limited data makes it difficult
to measure whether or not there has been any reduction in the
number of abuses committed by the Congolese security sector but
it is clear that it is still happening regularly. One of the biggest
challenges faced is the under reporting of incidents (particularly
by male victims) due to the social stigmas attached to being
a victim of rape. Security sector reform is key to turning this
around. We continue to push the Congolese Government to implement
a zero tolerance policy against human rights abuse and to address
impunity in the armed forces.
"The Committee asked what had happened to EUPOL
DRC's efforts under its previous mandate to provide access to
justice for victims of SGBV. This is challenging in the DRC because
of the distances involved and poor infrastructure which means
that the distance between the victims of SGBV and instruments
of justice (police, prosecutors, judges etc) is large. Failings
in the justice system such as corruption and a lack of capacity
mean that prosecutions are rare. EUPOL DRC was unable to fully
take forward work in this area due to the understaffing experienced
under the missions previous mandate. Other international actors
such as the US and UN are also engaged in tackling SGBV in the
eastern DRC along with many other NGOs (Oxfam, Human Rights Watch,
and Amnesty International) which has further limited the mission's
impact. As a result, the UK argued for EUPOL DRC's deployment
in the east to be reduced to a single antenna in Goma and the
mission has not been specifically tasked to help with the provision
of legal aid to SGBV victims of under the new mandate. The mission
will however remain engaged through advising and assisting members
of the Congolese judiciary.
"The EU led programme REJUSCO allocated £750,000
of its total programme budget to support activities on SGBV and
had two components. The first was aimed at raising awareness of
SGBV with the DRC population and the second targeted improving
victims access to justice along with the ability of the justice
system to respond. However disbursement of funds to this programme
has had to be stopped because of corruption issues.
"SGBV in DRC attracts a good deal of international
attention. The US, Sweden, the UK and the EU are particularly
active on the issue. Hillary Clinton visited DRC in August 2009
where she announced a $17 million plan to help tackle the problem.
In May 2010 Sweden hosted a major international donor conference
on sexual violence and Margot Wallström (UN Special Representative
on Sexual Violence in Conflict) is currently in the DRC to coordinate
the UN's response to the recent mass rapes in the east of the
country.
"The UK's Department for International Development
(DFID) is heavily engaged in the DRC and focuses on six priority
areas; governance, security and justice, road building, access
to education, minerals and humanitarian assistance. With the help
of UK Aid 18 million people in the DRC were able to vote in 2006
in the first democratic elections the DRC had seen for more than
40 years. Several non-EU states such as Angola, Canada, China,
the Republic of South Africa, and the USA are engaged in bilateral
assistance programs in support of the SSR process. South Africa
has its own SSR assistance mission and the USA is supporting a
stabilisation and reconstruction (STAREC) plan through USAID.
The USA has also expressed their intention to support EUPOL DRC's
activities combating sexual violence. Finally, Japan also provides
financial support to several police reform actions and projects.
"Since October 2005, the European Commission
(EC) has provided assistance related to the strategic direction
of judicial reform in the DRC. The EUPOL DRC senior justice advisor
is working closely with the EC and has established contacts with
the Congolese General Prosecutor and other senior legal personnel.
Under the European Development Fund and Instrument for Stability
(IfS) the EC is supporting preliminary reform work such as the
introduction of a system for human resource management in the
PNC and a nationwide quantitative and qualitative census to identify
training needs. Furthermore, in the framework of wider IfS programmes
the EC has allocated €3 million for a programme which is
assisting with the deployment of additional PNC officers to the
eastern DRC."
19 See headnote. Back
20
Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July
1999 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and five
regional States in July 1999, the Security Council established
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUC) by its resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999,
initially to plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement
of forces and maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire
Agreement. Later in a series of resolutions, the Council expanded
the mandate of MONUC to the supervision of the implementation
of the Ceasefire Agreement and assigned multiple related additional
tasks. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1925 of
28 May 2010, MONUC was renamed as of 1 July the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect the new phase reached in the
country. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/
for full information on MONUSCO. Back
21
See headnote: (31692) -: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 59 (8 September
2010). Back
22
See headnote: HC 428-ii (2010-11), chapter 26 (15 September 2010). Back
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