10 EU restrictive measures against Côte
d'Ivoire
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(32081)
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(b)
(32155)
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Draft Council Decision extending and amending Common Position 2004/852/CFSP on restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire
Draft Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No.174/2005 imposing restrictions on the supply of assistance related to military activities to Côte d'Ivoire
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | (a) Minister's letter of 5 November 2010
(b) EM of 8 November 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | (a) HC 428-v (2010-11), chapter 12 (27 October 2010); also see (27131) 16033/05: HC 34-xv (2005-06), chapter 15 (18 January 2006) and HC 38-i (2004-05), chapter 24 (1 December 2004);
(b) None
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| Discussed in Council | (a) 25 October 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
(b) 15 November 2010
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | (a) Cleared (decision reported to the House on 27 October 2010); further information provided
(b) Cleared
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Background
10.1 As earlier Reports have noted, a serious political and military
crisis has beset the Côte d'Ivoire since September 2002,
with the EU having repeatedly expressed concern at subsequent
human rights violations by both sides, chiefly prior to the signing
of the Linas Marcoussis peace agreement (LMA) in January 2003
but also subsequently. The LMA agreement identified reforms that
needed to take place to ensure an end to violence. However, the
agreement was not signed by either the President or Government
of Côte d'Ivoire (GCI). In July 2003, all sides signed a
new Agreement — Accra III — but in November 2003 the
GCI breached the ceasefire and crossed a UN-held line to attack
the northern rebels in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution
1528. In April 2004 a UN mission (UNOCI) was established, with
the French 'Licorne' force taking the role of rapid deployment
support. In November 2004 government forces attempted to attack
the Forces Nouvelles (FN) across the cease-fire line. On
6 November, government planes bombed French positions, killing
nine French peacekeepers; the French retaliated by destroying
the Ivorian air force. Riots ensued across Abidjan, targeting
French nationals and the French army; around 8,000 French nationals
were evacuated or subsequently left.
EU Common Position 2004/852/CFSP
10.2 In November 2004 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
unanimously adopted resolution 1572 (2004) imposing an arms embargo
against Côte d'Ivoire with immediate effect. The resolution
also imposed a travel ban and an assets freeze against individuals
who constituted a threat to the peace and reconciliation process,
to come into force on 15 December 2004. The African Union, in
a statement on 14 November 2004, gave its full support to the
resolution. The first EU Common Position implemented the terms
of resolution 1572 across the European Union. In addition, it
prohibited the supply of equipment which might be used for internal
repression. It was cleared by the then Committee on 1 December
2004 and agreed at the 13 December 2004 General Affairs and External
Relations Council.[28]
10.3 The criteria for lifting the arms embargo and
restrictive measures was full implementation of the LMA and Accra
agreements, i.e. demobilisation, disarmament and resettlement
(DDR) of combatants as well as free, fair and credible elections.
These criteria had not been met. Therefore, on 15 December 2005
the UNSC agreed resolution 1643 to renew all the above measures
(save the assets freeze, which was not time-specific and does
not require renewal).
10.4 Subsequently, the Common Position was amended
to reflect UNSCR 1643, banning the import of all rough diamonds
from Côte d'Ivoire. As the then Minister for Europe (Douglas
Alexander) made clear at the time, the political situation in
Côte d'Ivoire was little improved, and illicit diamond smuggling
there appeared not only to be stoking the fires of instability
but also to be threatening the integrity and credibility of the
whole Kimberley Process.[29]
With the overcoming of such threats to the peace and security
being crucial to the successful implementation of the recently
agreed EU Strategy on Africa, the previous Committee judged it
appropriate to draw the extension, in scope as well as duration,
of the Common Position to the attention of the House.[30]
Subsequent developments
10.5 A series of negotiations followed, involving,
at different points, the mediation efforts of France, Ghana, South
Africa and the African Union. An international contact group met
monthly to discuss the problem from November 2005 to February
2007. Various formulations of unity governments were tried, offering
ministerial posts to former rebels from the FN and political opposition.
No progress was made during this time on the two key issues —
disarmament of the former rebels and other militia, and the identification
of the population and establishment of credible and accepted electoral
lists.
10.6 In March 2007 a new agreement was signed between
the President and the leader of the New Forces, Guillaume Soro,
under the mediation of Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore —
the Ouagadougou Accords — under which Soro became Prime
Minister. The formal division between the rebel-held north and
the government south ended and the country was officially re-united
in April 2007. But significant progress has yet to be made on
re-integrating the rebel forces into the army, or on the national
identification process, and the Ouagadougou accord has had to
be supplemented by a further agreement in November 2007.
The proposed extension and amendment of Common
Position 2004/852/CFSP
10.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 22 October
2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) said that:
— after
five years and six postponements, Côte d'Ivoire was still
on track to hold Presidential elections on 31 October 2010;
— the outcome remained uncertain and there
was a high risk of demonstrations turning violent during and after
this period; and
— the Ivorian security forces currently
had little or no capacity to deal with protests using non-lethal
equipment.
10.8 Recalling the elements of the Common Position
thus far, the Minister explained that:
— UNSCR
1946 was adopted on 15 October 2010 renewing sanctions for a period
of six months;
— the arms embargo allowed, where agreed
by the UN Sanctions Committee, the supply of non-lethal equipment
intended solely to enable the Ivorian security forces to use only
appropriate and proportionate force while maintaining public order.
10.9 The Minister went on to explain that France
intended to supply non-lethal crowd control equipment to Côte
d'Ivoire, but could not do so legally until the EU Council Decision
and then subsequently the Council Regulations were brought into
line with UNSCR 1946. He and other Member States supported the
French action in this case. However, in order for the Ivorian
security forces to receive this crowd control equipment for use
during the electoral process the Council Decision had to be adopted
by 25 October 2010. Once the Council Decision was adopted, the
Council Regulation (the legal act giving effect to the Council
Decision in the EU) would need to be amended and then adopted
quickly thereafter. Failure to adopt both Decision and Regulation
would, he said, mean that non-lethal crowd control equipment would
not be available to the Ivorian security forces during the electoral
process. Due to the process involved it was likely that any such
equipment would not be available to the Ivorians in time for the
first round of elections on 31 October; but if the changes were
agreed and adopted, then it should be available to them before
the planned second round of elections on 28 November.
10.10 The Minister went on to say that, due to the
pressing need for the Ivorian security forces to have this equipment
during the imminent electoral process, the Council Decision needed
to be adopted as soon as is possible. This meant, he regretted
to say, that it had been necessary to override parliamentary scrutiny
in order to adopt the Council Decision; and, indeed, it would
in due course be necessary to do so again, in respect of the Council
Regulation; otherwise, the Council Decision and Regulation would
not be adopted in time for the Ivorian security forces to be equipped
with non-lethal crowd control equipment.
Our assessment
10.11 We reported this development to the House because
we thought that it should be aware of this change of policy.
10.12 We accepted that, the change to the UN resolution
not having been made until 15 October, it was not possible for
the Minister to have submitted the proposal in time for our meeting
on 20 October, and therefore did not object to his having over-ridden
scrutiny on this occasion and in these circumstances. Though unhappy
with the quality of the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum, we
had no wish to intervene in the process, and accordingly cleared
the document.
10.13 Our concerns stemmed from the Minister's failure
properly to explain important aspects of the proposal. The exception
to the arms embargo was for "non-lethal equipment intended
solely to enable the Ivorian security forces to use only appropriate
and proportionate force while maintaining public order".
The Minister had pointed out that the Ivorian security forces
currently had little or no capacity to deal with protests using
non-lethal equipment — which presumably also meant that
those forces had little or no experience of using such equipment,
let alone appropriately or proportionally. Yet the Minister had
provided no information about what equipment was to be supplied,
and how its non-lethality was to be guaranteed; nor any indication
of how the Ivorian security services were to be trained in its
proper use; nor about the general political situation in Côte
d'Ivoire and the likelihood of the equipment having to be used
during the elections; nor what was to happen to the equipment
once the elections were over. It seemed that this decision, no
doubt at the UN as well as within the EU, had been driven by France.
Given recent history in the Côte d'Ivoire, this was unsurprising.
But the EU as a whole was involved, and would be criticised should
matters not turn out as planned. All in all, the impression given
by the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum was, we felt, that it
was as last minute and hurried as the whole exercise appeared
to have been.
10.14 We accordingly asked the Minister to provide
this information, and also to ensure that further such changes
to sanctions regimes were fully explained in the way that this
one had not been.[31]
The draft Council Regulation
10.15 The Council Regulation follows the recently
adopted EU Council Decision and allows for the changes to the
restrictive measure to be acted upon.
10.16 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 8 November
2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) outlines the background
and rationale in much the same way as in his previous Explanatory
Memorandum, and says that, although the Ivorian security forces
did not have the crowd control equipment for use by the time of
the first round of elections, the benefit to making sure the Regulation
is adopted quickly is that such equipment will be available to
them in time for the second round.
The Government view
10.17 The Minister reiterates his support for the
renewal of restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire and
also the exemption on the arms embargo to allow the supply of
non-lethal equipment for the purpose of crowd control.
10.18 He continues as follows:
"Côte d'Ivoire is at a critical stage;
successful elections now could mean UNOCI — the UN peacekeeping
force — drawdown within the next year. This would be a substantial
success from the UK's perspective; our assessed contribution to
the force through the UN is about $35 million a year."
The Minister's letter of 5 November 2010
10.19 The Minister has also responded to our earlier
points as follows:
"no information about what equipment is to
be supplied, and how its non-lethality is to be guaranteed;
"This is fast moving dossier and, in our original
Explanatory Memorandum, we were pleased to provide as much information
as we had at the time to the Committees. We have since, following
continued dialogue with our French colleagues in Paris and New
York, been given more information which I believe will address
your specific concerns in this case. France intends to supply
the following non-lethal law enforcement equipment:
"> 10,000 bulletproof vests,
"> 190 x 56mm tear-gas grenade launchers
"> 19,400 tear-gas grenades
"> 5,000 propulsive cartridges — allowing the above
grenades to be rifle launched.
"no indication of how the Ivorian security
services are to be trained in its proper use;
"The goods will be shipped to the Integrated
Command Centre who are in charge of election security. This force
is made up of equal numbers of the Forces Nouvelles (who maintain
law and order in the north of Côte D'Ivoire) and the Ivorian
defence and security forces (who maintain law and order in the
south of Côte D'Ivoire). On 4 November France told us that
they are considering specialised training the Ivorians. Consideration
of this aspect will be finalised once they have final, internal
approval to send the equipment. France's provisional plans are
to send a team of either Gendarmes or Police to Côte D'Ivoire
for approximately ten days to conduct training, as they did with
the Guineans before their elections.
"no information about the general political
situation in Côte d'Ivoire and the likelihood of the equipment
having to be used during the elections;
"I have attached some general background on
the situation in Côte D'Ivoire to this letter. I hope that
this gives you more of an understanding of the political situation
that has lead up to the current set of elections. The first round
of the elections was peaceful and well managed. The second round
is currently scheduled for 28 November. We hope that these elections
will also be peaceful, but the risk of violence remains a real
possibility.
"no information about would happen to the
equipment once the elections are over.
"We have not received any indication from France
about this. But my officials consider it most likely that the
equipment will remain in the control of the Integrated Command
Centre, especially given that France now appear to intend to provide
training on its use."
10.20 Most of what the Minister has to say by way
of political background is what was already in our previous Report
(c.f. paragraph 0.1 and 0.6 above). However, he also says:
"While the current situation in Côte D'Ivoire
is stable throughout most of the country there is a possibility
of deterioration of law and order around the second round of elections
on 28 November. Even those intended to be peaceful can turn confrontational
and possibly escalate into violence. We consider some violence
to be possible. The UK remains concerned that if the Ivorian
security forces are confronted by a violent situation, and have
no alternative to using live ammunition, they may do so. By giving
them an alternative we hope that France's action will save lives."
10.21 The Minister concludes his letter by expressing
the hope that this information provides the Committee with a better
indication of the current situation, and reiterating the seriousness
with which he takes the responsibility to keep the Committee informed
on issues concerning sanctions is something I take seriously and
his regret at the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion
due to the timing of the UN resolution renewal and the ongoing
elections.
Conclusion
10.22 As with the Council Decision, given the
timelines that the Minister has explained, we accept that it was
not possible for him to have submitted the consequential Council
Regulation prior to adoption, and therefore do not object to his
having over-ridden scrutiny on this occasion and in these circumstances.
10.23 We have now received the sort of information
that would have enabled us to have dealt with this matter, had
it been provided in the first instance. We ask the Minister to
ensure that further such changes to sanctions regimes are fully
explained at the outset.
28 See headnote: HC 38-i (2004-05), chapter 24 (1 December
2004). Back
29
The Kimberley Process is a joint government, international
diamond industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow
of "conflict diamonds" - rough diamonds that are used
by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments
and which are generally regarded as having contributed to devastating
conflicts in countries such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. According to the
KP website, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme imposes
extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify
shipments of rough diamonds as "conflict-free", and
as of December 2009, the KP had 49 members, representing 75 countries,
with the European Community and its Member States counting as
an individual participant. For further information on the Kimberley
Process, see http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/. Back
30
See headnote: see (27131) 16033/05: HC 34-xv (2005-06), chapter
15 (18 January 2006). Back
31
See headnote: HC 428-v (2010-11), chapter 12 (27 October 2010). Back
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