Various Documents considered by the Committee - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


12 Stability and Growth Pact: excessive deficit procedure

(a)

(31826)

11292/10


(b)

(31827)

11296/10


(c)

(31828)

11300/10


(d)

(31829)

11301/10


(e)

(31830)

11304/10


(f)

(31831)

11305/10


(g)

(31832)

11306/10


(h)

(31835)

11307/10

Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Cyprus







Council Recommendation to Cyprus with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit







Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Denmark







Council Recommendation to Denmark with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit







Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Finland







Council Recommendation to Finland with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit







Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Bulgaria







Council Recommendation to Bulgaria with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit

Legal base(a), (c), (e) and (g) (i) Article 126(6) TFEU; —; QMV, with the Member State concerned not voting

(b), (d), (f) and (h) Article 126(7) TFEU; —; QMV, with the Member State concerned not voting

Deposited in Parliament(a)-(g) 26 July 2010

(h) 20 July 2010

DepartmentHM Treasury
Basis of considerationEM of 27 October 2010
Previous Committee ReportNone
Discussed in Council13 July 2010
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared

Background

12.1 The Stability and Growth Pact adopted by the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 emphasised the obligation of Member States to avoid excessive government deficits, defined as the ratio of a planned or actual deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices in excess of a "reference value" of 3%.[34] Each year the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) issues an Opinion on the updated stability or convergence programme of each Member State.[35] These Opinions, which are not binding on Member States, are based on a recommendation from the Commission. The economic content of the programmes is assessed with reference to the Commission's current economic forecasts. If a Member State's programme is found wanting, it may be invited by ECOFIN, in a Recommendation, to make adjustments to its economic policies, though such Recommendations are likewise not binding on Member States. This whole procedure is essentially the Pact's preventative arm.

12.2 On the other hand, the Pact also endorsed a dissuasive or corrective arm involving action in cases of an excessive government deficit — the excessive deficit procedure provided for in Article 126 TFEU and the relevant Protocol. This procedure consists of Commission reports followed by a stepped series of Council Recommendations (the final two steps do not apply to non-members of the eurozone). Failure to comply with the final stage of Recommendations allows ECOFIN to require publication of additional information by the Member State concerned before issuing bonds and securities, to invite the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy for the Member State concerned, to require a non-interest-bearing deposit from the Member State concerned whilst its deficit remains uncorrected, or to impose appropriate fines on the Member State concerned.

The documents

12.3 On 13 July 2010 the ECOFIN Council adopted Decisions and Recommendations for four Member States saying that they had excessive deficits, that is, putting them into the excessive deficit procedure, and adopted Recommendations for them as to how they might rectify these excessive deficits. The Decisions were taken on the basis that, although according to Council Regulation 1467/97, "relevant factors" can be taken into account if the deficit remains close to the reference value and is temporary, this double condition was not deemed to exist in these cases.

12.4 In relation to Cyprus the Council adopted a Decision and a Recommendation, documents (a) and (b). In the Decision the Council noted that:

  • according to the Cypriot Government, the deficit reached 6.1% of GDP in 2009, which not only exceeds the 3% reference value but was also considered an exceptional breach;
  • the Commission's spring forecast predicts that the budgetary deficit will reach around 7.75% in 2011, as current policies stand;
  • the Commission also predicts that real GDP will continue to shrink, by almost 0.5% in 2010 — the deficit criterion in the Treaty is therefore not fulfilled;
  • the Cypriot Government has also reported that the general gross debt remains below 60% of GDP reference value, at 56.2%;
  • however, the Commission's spring forecast envisages a rise in debt to 62.3% of GDP in 2010, followed by 67.6% in 2011; and
  • in view of this trend, the debt ratio cannot be considered to be diminishing and, consequently, the Council believes that the debt criterion in the Treaty is not fulfilled.

12.5 In the Recommendation the Council said Cyprus should:

  • put an end to the present excessive deficit procedure situation as rapidly as possible and by 2012 at the latest, most importantly by taking measures to reduce the 2010 deficit to no more than 6% of GDP;
  • ensure an average annual fiscal effort of at least 1.5 % of GDP over the period 2011-2012;
  • specify and rigorously implement the measures that will put an end to the excessive deficit by 2012 and, if economic or budgetary conditions turn out better than expected, it should accelerate the reduction;
  • strengthen the binding nature of its medium-term budgetary framework and improve the monitoring of the budget execution throughout the year;
  • improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by implementing reform measures to control pension and health care expenditure;
  • seize opportunities beyond the fiscal effort to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio back towards the reference value; and
  • meet a deadline of 13 January 2011 to take effective action and to specify measures that will be necessary to correct the excessive deficit.

12.6 In relation to Denmark the Council adopted a Decision and a Recommendation, documents (c) and (d). In the Decision the Council noted that:

  • according to the Danish Government its general deficit is planned to reach 5.4% of GDP in 2010, which not only exceeds the 3% reference value but was also considered an exceptional breach;
  • as the Commission's spring 2010 forecast predicts that the deficit would decline to 4.9% in 2011, the breach cannot be considered a temporary event — the deficit criterion in the Treaty is therefore not fulfilled;
  • Denmark also notified the Commission that the general gross debt remains at 45.1% and below the reference value; and
  • although this is predicted to rise to 49.5% in 2011, it is still below the 60% of GDP level — therefore the debt criterion in the Treaty is fulfilled.

12.7 In the Recommendation the Council said Denmark should:

  • put an end to the present excessive deficit procedure situation at the latest by 2013, most importantly by implementing the fiscal measures in 2010 as envisaged in the latest update of the convergence programme and start consolidation in 2011;
  • ensure an average annual fiscal effort of at least 0.5 % of GDP over the period 2011-2013;
  • specify and rigorously implement the measures that will put an end to the excessive deficit by 2012 and, if economic or budgetary conditions turn out better than expected, it should accelerate the reduction;
  • achieve the medium-term objective for appropriate budgetary management of economic downturns;
  • ensure that budgetary consolidation towards the medium-term objective for the budgetary position, a structural balanced budget by 2015, is sustained after the excessive deficit has been corrected; and
  • meet a deadline of 13 January 2011 to take effective action and to specify measures that will be necessary to correct the excessive deficit.

12.8 In relation to Finland the Council adopted a Decision and a Recommendation, documents (e) and (f). In the Decision the Council noted that:

  • according to the Finnish Government the general government deficit is planned to reach 4.1% of GDP in 2010, which not only exceeds the 3% reference value but was also considered an exceptional breach;
  • due to the third supplementary budget presented by the Ministry of Finance suggesting that tax revenues in 2010 could turn out higher than planned, the Commission's spring forecast predicts that the deficit will fall below the reference value in 2011;
  • the planned excess over the reference value can therefore be considered temporary — however, the deficit criterion in the Treaty is not fulfilled;
  • Finland notified the Commission that the gross debt remains below the 60% reference value, at 49.9% in 2010; and
  • although the Commission's spring forecast estimates that this will rise to 54.9% in 2011, it will remain below 60% — therefore the debt criterion in the Treaty is fulfilled.

12.9 In the Recommendation the Council said Finland should:

  • put an end to the present excessive deficit procedure situation at the latest by 2011, most importantly by implementing the fiscal measures in 2010 as envisaged in the latest update of the convergence programme;
  • ensure that the planned breach of the 3% of GDP reference value would remain contained and temporary;
  • specify its planned measures and ensure a fiscal effort of at least 0.5% of GDP in 2011;
  • needs to achieve the medium-term objective for appropriate budgetary management of economic downturns and also with a view of restoring the long-term sustainability of public finances;
  • ensure that budgetary consolidation towards the medium-term objective for the budgetary position, a structural surplus of 0.5% of GDP, is sustained after the excessive deficit has been corrected; and
  • meet a deadline of 13 January 2011 to take effective action and to specify measures that will be necessary to correct the excessive deficit.

12.10 In relation to Bulgaria the Council adopted a Decision and a Recommendation, documents (g) and (h). In the Decision the Council noted that:

  • the general government deficit in Bulgaria reached 3.9% of GDP in 2009, which not only exceeds the 3% reference value but was considered an exceptional breach;
  • despite the initial Spring 2010 forecast predicting that the deficit would fall below 3%, on the basis of the revised deficit target for 2010, 3.8% of GDP according to the Bulgarian government, the breach of the reference value may not remain temporary — the deficit criterion in the Treaty is therefore not fulfilled;
  • Bulgaria notified the Commission that the government gross debt remains well below the 60% of GDP reference value and this remains the case for projected forecasts also — therefore the debt criterion in the Treaty is fulfilled.

12.11 In the Recommendation the Council said Bulgaria should:

  • correct the excessive deficit procedure by the end of 2011 at the latest, most importantly by taking measures to avoid further deterioration of the 2010 budget deficit beyond the anticipated 3.8% of GDP;
  • limit risk through improved fiscal transparency, by reinforcing spending controls, strengthening its medium-term budgetary framework and improving the monitoring of budget execution;
  • needs to achieve the medium-term objective for appropriate budgetary management of economic downturns;
  • ensure that budgetary consolidation towards the medium-term objective for the budgetary position, a general government structural balance of 0.5% of GDP, is sustained after the excessive deficit has been corrected; and
  • meet a deadline of 13 January 2011 to take effective action and to specify measures that will be necessary to correct the excessive deficit.

The Government's view

12.12 The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr Mark Hoban) says that the Government believes that Member States should take forward fiscal consolidation as a priority to reduce their deficits and support recovery.

Conclusion

12.13 Whilst clearing these documents we draw them to the attention of the House for the information they give about the present fiscal situation of the Member States concerned. And in view of concerns over the accuracy in some cases of the information supplied on deficits, we are drawing the Treasury Committee's attention to this Report chapter.





34   This obligation does not apply to Member States, including the UK, whilst they remain outside the eurozone, but they are required to endeavour to avoid excessive deficits. Back

35   The 16 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) that have adopted the euro have Stability Programmes, whereas the other 11 Member States (including the UK) produce Convergence Programmes. Back


 
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