18 EU restrictive measures against Côte
d'Ivoire
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(32391)
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(b)
(32412)
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(c)
(32413)
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Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP on restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire
Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP on restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire
Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP on restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | (a) EM of 21 December 2010 and Minister's letter of 21 December 2010;
(b)EM of 10 January 2011
(c) EM of 10 January 2011
Minister's letter of 10 January 2011
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (32081) and (32155) —: HC 428 -viii (2010-11), chapter 10 (17 November 2010) and HC 428-v (2010-11), chapter 12 (27 October 2010); also see (27131) 16033/05: HC 34-xv (2005-06), chapter 15 (18 January 2006) and HC 38-i (2004-05), chapter 24 (1 December 2004);
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| Discussed in Council | (a) 22 December 2010
(b) 31 December 2010
(c) 18 January 2011
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
18.1 As earlier Reports have noted, a serious political and military
crisis has beset the Côte d'Ivoire since September 2002,
with the EU having repeatedly expressed concern at subsequent
human rights violations by both sides, chiefly prior to the signing
of the Linas Marcoussis peace agreement (LMA) in January 2003
but also subsequently. The LMA agreement identified reforms that
needed to take place to ensure an end to violence. However, the
agreement was not signed by either the President or Government
of Côte d'Ivoire (GCI). In July 2003, all sides signed a
new Agreement — Accra III — but in November 2003 the
GCI breached the ceasefire and crossed a UN-held line to attack
the northern rebels in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution
1528. In April 2004 a UN mission (UNOCI) was established, with
the French 'Licorne' force taking the role of rapid deployment
support. In November 2004 government forces attempted to attack
the Forces Nouvelles (FN; the rebel forces) across the
cease-fire line. On 6 November, government planes bombed French
positions, killing nine French peacekeepers; the French retaliated
by destroying the Ivorian air force. Riots ensued across Abidjan,
targeting French nationals and the French army; around 8,000 French
nationals were evacuated or subsequently left.
EU Common Position 2004/852/CFSP
18.2 Against this background, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 1572 (2004) imposing an
arms embargo against Côte d'Ivoire with immediate effect
and a travel ban and an assets freeze against individuals who
constituted a threat to the peace and reconciliation process,
to come into force on 15 December 2004. The African Union gave
its full support to the resolution. The first EU Common Position
implemented the terms of resolution 1572 across the European Union.
In addition, it prohibited the supply of equipment which might
be used for internal repression. It was cleared by the then Committee
on 1 December 2004 and agreed at the 13 December 2004 General
Affairs and External Relations Council.[80]
18.3 The criteria for lifting the arms embargo and
restrictive measures was full implementation of the LMA and Accra
agreements, i.e. demobilisation, disarmament and resettlement
(DDR) of combatants as well as free, fair and credible elections.
These criteria had not been met. Therefore, on 15 December 2005
the UNSC agreed resolution 1643 to renew all the above measures
(save the assets freeze, which was not time-specific and does
not require renewal).
18.4 Subsequently, the Common Position was amended
to reflect UNSCR 1643, banning the import of all rough diamonds
from Côte d'Ivoire. As the then Minister for Europe made
clear at the time, the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire
was little improved, and illicit diamond smuggling there appeared
not only to be stoking the fires of instability but also to be
threatening the integrity and credibility of the whole Kimberley
Process.[81] With overcoming
such threats to peace and security being crucial to the successful
implementation of the recently agreed EU Strategy on Africa, the
previous Committee judged it appropriate to draw the extension,
in scope as well as duration, of the Common Position to the attention
of the House.[82]
Subsequent developments
18.5 A series of negotiations followed, involving,
at different points, the mediation efforts of France, Ghana, South
Africa and the African Union. An international contact group met
monthly to discuss the problem from November 2005 to February
2007. Various formulations of unity governments were tried, offering
ministerial posts to former rebels from the FN and political opposition.
But no progress was made on the two key issues — disarmament
of the former rebels and other militia, and the identification
of the population and establishment of credible and accepted electoral
lists.
18.6 In March 2007 a new agreement was signed between
the President and the leader of the New Forces, Guillaume Soro,
under the mediation of Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore —
the Ouagadougou Accords — under which Soro became Prime
Minister. The formal division between the rebel-held north and
the government south ended and the country was officially re-united
in April 2007. But there was nosignificant progress on re-integrating
the rebel forces into the army, or on the national identification
process, and the Ouagadougou accord had to be supplemented by
a further agreement in November 2007.
The extension and amendment of Common Position
2004/852/CFSP
18.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 22 October
2010, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) said that:
— after
five years and six postponements, Côte d'Ivoire was still
on track to hold Presidential elections on 31 October 2010;
— the outcome remained uncertain and there
was a high risk of demonstrations turning violent during and after
this period; and
— the Ivorian security forces currently
had little or no capacity to deal with protests using non-lethal
equipment;
— UNSCR 1946 was adopted on 15 October
2010 renewing sanctions for a period of six months;
— the arms embargo allowed, where agreed
by the UN Sanctions Committee, the supply of non-lethal equipment
intended solely to enable the Ivorian security forces to use only
appropriate and proportionate force while maintaining public order.
18.8 The Minister went on to explain that France
intended to supply non-lethal crowd control equipment to Côte
d'Ivoire, but could not do so legally until the EU Council Decision
and then subsequently the Council Regulation (see below) were
brought into line with UNSCR 1946. He and other Member States
supported the French action in this case. Due to the process involved
it was likely that any such equipment would not be available to
the Ivorians in time for the first round of elections on 31 October;
but if the changes were agreed and adopted, then it should be
available to them before the planned second round of elections
on 28 November. Even to meet this timetable, it would, regrettably,
require him to over-ride scrutiny.
Our assessment
18.9 We reported this development to the House because
we thought that it should be aware of this change of policy.
18.10 We accepted that, the change to the UN resolution
not having been made until 15 October, it was not possible for
the Minister to have submitted the proposal in time for our meeting
on 20 October, and therefore did not object to his having over-ridden
scrutiny on this occasion and in these circumstances. Though unhappy
with the quality of the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum, we
had no wish to intervene in the process, and accordingly cleared
the document, which was subsequently adopted as Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP
on 29 October 2010.
18.11 Our concerns stemmed from the Minister's failure
properly to explain important aspects of the proposal. The exception
to the arms embargo was for "non-lethal equipment intended
solely to enable the Ivorian security forces to use only appropriate
and proportionate force while maintaining public order".
The Minister had pointed out that the Ivorian security forces
currently had little or no capacity to deal with protests using
non-lethal equipment — which presumably also meant that
those forces had little or no experience of using such equipment,
let alone appropriately or proportionally. Yet the Minister had
provided no information about what equipment was to be supplied,
and how its non-lethal use was to be guaranteed; nor any indication
of how the Ivorian security services were to be trained in its
proper use; nor about the general political situation in Côte
d'Ivoire and the likelihood of the equipment having to be used
during the elections; nor what was to happen to the equipment
once the elections were over. It seemed that this decision, no
doubt at the UN as well as within the EU, had been driven by France.
Given recent history in the Côte d'Ivoire, this was unsurprising.
But the EU as a whole was involved, and would be criticised should
matters not turn out as planned.
18.12 We accordingly asked the Minister to provide
this information, and also to ensure that further such changes
to sanctions regimes were fully explained.[83]
The subsequent Council Regulation
18.13 The Council Regulation followed adoption of
the EU Council Decision and allows for the changes to the restrictive
measure to be acted upon.
18.14 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 8 November
2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) reiterated the
background and rationale, and his support for the process, in
much the same way as in his previous Explanatory Memorandum. He
also noted that successful elections now could mean UNOCI —
the UN peacekeeping force — drawdown within the next year,
which he said would be a substantial success from the UK's perspective,
given its assessed contribution to the force through the UN being
about $35 million a year.
18.15 In a subsequent letter of 5 November 2010,
the Minister provided helpful answers to our concerns.[84]
Most of what he had to say by way of political background was
on by now familiar lines. But, though then stable throughout most
of the country, the Minister noted a possible deterioration of
law and order around the second round of elections on 28 November
2010; he remained concerned that if the Ivorian security forces
were confronted by a violent situation, and had no alternative
to using live ammunition, they might do so, and expressed the
hope that, by giving them an alternative, France's action would
save lives.
Our further assessment
18.16 As with the Council Decision, given the timelines
that the Minister had explained, we accepted that it was not possible
for him to have submitted the consequential Council Regulation
prior to adoption, and therefore did not object to his having
over-ridden scrutiny on this occasion and in these circumstances.
18.17 We also noted that we had now received the
sort of information that, had it been provided in the first instance,
would have enabled us to have dealt with this matter without further
correspondence, and asked the Minister to ensure that further
such changes to sanctions regimes were fully explained in this
way at the outset.[85]
The draft Council Decisions
18.18 The draft Council Decisions all amend Council
Decision 2010/656/CFSP.
18.19 In his first Explanatory Memorandum of 21 December
2010, Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) recalls that current
EU restrictive measures mirror UN sanctions as well as including
additional measures against the import of certain non-lethal military
equipment which could be used for internal repression. He then
outlines political developments up to that point as follows:
"The first round of the Côte d'Ivoire
Presidential election took place on 31 October 2010. President
Gbagbo emerged ahead, opposition leader Alassane Ouattara was
in second place and Konan Bedie of the PDCI was in third and therefore
eliminated from the next round of elections. The second round
was held on 28 November and the result was a 54% to 46% vote in
favour of Outtara, announced by the Independent Electoral Commission
(CEI) on 2 December and certified on 4 December by YJ Choi, the
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General. All the main
observer groups — EU, AU, ECOWAS, Carter Centre —
pronounced the elections not perfect but fair enough.
"President Gbagbo tried to prevent the CEI announcing
the result and the Gbagbo dominated Constitutional Council declared
the announced results null and void and announced results on 3
December giving Gbagbo a 51:49 majority.
"We have publicly backed the UN's endorsement
of the 28 November election results, which saw Ouattara win. We
have made it clear in ministerial statements that Gbagbo should
cede power. In an attempt to increase pressure on Gbagbo to step
aside agreement has been reached to amend the EU restrictive measures
to include targeting individuals who are blocking the democratic
process in CdI. The designated individuals will be subjected to
a travel ban.
"Consideration has been given to attempting
to amend the current UN sanctions to include those individuals
who have aligned themselves with Gbagbo. However, it is unlikely
that all UN Security Council Members would agree to extend UN
sanctions. Therefore agreement has been reached at the Foreign
Affairs Council that the EU would amend restrictive measures autonomously."
The Government's view
18.20 The Minister goes on to express his support
for the UN endorsement of the election results and "the need
for Gbagbo to cede power" and his serious concern "at
the serious escalation of tension in Côte d'Ivoire caused
by former President Gbagbo's call for UN and French forces to
leave the country", which he describes as "a serious
challenge to the internal stability of Côte d'Ivoire and
to the international community" He continues as follows:
"We remain concerned that Côte d'Ivoire
could return to conflict. Former President Gbagbo and his supporters
have the chance to bring the country back from the brink, but
he has so far remained obdurate in the face of all attempts to
persuade him to accept the results of the election and step aside
for the good of the country. The chances for a negotiated settlement
to this crisis are receding."
18.21 The Minister then refers to reports he has
received of attempted provocation of UNOCI personnel, and attacks
on UNOCI vehicles and positions:
"This is extremely serious, especially if proved
that these acts were carried out by members of the Ivorian forces
or militia groups supporting them. The UK supports the Secretary
General's statement made on 19 December that UNOCI will stay in
Côte d'Ivoire and carry out its mandate."
18.22 The Minister then says:
"Those who are responsible for threatening the
peace process in the country and for inciting acts of violence
against the international community will be held responsible for
their actions, and this first round of EU measures forms a good
basis for further action. We agree that the EU should look to
phase in the implementation of sanctions, starting with a travel
ban on individuals identified as blocking the democratic process."
18.23 Noting that, given the pressing need for the
Council to adopt the Decision before the House returns from the
Christmas Recess, the Minister concludes by expressing his regret
that it will be necessary for him to override parliamentary scrutiny.
The Minister's letter of 21 December 2010
18.24 The Minister's accompanying letter reiterates
the reason for over-riding scrutiny and his regret for having
to do so.
18.25 On 22 December an amended Council Decision
was adopted which targeted 19 individuals who have been identified
as blocking the democratic process in Côte d'Ivoire.
The second Council Decision
18.26 In his first Explanatory Memorandum of 10 January
2011, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) says that,
following the continuing deterioration of the situation, a further
59 individuals were identified as blocking the democratic process.
The first of the subsequent Council Decisions, which was adopted
on 31 December, adds them to the 19 individuals already subjected
to the travel ban.
The Government's view
18.27 The Minister reiterates the position set out
in his previous Explanatory Memorandum.
Subsequent developments
18.28 That Mr Outtara was the properly-elected President
and that ex-President Gbagbo should cede power is the position
also taken by the rest of the EU, the AU, the US and ECOWAS (the
relevant regional body). Drawing on this widespread international
support, in the first week of January 2011 ECOWAS mounted a diplomatic
mission, seeking to persuade ex-President Gbagbo to step aside.
However, he remains in control of significant military and other
forces, and some revenue streams from cocoa and oil exports. Control
of the national treasury, on the other hand, is in the hands of
President-elect Outtara. He, however, remains in Abidjan's main
hotel, threatened by forces loyal to ex-President Gbagbo and protected
by UNOCI troops. Widespread and sustained violence has been avoided
thus far. But UNOCI has still been denied access by forces loyal
to ex-President Gbagbo to areas in the north of the country that
they wish to visit in order to investigate reports of mass graves
of Outtara supporters.
The third Council Decision
18.29 In his other Explanatory Memorandum of 11 January
2011, the Minister for Europe says that addition to subjecting
those identified with a travel ban agreement has been reached
at the Foreign Affairs Council that these 78 individuals should
now also be targeted with an assets freeze.
18.30 The Minister goes on to say that consideration
has been given to attempting to amend the current UN sanctions
to include those individuals who have aligned themselves with
former President Gbagbo, but that it is unlikely that all UN Security
Council Members would agree to extend UN sanctions; and that it
was therefore agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council that the EU
would amend its restrictive measures autonomously.
The Government's view
18.31 The Minister reiterates the Government's support
for the UN endorsement of the election results and the need for
Gbagbo to cede power, and says that he remains deeply concerned
at the serious escalation of tension in Côte d'Ivoire caused
by former President Gbagbo's call for UN and French forces to
leave the country, which he describes as a serious challenge to
the internal stability of Côte d'Ivoire and to the international
community.
18.32 The Minister says that he also remains concerned
that Côte d'Ivoire could return to conflict. He also
says that former President Gbagbo and his supporters have the
chance to bring the country back from the brink, but that he has
so far remained obdurate in the face of all attempts to persuade
him to accept the results of the election and step aside for the
good of the country. The chances for a negotiated settlement
to this crisis are, he says, receding. He concludes his comments
thus:
"We have received reports of attempted provocation
of UNOCI personnel, and attacks on UNOCI vehicles and positions.
This is extremely serious, especially if proved that these acts
were carried out by members of the Ivorian forces or militia groups
supporting them. The UK supports the Secretary General's statement
made on 19 December that UNOCI will stay in Côte d'Ivoire
and carry out its mandate.
"Those who are responsible for threatening the
peace process in the country, and for inciting acts of violence
against the international community will be held responsible for
their actions, and this first round of EU measures form a good
basis for further action. We agree that the EU should look to
phase in the implementation of sanctions, starting with a travel
ban on individuals identified as blocking the democratic process.
The travel ban has now been implemented and the next step agreed
is to target those individuals identified with an assets freeze."
The Minister's letter of 10 January 2011
18.33 In his accompanying letter, the Minister notes
that, as the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to deteriorate,
the EU needs to move quickly; thus, he explains, in addition to
adopting this further Council Decision on 18 January, a Council
Regulation implementing it will also need to be adopted. But,
he says, the text of the Council Regulation has not yet been drafted.
In view of the need to act quickly, and to agree both documents
at Council on 18 January, the Minister asks the Committee to consider
waiving the requirement for scrutiny on this latter document,
in accordance with paragraphs 3(a) and (b) of the Scrutiny Reserve
Resolution.[86]
Conclusion
18.34 We clear the Council Decisions.
18.35 In so doing, we do not object, on this occasion
and in the circumstances prevailing during the Christmas recess,
to the action taken by the Minister with regard to the earlier
Council Decisions of 22 and 31 December 2010.
18.36 With regard to the implementing Council
Regulation, we think that the Minister's request is reasonable
in the circumstances, and accordingly agree to waive scrutiny
pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the scrutiny reserve resolution,
so that he may participate in its adoption prior to the completion
of scrutiny.
18.37 However, we continue to expect him to submit
it for scrutiny in the normal way, once he is in a position to
do so.
80 See headnote: HC 38-i (2004-05), chapter 24 (1 December
2004). Back
81
The Kimberley Process (KP) is a joint government, international
diamond industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow
of "conflict diamonds" - rough diamonds that are used
by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments
and which are generally regarded as having contributed to devastating
conflicts in countries such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. According to the
KP website, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme imposes
extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify
shipments of rough diamonds as "conflict-free", and
as of December 2009, the KP had 49 members, representing 75 countries,
with the European Community and its Member States counting as
an individual participant. For further information on the Kimberley
Process, see http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/. Back
82
See headnote: see (27131) 16033/05: HC 34-xv (2005-06), chapter
15 (18 January 2006). Back
83
See headnote: HC 428-v (2010-11), chapter 12 (27 October 2010), Back
84
See (32081) and (32155) -: HC 428 -viii (2010-11), chapter 10
(17 November 2010) for details. Back
85
Ibid. Back
86
This reads as follows:
"(3) The Minister concerned may,
however, give agreement-
(a) to a proposal which is still subject
to scrutiny if he considers that it is confidential, routine or
trivial or is substantially the same as a proposal on which scrutiny
has been completed;
(b) to a proposal which is awaiting
consideration by the House if the European Scrutiny Committee
has indicated that agreement need not be withheld pending consideration." Back
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