16 EU relations with Belarus
(32435)
| Council Decision amending Council Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus
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Legal base | Articles 29 EU; unanimity
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Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Basis of consideration | EM and Minister's letter of 17 January 2011
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Previous Committee Report | None; but see (32019) : HC 428-iii (2010-11, chapter 17 (13 October 2010); (31171) : HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 17 (9 December 2009) ; (30507) : HC 19-xiii (2008-09), chapter 10 (1 April 2009); (30076) : HC 16-xxxiii ( 2007-08), chapter 5 (29 October 2008); and (27458) 8836/06 and (27459) : HC 34-xxviii (2005-06), chapter 15 (10 May 2006)
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To be discussed in Council | 24 January 2011 Foreign Affairs Council
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Committee's assessment | Politically important
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Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
16.1 The Belarus "Country Profile" on the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office website continues to catalogue a litany of
repressive and undemocratic behaviour since Alyaksandr Lukashenka
won the first Presidential elections in July 1994.[61]
The highly critical September 2006 report by Adrian Severin, the
UN Special Rapporteur appointed in 2004 by the 60th UN Commission
on Human Rights, is described as one of many to cite numerous
human rights violations including persistent accounts of harassment
of NGOs, the independent media, opposition political parties,
educational institutions, religious organisations, and trade unions.
It says that this pattern of repression has been particularly
evident in the build up to parliamentary and presidential elections,
when opposition figures were put under intense pressure and numerous
independent media outlets were suspended or closed.
16.2 These concerns include the disappearance of
four opponents of the regime in 1999/2000, including former Belarusian
Interior Minister Yury Zakharenko and deputy Viktor Gonchar. Despite
appeals from the international community, the Belarusian authorities
have not investigated satisfactorily these disappearances. The
EU repeatedly called on the Belarusian authorities to open a truly
independent investigation, but the Belarusians failed to act.
In response, in September 2004 the EU decided to apply travel
restrictions against those Belarusian officials named in the Pourgourides
report on 'Disappeared Persons in Belarus' as key actors in the
disappearances (this report was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe in April 2004).
16.3 Further sanctions were imposed following the
Presidential elections of March 2006. These failed to meet OSCE
standards: there was arbitrary use of state power, widespread
detentions, disregard for the basic rights of freedom of assembly,
association and expression, and violent suppression of protests
and the detention of peaceful protesters. In response the EU adopted
restrictive measures a visa ban and an asset freeze
against President Lukashenka, the Belarusian leadership and officials
personally responsible for the violations of international electoral
standards.
16.4 The measures were renewed, given that there
had been no independent investigation into the disappearances,
nor any reform of the electoral code, in line with OSCE recommendations,
nor any concrete action to respect human rights with respect to
peaceful demonstrations: on the contrary, the situation had continued
to deteriorate. On 7 April 2008 the Council adopted Common Position
2008/288/CFSP extending the measures by 12 further months until
10 April 2009.
16.5 In so doing, the Council agreed that the restrictive
measures provided for by Common Position 2006/276/CFSP should
be extended for a period of 12 months, but that the travel restrictions
aimed at certain officials of Belarus with the exception
of those involved in the 1999-2000 disappearances and the President
of the Central Electoral Commission should not apply for
a reviewable period of six months, so as to encourage dialogue
with the Belarus authorities and the adoption of measures to reinforce
democracy and respect for human rights; at the end of this six-month
period, the Council would re-examine the situation.
16.6 The previous Committee's most recent Report
outlines subsequent shifts in the EU position, as differences
emerged among Member States about how best to handle Belarus,
given the EU's concerns but also its concern that an increasingly
isolated Belarus would be drawn closer to an increasingly assertive
and difficult Russia (with unspoken anxieties about the gas supply
situation, where Belarus is a key link in the chain).
16.7 As that Report notes, there were a number of
exchanges between the Committee and the then Minister for Europe
(Caroline Flint). She said there had been some signs that Belarus
might be interested in increasing its contacts with Member States
and willing to adopt a more moderate stance on other issues. The
release of its last three internationally recognised political
prisoners in late August 2008 met one of the 12 conditions for
engagement set out by the EU in the Commission document 'What
the European Union could bring to Belarus' published in November
2006.[62] Meanwhile,
President Lukashenka had promised that September 2008 parliamentary
elections would be free and fair. Whilst the initial OSCE report
said that the elections failed to meet OSCE standards, Belarus
had, she said, been significantly more co-operative in their interactions
with OSCE monitors. Though this represented less progress than
she would have liked, she shared the view of other EU Member States
that "isolating Belarus will not promote further positive
progress but rather focus the leadership on strengthening their
ties with Russia whilst failing to deliver on EU demands."
She therefore supported the EU consensus in favour of suspending
the visa ban for six months whilst renewing the restrictive measures
for a further 12 months, "backed up by a strong statement
from Council Members", as "the approach most likely
to encourage the Belarusians to make further progress on the road
toward human rights and democracy." The EU would continue
to "a path of critical engagement" ensuring Belarus
understood that the process must be sustained by further Belarusian
steps.
16.8 Whilst it was unlikely that all 12 conditions
for engagement would be met over the next six months, she expected
some positive progress, particularly in the areas of freedom of
the media, civil society and elections. In addition to pushing
for the EU to set down clear modalities measuring progress she
said she would continue "to deliver clear and firm messages
basing our demands explicitly on the EU's '12 Propositions.'[63]
She argued that lifting the visa ban would enable the EU and Member
States" to engage at senior levels and create personal incentives
for senior officials in Belarus, who will be keen to ensure that
the ban is not imposed again." Belarus would have a six month
window in which to demonstrate concrete improvements in human
rights and democracy. She hoped that Belarus would make the most
of this opportunity to rebuild the relationship with the EU. If
Belarus failed to move toward the necessary reforms, the restrictions
would be automatically re-imposed at the end of that six month
period, with a unanimous decision required to extend the decision
by another six months.
16.9 In a subsequent letter of 9 March 2009, the
then Minister reported that the EU had made clear its five priorities
no new political prisoners, freer media, reform of electoral
code, liberalisation of NGO environment, and freedom of assembly
and that the Belarusians had "refrained from flagrant
human rights abuses" and introduced "a number of small
reforms." But progress against the five priorities had been
mixed, the positive changes had not been systemic and could be
reversed and she was concerned by some negative steps in the immediately
preceding couple of weeks including the arrest of three
human rights activists, two of whom had been recognised as political
prisoners by the international community during previous periods
of detention.
16.10 The then Minister went on to say that, while
some Member States shared her concerns, most were leaning towards
renewal of the suspension on the grounds that there had been some
progress; though renewal could demonstrate the EU's commitment
to engagement with Belarus, and "tie them closer to international
organisations and internationally accepted standards through the
Eastern Partnership and the Council of Europe, so encouraging
further reform", renewal on the basis of the limited reforms
so far, the Minister said, "risks suggesting that we were
satisfied with progress, weakening an important lever for further
reform" and "could lead them to believe that sanctions
would be lifted altogether when they come up for renewal in October."
Conversely, the Minister said, re-imposition could be interpreted
negatively by international bodies other than the IMF and jeopardise
the additional assistance that their $2.5bn loan in January assumed,
and make Belarus vulnerable to Russian influence, which would
in turn be unlikely to help the reform process.
16.11 Overall, the Minister concluded, her judgement
on whether to support renewal of the suspension would be based
on the most effective way of supporting reform; the Belarusian
reaction to whichever step the EU took was unpredictable, with
neither option providing guarantees of improved performance; an
important part of the effectiveness of her approach would be achieving
EU unity, "so Belarus was left in no doubt about our messages",
which unity would be needed when the Common Position was due for
renewal in October 2009, without which the sanctions would lapse.
Given "these challenges", the Minister said her position
would "continue to evolve in the run up to the GAERC",
and she would "inform the committee in the usual way of the
outcome of the Council."
16.12 There then followed further exchanges with
the then Minister and, more recently, her successor (Chris Bryant),
which are detailed in our previous Report. Once again, in November
2009, the Council, though noting an absence of tangible progress
in areas identified in the Council Conclusions of 13 October 2008,
decided that the restrictive measures should be extended until
31 October 2010, "but to encourage further reform, the suspension
of the travel restrictions were also extended for the same period."
The then Minister professed himself disappointed that Belarus
had not made more progress since the previous year, and reflected
the balance of views between EU Member States. This outcome sent
"a united message" to the Belarusian authorities that
the EU was not yet satisfied with their progress; the extension
enabled the EU to maintain leverage whilst still promoting engagement;
appetite for sanctions within the EU had diminished so the Belarusian
authorities might have believed they could sit sanctions out and
wait for the measures to lapse; the renewal, he concluded, made
it clear that the EU was not yet convinced of the Belarus authorities'
commitment to reform.
16.13 In clearing the Council Decision, the previous
Committee said that it was reporting this further extension so
fully because of the degree of interest in the House both in EU
relations with Russia's "near neighbours" and in EU
sanctions policy around the globe. They again left it to others
in the House to judge the effectiveness of the EU's policy, and
its shifts since 2006, in relation to its avowed objectives (which
it set out in Annexes 1-3 of its Report).[64]
The most recent Council Decision
16.14 Council Decision 2009/969/CFSP extended the
restrictive measures until October 2010, whilst suspending the
travel restrictions imposed on certain leading figures in Belarus,
with the exception of those involved in the disappearances which
occurred in 1999 and 2000 and of the President of the Central
Electoral Commission.
16.15 This most recent Council Decision extended
the restrictive measures until 31 October 2011. At the same time
the application of the travel restrictions imposed on certain
leading figures in Belarus, with the exception of those involved
in the disappearances which occurred in 1999 and 2000 and of the
President of the Central Electoral Commission, were to be further
suspended.
16.16 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 8 October
2010, after briefly reviewing the history of the EU's engagement
with Belarus in the same terms as did his predecessors, the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) said that over the last year greater
EU engagement had not delivered improvements in human rights or
democracy. The Belarus authorities had taken a few, mostly cosmetic,
steps but progress had stalled, and in some areas deteriorated.
Already, in the run up to the Presidential elections, signs of
progress were not encouraging. Repressive tactics were being employed
in order to discredit opposition parties, whilst intimidating
the limited independent media sector. In addition, the President's
rhetoric on relations with the EU over the last few months continued
to be negative. He concluded thus:
"Under these circumstances, lifting the
sanctions would send the wrong signal to Belarus and the wider
public. It would suggest that we do not consider human rights
a priority. And lifting the sanctions before elections that we
expect will fail to meet international standards would be particularly
unfortunate timing.
"But re-imposing sanctions could actually
be counterproductive for our broader policy of engagement and
for our specific need to maintain a dialogue with the authorities
ahead of the Presidential elections."
Our assessment
16.17 We reported this Council Decision to the House
for the same reasons as did the previous Committee.
16.18 In so doing, we noted that the Minister commented
in only very general terms about what had happened over the past
ten months, particularly in relation to the EU's benchmarks. He
also made no mention of the detained individuals referred to in
previous discussion with his predecessors.
16.19 Referring to the upcoming 19 December Presidential
elections, in which President Lukashenka would be running for
a fourth term, we noted press reports that his closest challenger,
Alyaksandr Milinkevich, had already
pulled out last September,
saying he believed the poll would be rigged.
16.20 We presumed that the EU would review the outcome.
Bearing in mind the Council's proviso, we asked the Minister to
write to us then about that review and with his views on the best
way forward, and to include information about progress against
the EU's Twelve Points and the detained individuals.
16.21 We also cleared the document.[65]
The draft Council Decision
16.22 This Council Decision amends Council Decision
2010/639/CFSP and will result in a re-imposition of these measures
on those involved in 2006 election violations, including President
Lukashenka, and the addition of a new basis for the extant restrictive
measures on the basis of involvement in the violations of international
electoral standards and the crackdown on the opposition, the independent
media and civil society during the 2010 Presidential election.
The Government's view
16.23 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 17 January
2011, the Government's new Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
says that the pre-election campaign saw an improvement in freedoms,
compared with previous election campaigns (e.g. the opposition
were allowed to collect signatures without harassment and were
given access to some limited airtime on state
radio and TV. He then continues as follows:
"but the relentless government propaganda
against the opposition, the fixing, yet again, of the elections,
plus the appalling behaviour of the authorities in their aftermath
have completely wiped this sense of improvement out."
16.24 He then notes that, according to the official
figures, incumbent President Lukashenka won the 19 December 2010
presidential elections with 79.65% of the votes, and says:
"The OSCE/ODIHR released its preliminary
findings on the conduct of the 2010 Presidential election in Belarus
on the day following the 19 December election. ODIHR acknowledged
that some specific improvements had been made, but concluded that
Belarus still had a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE
commitments. The election night was marred by the violent disruption
by the authorities of an opposition rally, the detention of seven
presidential candidates and more than 600 activists, journalists
and civil society representatives."
16.25 The Minister then refers to a joint EU-US statement
of 4 January, "regretting the decision of the Government
of Belarus to terminate the mission of the OSCE's Office in Minsk,
calling for the immediate release of all detained and for the
Belarusian authorities to fulfil their commitments to the OSCE
by reforming the election process and providing greater respect
for human rights."[66]
He goes on to say:
"Although most detainees have now been released,
the crackdown continues. Thirty-one oppositionists remain in detention
and could face up to 15 years in prison for organisation and participation
in mass riots. We expect there to be repercussions for those who
were kept in administrative detention; students will be expelled
and workers will not have their standard one-year contracts renewed.
One lawyer who was detained has had her licence to work revoked;
the Ministry of Justice has announced it will revoke the licence
of the lawyer defending Sannikov, one of the major opposition
figures.
"The re-imposition of the restrictions forms
part of the EU's response to this rapid deterioration of the human
rights situation in Belarus."
16.26 Referring to the EU approach outlined above,
the Minister then says:
"Since the suspension of sanctions, we have
seen less progress than we had hoped. However, the small positive
steps raised hopes that Belarus could be moving towards an acceptance
of European standards. For this reason, in October last year,
we maintained the approach taken by the previous government of
maintaining the suspension of the sanctions, while retaining the
ability to re-impose sanctions if the situation in Belarus deteriorated.
"Given that the elections were once more
seriously flawed and the authorities carried out yet another crackdown
on the opposition, civil society and the independent media, the
Government considers it essential to re-impose sanctions, including
on those involved in the most recent human rights violations."
16.27 The Minister concludes by saying that the Council
Decision is scheduled to be adopted in January 2011.
The Minister's letter of 17 January
2011
16.28 In his accompanying letter, the Minister says
that in view of the need for the EU to respond quickly to conditions
in Belarus, he wants to be able to agree the text at Council on
24 January; and that, while his Explanatory Memorandum reflects
the most recent draft Decision, discussions are continuing in
Brussels and there remains a possibility that the text will change
during this week. As, in those circumstances, there would not
be time for the Committee to consider any amendments before the
Council meeting, he asks the Committee to consider waiving the
requirement for scrutiny on the amended text in accordance with
paragraph 3(b) of the Scrutiny Reserve Resolution,[67]
and says that his officials will continue to keep the Committee
updated.
Conclusion
16.29 We again leave it to others to judge how
well the EU has played its hand over the past five years.
16.30 We are content to clear the Council Decision.
16.31 We do not, however, consider it appropriate
to exercise the waiver to which the Minister refers when we have
no idea of what changes might materialise. Instead, we ask that
the Minister writes to the Committee after the Council meeting
about whatever changes emerge between now and then and, should
they be substantive, why he decided to agree to their adoption.
16.32 A
small point: we ask that, in future, his Explanatory Memoranda
should include a specific date on which (and not just the month
in which) he expects a Council Decision or Council Regulation
to be adopted.
61 See Belarus Country Profile at:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/europe/belarus?profile=politics&pg=7. Back
62
See http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/documents/eu_belarus/non_paper_1106.pdf
for the full text of the paper. Back
63
Which are set out in the Council Non-Paper to which the Minister
referred, and which were reproduced at Annex 2 of the relevant
chapter of the previous Committee's Report 9 December 2009 : see
headnote : (31171) -: HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 17 (9 December
2009). Back
64
See headnote: HC 5-iii (2009-10), chapter 17 (9 December 2009). Back
65
See headnote: (32019) -: HC 428 -iii (2010-11), chapter 17 (13
October 2010). Back
66
The statement is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118708.pdf. Back
67
This reads as follows:
"(3) The Minister concerned may,
however, give agreement-
(a) to a proposal which is still subject
to scrutiny if he considers that it is confidential, routine or
trivial or is substantially the same as a proposal on which scrutiny
has been completed;
(b) to a proposal which is awaiting
consideration by the House if the European Scrutiny Committee
has indicated that agreement need not be withheld pending consideration."
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