14 Restrictive measures against Zimbabwe
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(32490)
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| Council Decision extending restrictive measures against Zimbabwe
Draft Council Decision on adapting and extending the period of application of the measures in Decision 2002/148/EC concluding consultations with Zimbabwe under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement
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| Legal base | Article 29 EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EMs of 3 and 7 February 2011 and Minister's letter of 7 February 2011
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| Previous Committee Report | (a) None; but see (31284) 5835/10: HC 5-ix (2009-10), chapter 4 (3 February 2010)
(b) None; but see (31287) —: HC 5-ix (2009-10), chapter 4 (3 February 2010)
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| To be discussed in Council | 14 and 15 February 2011 Education and Youth and ECOFIN Councils
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
14.1 The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (the Cotonou Agreement),
signed in 2000, provides the latest framework for a more than
20-year partnership for development aid to the 77 African, Caribbean
and Pacific countries, funded mainly by the European Development
Fund (EDF). Revisions in 2005 and 2010 have provided for a stronger
political foundation to ACP-EU development cooperation. Political
dialogue is one of the key aspects of the revised arrangements.
New issues which had previously been outside the scope of development
cooperation, such as peace and security, arms trade and migration,
were addressed. The element of good governance was included
as an "essential element", the violation of which could
lead to the partial or complete suspension of development cooperation
between the EU and the country in violation.[62]
14.2 If a Party considers that the other Party
has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law referred to
in Article 9, a process of consultation then ensues; if the consultations
do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if consultation
is refused, or in cases of special urgency, "appropriate
measures" may be taken. These procedures, under Article 96,
are intended as a measure of last resort and can only be invoked
when Cotonou's "essential elements" are deemed to have
been breached and all possible options provided through regular
political dialogue have been exhausted. The aim of the process
is to focus on the specific measures to be taken by the Party
concerned to remedy the situation and thus arrive at a solution
acceptable to the Parties.
14.3 Council Decision 2002/148/EC partially suspended
European Commission (EC) aid to Zimbabwe as part of the application
of "appropriate measures" provided for under Article
96 of the Cotonou Agreement.
14.4 In 2004 the EU adopted Common Position 2004/161/CFSP.
This imposed an arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban, with
certain exemptions. Council Common Position 2008/135/CFSP, adopted
on 18 February 2008, extended Common Position 2004/161/CFSP until
20 February 2009. Common Position 2009/68/CFSP did not include
any amendments or additional measures; the Annex listing the individuals
subject to targeted measures was updated (two names were added;
the names of two individuals amended; the name of one deceased
individual was removed).
14.5 The objective of these restrictive measures
is to encourage the persons targeted to reject policies that lead
to suppression of human rights, of freedom of expression and of
good governance. The measures are to be monitored and modified
as necessary according to whether the objectives have been met
in the context of political developments in Zimbabwe.
14.6 The background to Common Position 2009/68/CFSP
was the "stolen election" in Zimbabwe in March 2008.
The then Minister for Europe explained that, after a proposed
power-sharing deal in late Summer 2008, the EU had refrained from
imposing further measures to permit progress to be made between
Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai; but that little progress
had been made, and the social, economic and humanitarian situation
in Zimbabwe had deteriorated. The Common Position accordingly
extended the restrictive measures (arms embargo, asset freeze
and travel ban) for a further year and also listed a number of
individuals and entities associated with the Zimbabwean regime
who had contributed to, or were complicit in, activities that
seriously undermined democracy, respect for human rights and the
rule of law. For all those listed, it had been considered necessary
and proportionate to impose financial and travel restrictions
— and where entities had been designated, it had been assessed
that the restrictions would have minimal economic impact on ordinary
Zimbabweans and could not justifiably be portrayed as "economic
sanctions".
14.7 Although no questions arose, the previous
Committee reported this further extension because of the widespread
interest in the House in developments in Zimbabwe, and cleared
the document.[63]
14.8 A year ago, the previous Committee considered
two further Council Decisions. The first extended in slightly
modified form the February 2002 Decision (as subsequently extended
annually) that partially suspended European Community (now EU)
aid to Zimbabwe in accordance with the application of "appropriate
measures" provided for under the Cotonou Agreement "Article
96" process.
14.9 The second, which became Council Decision
2010/92/CFSP, extended the application of the targeted measures
until February 2011 and updated the list.
14.10 The then Minister for Europe explained
that the "appropriate measures" included suspending
budgetary support and support for projects that would be given
directly to the Government of Zimbabwe, as well as suspending
signing the 9th and 10th European Development Fund National Indicative
Programmes; and that they explicitly do not affect support for
humanitarian operations.
14.11 The Minister went on to say that the measures
were last renewed before the formation of a power sharing Inclusive
Government in Zimbabwe, underpinned by a General Political Agreement
(GPA), in February 2009. He described the Inclusive Government's
performance as "mixed with good progress on economic reform
and very limited political reform." He characterised the
extension of slightly modified Article 96 measures as consistent
with the then administration's strategy "of maintaining pressure
on the hardliners to reform, while supporting the efforts of reformers
to secure GPA implementation", and said that "the EU
will make clear that any further EU engagement will be dependent
on further reform in Zimbabwe" He noted that "elements
of the Government of Zimbabwe" had continued to violate essential
elements cited in Article 9 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement,
and that the current conditions in Zimbabwe did not ensure respect
for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. Against
this background, the EU therefore proposed to extend the measures
identified, with a minor modification to enable the EU to support
projects to further GPA implementation.
14.12 He also noted that the "appropriate
measures" also included suspending Article 12 of Annex 2
of the Cotonou Agreement, concerning current payments and capital
movements, to allow the EU to take further restrictive measures,
in particular freezing funds, and that these measures were independent
of the EU's targeted sanctions measures (the travel ban, asset
freeze and arms embargo) imposed on Zimbabwe.
14.13 Common Position 2009/68/CFSP extended the
list of individuals and entities subject to targeted measures
to 203 individuals and 40 entities. The second Council Decision
extended the targeted measures, with a minor modification, until
February 2011: it lifted the measures on eight parastatal entities
which were supervised by reformers and which no longer financed
hardliners; and deleted: four deceased persons; Oryx, a company
which no longer exists; Thamer Al Shanfari, whose listing was
linked to Oryx; and Dumiso Dabengwa, who had left ZANU-PF to re-establish
a separate party not opposed to reform.
14.14 The then Minister said that, in reaching
a consensus on extending the measures the EU had balanced the
need to signal acknowledgement of the (mostly economic) reform
achieved in Zimbabwe since the establishment of the February 2009
Inclusive Government and to incentivise further progress, with
the need to maintain pressure on hardliners. This consensus would,
he said:
"…make clear the EU preparedness to calibrate
its reengagement with Zimbabwe in response to implementation of
the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which underpins the Inclusive
Government. In communicating its decision on the targeted measures,
the EU will make clear that any further easing of the targeted
measures will be only in response to GPA implementation."
14.15 By way of illustration, the Minister recalled
that in January 2009, after the "stolen election" of
March 2008 and related violence, the EU had expanded the targeted
restrictive measures on Zimbabwe, and described the then Government's
approach thus:
"An Inclusive Government was established in
Zimbabwe in February 2009, underpinned by the Global Political
Agreement (GPA) signed by President Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister
Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara.
The UK Government supports the Inclusive Government and broadly
the implementation of the reform outlined in the GPA. Significant
economic reform has been achieved. Political reform has been more
limited. To promote the prospects of further reform leading to
free and fair elections, HMG's strategy is to support reformers
and keep pressure on hardliners. Consistent with this strategy
and given the limited GPA implementation to date, a significant
easing of the targeted measures would not be appropriate. The
proposed 12 month extension of slightly modified targeted measures
would support the strategy."
14.16 The then Minister also noted that on 29
January 2010, "the BBC reported that Tsvangirai supported
an easing of the EU measures", upon which he commented as
follows:
"Tsvangirai is under considerable ZANU-PF
pressure to secure the lifting of targeted measures. This is evidence
of the effectiveness of the measures. The EU decided its position
on targeted measures based on GPA implementation."[64]
The previous Committee's assessment
14.17 The previous Committee noted that the BBC
had also reported that deputy prime minister Arthur Mutambara,
too, had called for an end to sanctions against Zimbabwe and told
the BBC that by keeping the sanctions in place, western governments
were undermining Prime Minster Tsvangirai[65]
— not to take issue with the then Minister, but rather to
note that the situation was no longer as clear cut as once it
might have seemed.
14.18 For this reason as well as more generally,
they also again reported these developments to the House, and
cleared the documents.[66]
The first draft Council Decision
14.19 In his first Explanatory Memorandum of
3 February 2011, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
explains that the 2011 review of the Targeted Measures has resulted
in the proposed removal of 35 names of individuals — three
dead, seven spouses (not including Grace Mugabe), nine ex-ministers,
eight miscellaneous officials and eight minor Politburo members.
The Minister says that none is a "hardliner" or personally
accused of human rights offences; and that the arms embargo remains
in place.
The Government's view
14.20 The Minister comments as follows:
"The EU's and UK's long standing policy has
been that amendments to Targeted Measures are decided on the strength
of progress on reforms set out in the Global Political Agreement
(GPA). In reaching a consensus on extending the measures, the
EU has balanced the need to acknowledge progress in Zimbabwe since
the establishment of an Inclusive Government in February 2009
(specifically on the economy and human rights) with recognition
of the long road still to be travelled and the need to maintain
pressure on hardliners. The consensus will further incentivise
reformers by making clear the EU preparedness to respond progressively
to further concrete implementation of the GPA which underpins
the Inclusive Government."
14.21 The Minister then goes on to say that the
Government supports the Inclusive Government and "broadly"
the implementation of the reform outlined in the GPA:
"Significant economic reform has been achieved.
Political reform has been more limited. To promote the prospects
of further reform leading to free and fair elections, HMG's strategy
is to support reformers and keep pressure on hardliners. Consistent
with this strategy and given the limited GPA implementation to
date, an easing of the targeted measures would not be appropriate."
14.22 The Minister concludes by noting that the
draft Council Decision is due to be adopted by the 14 February
Education and Youth Council.
The second draft Council Decision
14.23 The Commission proposal extends in slightly
modified form the February 2002 (and subsequently annually extended)
Decision that partially suspended European Community (now EU)
aid to Zimbabwe as part of the application of "appropriate
measures" provided for under Article 96 of the ACP-EU Partnership
Agreement (the Cotonou Agreement).
14.24 In his second Explanatory Memorandum, of
7 February 2011, the Minister for Europe recalls that the "appropriate
measures" suspend budgetary support as well as financial
support for all projects except those in direct support of the
population, in particular in the social sectors and those in support
of the reforms contained in the GPA; do not affect humanitarian
support; and use only the UN and civil society organisations to
ensure that funds do not pass via Government channels.
The Government's view
14.25 The Minister comments as follows:
"The EU consensus to re-conduct the appropriate
measures under Article 96 is consistent with our broad approach
to link revisions to Measures with progress on the ground. The
letter that is annexed to the draft Decision makes clear the EU's
willingness to revisit the Measures in-year in response to concrete
progress, with specific reference to steps towards ensuring credible
elections. This allows us the option of including re-launching
dialogue under Article 96 (without commitment of further funding)
as part of any package of incentives that the EU considers in-year
in response to progress on the GPA and regional diplomatic initiatives
such as the SADC roadmap to elections."[67]
14.26 The Minister then reviews developments
since the measures were last renewed in February 2010, as follows:
"...elements of the Government of Zimbabwe have
continued to violate essential elements cited in Article 9 of
the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, and the current conditions in
Zimbabwe do not ensure respect for human rights, democratic principles
and the rule of law.
"The domestic political context in Zimbabwe
remains uncertain, although there has been significant progress
on the economy and the provision of basic public services. The
central issue on the political landscape has been Mugabe's call
for mid-2011 elections, which has created widespread unease.
"Although the balance of opinion, including
within ZANU(PF), is that we will be looking at a longer timeframe
to elections with polls potentially in early 2012, there has been
a recent increase in partisan violence which is causing concern.
It is widely accepted that a premature election without completion
of the constitutional process (the referendum on which is due
in the summer) would be like the last election — violent
and stolen. We are keen to support, including through controlled
flexibility on sanctions, regional initiatives, such as the SADC
roadmap, that will lead towards a credible, free and fair election
process."
14.27 The Minister then says that the extension
of slightly modified Article 96 measures is consistent with the
Government's strategy of maintaining pressure on the hardliners
to reform, while supporting the efforts of reformers to secure
GPA implementation; that the EU will make clear that any further
EU engagement will be dependent on further reform in Zimbabwe;
and that, though independent of the EU's targeted sanctions measures,
"together they represent key components of the EU's overall
strategy of bringing pressure to bear on the Government of Zimbabwe
and associates."
14.28 Finally, the Minister says that the measures
shall apply until 20 February 2012, are due to be adopted
at the 15 February 2011 ECOFIN Council, and shall be kept under
constant review.
The Minister's letter of 7 February 2011
14.29 In an accompanying letter of 7 February
2011, the Minister comments thus on the influence in Zimbabwe
of Chinese activity:
"'Look east' is now a key element of Zimbabwe's
foreign policy and the growing influence of China will be illustrated
by the visit of Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi this week. Commercial
interests drive China's engagement. China is a major investor
in Zimbabwe, particularly in the mining and extractive industries,
and although they do not see themselves as a member of the international
development community reports suggest that Zimbabwe may soon receive
in the order of $10bn from the Chinese development bank, much
of which is expected to be linked to Chinese business opportunities
(although it is not certain how much, if any, of this will materialise
or how it will be structured).
"China's commercial activities in Zimbabwe exploit
the space that we and other likeminded states have vacated. Often
these are not carried out at a government-to-government level
but through large private corporations. China operates a large
scale Joint Venture in the controversial Marange diamond fields
and has also been involved in arms exports and the construction
of Zimbabwe's new defence college. They also have investments
in less controversial areas, such as mobile phone and broadband
infrastructure and glass. Politically China maintains a relationship
with the Inclusive Government as a whole and Prime Minister Tsvangirai
and Finance Minister Biti were invited to Beijing in 2010. However
China's historical and continued preference appears to be to work
with ZANU-PF, a relationship which, inter alia, enables it to
gain access to Zimbabwe's considerable mineral wealth."
Conclusion
14.30 Although no questions are raised by
them, we are drawing this further renewal of the EU's restrictive
measures to the attention of the House because of the widespread
interest in the situation in Zimbabwe.
14.31 The Minister's analysis of the countervailing
impact of Chinese activity is interesting not just in this context,
but more broadly, as noted elsewhere in this Report in connection
with similar activity by both the EU and China, in not dissimilar
circumstances, in the Republic of Guinea.[68]
14.32 We now clear the documents.
62 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm
for full details of the agreement. Back
63
See (30343) -: HC 19-iv (2008-09), chapter 16 (21 January 2009). Back
64
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8486814.stm for the
BBC report. Back
65
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8483051.stm for the BBC
report. Back
66
See headnote: (31284) 5835/10: HC 5-ix (2009-10), chapter 4 (3
February 2010)
Back
67
The process launched in December 2010 whereby SADC- appointed
mediator South African President Jacob Zuma has been tasked with
facilitating inter-party negotiations aimed at drafting a roadmap
to Zimbabwe's next elections. Back
68
See (32487) - at chapter 15 of this Report. Back
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