15 EU restrictive measures against
the Republic of Guinea
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| Draft Council Decision modifying certain restrictive measures in respect of Guinea
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 3 February 2011 and Minister's letter of 7 February 2011
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (32020) —: HC 428-iii (2010-11), chapter 18 (13 October 2010) and (31404) —: HC 5-xiv (2009-10) chapter 4 (17 March 2010); also see (31133) —:HC 5-ii (2009-10), chapter 10, (25 November 2009); (30721) 11429/09 HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 8 (15 July 2009) and (26227) 16041/04, (29544) 7499/08 and (30446) 6543/09: HC 19-x (2008-09) , chapters 7 and 8 (11 March 2009)
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| To be discussed in Council | 14 February 2011
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
15.1 Under Article 96 of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between
the EU and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries,
either party may invite the other for consultations if it considers
that the other has failed to respect the "essential"
political elements in Article 9: human rights, democratic principles
and the rule of law, or to provide good governance. Strengthening
this political dimension was one of the main changes introduced
in the 2005 revision of the Agreement.
15.2 At the end of 2003, the Commission proposed
such consultations with the government of the Republic of Guinea
(GOG), after trying unsuccessfully for the previous two years
to resolve various democratic shortcomings through normal Article
8 political dialogue.
15.3 The previous Committee took a particular
interest in this process because the undertakings given by the
GOG were all in areas in which success, or failure, might well
have much wider lessons, or repercussions, and not just for the
Cotonou Process but also ESDP: a number of other ACP countries
were similarly challenged, against a background in which the inter-relationship
between development, security and good governance was now widely
acknowledged. As it noted, the Cotonou Agreement is clear: respect
for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are
essential elements of the partnership, with the Commission characterising
the revision of the political components in 2005 as "strengthening
the political dimension by placing greater emphasis on effective
dialogue and results"; against the yardstick set out in those
last four words, they found little persuasive evidence that the
Article 96 process had, to use the then Minister for Europe's
(Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead) words, led to the Cotonou provisions
being taken seriously — after over five years of Article
96 engagement, Guinea seemed to be no nearer than it was then
to a functioning democratic and law-based society.[69]
15.4 Subsequent developments are set out in the
Report referred to above and those referred to therein.[70]
As these Reports note, a bloodless coup took place on 23 December
2008, following the death of the then President after a long illness,
when a military junta calling itself the National Council for
Democracy and Development (NCDD) seized power and its leader,
Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, declared himself President. In response,
further Article 96 consultations were initiated; subsequently,
the Commission proposed that they be closed, and a staged process
initiated whereby, in return for measured progress towards, and
the holding of, free and transparent elections, normal relations
would be restored.
15.5 The then Minister for Europe supported this
proposal, arguing that it was important that the EU played a constructive
role in assisting Guinea's transition to constitutional order
and democracy. But because the "broadly encouraging undertakings"
offered during the Article 96 consultations had "not been
followed up by action", she thought it wise that the Commission
had proposed that the EU continued to monitor the situation closely
over a period of 24 months, with a regular review at least once
every six months, and had reserved the right to amend the "appropriate
measures" in the light of the interim authorities' implementation
of the commitments they had entered into.
15.6 Then, on 28 September 2009, unarmed opposition
supporters, protesting at Captain Dadis Camara's intention to
run for President next year (despite having forsworn this when
he seized power) were killed by soldiers in the capital, Conakry.
This was condemned by the EU, the US, the AU and ECOWAS; the latter
two took the lead to resolve the political crisis and prevent
further violence.
15.7 Against this background, the 26-27 October
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) adopted
Common Position 2009/788/CFSP imposing an arms embargo and travel
restrictions targeting members of the military junta and individuals
associated with them who were responsible for the violent repression
of 28 September or the political stalemate in the country. The
EU thus intended both to bolster any AU/ECOWAS sanctions on Guinea
and send a coordinated and strong message that it condemned the
violent crackdown. The Common Position applied for 12 months,
but would be reviewed and amended as appropriate, depending on
what steps were taken by the military junta to restore the rule
of law.
The previous Committee's assessment
15.8 In clearing the document, the previous
Committee said that it could not avoid wondering nonetheless how
effective the Common Position was likely to be. Guinea is the
world's largest bauxite exporter and has significant deposits
of gold, diamond, uranium and iron ore — resources that
allowed Lansana Conte, the former dictator, to survive periods
of international isolation; and its oil prospects had recently
drawn attention after discoveries in nearby countries such as
Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, leading (according to media
reports) to oil and minerals deals being under negotiation between
Guinea's military government and the China International Fund,
who would provide the lion's share of finance for about $7bn worth
of projects, ranging from power-generation to the creation of
an airline.
15.9 Noting that both EU courses of action —
this Common Position and the action taken under the Cotonou Agreement
— were to be reviewed in the coming months, the previous
Committee asked that, when any Explanatory Memorandum was put
forward on subsequent action, the Minister concerned should ensure
that it included his views on this wider perspective of China's
activity in the country and the region, and its impact on the
effectiveness of EU action.
15.10 In a subsequent Explanatory Memorandum
of 11 March 2010, the then Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (Ivan Lewis) explained that in view of tangible
progress towards the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea,
the Council had agreed that the EU travel ban should be lifted
on four individuals.
15.11 The Minister recalled that on 28 September
2009, "156 peaceful protestors were killed and there were
reports of mass rapes and other human rights atrocities",
noting that these events and the resultant UN Secretary General's
Commission of Inquiry report had dictated the UK and the international
community's response. The report had clearly identified Dadis
Camara and other leading figures in the Guinean regime as responsible
for events on 28 September. The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court was currently examining the situation in Guinea;
the Deputy Prosecutor had visited Guinea in February 2010 and
described the events around 28 September 2009 as crimes against
humanity.
15.12 He also reported that on 3 December 2009
Dadis Camara had been shot in the head by his Aide de Camp, Toumba
Diakite, during an argument about responsibility for the massacre
on 28 September; had been taken to Morocco for treatment; and
was later moved to Burkina Faso where he was likely to remain.
15.13 He then went on to outline the political
process, whereby the AU and ECOWAS, working with appointed mediator,
President Compaore of Burkina Fasso, had taken the lead in attempts
to resolve the political crisis and prevent further violence and
appointed Sekouba Konate as interim President. An Agreement had
been signed in Ouagadougou on 15 January 2010 agreeing to the
establishment of a unity transitional government. Jean-Marie Dore
had been sworn in as interim Prime Minister on 26 January and
his cabinet — a coalition of 10 NCDD members and opposition
members— sworn in on 15 February. Presidential elections
would be held on 27 June 2010. The UK, along with EU partners,
was now keen to recognise progress under the transition and favoured
lifting the EU travel ban on four individuals who had been helpful
in brokering the Ouagadougou Agreement and putting the transitional
process in place: Interim President Sekouba Konate; Mamadou Toto
Camara (Minister of Security); Lieutenant Colonel Keletigui Faro
(Minister of Agriculture) and Kabine Komara (previously Prime
Minister).
The previous Committee's assessment
15.14 The previous Committee said that, though
the way in which the main obstacle to progress had been removed
was hardly the sort of transition process that the Council would
have had in mind, the rest of what the Minister described appeared
to warrant the relaxation of the measures in the way proposed.
15.15 In clearing the proposal, it reminded the
then Minister of their earlier request for his assessment of the
impact of Chinese activity in Guinea and more widely on EU efforts
to encourage and bolster democratic development (c.f. paragraph
0.09 above) and asked that, the next time any change was proposed
to either this Common Position or to the action taken under the
Cotonou Agreement, this was provided along with the evidence justifying
the proposal.
15.16 Then, in his Explanatory Memorandum of
8 October 2010, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) noted
further progress: a first round of Presidential elections took
place in June; no single candidate won outright; the second round
due to take place in September had been postponed; this was now
scheduled for 24 October. Keeping the restrictive measures in
place until the electoral process was complete would send "a
strong signal that the EU expects the election process to be completed
satisfactorily and a democratic government put in place."
They would be "continually under review in the coming months
once the election process has been completed"; and "if
the election process has not been completed or a democratic government
is not in place the EU will consider imposing further restrictive
measures."
Our assessment
15.17 In clearing this amendment, we noted that
the jury continued to be out with regard to the effectiveness
of these and the related Cotonou Agreement measures.
15.18 We also reiterated our predecessors' earlier
request and reminder: that when any further action was proposed,
either in this context or that of the Cotonou Agreement, any Explanatory
Memorandum should include the Minister's views on the wider perspective
of China's activity in the country and the region, and its impact
on the effectiveness of EU action.[71]
The draft Council Decision
15.19 The amended Council Decision would remove
the travel ban and assets freeze on 62 listed individuals and
also amend the listing criteria to take into account the report
published by the UN International Commission of Inquiry regarding
the events of 28 September 2009 in which five persons were named
as being complicit in those events. These five individuals would
remain targeted with a travel ban and assets freeze, and the arms
embargo remain in place.
The Government's view
15.20 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 3 February
2011, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) says that that,
though the second round campaign was marred by minor ethnic clashes,
the voting was peaceful and Alpha Conde was sworn in as the first
democratically elected president of Guinea on 21 December 2010.
Guinea, he says, emerged with an elected leader and avoided descending
into an ethnically fuelled civil war because Guinea citizens chose
to avoid repeating the experience of Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Côte d'Ivoire in recent times.
15.21 The Minister goes on to say that the proposal
shows that the EU is responding to positive changes on the ground
and that he fully supports these developments. He also notes that
the measures are in place to 27 October 2011, but will be kept
under review; and that discussions will take place prior to this
date with regard to whether the measures are rolled over or amended
further.
The Minister's letter of 7 February 2011
15.22 The Minister responds to the Committee's
earlier requests to his predecessors and, in their absence, gives
his views on the wider perspective of China's activity in the
Republic of Guinea and the region, and its impact on effectiveness
of EU action as follows:
"Although we welcome China's contributions to
poverty alleviation and peacekeeping in Guinea and the wider region,
some of the impact of this can be lost through a lack of transparency
around investment, local markets and good governance. This was
particularly evident in 2009 when the China Investment Fund (CIF)
signed a $7bn (£4.5bn) mining and oil deal with the junta
government, just two weeks after 150 protesters were killed by
the military regime. Chinese interest and investment is attractive
to many African governments but, as in the CIF deal in Guinea,
it can undermine the principles of our and EU engagement in Africa,
and diminish the leverage we have to prevent conflict and promote
human rights and good governance.
"Ultimately though, a stable and properly governed
Africa is in China's interests as well as ours and we are increasing
efforts for the EU and China to work together globally on Africa
by deeper engagement with African stakeholders and working with
other partners in their dialogue with China. EU action in Guinea
has been effective, particularly through the work of the International
Contact Group on Guinea. The Chinese Ambassador to Guinea joined
these meetings and played a positive role in the latter stages
of the transition to a democratically elected President in December
2010."
Conclusion
15.23 We thank the Minister for this assessment,[72]
which we are content to leave to others to pursue, should they
so wish.
15.24 In the meantime, we clear the document.
69 (26227) 16041/04 and (29544) 7499/08: see headnote. Back
70
(31133) -: HC 5-ii (2009-10), chapter 10 (25 November 2009) and
(30721) 11429/09: HC 19-xxiv (2008-09), chapter 8 (15 July 2009);
see headnote. Back
71
See headnote: (32020) -: HC 428-iii (2010-11), chapter 18 (13
October 2010). Back
72
The Minister provides some similar comments in connection with
the latest restrictive measures against the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe,
which we consider in chapter 14 of this Report. Back
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