8 EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina
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| Council Decision concerning restrictive concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 11 March 2011 and Minister's letter of 14 February 2011
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (31859) —: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 66 (8 September 2010) and (30489) —: HC 19-xiv (2008-09), chapter 11 (22 April 2009)
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| To be discussed in Council | 21 March 2011
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
8.1 The internationally brokered Dayton Peace Agreement ended
the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).[42]
It established BiH as a state comprising two Entities, each with
a high degree of autonomy: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation
(FBiH).
8.2 The Agreement also designated the Office of the
High Representative (OHR) as the chief civilian peace implementation
agency in BiH, to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects
of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the international community.
He or she is also tasked with co-ordinating the activities of
the civilian organisations and agencies operating in the Bosnia
and Herzegovina.[43]
8.3 The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) —
55 countries and international organisations that sponsor and
direct the peace implementation process — oversees these
arrangements. The PIC Steering Board nominates the High Representative
(HR); the UN Security Council, (which approved the Dayton Agreement
and the deployment of international troops in BiH) then endorses
the nomination. On a day to day basis, a Board of Principals,
chaired by the HR, serves as the main coordinating body. Its permanent
members are OHR, EUFOR, NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM
and the Commission. International financial institutions such
as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP are also regular participants.
From the outset the HR has been "double-hatted" as EU
Special Representative (EUSR).
8.4 The longstanding goal has always been for BiH
to work its way towards European accession. The most recent major
step forward was the signing in June 2008 of BiH's Stabilisation
and Association Agreement (SAA). Then, according to plan, the
OHR would have been wound up and there would then be only the
EUSR, acting in his normal capacity, working with the local community
in implementing the SAA. But things have not gone according to
plan.
8.5 Prior to this transition, the BiH authorities
need to deliver five objectives (well established, approved by
the PIC SB and all previously recognized by BiH authorities as
obligations) revolving around creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic,
democratic, law-based State, and to fulfil two conditions —
signing of the SAA, and a positive assessment of the situation
in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton
Agreement. These "Five Objectives and Two Conditions"
are far from either delivery or fulfilment; on the contrary.
8.6 When we considered the renewal of the present
EUSR at our meeting on 8 September 2011, we noted then the Minister
for Europe's (Mr David Lidington) great concern about the situation
in BiH, where, he said, reform progress had been slow and there
were high levels of ethnic nationalist rhetoric. Elections were
scheduled to be held in BiH on 3 October. The EUSR would therefore
have a key role over the next twelve months, working to focus
pre-election debate on the reforms necessary for further EU integration
and to encourage BiH's political leaders to work constructively
together on achieving these reforms. The EUSR would then be at
the centre of the EU's crucial early engagement with a new government
in BiH after elections. The EUSR would continue his outreach and
communication programme in BiH, in order to further communicate
the benefits of EU accession and the nature of the accession process
to the general public in BiH. The Government strongly supported
this work.
8.7 According to the OHR website, in a recent keynote
speech to an international conference in Graz, the High Representative
and EUSR for BiH, Valentin Inzko, said that BiH is not going to
be integrated in Europe under present circumstances and went on
to speak as follows:
"Noting that the members of the Peace Implementation
Council Steering Board are committed to securing Bosnia and Herzegovina's
full recovery and integration in Europe, the HR/EUSR said that
the OHR — as long as it exists — can work in harmony
with the reinforced EU presence that is now being developed.
"He said that, as it moves centre-stage, the
EU will assume 'a responsibility that will affect the lives and
the future prospects of four million people.' He added that, as
the 'toolkit' for the EU presence is developed, it should be remembered
that this office will not simply be representational; it will
play a key role in engineering the final transition of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and, by doing this, it will facilitate the transition
of the region as a whole.
"Until domestic mechanisms are established that
will deal effectively with the problem of obstructionism it is
hard to see how OHR's role can reasonably be abandoned,' he said,
adding that, while 'vital national interest' is a common political
mantra, the civic interest of all Bosnians and Herzegovinians
cannot be ignored. For over a decade the OHR has protected the
interests of BiH citizens; the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina
must have the capacity to protect its citizens in the same way."[44]
The Minister's letter of 14 February 2011
8.8 The EUSR's remarks are at one with the Minister's
letter of 14 February 2011, in which he notified the Committee
of discussion that he envisaged would take place at the 21 February
2011 Foreign Affairs Council.
8.9 The Minister began by saying that he remained
very concerned about the situation: coalition negotiations following
last autumn's elections had so far failed to deliver new governments
at the State and Federation-entity levels; there had been almost
complete lack of progress on EU-related and other important reforms;
and provocative and nationalist rhetoric was on the rise. He said
that a more proactive EU role was needed to continue to press
clearly and firmly for progress. However, with stability not firmly
embedded, now was, he said, not the time to give up the internationally-mandated
executive powers at the disposal of the international community
(i.e., the ICR and the EU military force EUFOR Operation Althea).[45]
His approach would therefore be:
- the EU presence in BiH to
be reinvigorated and reinforced:
EUSR and Commission Head of Delegation roles to be combined, and
the EUSR mandate reinforced to include the ability to make use
of both the incentives provided by the EU accession process and
certain restrictive measures, such as travel restrictions and
asset or funding freezes (yet to be defined but the Government
would press for the strongest possible "EU toolbox");
- the High Representative and his executive
powers to be maintained in an ongoing
OHR, separate (or "decoupled") from the EU presence
and perhaps eventually located outside BiH. PIC conditionality
for the eventual closure of the OHR would continue to apply. Close
co-ordination mechanisms would be needed to ensure that the EU
and OHR worked together and co-ordinated the application of their
respective powers. The Government would press firmly for this
in negotiation;
- the executive (Chapter VII) mandate of EUFOR
Operation Althea to be maintained, even
if EU troop draw-downs meant that this executive mandate needed
to be serviced by fewer troops on the ground.
8.10 The Minister concluded by saying that he understood
that such a package would be tabled by the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Baroness
Ashton) and Enlargement Commissioner Füle, which the UK had
"very proactively shaped", working closely within the
PIC to maintain the conditionality in respect of the eventual
closure of the OHR, and of which he would "therefore be strongly
supportive."
The draft Council Decision
8.11 The preamble to the draft Council Decision notes
that:
— on
14 December 2010, the Council confirmed its determination to support
the Dayton/Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace and its
readiness to consider proposals to strengthen the EU's ability
to engage effectively with Bosnia and Herzegovina in this regard;
— in this context, restrictive measures
should be imposed against certain natural and legal persons whose
activities undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional
order and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
seriously threaten the security situation or undermine the General
Framework Agreement for Peace and the Annexes thereto.
8.12 The Council Decision obliges Member States to
take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit
through, their territories of such persons, and provides the basis
for all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held
or controlled by such persons and natural or legal persons and
bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, to be frozen.
The Government's view
8.13 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 11 March 2011,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) explains that the
procedures for designating individuals are fully compliant with
fundamental rights: individuals may only be listed where evidence
exists that they are engaged in the activities listed under Article
1 of the draft Decision, and would be entitled to challenge the
implementation or application of such a ban in the General Court
of the European Union; and, in addition, Member States may grant
exemptions from the measures for specified reasons including,
inter alia, where travel is justified on the grounds of
urgent humanitarian need.
8.14 The Minister reiterates his concern over the
failure of coalition negotiations following last autumn's elections
to deliver new governments at the State and Federation-entity
levels; an almost complete lack of progress on EU-related and
other important reforms; and a rise of provocative and nationalist
rhetoric, especially during last year's election campaign.
8.15 He goes on to say that:
"A clear and united international community
voice is needed to press clearly and firmly for progress. To this
end, the EU needs to take on a more proactive role in BiH. This
will allow it to maximise the incentives provided by BiH's EU
perspective and future accession process and — where necessary
— to use deterrents and take decisive action to address
blockages and threats to stability.
"In addition to the EU policy instruments already
in place or being considered to address the potential risks and
challenges that BiH might face, restrictive measures are being
developed."
"The possibility of imposing restrictive measures
is part of a broader comprehensive EU strategy, alongside other
EU instruments such as political facilitation, IPA financing,
the monitoring and support of reform progress through bodies established
by the SAA/IA and the two EU missions on the ground, namely EUFOR
Operation Althea and the EU Police Mission.
"The proposals received broad support from Ministers
at the February FAC, with plans for a more detailed discussion
at the March FAC. In line with this approach, in our subsequent
discussions since the February FAC, the Government has pressed
for the strongest possible restrictive measures and incentives
for progress."
8.16 Finally, the Minister notes that the Council
Decision is due to be adopted at Foreign Affairs Council on 21
March 2011.
Conclusion
8.17 We are reporting this development to the
House because of the degree of interest in developments in the
western Balkans.
8.18 As the Minister indicates in both his letter
and EM (and as also indicated by the HR/EUSR), these restrictive
measures are but part of a wider package of changes to the longstanding
arrangements, the outline of which is not entirely clear and the
details of which have yet to be negotiated.
8.19 We should therefore be grateful if the Minister
would continue to keep the Committee informed. As the Council
Decision will require an "implementing" Council Regulation,
his EM thereon might provide an opportunity to inform the Committee
about the nature and outcome of the discussion that he envisages
at the 21 March 2011 Foreign Affairs Council. In due course, we
also look forward to his EM on the proposed new EUSR mandate broadly
outlined in his letter.
8.20 In the meantime, we now clear the document.
42 See http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380
for full information on the GFAP. Back
43
See http://www.ohr.int/ for full information about the OHR. Back
44
See http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=45830 for this summary
and http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=45822
for the full text. Back
45
On 2 December 2004 the European Union (EU) launched an EU-led
military operation in BiH - Operation EUFOR Althea, as part of
the Common Security and Defence Policy in support of BiH. The
UN Security Council authorized EUFOR Althea as a legal successor
to SFOR, the previous NATO led operation. UN Security Council
Resolution 1948 (2010) extended the mandate of EUFOR Althea until
November 2011. Operation Althea's job is to provide a military
presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment,
deny conditions for a resumption of violence and manage any residual
aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (also
known as Dayton/Paris Agreement). At the moment, EUFOR deploys
around 1,600 troops in theatre that can be reinforced by troops
from the NATO Mission in Kosovo (KFOR) and additional "Over
the Horizon Forces". See http://www.euforbih.org/ for full
information on EUFOR Althea.
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