4 EU Special Representatives
(a)
(32590)
(b)
(32601)
(c)
(32602)
(d)
(32603)
|
Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Kosovo
Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process
Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus
Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia
|
Legal base | Articles 28, 31 (2 ) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
Basis of consideration | EM of 15 March 2011
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Previous Committee Report | None; but see (31290-1) , (31295-99) and (31300-04) : HC 5-x (2009-10), chapter 8 (9 February 2010); (31844) , (31884) , (31863) , (31865) , and (31861) : HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 66 (8 September 2010); and (32505) : HC 428-xvii, chapter 12 (16 February 2011)
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To be discussed in Council | To be determined
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Committee's assessment | Politically important
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Committee's decision | (a)-(c) Not cleared; further information requested
(d) Cleared
|
Background
4.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed to represent
Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Council agrees that
an additional EU presence on the ground is needed to deliver the
political objectives of the Union. They were established under
Article 18 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and are appointed by the
Council. Their purpose is to represent the EU in troubled regions
and countries and to play an active part in promoting the interests
and the policies of the EU.
4.2 An EUSR is appointed by Council through the legal act
of a Council Decision (formerly a Joint Action). The substance
of his or her mandate depends on the political context of the
deployment. Some provide, inter alia, a political backing
to an ESDP operation; others focus on carrying out or contribute
to developing an EU policy. Some EUSRs are resident in their country
or region of activity; others work on a travelling basis from
Brussels.
4.3 All EUSRs carry out their duties under the authority and
operational direction of the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Baroness Catherine
Ashton). Each is financed out of the CFSP budget implemented by
the Commission. Member States contribute regularly e.g. through
seconding some of the EUSR's staff members.
4.4 In February 2006, EUSR mandates were extended for 12 months
rather than the previous arrangement of six months; this, it was
judged, would enable extensions to be based on a more thorough
reporting cycle, with progress reports in mid-June and mandate
implementation reports in mid-November.
4.5 The European Union currently has 11 EUSRs dealing with
12 areas (one EUSR carries out two functions): Afghanistan, the
African Great Lakes Region, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Central Asia, Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Kosovo, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus and Sudan.
4.6 In February 2010, the mandates were extended, not for
the usual twelve months, but only until 31 August 2010, or until
the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS),
whichever was the earlier; the HR intended to revert to the matter
in the light of further work on the EEAS.[19]
4.7 The Council Decisions concerning the subsequent extensions,
and some of the history, mandate and activities of each EUSR,
was helpfully summarised by the Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) in his Explanatory Memorandum of 2 August 2010. His
comments on each one are beneath the summary. In the case of the
ones under consideration now, the Minister commented as follows:
Kosovo
4.8 This Council Decision extended the appointment of Pieter
Feith until 28 February 2011 or until the Council decided, on
a proposal by the HR, that appropriate corresponding structures
to those under the current decision had been established in the
EEAS.
4.9 On 14 December 2007 the European Council underlined the
EU's readiness to play a leading role in strengthening stability
in the Western Balkans, including by contributing to a European
Security and Defence Policy mission and to an International Civilian
Office as part of the international presences in Kosovo. Joint
Action 2008/123/CFSP adopted on 4 February 2008 established an
EU Special Representative for Kosovo. Kosovo declared independence
on 17 February 2008.
4.10 The mandate of the EUSR is based on the objective of
securing a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo, which
will contribute to regional stability. His tasks include being
the channel for the EU's advice and support to the political process,
promoting political coordination in Kosovo through the EU missions,
ensuring a coherent public message, and contributing to the consolidation
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo.
4.11 The EUSR role is currently combined with that of the
International Civilian Representative (ICR) who is appointed by
an International Steering Group (ISG, of which the UK is a member)
and is the ultimate supervisory authority over the implementation
of the UN Special Envoy's Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (Kosovo
committed itself to that proposal as part of its declaration of
independence). The ICR does not have a direct role in the administration
of Kosovo but retains strong corrective powers to ensure the successful
implementation of the Settlement. The ICR's mandate will continue
until the ISG determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms
of the settlement.
4.12 The Minister fully supported maintaining the office of
the EUSR in Kosovo and welcomed the continued appointment of Pieter
Feith in this post. He noted Mr Feith's long track record of crisis
management in both NATO and the European Union and close involvement
with Kosovo since his time as a senior policy official in the
NATO International Secretariat in the late 90s; his successful
leadership of the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005 and 2006;
and his appointment in 2007 as Director of the EU's Civilian Planning
and Conduct Capability and as the Civilian Operation Commander
for civilian ESDP missions. He said that Mr Feith had proved highly
capable in his role in Kosovo, supporting development of a stable,
viable and prosperous Kosovo as it worked towards its European
perspective. In particular he had contributed to efforts to hold
free and fair elections in line with international standards,
reached out to the non-majority community and supported dialogue
in the field of religious and cultural heritage. He was, the Minister
judged, very well placed to continue to provide strategic policy
leadership to the international community effort in Kosovo and
to work closely with the NATO and EU missions there. His double-hatting
as the ICR had proved highly effective, adding authority and political
influence to enable the EUSR to achieve the EU's objectives.
Middle East Peace Process
4.13 The mandate of Marc Otte was extended by six months until
the end of February 2011 or until the HR decided to incorporate
the role into the new EEAS.
4.14 The mandate involves working with EU partners to ensure
strong collective support for the negotiations, encouraging both
sides to engage on the key final status issues and holding both
sides accountable for any actions that undermine the peace process.
4.15 The Minister said that the UK would continue to:
- work with the EUSR and the High Representative on work looking
at how the EU could contribute to post-conflict arrangements aimed
at ensuring the sustainability of peace agreements;
- work with EU partners to deliver an urgent and fundamental
change to the policy of closure of Gaza;
- press Israel to lift the restrictions and allow aid, people
and commercial goods into and out of Gaza; and
- at the same time press for the immediate release of the captured
Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, and the cessation of all violence.
4.16 The Minister described the EU, as a member of the
Quartet for the Middle East, as having an essential role to play
in international policy on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and the EUSR and High Representative as key to driving this policy
forward; and said that he would continue to push for the
EU to pursue an active stance in support of US efforts towards
direct negotiations between the parties.
South Caucasus
4.17 This Decision extended the mandate of Mr Peter Semneby for
a six month period until 28 February 2011. The intention
was that by the end of this period the functions carried out under
the mandate would have been absorbed into the EEAS.
4.18 The EUSR for the South Caucasus was first appointed
on 20 February 2006. The EUSR supports the work of the High Representative/VP,
Baroness Ashton, in the region. He is tasked with: assisting Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia in carrying out political and economic
reforms; preventing conflicts in the region and contributing to
the peaceful settlement of conflicts, including through promoting
the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; engaging
constructively with main interested actors concerning the region;
encouraging and supporting further cooperation between States
of the region, including on economic, energy and transport issues;
and enhancing the effectiveness and visibility of the EU in the
region.
4.19 The Minister said that these objectives remained relevant,
in a region of strategic importance to the UK and the EU: but
also agreed that much of the mandate could be taken on by the
EU Delegations in Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan under the EEAS, provided
they were "properly resourced and tasked to do so"
except for "functions relating to conflict resolution and
prevention, which need to be undertaken by someone based outside
the region." This could, the Minister went on to say, potentially
be a senior member of the EEAS based in Brussels; in ongoing discussion
about what this role would cover and who would carry it out, the
UK would seek to ensure whoever filled the position would have
"sufficient seniority and experience to establish the
level of access and influence necessary to have an impact on key
players."
The Crisis in Georgia
4.20 This Decision extended the mandate of the EUSR (who is
also EUSR to Central Asia) for 12 months until 31 August
2011. The EU established a Special Representative for the Crisis
in Georgia in September 2008 to ensure coordination and consistency
of external EU actions in the region.
4.21 The EUSR's mandate is based on the objectives established
by the conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting
in Brussels on 1 September 2008 and the Council conclusions of
15 September on Georgia. The EUSR's role is to enhance the effectiveness
and visibility of the EU in helping to resolve the conflict in
Georgia. A key element of the role is representing the EU
in the "Geneva Talks" process, the mechanism for seeking
a resolution to the conflict.
4.22 The Minister supported continuation of this mandate. He
also noted that, while the Geneva Talks had "become bogged
down over status issues", they remained the only forum in
which all the parties to the conflict meet and he strongly
supported their continuation. The regularity of meetings,
combined with local level Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
(IPRM) meetings, helped manage tensions between Georgia, Russia
and the separatist regions. The current EUSR, Pierre Morel,
had played a valuable role in keeping the process going and built
personal relationships with key players, including the de facto
authorities in the separatist regions.
Our assessment
4.23 As well as endorsing undertakings from the Minister to
press the HR for earlier submission of draft revisions to EUSR
mandates in general, we said that we felt that this should apply
particularly to any Council Decision to end an EUSR's mandate
and incorporate it into the activity of the EEAS. The Minister
had already raised concerns about how this would work in the case
of the EUSR to the South Caucasus; the same sort of consideration
would, we felt, be bound to arise in the case of the EUSR to the
MEPP, whose mandate had been extended for only six months, but
without any explanation by the Minister. Against this background,
we were concerned to note press reports that, at the July 2010
Foreign Affairs Council, it was decided to end four mandates from
February 2011, including those of the EUSRs to the South Caucasus
and to the MEPP (the others being those to Macedonia and Moldova);
and that the Council had been unable to reach any agreement on
the position of the ICR/EUSR to Kosovo. We therefore asked the
Minister to explain:
- how his concerns about the need for conflict resolution and
prevention in the south Caucasus to be undertaken by someone based
outside the region had been resolved and, now a decision had been
taken to end the mandate in February 2011; how he would be able
to ensure that this role would be adequately covered and that
the person selected to perform it would meet his requirement of
"sufficient seniority and experience to establish the level
of access and influence necessary to have an impact on key players";
- if the EUSR and High Representative were key to driving EU
policy on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the rationale behind
abolishing this EUSR MEPP post; and
- given his strong endorsement of both the role of the ICR/EUSR
Kosovo and the present incumbent, what had held up agreement in
the Council regarding his mandate.
4.24 Against this background, we then cleared the documents.[20]
4.25 Then, on 19 February 2011, we considered a further Council
Decision extending the mandate of the EUSR Kosovo for a further
two months, until 30 April 2011.
4.26 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 11 February 2011, the
Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) described the proposed
extension as a pragmatic way of ensuring political continuity
of EU expertise and visibility in Kosovo as the EEAS sought to
finalise its plans for an enhanced EU presence in Kosovo within
the framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty.
4.27 He then continued as follows:
"The presence of an EUSR is essential for the international
community's efforts to build stability and prosperity in Kosovo
and HMG will seek to ensure that the role is continued as part
of the revised EEAS structure. The EUSR plays a key role in advising
and encouraging the Kosovo government to drive forward the reforms
necessary for Kosovo's continued progress along its European path,
and in providing strategic policy leadership to the international
community effort in Kosovo, in particular by giving political
direction to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).[21]
"In recent months, the EUSR has made a key contribution to
efforts to hold Kosovo's first general elections since independence,
including coordination of a strong international election monitoring
mission. These elections were widely recognised to have been conducted
in a peaceful and stable manner, and broadly in line with international
standards. There were a number of irregularities and allegations
of fraud, but the efficient and responsible manner with which
the Central Election Commission and Constitutional Court addressed
these is a further sign of Kosovo's maturing democracy and integration
into the international community.
"The EUSR continues to be very active in the field of religious
and cultural affairs. The Greek Ambassador Dimitris Moschopoulos
has been appointed as EU facilitator and the past 6 months has
seen real signs of progress. The Enthronement of the new Serbian
Orthodox Church patriarch passed peacefully. The transfer of historic
religious sites from KFOR protection to the Kosovo Police is proceeding
steadily and successfully.
"Looking ahead, it will be important for the EUSR and the
Kosovo Government to focus their attention on taking forward the
much needed reforms highlighted in the 2010 Commission Progress
Report on Kosovo, and in particular in relation to improving governance,
fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law.
"The EUSR will also have an important role to play in supporting
the upcoming EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina
on how to improve practical cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo
and make progress towards both countries' European perspective.
Recent political events in Kosovo early general elections
and subsequent re-runs have prevented a start to the EU-facilitated
dialogue. But all parties are committed to commencing as soon
as possible."
The Minister's letter of 15 February 2011
4.28 In his letter, the Minister responded to the Committee's
question from last September "relating to Kosovo, namely:
given [the Minister's] strong endorsement of both the role of
the ICR/EUSR Kosovo and the present incumbent, what had held up
agreement in the Council regarding his mandate[?]"
4.29 He did so as follows:
"The delays have been the result of EEAS efforts to enhance
the EU presence in Kosovo within the framework provided by the
Lisbon Treaty. As the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal gets closer
to full implementation and the EU seeks to develop its relationship
with Kosovo, some rebalancing of the EUSR and ICR responsibilities
is inevitable, resulting in a greater, not lesser role for the
EU. That is why the EEAS is looking to increase the focus and
breadth of the EU's role in Kosovo.
"In practice, this requires consideration of how the EU can
strengthen the current EUSR's mandate, including its relationship
with the other EU presences in Kosovo the European Commission
Liaison Office and the EU's Rule of Law Mission. I should underline
here that there is currently no suggestion in Brussels that the
mandate be allowed to expire or to be subsumed into the EEAS structures
in Brussels.
"There are two factors that complicate this process. Firstly,
the current double hatting of the EUSR mandate with that of the
International Civilian Representative makes it important for the
EEAS to consider the views of the International Steering Group
members, and in particular those who are not EU Member States
(Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US). Secondly, the
EEAS also needs to reconcile the views of the 22 EU Member States
who recognise Kosovo with the five that currently do not. This
impacts for instance on the question of whether the EU can have
a full 'delegation' or just a 'liaison office' in Pristina."
4.30 The Minister concluded his letter by apologising for
not having responded earlier to the Committee's questions and
by reiterating his:
- support for the proposed extension as a pragmatic way of ensuring
political continuity of EU expertise and visibility in Kosovo
as the EEAS seeks to finalise its plans;
- confidence in the EEAS's capacity to deliver a revised mandate
and structure before the proposed new expiry date of 30 April;
- view that the presence of a EUSR is essential for the international
community's efforts to build stability and prosperity in Kosovo,
and for the EU's efforts to assist Kosovo in its efforts to further
integrate itself with the EU;
- commitment to ensuring proper Parliamentary scrutiny of decisions
regarding EUSR mandates; and
- assurance that the FCO continued to underline with the EEAS
the need to ensure timely EUSR mandate documentation and discussion.
Our assessment
4.31 We thanked the Minister for this further information,
and looked to him to ensure that the EEAS responded appropriately
to his representations.
4.32 We also reported this matter to the House because of
the degree of interest in developments in Kosovo and cleared the
Council Decision.[22]
The further Council Decisions
4.33 These latest Council Decisions further elaborate the
mandates of the EUSRs to Kosovo, the MEPP, the South Caucasus
and the Crisis in Georgia. They are dealt with in a single Explanatory
Memorandum of 15 March from the Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington). As before, his comments are immediately beneath each
one.
Kosovo
4.34 As well as the tasks of offering the EU's advice and
support to the Kosovo Government on the political process, promoting
overall coordination of the EU presence in Kosovo and contributing
to the development and consolidation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in Kosovo, the proposed mandate also requires the new
EUSR to assist in the implementation of the EU-facilitated (and
UN-endorsed) Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.
4.35 The Minister notes that it also ends the current practice
of combining (or "double-hatting") the EUSR role with
that of the International Civilian Representative (ICR); and that,
instead, it foresees the role of the EUSR being combined (or "double-hatted")
with that of the Head of the European Commission Liaison Office
in Pristina (ECLO). He comments thus:
"In tabling this proposal, Baroness Ashton is seeking to
enhance the EU's presence and effectiveness in Kosovo within the
framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty[.] The proposal foresees
the responsibilities of the EUSR and those of the Head of ECLO
being vested in the same individual.
"I strongly support Baroness Ashton's desire to improve the
EU's relationship with Kosovo and her proposal to extend the mandate
of the EUSR. The continued presence of an EUSR is essential for
the international community's efforts to build prosperity and
stability in Kosovo.
"I am concerned that Baroness Ashton's plans to re-design
the EU presence in Kosovo will not in practice enhance EU influence
and reputation as much as she and the UK would like. I am particularly
concerned that, given the tight timescales involved, the EU risks
being without a EUSR for a sustained period of time. This would
be the wrong signal to send at a time when we are looking to the
new Kosovo government to drive forward the reform priorities highlighted
in the Commission's progress report, and when we would like the
EU to send tangible signals of its support for Kosovo's progress
towards the EU, in line with the European perspective of the entire
Western Balkans region.
"This draft also foresees an end to the current double-hatting
of the EUSR and International Civilian Representative (ICR) roles.
The UK has long supported this arrangement, seeing it as important
for the coherence of the overall efforts of the International
Community; and for bringing the greatest possible authority to
the mandates of both roles when working with the Kosovo government.
"Given the concerns I outline above, I have instructed my
officials not to support the draft decision in its current form,
and to seek significant improvements to it. I will update the
Committee on negotiations of this decision as they progress."
Middle East Peace Process
4.36 The current MEPP EUSR's mandate expired on 28 February
2011. Member States have discussed appointing a new EUSR. The
initial mandate will run until 2012 with the specific date of
expiry dependent upon the start date. and shall be based on the
EU's policy objectives regarding the MEPP, including pursuing
a comprehensive peace agreement; working with EU Member States
and international partners to ensure strong collective support
for the negotiations, encouraging both sides to engage on the
key final status issues and putting forward EU proposals to help
advance the MEPP. The Minister supports this approach. He comments
thus:
"The EU, as a member of the Quartet for the Middle East,
has an essential role to play in international policy on
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EUSR and High Representative
are key to driving this policy forward and we will continue to
push for the EU to pursue an active stance driving both sides
towards a return to direct negotiations.
"The previous MEPP EUSR gave presence, visibility and political
impetus in the region to the EU's efforts to help bring about
a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The MEPP
EUSR worked with FCO officials based in Brussels, London, Tel
Aviv and Jerusalem, to develop and refine the EU's policies on
the MEPP and the UK's position with regard to EU MEPP policy.
"It remains the role of the MEPP EUSR to keep in contact
with the European Union's presence on the ground particularly,
the two European Security and Defence operation in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah. The MEPP
EUSR provides political guidance to the heads of both EUPOL COPPS
and EUBAM Rafah."
South Caucasus
4.37 The mandate for the previous EUSR for the South Caucasus,
Ambassador Peter Semneby, expired on 28 February 2011. The draft
sets out the European External Action Service's proposal for a
revised mandate for the proposed new role. The Minister says that:
discussions are at an early stage, the document is therefore incomplete
and may be subject to significant changes; no financial information
has been provided; and the remit of the role may also be subject
to further changes following discussions between Member States.
He undertakes to inform the Committee as appropriate.
Georgia
4.38 The Minister notes that the current budget for the EUSR
for the Crisis in Georgia is 700,000, and that the draft
seeks to increase funding by 304,000 to cover operating
expenditure until 31 August 2011. He explains that the request
has been made due to a proposed temporary increase in staff reporting
to EUSR Morel these staff members having been formerly
attached to the EUSR for the South Caucasus, whose mandate expired
on 28 February 2011 and that the EEAS wish to assign some
of his staff to the EUSR for the Georgia Crisis to retain their
expertise and knowledge whilst provision is made for a new EUSR
to cover the South Caucasus.
4.39 The Minister comments thus on both mandates:
"Working with and through the EU forms a key part of HMG's
engagement with the three South Caucasus countries, and the work
of the EUSR forms an important part of this engagement. Discussions
are being held in Brussels about the future shape of the EU's
representation in the region.
"We would like to see the EU playing a more effective role
in helping to prevent and resolve conflict in the region, including
through targeted and practical funding of projects as well as
maintaining high-level dialogue.
"The first stage has been to end the mandate of the EUSR
for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby. The proposal is for a newly-defined
EUSR mandate dealing with the conflicts in the South Caucasus.
It is subject to ongoing debate in the relevant Council committees
in Brussels.
"Our preferred option is to consolidate the two EUSR positions
(i.e. the former South Caucasus' mandate and a separate mandate
for the Crisis in Georgia which dates to the 2008 Russia/Georgia
war) to form one EUSR for the South Caucasus with a focus on resolving
the ongoing conflicts in the region. The role needs a senior figure
with the ability to gain access to and influence the leaderships
in the South Caucasus.
"A draft proposal for a new EUSR dealing with the conflicts
in the South Caucasus is being debated. In anticipation that there
will, in due course, be an agreement to create such a post, the
European External Action Service wish to retain the expertise
of the outgoing EUSR's staff. They will provide continuity between
the EUSRs.
"EUSR Morel maintains strong relations with the other international
organisations working in the region. He is also one of the few
international figures who continues to enjoy easy access to the
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With the OSCE
and UN mandate renewals having been vetoed by Russia in 2009,
the EU is the only major international presence in Georgia and
it is essential to signal the EU's continued serious commitment
to these issues.
"We would like to see the EU also playing a more important
role in helping to prevent and resolve conflict in the region,
including through targeted and practical funding of projects as
well as maintaining high-level dialogue."
Conclusion
4.40 Reading between the lines, it would seem that the
Minister is concerned about getting the right person there
is no mention as to whether it is envisaged that this would be
Mr Feith or someone else and how, if the EUSR is no longer
to wear the ICR hat, it is proposed to ensure that EU activity
and ICR activity continue to be in lock step, and not instead
risk being out of step. Given the importance of these matters,
particularly at this juncture, we shall continue to retain this
Council Decision under scrutiny and await what we hope will be
further, reassuring, information from the Minister about these
issues.
4.41 Given the uncertainties surrounding the proposed revisions
to the EUSR mandates relating to the MEPP and the South Caucasus,
we shall also retain documents (b) and (c) under scrutiny pending
the receipt of further information from the Minister.
4.42 We clear the proposed increase in the budget for the
EUSR to the Crisis in Georgia (document (d)).
19 For further details, see (31290-1) -, (31295-99)
- and (31300-04) -: HC 5-x (2009-10), chapter 8 (9 February 2010). Back
20
See headnote: (31844) -, (31884) -, (31863) -, (31865) -, and
(31861) -: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 66 (8 September 2010). Back
21
For the Committee's most recent consideration of the EULEX Kosovo
mandate, see (31677)-: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 4 (8 September
2010). The record of the subsequent European Committee is available
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmgeneral/euro/101115/101115s01.htm
(Gen Co Deb, European Committee B, 15 November 2010, cols
3-18). Back
22
See headnote: (32505) -: HC 428-xvii, chapter 12 (16 February
2011). Back
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