9 Partnership with the Southern Mediterranean
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7592/11
COM(11) 200
| Commission Communication: A Partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean
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| Legal base | —
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| Document originated | 8 March 2011
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| Deposited in Parliament | 14 March 2011
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 29 March 2011
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (29704) 9865/08: HC 428-x (2010-11), chapter 16 (8 December 2010); HC 19-xvii (2008-09), chapter 7 (14 October 2009); HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 1 (29 April 2009); HC 16-xxix (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008) and HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008); also see (29029) —: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 2 (7 November 2007)
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| Discussed in Council | 14 March 2011 European Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
9.1 On 4 February 2011, the European Council met to discuss
developments in Tunisia and Egypt. In its subsequent declaration,
the EU said that was determined to lend its full support to the
transition processes towards democratic governance, pluralism,
improved opportunities for economic prosperity and social inclusion,
and strengthened regional stability; and committed to a new partnership
involving more effective support in the future to those countries
pursuing political and economic reforms including through the
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean.
9.2 In this context, the European Council invited
the High Representative within the framework of this partnership
to develop a package of measures aimed at lending European Union
support to the transition and transformation processes (strengthening
democratic institutions, promoting democratic governance and social
justice, and assisting the preparation and conduct of free and
fair elections); and to link the European Neighbourhood Policy
and Union for the Mediterranean more to these objectives.[30]
The Commission and High Representative Joint Communication
9.3 The Communication recalls the European Union's
"proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from
autocratic regimes to democracy" and, while "respecting
what are primarily internal transformation processes", offers
the expertise of governments, the European Commission, the European
Parliament, local and regional authorities, political parties,
foundations, trade unions and civil society organizations. Based
on "a shared interest in a democratic, stable, prosperous
and peaceful Southern Mediterranean", the Commission/HR propose
"a qualitative step forward in the relations between the
EU and its Southern neighbours…[which] should be rooted unambiguously
in a joint commitment to common values…[and] expressed in
recent weeks can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious
political and economic reforms." On this basis, the Commission/HR
say that the EU is ready to support all its Southern neighbours
who are able and willing to embark on such reforms through a "Partnership
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity". The Partnership must
be based on commitments to and concrete progress on democracy,
human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of
law. The approach must be differentiated, acknowledging the fact
that, despite some commonalities, no two countries in the region
are the same.
9.4 The Commission/HR set out to explain what
the EU has done to address the short-term consequences of recent
events in North Africa and spell out their approach to the longer
term process of "turning into reality the tremendous hopes
that have been voiced in the region… by listening, not only
to requests for support from partner governments, but also to
demands expressed by civil society." With a radically changing
political landscape, the Southern Mediterranean requires a change
in the EU's approach — the underlying themes of differentiation,
conditionality and partnership being part of the ongoing review
of the European Neighbourhood Policy[31]
on which the Commission/HR will present a joint Communication
in April.
9.5 The immediate response includes humanitarian
aid of €30 million; facilitating consular cooperation and
evacuation; Frontex joint operations; drawing on the €25
million EU External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund; High
Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) visits to Tunisia and Egypt
and international co-ordination meeting in Brussels; and support
for democratic transition.
9.6 Looking ahead, the Communication sets out
the three elements on which the Partnership would be based:
- democratic transformation and
institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms,
constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight
against corruption;
- a strong partnership with the people, with specific
emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities
for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with a particular
focus on the young; and
- sustainable and inclusive growth and economic
development, especially support to Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health
and education systems and development of the poorer regions
9.7 The detail of these elements includes an
incentive-based approach based on greater differentiation —"more
for more" — in which those that go "further and
faster" in their reforms would receive greater support. A
commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections would
be the entry qualification. Progress in human rights and governance
would have minimum benchmarks against which performance would
be assessed. Those who do not follow agreed reform plans would
have their support reallocated. The Partnership should be underpinned
by enhanced political dialogue, with a strong focus on human rights
and political accountability. Partner countries carrying out the
necessary reforms can expect to resume negotiations on Association
Agreements with the aim of achieving "advanced status",
viz., significantly strengthened political dialogue, increased
links between the partner country and EU institutions, deeper
engagement on mobility and improved market access to the EU.
9.8 A "Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility,"
which would develop the advocacy capacity of civil society organisations
and increase their ability to monitor reform, would be created
and the EU would continue its work on supporting capacity building
to strengthen government institutions. Capacity building would
also be employed to strengthen borders and migration, asylum and
law-enforcement co-operation to improve security.
9.9 "Mobility Partnerships" to manage
movement of persons between the EU and third countries would include
visa facilitation and readmission agreements, and, eventually,
steps towards visa liberalisation.
9.10 The promotion of economic development, including
support for SMEs, an increase in the European Investment Bank's
(EIB) general lending envelope by €1 billion, extending the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD) operations
to the region, and allowing "reflows" — the re-investment
of previous financing operations to support the private sector
— are all outlined.
9.11 The proposal also addresses longer term
financing issues and refocusing existing programmes. Noting that
€4 billion is currently available to the region under the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the
Communication states that all ENPI programmes for the region will
be screened and possibly re-focused to address the Partnership's
three priorities. It also details the need to leverage loans via
IFIs, and encourages Member States to contribute to the Neighbourhood
Investment Facility (NIF), which provides grant support.
9.12 The Partnership would support the development
of trade and investment through the conclusion of a single, regional,
Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin.
It would include the conclusion of EU trade liberalisation agreements
and the negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas,
building on the current Association Agreements.
9.13 Sectoral Co-operation would include the
establishment of an EU-South Mediterranean Energy Community with
the long-term aim of extending the Energy Community Treaty; launching
an Agricultural/rural development support programme; increasing
participation in education programmes; and developing access to
the Internet and other communication technologies.
The Government's view
9.14 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 29 March
2011, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) describes the
proposed changes as "broadly in line with UK thinking and
the views I expressed to the European Commission in response to
their review of the ENP."
9.15 The Minister continues as follows:
"We share their thinking on the need for greater
differentiation between countries. We have stressed that strict
conditionality is essential; that clear and measurable conditions
must underpin the EU's relationship with countries in the region,
and that those countries who meet agreed reforms should continue
to receive EU funding, whereas those that fail to reform should
have funding withheld. We have stressed the need for reforms in
human rights and governance to be given greatest priority."
9.16 The Minister says that he is not opposed
to the principle of "Advanced Status", though he thinks
the EU should clarify what this status entails, including what
benefits beneficiary countries might expect as a result.
9.17 The Minister agrees with the view that civil
society involvement is important for the development of good governance
and monitoring of human rights and "therefore views positively
the proposal to create structures which would enable civil society
to monitor reforms."
9.18 The Minister goes on to note that, as the
UK does not participate in the EU common visa policy, "as
it builds on an area of the Schengen acquis which the UK
has chosen not to opt-in to", the EU visa facilitation and
liberalisation agreement proposals that the Communication describes
do not apply to the UK.
9.19 With regards to financing, the Minister
says that he has for some time expressed the view that this should
be focussed on the delivery of political and economic reform,
and accordingly welcomes the statement that current programmes
will be assessed to ensure they support priority reforms:
"We believe that priority reforms can be supported
by the reallocation of existing funding, rather than an increase
in budget, so we are content that the Communication states that
assistance will come from the current EU budget."
9.20 The Minister then says that he is opposed
to the proposal of a general increase in the European Investment
Bank's (EIB) mandate, commenting as follows:
"The Chancellor is prepared to support the proposed
additional lending envelope of €1 billion, but subject to
the conditionality that the €1 billion increase is a one-off,
temporary increase, and that it is a stand-alone increase and
not part of a larger increase to general EIB lending. Our policy
on 'reflows' — recycling funding from one year to the next
— is guided by our commitment to the principle of budget
discipline that is enforced by the return of repayments to Member
States. Whilst we appreciate that the introduction of reflows
would facilitate more flexible use of funds, this should not be
at the expense of budget discipline. We favour a return of repayments
to Member States to ensure a balanced EU budget at the end of
the financial year."
9.21 With regard to the trade components of the
proposal, the Minister says:
"We share the view that development of sustainable
trade is key to the general reinvigoration of economies in the
region, and that the removal of barriers to trade with the EU,
and the opening of EU markets, would support this. The opening
of markets is one of the greatest incentives to reform we are
able to offer the region. However, we are aware of the sensitivities
of some, particularly southern, Member States to the opening of
certain sectors — in particular agriculture — and
are realistic about the difficulty of securing the agreement of
all Member States to this."
9.22 On the sectoral element, the Minister then
says:
"We support the development of new routes and
sources of supply of energy to the EU, including the Southern
Corridor, and, where appropriate, encourage adoption of the EU's
energy market rules by near neighbours and major energy producers,
for example by extending the Energy Community Treaty to them and
by extending and consolidating the Energy Charter Treaty. We therefore
welcome in principle the proposal to establish an EU-South Mediterranean
Energy Community and will follow its development."
9.23 Finally, and looking ahead, the Minster
says that, as "an expression of the views of the Commission"
there is no timetable for its implementation, and that the individual
proposals it covers "will be dealt with independently of
the Communication and according to their nature."
9.24 On 14 March 2011, the European Council held
an extraordinary session to discuss developments in Libya and
the Southern neighbourhood region and set the political direction
and priorities for future EU policy and action. The Council noted
that progress and democracy needed to go hand in hand, and all
countries in the region needed to undertake or accelerate political
and economic reforms; and said that the EU would support all steps
towards democratic transformation, political systems that allow
for peaceful change, growth and prosperity, and a more proportionate
distribution of the benefits of economic performance. It endorsed
the notion that progress by partners towards transformation would
drive EU support. Developing strong democratic institutions would
be one of the key objectives. On a more general level, the Council
noted that existing partnership and assistance programmes will
be rapidly reviewed, in close cooperation with partners in the
region, in order to better target present needs. In this context,
the Council called on the Commission and the High Representative
to give priority to country-focused and performance based approaches.
Looking to the medium term, the European Council called for a
new partnership with the region, in line with its declaration
of 4 February 2011, broadly welcomed the joint communication and
called on the Council to examine rapidly the proposals contained
in the communication and in particular the conditions under which
the EU's support to its partners could be enhanced.
9.25 In particular, the Council was asked:
- to agree urgently pending proposals
on pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin (and the Commission
was invited to present proposals on further means to enhance trade
and foreign direct investment in the region in the short, medium
and long term);
- to consider rapidly the Commission's proposals
on European Investment Bank reflows and look at further possibilities
to increase the EIB's overall financial support capacity; and
- to review the missions of the Union for the Mediterranean,
with the objective of promoting democracy and fostering stability
in the region and giving "a new push" to concrete measures
and projects so as to strengthen democratic institutions, freedom
of expression, including unhindered access to internet, reinforce
civil societies, support the economy, reduce poverty and address
social injustice.[32]
Conclusion
9.26 The Barcelona Process (a.k.a. the Euro-Med
Process) was launched during the 1995 Spanish Presidency between
the EU and its Mediterranean partners — Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria,
Tunisia and Turkey (Libya has observer status since 1999) —
with the aim of building "a space of dialogue, peace, security
and shared prosperity". At the outset, the Commission described
this as "a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations".
On examining the most recent Commission Communication on the Process
in November 2007, the previous Committee concluded that, in reality,
it had become impossible to judge the extent to which the Process
was merely processing, rather than achieving concrete outcomes;
and that, with approximately €4.7 billion committed in 2000-06
and a further €1.3 billion earmarked for 2007-10, it was
time to examine the Process more closely, via a debate on the
Communication in the European Standing Committee.[33]
That debate took place on 22 January 2008.[34]
9.27 During that debate, there was some, perforce
limited, discussion of President Sarkozy's idea of a "Union
of the Mediterranean". The subsequent Communication (which
the previous Committee considered on 18 June 2008)[35]
set out the rationale for the Process and a vision for enhanced
co-operation. The intention was to build on the existing process,
but add a number of higher-profile projects to give added impetus
and visibility. Funding arrangements were somewhat imprecise.
The Commission noted that the EU and its Member States already
provided significant funding in the Mediterranean region,
[36] but
that "to bring added value to existing arrangements, the
'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' should be designed
to mobilise additional funding for the region, mainly through
regional projects", and that "its added value will very
much depend on its capacity to attract more financial resources
for regional projects." The UMed process was finally launched
in November 2008.
9.28 Two years on, when the Committee last
considered the UMed, the Minister for Europe noted that the second
UMed Summit (due to have been held in Barcelona on 21 November
2010) had been postponed, for a second time and sine die, because
of the lack of progress on a resumption of direct talks in the
Middle East Peace Process, and that a new date had not yet been
set; and the Secretariat had yet to become fully operational or
make substantial progress on developing and promoting any projects.
9.29 We outline these earlier endeavours to
establish a productive partnership with the EU's southern neighbours
not to pour cold water on the latest manifestation, but to illustrate
how hard it will be to implement. It is customary in such circumstances
to say that the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. Now,
it is by no means clear what can be achieved, when the polity
of so many of the southern neighbours is in a state of radical
flux, and in circumstances very different from those facing the
then Member States in central and eastern Europe in 1989. In present
circumstances, it is by no means clear what form the entry qualification
of a "commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections"
would take, in societies with little or no parliamentary history
or embryonic civil society (in contrast to the situation in Europe
in 1989). Or whether, once the process was underway, the EU would
really be willing to slow down or turn off funding in the face
of backsliding.
9.30 Nevertheless, unpromising as the past
and present context is, we can but hope for the best, since there
is no good alternative to the essence of what is proposed. However,
the Minister is surely right when he says priority reforms can
be supported by the reallocation of existing funding, rather than
any increase in budget.
9.31 We now clear the document.
Annex: Glossary of terms
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT
These refer to contractual relationships between
the European Union (EU) and a non-EU country. Association Agreements
may promote the establishment/strengthening of regular dialogue
and close relations on political and security matters; gradual
liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital; economic
cooperation with a view to encouraging economic and social development
and regional economic integration; social, cultural and human
dialogue. The legal base for the conclusion of the association
agreements is provided by Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU). The Treaty on European Union (TEU)
makes a specific reference to agreements with neighbouring countries
in Article 8(2).
The concept of "advanced status" under
the Association Agreements means a strengthening of political
cooperation and new opportunities in economic and trade relations,
progressive regulatory convergence as well as strengthened cooperation
with certain European agencies and programmes.
DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AREA (DCFTA)
A free trade agreement covering a wide array of trade-related
issues ("comprehensive") and aiming at eliminating "behind
the border" obstacles to trade through processes of regulatory
approximation, thus partially opening/extending the EU internal
market to the other party. It is currently offered only to ENP
countries.
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY (ENP)
Proposed by the Commission in 2003-2004 as a framework
policy through which an enlarged EU could strengthen and deepen
relations with its 16 closest neighbours (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova,
Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine)
with a view to counteracting risks of marginalisation for the
neighbouring countries which had not participated in the historic
2004 enlargement and therefore ensuring the strengthening of a
shared area of prosperity, stability and security. A review of
the ENP is scheduled for adoption in April 2011.
ENP ACTION PLANS
These documents are negotiated with and tailor-made
for each country, based on the country's needs and capacities,
as well as their and the EU's interests. They jointly define an
agenda of political and economic reforms by means of short and
medium-term (3-5 years) priorities. They cover political dialogue
and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related
issues and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice
and home affairs, sectors (such as transport, energy, information
society, environment, research and development) and a human dimension
(people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health).
The incentives on offer, in return for progress on relevant reforms,
are greater integration into European programmes and networks,
increased assistance and enhanced market access.
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD AND PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT
(ENPI)
Since 2007 the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI) is the legal base for assistance to ENP countries
and Russia — supporting the agreed priorities in the ENP
Action Plans, as well as the Strategic Partnership with Russia,
replacing previous instruments for the Eastern Neighbours and
Russia and for the Mediterranean Partners respectively.
BARCELONA PROCESS
Framework policy launched in 1995 by the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the then 15 EU members and 14 Mediterranean
partners as the base for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which
has evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean. The partnership
was organised into three main dimensions: political and security
dialogue; economic and financial partnership; social, cultural
and human partnership. With the introduction of the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) in 2004, the Barcelona Process essentially became
the multilateral forum of dialogue and cooperation between the
EU and its Mediterranean partners while complementary bilateral
relations are managed mainly under the ENP and through Association
Agreements signed with each partner country.
FACILITY FOR EURO-MEDITERRANEAN INVESTMENT AND PARTNERSHIP
(FEMIP)
This facility brings together EIB loans guaranteed
by the EU budget and other services provided by the European Investment
Bank (EIB) to assist the economic development and the integration
of the Mediterranean partner countries. Activities are focused
on two priority areas: support for the private sector and creating
an investment-friendly environment.
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (EIB)
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the European
Union's financing institution. Its shareholders are the 27 Member
States of the Union, which have jointly subscribed its capital.
The EIB's role is to provide long-term finance in support of investment
projects. Inside the European Union the EIB supports the EU's
policy objectives in the following areas: small and medium-sized
enterprises; cohesion and convergence; the fight against climate
change; environmental protection and sustainable communities;
sustainable, competitive and secure energy; the knowledge economy;
trans-European networks. Outside the EU, the EIB is active in
over 150 countries to implement the financial pillar of EU external
cooperation and development policies (private sector development,
infrastructure development, security of energy supply, and environmental
sustainability).
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
(ERBD)
established in 1991 in response to major changes
in the political and economic climate in central and eastern Europe,
the ERBD is an international financial institution that supports
projects from central Europe to central Asia by investing primarily
in private sector clients whose needs cannot be fully met by the
market, with a view to fostering transition towards open and democratic
market economies. Its area of operations has been recently extended
to Turkey.
FRONTEX
Is the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union. Based in Warsaw, it is a specialised and independent
body tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between
Member States in the field of border security.
MAGHREB
The term generally refers to the five North African
countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania,
plus the disputed territory of Western Sahara — although
it is most commonly used for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
MASHREQ
This refers to the region of countries to the east
of Egypt and north of the Arabian Peninsula (Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, and the occupied Palestinian territory), although it is
commonly used to include Egypt as well.[37]
30 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119145.pdf
for the full text of the Declaration. Back
31
The Communication includes a useful glossary of terms, which explain
the nature of the European Neighbourhood Policy and other central
elements, and which is reproduced at the Annex to this chapter
of our Report. Back
32
The full declaration is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119780.pdf. Back
33
See headnote: (29029) -: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 2 (7 November
2007). Back
34
See Stg Co Deb cols 3-18, 22 January 2008: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmgeneral/euro/080122/80122s01.htm. Back
35
See headnote: HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008). Back
36
See HC 16-xxix (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008), Annex
1. Back
37
See headnote: see (29704) 9865/08: HC 428-x (2010-11), chapter
16 (8 December 2010), and earlier Reports cited therein. Back
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