53 Restrictive measures against the regime
in Burma
(31494)
| Council Decision 2010/232/CFSP of 26 April 2010 renewing restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar
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Legal base | Article 215 TFEU; QMV
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Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Basis of consideration | EM of 2 June 2010
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Previous Committee Report | None; but see (31405) : HC 5-xiv (2009-10), chapter 5 (17 March 2010); (30854) : HC 19-xxvi (2008-09), chapter 17 (10 September 2009); (30542): HC 19-xiv (2008-09), chapter 12 (22 April 2009); (29621) : HC 16-xix (2007-08), chapter 9 (23 April 2008); (29368) 5401/08: HC 16-xi (2007-08), chapter 9 (6 February 2008); and (29083) : HC 16-ii (2007-08), chapter 21 (14 November 2007)
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To be discussed in Council | 26 April 2010 Foreign Affairs Council
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Committee's assessment | Politically important
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Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
53.1 Starting with Common Position 1996/635/CFSP, the EU has adapted
and strengthened its sanctions regime against Burma over the years
in response to deteriorating circumstances on the ground and the
continuing failure by the government of Burma to make progress
on human rights and national reconciliation. In line with EU sanctions
policy the EU has worked to achieve change in Burma by placing
pressure on those responsible for its policies, whilst minimising
any adverse impact on the general population.
53.2 In 2006, EU Common Position 2006/340/CFSP imposed
the following measures:
a
visa ban and assets freeze against named members of the military
regime, the military and security forces, the military regime's
economic interests and other individuals, groups, undertakings
or entities associated with the military regime and their families;
a
visa ban against serving members of the military of the rank of
Brigadier-General and above;
a
comprehensive embargo on arms and equipment that might be used
for internal repression and ban on military personnel being attached
to diplomatic representations in and from Burma;
a
ban on high-level bilateral government visits at the level of
Political Director and above;
a
suspension of most non-humanitarian aid; and
prohibition
on EU companies making finance available to, or extending participation
in, named Burmese state-owned companies, their joint ventures
and subsidiaries.
53.3 In view of further deterioration of the situation
in Burma, the EU adopted Common Position 2007/750/CFSP on 19 November
2007 (which the previous Committee cleared on 14 November 2007).
This provided for new restrictive measures concerning certain
imports from, exports to and investments in Burma/Myanmar, targeting
its timber and extractive industries, which provide sources of
revenue for the military regime. It also broadened the scope of
the existing restrictions on investment by applying them also
in respect of investment in enterprises owned or controlled by
persons or entities associated with the military regime, and broadened
the categories of persons targeted by the freezing of funds and
economic resources.[224]
53.4 Then, on 6 February 2008, the previous Committee
cleared a revised Council Regulation which
- extended the current restrictive
measures which provide sources of revenue for the military regime
of Burma/Myanmar in respect of;
extending
and updating persons subject to a travel ban;
the
freezing of their assets; and
extending
and updating the list of enterprises in Burma subject to an investment
ban.
- proposed additional restrictive
measures;
an
export ban on the industrial sectors of logs and timber and defined
metals, minerals, precious and semiprecious stones; to include
diamonds, rubies, sapphires, jade and emeralds (the Regulation
will now include finished products with an exemption for personal
items of jewellery);
an
import ban on products from the above mentioned sectors;
an
investment ban on new trade in the above mentioned sectors; and
the
provision of technical assistance or training related to relevant
equipment and technology destined for enterprises in the above
industries in Burma/Myanmar.
53.5 This was subsequently adopted as Council Regulation
194/2008.
53.6 Later, on 21 April 2008, the previous Committee
cleared Common Position 2008/349/CFSP, which renewed the current
restrictive measures on sources of revenue for the military regime
for a further 12 months and amended the Annexes in respect of:
updating
persons subject to a travel ban (with the inclusion of members
of the judiciary) who are responsible for implementing acts of
repression by the regime;
the
freezing of their assets; and
updating
the list of enterprises in Burma subject to an investment ban
by adding a further 30 names to the list.
53.7 The Common Position that the previous Committee
considered on 23 April 2009 essentially extended the existing
Common Position for a further 12 months. Both the list of entities
subject to an asset freeze and the list of persons subject to
an asset freeze/travel ban were updated (e.g. to take account
of changes within the government). Apart from these changes, the
restrictive measures were renewed as they were for a further 12
months.
53.8 In her supporting Explanatory Memorandum of
16 April 2009, the then Minister (Caroline Flint) recalled that
the Council adopted these restrictive measures after the violent
suppression of peaceful protesters in November 2007 the
so-called "Saffron Revolution" as well as the
continued human rights abuses in Burma and detention of over 1100
political prisoners. This was, she again said, consistent with
EU policy to increase pressure on the military regime to enter
into a meaningful and genuine dialogue with the democratic opposition,
whose ultimate aim is the eventual transition to civilian rule
and full respect of human rights, including the release of political
prisoners and recognition of the rights of ethnic communities.
53.9 The then Minister strongly supported renewal
"as it binds the 27 Member States to a robust policy in support
of political change in Burma"; extension for a further 12
months was warranted by the lack of improvement of the human rights
situation and the lack of substantive progress towards an inclusive
democratisation process: "the Burmese military have failed
to meet the demands of the international community and continue
to violate human rights, including by continuing to detain and
sentence democracy campaigners", and that "there are
now estimated to be over 2200 political prisoners."
53.10 Then, in his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 August
2009, the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Mr Ivan Lewis) explained that on 13 May 2009 Aung San
Suu Kyi (thereafter referred to as ASSK) was arrested for violating
the terms of her house arrest:
"This violation was as a result of an American
man who swam across the lake surrounding her house, he says, to
warn her that her life was in danger. ASSK's house arrest was
due to expire at the end of the month and it is widely accepted
that the Burmese authorities are using the opportunity offered
by this event to ensure ASSK cannot participate in elections due
in Burma early next year."
53.11 The then Minister recalled that in June and
July the previous Committee was forewarned that:
should
ASSK be found guilty the EU, with the UK's full support, would
seek to impose further sanctions upon the Burmese regime;
after
much delaying, a guilty verdict was delivered on 11 August; and
under
the proposed new measures, the four individuals overseeing ASSK's
trial would be added to the list of those subject to a travel
ban and asset freeze within the EU; several new entities, most
notably the media organisations responsible for the Burmese junta's
propaganda, would be subject to an asset freeze; and 48 other
entities currently subject to an investment ban had also been
identified to have any assets held within the EU frozen.
53.12 Having explained how the procedures for designating
individuals were fully compliant with fundamental rights and noted
the consistency of these measures with EU policy, often led by
the UK, to increase pressure on the military regime in Burma to
enter into a meaningful and genuine dialogue with the democratic
opposition, with the ultimate aim of the eventual transition to
civilian rule and full respect of human rights, including the
release of political prisoners and recognition of the rights of
ethnic communities, the then Minister concluded by saying that
the Common Position would be adopted on 13 August 2009.
The previous Committee's assessment
53.13 At its meeting on 10 September 2009, the previous
Committee acknowledged the endeavours of the Minister for Europe
to forewarn the Committee, accepted the particular circumstances
that had led to this breach of scrutiny, and cleared the document.
53.14 It also reported these further proposals because
of the widespread interest in the situation in Burma in the House.
53.15 With that interest in mind, the previous Committee
also once again reminded the then Minister that such Explanatory
Memoranda should also outline the wider context, and any action
that had been and was being taken by the government, the EU or
other countries in this instance, in relation to China,
without whose support it was difficult to see these further measures
making any more impact than had the previous ones. The previous
Committee noted that it would have liked to know, for example,
if the situation in Burma had been discussed during the most recent
EU-China Summit; and if so, what the Chinese response was.
53.16 In the meantime, the previous Committee left
it to others to judge what the likely impact of these additional
measures would be, though found it difficult to be optimistic
in the light of a recent US$5.6 billion deal between China and
Burma, with the help of Indian and South Korean companies, to
supply China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with gas for
30 years.[225][226]
The then Minister for Europe's
letter 25 February 2010
53.17 On 25 February 2010, the then Minister for
Europe (Chris Bryant) wrote to inform the Committee that, with
the current EU Common Position on Burma and the restrictive measures
it contains due to expire on 30 April 2010, negotiations to secure
the rollover of these restrictive measures were about to begin.
53.18 After reiterating the circumstances that led
to their imposition in 1996 and recalling the most recent changes
to the EU's Common Position in August 2009, he went on to say
that in late 2009, the Burmese authorities "showed some willingness
to engage with Aung Sang Suu Kyi and the international community",
e.g. in October, Aung San Suu Kyi was permitted to meet the British
Ambassador, in his capacity as the EU representative, for the
first time in six years, and to discuss western sanctions along
with American and Australian officials; and also allowed to meet
US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell in early November.
These "small but welcome developments" were followed
up in December, when Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, representing
the EU Presidency, met his Burmese counterpart in the margins
of the Copenhagen conference, and preparations were underway for
a senior officials visit to Burma:
"However dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi has
since stalled and the regime has failed to engage with the US
or EU on any issues of substance. The recent release of National
League for Democracy Vice-Chairman U Tin Oo, whilst welcome, does
not change the fact that we have seen minimal progress towards
the changes that we are looking for."
53.19 Given that HMG's position was, the then Minister
said, that there should be no easing of sanctions in the absence
of tangible progress, the Government would therefore look for
a renewal of the Common Position for a further 12 months
a position upon which, although formal discussion of the issue
had not yet begun, he said there appeared to be a broad consensus
amongst Member States.
53.20 Responding to the previous Committee's expressed
interest in its earlier reports in UK and EU engagement with other
parties, particularly China, to try and secure change within Burma,
the then Minister also said:
"We continue to actively encourage Burma's regional
neighbours, including China, Japan and members of the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to press for a transition
to democracy. As previously noted, the Foreign Secretary attended
the meeting of the UN Secretary General's Group of Friends on
Burma in September 2009, where he stressed that all members, including
China, must continue to use their influence to encourage the regime
to commit to a path of reconciliation and change. The Prime Minister
subsequently raised Burma with Prime Minister Hatayoma of Japan
on 26 November 2009, and he and PM Hatoyama agreed on the importance
of Aung San Suu Kyi's release and full participation in the democratic
process.
"The Government has repeatedly raised the issue
of Burma with ASEAN members. We engaged the Vietnamese government
both before and as it took over the chairmanship of ASEAN for
2010, making clear how important its robust leadership on Burma
is, and highlighting the need for ASEAN to sustain its calls for
the release of political prisoners and credible elections. The
Foreign Secretary raised Burma with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister
Hai in London on 21 October 2009, and in a letter to the Deputy
Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 2010 as Vietnam
assumed the ASEAN chairmanship. Most recently, the Foreign Secretary
raised Burma with the new Indonesian Foreign Minister during a
telephone conversation on 8 January 2010. Burma remains a key
foreign policy area for the UK Government and we will continue
to do all we can, including through Burma's neighbours, to secure
a transition to democracy."
53.21 The previous Committee thanked the then Minister
for this information and looked forward to hearing about the outcome
of the negotiations, and also updates on supporting actions in
the wider context, particularly regarding China, and the responses
of those approached for support.
53.22 In the meantime, the previous Committee drew
all this to the attention of the House because of the widespread
interest in this matter.
The Council Decision
53.23 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 2 June 2010,
the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(David Lidington) now says that, despite the signs in late 2009
that the Burmese authorities were more willing to engage with
ASSK and the international community, the recently-released new
electoral laws, designed to prevent credible opposition in the
upcoming elections, suggest that nothing has changed. The Government's
position was, he further says, therefore that there should be
no easing of sanctions in the absence of tangible progress and
a renewal of the Common Position (now a Decision) for a further
12 months, which found a broad consensus amongst Member States
and was adopted on 26 April.
53.24 The Minister also notes that the only changes
will be updating the language to reflect the adoption of the Lisbon
Treaty and the list of those individuals/entities subject to these
measures to reflect changes that have occurred in Burma over the
last year. He goes on to say that these measures are consistent
with EU policy, often led by the UK, to increase pressure on the
military regime to enter into a meaningful and genuine dialogue
with the democratic opposition the ultimate aim being
the eventual transition to civilian rule and full respect of human
rights, including the release of political prisoners and recognition
of the rights of ethnic communities.
53.25 The Minister then recalls the previous Committee's
interest in the Government's engagement with others, principally
China, on this matter, and says:
"The Foreign Secretary raised Burma with Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang during his recent visit to Beijing. In addition,
officials at the British Embassy met in March with Chinese counterparts
to discuss the recently announced Burmese election laws. We continue
to encourage China to use its influence to press for genuine political
reform in Burma. China maintains its policy of non-interference
in Burma's affairs, but did agree to a UK instigated Security
Council discussion on recent developments on 24 March. China also
participated in a meeting of the UN Secretary General's Group
of Friends of Burma the following day, allowing Ban Ki-moon to
make a strong statement of concern about the prospects for free
and fair elections in Burma. The Government has also repeatedly
raised the issue of Burma with ASEAN members. For example, we
engaged the Vietnamese government both before and as it took over
the chairmanship of ASEAN for 2010, making clear how important
its robust leadership on Burma is, and highlighting the need for
ASEAN to sustain its calls for the release of political prisoners
and credible elections."
Conclusion
53.26 The previous Committee has normally not
regarded the straightforward extension of existing measures in
response to well-known circumstances as warranting a substantive
Report to the House. But, given the traditionally high level of
interest in the House in developments in Burma, we felt that the
Minister's remarks about the new governments' maintenance of representations
to China and ASEAN warrant one in this instance.
53.27 We now clear the document. In so doing,
we recognise that the Dissolution and consequent lack of a Scrutiny
Committee militated against the Minister withholding agreement
to this Decision until it had been scrutinised by the Committee,
and do not object, on this occasion and in these circumstances,
to the action that he took in agreeing to its adoption prior to
scrutiny.
224 See headnote. Back
225
See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article6809986.ece
for further information. Back
226
See headnote: (30854) -: HC 19-xxvi (2008-09), chapter 17 (10
September 2009). Back
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