56 European Security and Defence Policy
and Guinea-Bissau
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| Council Decision amending and extending Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU)
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| Legal base | Article 28 and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 21 May 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | None: but see (31072) —: HC 19-xxx (2008-09), chapter 6 (4 November 2009); (30551) — HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 12 (29 April 2009); and (29349) — : HC 16-ix (2007-08), chapter 12 (23 January 2008)
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| To be discussed in Council | 25 May 2010 Competitiveness Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
56.1 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office website paints a troubled
and unhappy picture of Guinea-Bissau's move to independence, via
a protracted guerrilla war and then Portugal's own 1974 "carnation
revolution": firstly, one-party rule, then a coup in 1980
which "began a pattern of military coups and instability,
which has persisted until quite recently". That coup was
led by Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, who became the first
directly-elected President in 1994, after the acceptance of multi-party
democracy in 1991 (a presidential democracy which allows for multiparty
politics and an elected national assembly).
56.2 The period from 1998 to 2004 was notable for
a further coup attempt; protracted stalemate between loyalist
and rebel forces; the intervention of troops from neighbouring
Senegal and Guinea, as well as from the regional peacekeeping
force, ECOMOG; elections in December 1999 and January 2000; and
the eventual election of opposition leader Kumba Yala in February
2000.
56.3 The first half of this present decade then consisted
of further manifestations of unresolved tensions between the government
and the military hierarchy: a further attempted military rebellion;
subsequent rule by President Yala "characterised by chronic
political instability"; his eventual deposition in a bloodless
coup in September 2003 supported by all political parties, including
Yala's own; the installation of a businessman as interim President;
and legislative elections in March 2004 in which no party came
out with an overall majority.
56.4 A further period of political turmoil followed
the June 2005 presidential elections, following which ex-President
Vieira eventually emerged as the winner in a close finish, and
was sworn in as President on 1 October; including ex-president
Yala's return from exile in late 2006; and culminating in the
collapse of the government coalition in March 2007. After a stand-off
the opposition leader Martinho N'Dafa Kabi became Prime Minister
in April, and the political situation in the country steadied.
The mandate of the legislature ended on April 21st
2008. The President then passed a temporary constitutional amendment
allowing the continuation of the legislature until further elections
could take place. These occurred on 16 November 2008 and resulted
in a new Prime Minister, Carlos Gomez Junior, being appointed
in January 2009.
56.5 It then notes that, following the March 2009
assassination of President Viera, the interim Head of State is
the parliamentary speaker Raimundo Pereira; and that elections
were due to occur in June 2009. The entry (which was last reviewed
on 1 July 2010) closes as follows:
"In recent months several media reports have
bought to public attention a growing problem of drug trafficking
via Guinea Bissau. Drugs coming from Latin America are being smuggled
to Europe via the country, taking advantage of the mangrove swamps
and jagged coastline, and the poor capacity of the government
to deal with the problem."[240]
Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP
56.6 The preamble set out the context for the proposal
therein:
— the
promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and Europe
is a key strategic priority of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted
by the EU-Africa Summit on 9 December 2007;
— security
sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau is essential for the stability
and sustainable development of the country;
— in
November 2006, the Government of Guinea-Bissau presented a National
Security Strategy underlining its commitment to implement security
sector reform;
— the
Council and the Commission carried out an initial joint information
gathering mission in May 2007 in Guinea Bissau, in cooperation
with the Bissauan authorities, to develop an overall EU approach
to support for the national security sector reform process;
— an
Action Plan for the Restructuring and Modernisation of the Security
and Defence Sectors was presented by the Government of Guinea-Bissau
in September 2007, and the institutional framework for the implementation
of this Action Plan was established;
— in
order to combat the increasing threat posed by organised criminal
networks operating in the country, the Government of Guinea-Bissau,
with the assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), also announced an Emergency Plan to Fight Drug
Trafficking in September 2007;
— a
report by the UN Secretary-General of 28 September 2007(S/2007/576),
whilst commending the Government of Guinea-Bissau for the positive
measures taken so far to implement the security sector reform
programme, also underlined the country's inability to combat drug
trafficking by itself and called for technical and financial support
from regional and international partners;
— on
19 November 2007, the Council considered that an ESDP action in
the field of security sector reform in Guinea Bissau would be
appropriate, in coherence with and complementary to European Development
Fund and other Community activity; and
— following
a second EU fact-finding mission deployed in October 2007, the
Council approved on 10 December 2007 the General Concept for potential
ESDP action in support of Guinea-Bissau Security Sector Reform.
56.7 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 17 January
2008, the then Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Mr Jim Murphy) explained that the Joint Action —
to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) security
sector reform (SSR) Mission in Guinea Bissau (EUSSR Guinea Bissau)
— followed a visit in 2007 by the Ministry of Defence's
Security Sector Defence Advisory Team, and would provide advice
and assistance to the local authorities in Guinea Bissau on reform
of the security sector, within the initial framework of the National
Security Sector Reform Strategy, which now needed to be implemented.
The Mission's tasks would include:
— advising
and contributing to the development of detailed resizing/restructuring
plans for the armed forces;
— assisting
in the development of an underpinning doctrine for employment
of the Armed Forces, including the areas of command, control and
logistic support, and mainstreaming the counter narcotics effort;
— supporting
the development of detailed plans for the restructuring of police
bodies into four services;
— advising
on the planning and development of an effective criminal investigations
capacity.
56.8 The Mission was to comprise approximately 15
experts in the various fields of the security sector; consist
of a preparatory phase beginning in mid February, and an implementation
phase beginning no later than 1 May 2008; and last for 12 months,
with a review six months after the beginning of the implementation
phase. Funding for common costs (in-country transport, office
equipment etc) would be met from the Common Foreign and Security
Policy Budget, to which the UK currently contributed approximately
17%; with an estimated cost of €5.75 million, the cost to
the UK would be approximately £739,000.
56.9 The Minister explained that, with the country
still dealing with the aftermath of civil war, and in the lead
up to November 2008 elections, there was now a good opportunity
to assist SSR in Guinea Bissau, and help to address its use as
a transit point for drugs being trafficked from Latin America
to Europe; there was strong support for the EU's proposals from
the authorities, who lacked the capacity and structures to deal
with the problems caused directly and indirectly by the influx
of drugs and organised crime to the country, and from all political
parties in the country, which meant that the outcome of the elections
should not affect the reform process. He said that, although Guinea
Bissau's problems were large, the country was small,[241]
and enough political will existed to instigate reform.
56.10 The previous Committee felt that the justification
was clear, the Mission had been well-prepared and the costs were
relatively modest, and accordingly cleared the document at our
meeting on 23 January 2008; the Joint Action was then agreed at
the 28 January General Affairs and External Relations Council.
56.11 The previous Committee also said that only
time would tell if the Minister's hopes came to fruition. It noted
that the mission was due to last for a year; that there would
be a mid-point review; and that moves were afoot within the Council
to develop formal assessment mechanisms for such ESDP missions.
It therefore asked, when the mission ended, the Minister to let
it have either the mission assessment and his views thereon or,
if it had not yet been formally assessed, his own assessment of
its outcomes and effectiveness (to include the conclusions of
the mid-point review and steps taken to address them).
56.12 On 29 April 2009 the previous Committee considered
an extension of the current mandate for a further six months until
30 November 2009. The then Minister for Europe (Caroline Flint)
said that the EUSSR Mission had, so far, carried out important
work under difficult circumstances, in particular in the police
and prosecution services. However, overall progress on SSR had
been slower than expected and the Mission had not yet accomplished
its mandate. Political instability in the country had hampered
the mission's progress; the high profile assassination of Guinea
Bissau's Chief of the Armed Forces, General Tagme, along with
President Vieira in March, combined with the difficulties involved
by working with three different governments since June 2008 and
the staging of legislative elections last November, had all distracted
attention from the SSR process. Guinea Bissau's limited access
to SSR expertise and basic infrastructure, such as office space
and equipment, had also contributed to delays.
56.13 However, the then Minister said, there was
no doubt that Guinea Bissau continued to depend on international
assistance to succeed in their SSR process and EU SSR Guinea Bissau
was a crucial part in creating stability. Despite the recent assassinations
and resulting political fragility, the new government continued
"to provide a window of opportunity to implement meaningful
reform, expressing a clear request for continued ESDP engagement
beyond 31 May 2009 and underlining its commitment to the reform
process"; this had been demonstrated by their appointment
of a Special Counselor for the Prime Minister for SSR and the
fight against drug trafficking, and their re-animation of the
national SSR structures.
56.14 The then Minister also noted that other partners
from the International Community, including the United Nations,
ECOWAS and the European Commission, "also continued to express
their willingness to step up their SSR related activities in Guinea
Bissau and to cooperate with the ESDP mission", and were
considering "transferring its various actors in Bissau, including
SSR work streams into a single 'integrated mission' from June
2009."
56.15 The then Minister explained that this would
be a "no cost extension": the Mission would use money
left unspent from the €5.65m allocation under the existing
mandate to pay for mission activities until 30 November 2009;
it would provide the Mission a further six months to fully accomplish
its current mandate, and an opportunity "to test the commitment
and capability of the new Government of Guinea Bissau (G-BG) to
implement SSR, particularly in light of the Presidential elections
planned for June."
The previous Committee's assessment
56.16 The previous Committee cleared the document,
again reporting it to the House because of the widespread interest
in European Security and Defence Policy and its growing involvement
in security sector reform in troubled areas of Africa.
56.17 In so doing, it drew the then Minister's attention
to its request of her predecessor (c.f. paragraph 56.11 above).
It noted that what the then Minister described as "Other
partners from the International Community", including the
United Nations, ECOWAS and the European Commission having expressed
willingness to step up their SSR-related activities in Guinea
Bissau and to cooperate with the ESDP mission, and asked her to
ensure that the review included an assessment of the extent to
which this happened and of its overall effectiveness.[242]
56.18 The Joint Action was extended for a further
six months until 31 May 2010, with the majority of the costs covered
by outstanding funding from the mission's budget for the period
up to 30 November 2009.
56.19 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 2 November
2009, the then Minister for Europe (Chris Bryant) commented in
much the same terms as his ante-predecessor six months earlier.
The assassinations had distracted the Guinea Bissau government's
attention away from the SSR process; officials were often unavailable
to attend pre planned meetings with the Mission to discuss SSR;
and there were a number of delays with getting Government approval
for the proposed restructuring plans for the Armed Forces. The
Mission had therefore not been able to fully achieve its mandate.
But a new President had been elected and sworn in on 8 September
2009. The new government had subsequently expressed its intent
to re-engage in the SSR process, which the then Minister took
"as a sign that the Mission will receive the necessary political
support over the next six months to complete the tasks set out
in its current mandate."
56.20 The then Minister went on to say that:
"as part of any extension there will be a strategic
review on the future of EU engagement in Guinea Bissau that will
be submitted to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) by
the end of January 2010. The review will focus on where, amongst
other International Community interventions, the EU can add most
value to stabilisation efforts in Guinea Bissau in the future.
This review will then form the basis for making an informed judgement
about any subsequent EU engagement in Guinea Bissau after the
end of the mandate of the Mission."
56.21 Turning to the review recent six-month extension,
the Minister said that the report recommended that the Mission
was extended for six months in order to:
- "Reach a better understanding
of plans by the wider International Community (notably the Economic
Community of West African States and the UN) to increase their
presence in Guinea Bissau;
- "To conclude the mission's existing work;
and
- "To build bridges towards further implementation
in the future."
56.22 Finally, on the financial implications, the
then Minister said that:
"Due to the political instability in Guinea
Bissau over the previous eight months and slow progress on SSR
so far the UK has pushed hard for any extension to be of minimal
cost and would not support another extension of the Mission, in
its current form, beyond the end of the proposed six month period.
The extension should be used by the Mission to complete the tasks
of its current mandate (without taking on any additional ones)
and to prepare the conditions for engagement by another SSR actor
in the future."
56.23 Finally, the then Minister explained that the
proposed budget for the six month extension was €1.53 million.
But with the estimated amount left unspent from the current Mission
budget at the end of November 2009 of €1.192 million, the
net cost to the EU for extending the mission was estimated to
be €338,000, including €290,000 to fund the costs of
terminating the Mission should it close in six months time —
so the additional funding for the Mission's running costs would
be €48,000.
The previous Committee's further assessment
56.24 The previous Committee drew this latest extension
to the attention of the House for the same reasons as hitherto.
In so doing it:
— noted
that, three years after the first commitment by the then G-BG
to security sector reform, there was a strong sense of disillusionment
running through the Minister's comments and of this being the
last chance for the latest President and government, but the EU
had yet to lose patience with an ESDP mission and cut its losses;
and
— asked
the then Minister to write with information about the outcome
of the January 2010 review and the PSC's assessment and recommendations,
ahead of any final determination about what form any further EU
involvement may or may not take.
The draft Council Decision
56.25 The attached Council Decision extends the mandate
of EUSSR Guinea Bissau for a period of four months until 30 September
2010, and reduces the number of international staff for that period.
56.26 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 21 May 2010,
the Minister for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(David Lidington) says that this four-month extension has
been proposed in response to a military mutiny that took place
in Guinea Bissau on 1 April, and:
"is intended to demonstrate strong EU support
to the weakened civilian government of Guinea Bissau, allow the
government time to reassert its authority over the military, while
allowing time for the EU to reach a decision on whether the conditions
exist for longer term CSDP engagement."
The Government's view
56.27 The then Minister continues as follows:
"Security sector reform (SSR) is crucial to
the development, security and stability of Guinea Bissau. Since
gaining independence in 1973 the Guinea Bissau military has often
interfered in political affairs, and, unfortunately, continues
to do so; this undermines the authority of the civilian Government.
Guinea Bissau is also a gateway for the illegal narcotics trade
into Europe and there are fears that, without successful SSR,
the country could slip into further instability. As such, a stable
Guinea Bissau would be an important contribution to the fight
against narcotics as well as for the stability of the wider West
Africa region.
"Prior to the events of 1 April, there were
hopeful signs of local engagement with the EU's Security Sector
Reform mission that is intended to support reform and greater
stability. For example, the Prime Minister of Guinea Bissau sent
a letter of intent to the previous EU High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. That is why the UK
agreed, in principle, to support the launch of a new smaller EU
mission from 1 June focused more clearly on reform of the armed
forces.
"However, the deployment of this new Mission
has been put on hold due to a military mutiny that took place
on 1 April. The mutiny not only displayed a complete lack of regard
and buy-in to the SSR process by the military, but it has also
delayed the implementation of the security sector legal framework,
for which EUSSR Guinea Bissau has pushed, and which would have
been fundamental to the success of the future Mission. The President
quickly declared that the situation was under control, yet the
Armed Forces Chief remains incarcerated and no action has been
taken against the mutineers, who remain in positions of power.
It is apparent that the local authorities lack the capacity and
structures to deal with the root causes of instability (international
drugs trafficking and organised crime) themselves. To withdraw
CSDP engagement completely now could further weaken them.
"Following the military mutiny the UK does not
see the case for deploying a longer term mission because this
may be taken as rewarding unconstitutional behaviour. At the same
time, recognising the damage it would do to Guinea Bissau's own
development, security and stability if the Mission were pulled
out immediately, the Government believes that there should be
a period of reflection in order to re-assess conditions on the
ground before making a more informed decision on the future of
CSDP engagement. The Council Decision provides for a review of
engagement two months into the proposed four month extension to
consider whether the EU should launch a new mission after 30 September
2010. If conditions on the ground have not improved and make serious
SSR unlikely, then we believe the EU should consider closing the
mission."
56.28 The Minister then says that one measure of
progress will be the extent to which the Guinea Bissau government
has met the demands set out in an EU demarche issued in April,
which were:
- the immediate and unconditional
liberation of the Armed Forces Chief and all of the other personnel
detained in violation of the law;
- the establishment of the legal responsibility
of and disciplinary measures against those found to be responsible
for the incidents of 1 April and the putting into place of a framework
for the continuation of the reforms;
- the affirmation of the primacy of the civilian
authorities and the legitimate democratic authorities; and
- a guarantee of the respect for all parts of the
Vienna Convention and diplomatic immunity.
56.29 However, he then says:
"It may be that not all of these demands can
be met in full. Specifically, the immediate release of the detained
Armed Forces Chief may not be possible politically. We will continue
to monitor the situation closely, including analysing alternative
solutions such as requesting that the Armed Forces Chief is either
liberated or prosecuted under Guinea Bissau law. This would allow
the President room to manoeuvre and the opportunity to appoint
another, legitimately selected, individual.
56.30 As for the mission itself, the Minister says:
"Under the proposed four-month extension, the
mandate of EUSSR Guinea Bissau would not change but the Mission's
activities and size would both be scaled down. This is an explicit
acknowledgement that, until the current situation is resolved,
there is little chance of the Mission achieving success, but this
approach maintains a CSDP foothold in-country."
56.31 With regard to the most recent extension, the
Minister says:
"We recognise that this does not accord with
the position set out by the then Minister for Europe in his letter
of October 2009 which stated that the UK would not support another
extension to EUSSR Guinea Bissau in its current format. However,
in light of the events of 1 April we have had to revise our position
as the circumstances in which the Mission has been operating have
changed. To bind ourselves inflexibly to our previous position
would be to the detriment of Guinea Bissau itself, and would hand
a victory to the military mutineers."
56.32 Finally, the Minister say that:
— the total cost to the EU to date has
been €7.13 million;
— the amount required for the four-month
extension is €630,000, with the first month of the mission's
extension covered by under-spends on the current budget;
— the UK's contribution to the overall
EU budget is 13.59% meaning that the UK's share of the costs for
this extension is approximately £85,600; and
— the Council Decision is expected to be
agreed at the Competitiveness Council in Brussels on 25 May 2010.
Conclusion
56.33 It is for others to judge whether or not
this is the right approach, given how much has been spent and
how little has been achieved.
56.34 For our part, we note that the Committee
has heard nothing from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about
developments since last November, despite its request to the previous
Minister to write with information about the outcome of the January
2010 review and the PSC's assessment and recommendations, ahead
of any final determination about what form any further EU involvement
might or might not take.
56.35 A further review of engagement is now in
prospect, two months into the proposed four month extension, to
consider whether the EU should launch a new mission after 30 September
2010. We ask the new Minister to let us know the outcome and his
views, so that we are not again presented with scrutinising a
fait accompli.
56.36 In the meantime, the Committee recognises
that the general election and consequent lack of a Committee militated
against the Minister withholding agreement until this Decision
had been scrutinised, and does not object, on this occasion and
in these circumstances.
56.37 We now clear the document.
240 See FCO Country Profile at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/guinea-bissau?profile=politics&pg=7.
Back
241
Area: 36,120 sq km; Population: 1.5 million (2005 United Nations
estimate). Back
242
See headnote: (30551) - HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 12 (29 April
2009). Back
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