13 Cyprus: the Green Line Regulation
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13967/10
+ ADD 1
SEC(10) 1094
| Annual Report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No.866/2004 and the situation resulting from its application
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| Legal base | Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No.866/2004; —
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| Document originated | 21 September 2010
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| Deposited in Parliament | 28 September 2010
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 12 October 2010
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (30977) 13289/09: HC 19-xxviii (2008-09), chapter 12 (21 October 2009); also see (31586) 9284/10: HC 428-iii (2010-11), chapter 14 (13 October 2010)
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| Discussed in Council | To be determined
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
13.1 Since Turkish troops landed in Cyprus in 1974 the island
has been effectively partitioned, with approximately 37% of the
territory of the Republic not under the control of the Government
of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). A "Green Line" buffer
zone divides the island and is patrolled by United Nations forces.
A significant Turkish troop presence remains in the northern part
of Cyprus.
13.2 Pending a settlement of the Cyprus problem,
Article 1 of Protocol 10 of the Act of Accession provides that
the application of the EU's acquis will be suspended in
those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus
does not exercise effective control — that is, the northern
part of the island — while Article 2 states that the Council
should define the terms under which the provisions of EU law should
apply to the line dividing the island (i.e., the Green Line).
Protocol 3 of the Act of Accession puts in place special arrangements
for the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).[51]
13.3 Regulation No 866/2004 established a regime
under Article 2 of Protocol 10 with special rules concerning goods,
services and persons crossing the line between those areas of
the RoC in which the RoC Government does not exercise effective
control and those areas in which it does. The Regulation, which
came into force on 1 May 2004, followed the rejection in April
2004 of the UN's settlement plan for Cyprus (the Annan Plan) by
the Greek Cypriots. To ensure its effectiveness, this also covered
the boundary between the northern part of Cyprus and the Eastern
Sovereign Base Area. Several amendments have been adopted designed
to further facilitate trade across the Green Line, while safeguarding
proper functioning of EU rules and policies within the single
market.
The Commission Report
13.4 The report covers the period from 1 May 2009
to 30 April 2010. It concludes that the Green Line Regulation
continues to provide a workable basis for allowing the passage
of persons and goods to the government-controlled areas of the
Republic of Cyprus.
13.5 A year ago, the total value of recorded trade
across the Green Line during the reporting period amounted to
€6,111,030 compared to €4,473,408 in the previous reporting
period; 30% of which was accounted for by trade in potatoes. In
this period, the Commission notes that the value of Green Line
trade decreased for the first time since the Regulation came into
force in 2004 — by 16.8% down to €5,232,328 —
but says that this has mainly been attributed to a bad harvest
and subsequent fall in the potato trade; excluding potatoes (which
fell from 30% to 14% of overall trade), Green Line trade remained
stable.
13.6 The Commission notes, however, that the overall
scale of Green Line trade still remains limited, partly due to
the restricted scope of the Regulation itself, and partly due
to remaining obstacles to trade. As an example, the Commission
says that Turkish Cypriot commercial vehicles, particularly those
over 7.5 tonnes, cannot move freely across the island. No further
progress is reported regarding other non-tariff trade barriers
either. Many Greek Cypriots are said to be still reluctant to
purchase Turkish Cypriot branded products, causing Turkish Cypriot
traders to struggle to get their products stocked and advertised
in the government-controlled areas.
13.7 The report notes that the smuggling of goods
across the Line (mainly cigarettes, alcohol and seasonal goods
such as game or fire crackers) remains widespread, but has decreased
over the reporting period. Seven criminal cases were filed in
2010 compared to 11 in 2009.
13.8 The Commission states that the control of the
Green Line at the authorised crossing points is satisfactory,
and says that no major incidents were reported in relation to
daily crossings. Although the number of apprehended illegal immigrants
fell by 54% from the previous year, the report also says (as in
previous Reports) that the illegal crossing of third country nationals
still remains an area of concern and (ditto) recommends that surveillance
on the Line between the crossing points conducted by the Republic
of Cyprus and the SBA Administration should be strengthened to
help tackle illegal migration, with particular reference on this
occasion to several unauthorised crossing points near the village
of Pergamos. However, the report also says that there is excellent
cooperation the Republic of Cyprus and SBA Customs and Immigration.
The Government's view
13.9 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 October
2010, the Minister for Europe (David Lidington) says that the
current Green Line Regulation is sufficient to protect the security
of the EU, including by addressing illegal immigration and by
regulating the flow of goods into the single market.
13.10 He continues as follows:
"The Government remains committed to ending
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitating
the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development
of the Turkish Cypriot community. Increased trade between north
and south will contribute to the integration of the island and
reducing the disparity in economic activity between north and
south. It is disappointing, therefore, that overall trade did
not increase this year, even taking the bad potato harvest into
consideration, as highlighted in the report. However, the opening
of the Limnitis crossing (October 2010) should further increase
the scope for legal movement of people and goods across the Green
Line."
13.11 In the event of a comprehensive settlement
to reunite Cyprus, the Minister notes that the Green Line Regulation
would become null and void, "and free trade would flourish
between the two communities." He recalls the direct negotiations
that began on 3 September 2008 between the two leaders in Cyprus
aimed at reunifying Cyprus, which he describes in similar terms
to those used by his ante-predecessor a year ago — "arguably
… the best opportunity in a generation to finally achieve
a comprehensive and durable Cyprus settlement, which all Cypriots
can accept" — and says that the UK will continue to
engage closely with all parties, in the region and wider, to support
the efforts of the two leaders.
13.12 The Minister also observes that the continued
implementation of the Regulation does not have significant financial
implications for UK public expenditure or the EU budget; though
the Regulation "already imposes additional monitoring requirements
on the Sovereign Base Areas Administration … the Government
considers that this is consistent with their other activities."
13.13 Finally, the Minister says that the Commission
has presented the report to the Council's "Ad Hoc Working
Group on the follow-up to the Council Conclusions on Cyprus of
26 April 2004", and that no further action is planned.
Conclusion
13.14 Though the report raises no questions,
we note that the Minister makes no mention of the wider perspective,
particularly the continuing failure to reach agreement on the
implementation of long-standing proposal to permit direct trade
between the EU and the Turkish-occupied part of the island and
its wider ramifications; or of the election of a new leader of
the Turkish Cypriot community in April, who is widely seen as
more hard-line than his predecessor and who is quoted on his recent
visit to Brussels as talking of the EU's "historic responsibility
to encourage the Greek Cypriot side to come to the negotiating
table" and of implementation of the direct trade proposal
as essential to persuading the Greek Cypriot leadership of the
need to compromise.[52]
13.15 As in previous years, we draw the Commission
report to the attention of the House because of the widespread
interest in developments in Cyprus, and clear the document.
51 For the Committee's consideration of the latest
Commission Report on the special arrangements for the SBAs, see
(31586) 9284/10: HC 428-iii (2010-11), chapter 14 (13 October
2010). Back
52
See European Voice of 16 September 2010, page 3. Back
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