1 Introduction
1. In his evidence to us, the Minister for Europe,
David Lidington, described the purpose of the "referendum
lock" in Part 1 of the EU Bill as follows:
The point of having the referendum lock is to guard
against the risk that, in future, powers would be transferred
to the European Union, without the consent of the British people
in the way that has happened in the past. I very much want to
see the UK not only remaining a member of the EU, but being a
very active participant as well. One of the difficulties in us
taking on that role with confidence has been the fact that people
in this country feel that vital decisions have been taken in the
past, about which they were not consulted and about which they
ought to have had a say, and about which the populations of other
European countries have been able to have a say.[1]
2. At the conclusion of his evidence, he added:
I think [Part 1 of the Bill is] a lot more than a
de minimis measure. I think that the introduction of additional
powers for Parliament to insist on giving its assent before certain
decisions are taken, and the new powers for the people to have
the final say over any future proposal to transfer competence,
are very significant changes to our law. What is true is that
the Bill does not set out to revisit previous treaties or the
existing legal order as regards the directly effective nature
and primacy of European Union law in this country.
What the Bill is doing is delivering two of the Government's
commitments under the coalition programme. It brings in legislation
to require a referendum before transfers of competence and to
require primary legislation before passerelle clauses are
used. Secondly, it delivers on what was in the coalition programme
simply as an agreement to consider the case for a sovereignty
Bill—that Bill is being introduced by the means of clause
18. There was a third limb to the coalition programme's commitments
on Europe, which was to examine the balance of competencies between
this country and the European Union and, in particular, to examine
ways in which the operation of the Working Time Directive could
be made less onerous. That work is going on.[2]
3. But
the Government has made plain that there will not be a referendum
under Part 1 of the Bill in the lifetime of this Parliament.[3]
And the Explanatory Notes to the Bill (the Explanatory Notes)
emphasise that the Government's consent to a proposal in Brussels
is an important pre-condition to triggering the referendum lock:
A referendum would only be required if the Government
of the day wanted to support the change to the TEU or TFEU in
question. If the Government of the day did not want to support
the change in question, it would block the proposal at the negotiations
stage. As all of the types of Treaty change that are to be
subject to the referendum provisions will have to be agreed by
unanimity at the EU level, the proposal could not form part
of a new Treaty or a Treaty change—and there would then
be no need for a referendum—if the Government did not support
such a change.[4] (Emphasis
added.)
4. The approach this Report takes is to explain in
chapter 2 what Part 1 of the Bill sets out to do and then to summarise
it; in chapter 3 to examine Part 1 for gaps in the constitutional
safeguards it introduces, and to consider other legal concerns;
in chapter 4 to look at the practicalities of implementing the
referendum requirements; and in chapter 5 to look at the impact
of Part 1 on UK-EU relations. Chapter 6 contains our evaluation
and conclusions.
5. This is the second of two Reports which we have
produced on the European Union Bill. This Report draws on evidence
published as Volume II of our Tenth Report of Session 2010-11,
The EU Bill and parliamentary sovereignty. Where this occurs
the footnotes to the text make clear that references relate to
Volume II of the Tenth Report (HC 633-II). Further written evidence
has been received and oral evidence taken since we published the
Tenth Report. The oral evidence sessions with Professor Simon
Hix, Professor of European and Comparative Politics, London School
of Economics and Political Science; Professor Ken Minogue Professor
Emeritus at the Department of Government, London School of Economics
and Political Science; and Sir John Grant, former UK Permanent
Representative to the European Union, are published in Volume
II to this Report along with further written evidence. This Report
is concerned with the provisions of Part 1 of the Bill. Where
evidence relates to the subject of our earlier Report—the
Bill's Parliamentary sovereignty clause and the question of binding
of future parliaments—it is published but not commented
on.
1 Q 154 (HC 633-II) Back
2
Q 193 (HC 633-II) Back
3
The Coalition: Our programme for government, page 19 Back
4
Paragraph 15 of the Explanatory Notes Back
| 
