Conclusions and recommendations
PROGRESS AFTER THE MILITARY SURGE
The surge and civilian safety: losing hearts and
minds?
1. We
conclude that it is a matter of considerable concern that civilian
casualties in Afghanistan have risen so sharply since the start
of the military surge. While much of this can be attributed to
insurgents as opposed to Coalition Forces, the overall effect
of more troops on the ground, at least in the short term, has
been one of heightened instability and suspicion of ISAF forces.
We welcome recent attempts to modify rules of engagement to try
to ensure both troop and civilian safety, but we are concerned
that in terms of Afghan perceptions this may amount to too little,
too late. We are also concerned that some recent reports suggest
that operations are becoming more, not less aggressive. (Paragraph
28)
2. We conclude that
while large numbers of Coalition Forces may be able to clear areas
of insurgents, and hold the territory gained, we are more sceptical
about the efficacy of the 'build' phase of operations in which
aid is distributed with a view to 'winning hearts and minds'.
(Paragraph 29)
Tactical rather than strategic success?
3. We
conclude that although UK forces, alongside their Afghan and ISAF
partners, may have achieved a series of tactical successes, the
security situation in Afghanistan as a whole remains precarious.
We have gained the impression that the focus on tactical military
gains in specific provinces is in danger of obscuring the very
real security and other strategic challenges which exist beyond
the immediate military campaign elsewhere in Afghanistan and in
other aspects of the economy, politics and the state. (Paragraph
35)
Helping or hindering the push towards political
reconciliation?
4. The
military surge remains at the heart of US policy in Afghanistan
and it is one that has been strongly supported by the British
Government. However, it is clear that the surge and military pressure
alone are not enough to bring security and stability to Afghanistan.
We are concerned that attempts to create the conditions for security
transfer to Afghan forces have resulted in an escalation of the
counter-insurgency campaign which has had a negative effect on
Afghan civilians and prospects for political reconciliation.
(Paragraph 38)
A SELECTIVE PAKISTANI APPROACH TO THE INSURGENCY?
5. We
conclude that it was inappropriate and unhelpful for the Prime
Minister to have made negative remarks about Pakistan's record
on counter-terrorism in India. Nonetheless, we further conclude
that the substance of his concerns remain pertinent. (Paragraph
54)
The West's lack of political leverage
6. We
conclude that the continuing existence of Pakistani safe havens
for Afghan insurgents makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for ISAF's counter-insurgency campaign to succeed. It is of considerable
concern that the UK is in a situation where, along with its key
ally the US, it is reliant upon, but appears to have little influence
over, Pakistan, considering the capacity of that country substantially
to affect the longer-term prospects for peace in Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 61)
Direct US action in Pakistan
7. The
ability of insurgents in Pakistan to carry out attacks against
Western interests is a major concern. We conclude that drone attacks
are already a high risk strategy and we further conclude that
the use of ground attacks, without the express consent of the
Pakistani government could significantly undermine the Pakistani
government's authority, provide militants with an excuse for targeting
Western interests, and have the unintended consequence of significantly
escalating tensions between Pakistan and the West. We strongly
urge the Government to do all that it can to ensure that future
US policy on Pakistan does not further undermine the stability
of the Pakistani state. (Paragraph 64)
TRANSITION TO AFGHAN CONTROL
Progress on security transition
8. We
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
explains what planning is currently being undertaken across different
Departments on scenarios for UK engagement in Afghanistan after
2015. (Paragraph 70)
9. We conclude that
in spite of substantial amounts of money being made available
to train and develop the Afghan National Security Forces, and
the obvious commitment and effort of UK and other personnel engaged
in training and security transition, serious questions remain
as to the quality of the force that will eventually emerge. It
is regrettable that the issue of quality was not dealt with at
an earlier stage in the international community's intervention
and that it still appears to be playing second fiddle to force
generation. Given that, despite considerable efforts, there can
be no guarantee that the Afghan National Security Forces will
necessarily be able to cope after ISAF withdraws, we further conclude
that it is even more vitally important to pursue, swiftly, a process
of political reconciliation. (Paragraph 77)
10. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government sets out what steps
it is taking to ensure that the withdrawal of NATO allies from
Afghanistan in the coming months and years, and after withdrawal
in 2014, does not result in unacceptable and additional military
and financial burdens falling upon the UK. (Paragraph 79)
Civilian transition: bolstering the Afghan state?
11. We
conclude that despite 10 years of international assistance designed
to bolster the Afghan state, the international community has not
succeeded in materially extending the reach and influence of the
central Afghan government or in improving governance more generally.
We further conclude that the current international approach has
yet to fully reflect Afghanistan's history, regional differences
and realities on the ground, and is in danger of failing despite
the vast sums of money expended. We believe that it is only right
and proper that responsibility for Afghan affairs rests primarily
with the Afghans themselves, and this should and will eventually
reflect the complex and diverse nature of Afghan society. (Paragraph
97)
PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT?
12. We
conclude that the predominance of the belief that negotiations
cannot commence until the insurgency has been defeated militarily
is a matter for considerable concern, particularly given that
the prerequisites for such a defeat do not appear currently to
exist. (Paragraph 116)
What role for the UK?
13. We
conclude that the US is facing a rapidly closing window of opportunity
to push ahead with political reconciliation through which it can
help to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and the wider
region and, in the process, ensure that the sacrifices made by
allies and Afghans alike are not in vain. We further conclude
that the UK Government is to be commended for its support of political
reconciliation, but recommend that it re-double its diplomatic
efforts to bring whatever influence it can to bear on the US to
highlight the need for US leadership on the issue of reconciliation.
(Paragraph 123)
14. We conclude that
the UK's influence and role in respect of Pakistan is probably
limited when it comes to reconciliation in Afghanistan. However,
it is in the UK's national interests, far more so than in those
of the US, to see a strong and democratic Pakistan emerge. For
this reason, it is imperative that the UK encourages the US to
adopt a policy in relation to Pakistan which takes account of
Pakistan's security concerns and which therefore may help to induce
Pakistan's constructive role in reconciliation in Afghanistan.
We are under no illusion about the difficulties involved in this,
not least because the UK can only exercise limited influence over
the US and because both the UK and US policies in the past have
not resulted in significant shifts in Pakistan's position on the
Afghan Taliban. (Paragraph 131)
15. We conclude that
the UK Government is to be commended for its advocacy of a regional
approach to political reconciliation, and we recommend that the
FCO continues to make the case to its allies for their wholehearted
support in this respect. (Paragraph 136)
Prospects for success
16. We
conclude that at present the conditions for a political settlement
do not exist, not least because the international community's
approach is incoherent, Afghan leadership is not sufficient, the
US approach is overly focused on re-integration at the expense
of reconciliation and, in the resulting political vacuum, regional
powers and Pakistan in particular, are forging ahead with their
own agendas on reconciliation, not necessarily in the interests
of Afghanistan or the wider region. (Paragraph 142)
THE DEBATE OVER DEADLINES
Who made the decision on the 2015 deadline?
17. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government explains
why the decision to announce a deadline for British combat withdrawal
in 2015 was not taken within the National Security Council. (Paragraph
156)
18. We conclude that
the Government's policy statements on the withdrawal of combat
forces are inconsistent and we invite it to explain why there
was such a sudden and dramatic shift in policy in favour of an
arbitrary deadline. We recommend that in its response to this
Report, the Government explains what political and international
factors prompted the Prime Minister to decide upon 2015 as a deadline,
what the security rationale is, what advice he received from the
military in advance of this decision, and what consultations the
UK had with the US on this specific issue. (Paragraph 157)
The possible consequences of announcing deadlines
19. We
are concerned that Pakistan may feel that its security interests
in connection with Afghanistan are not being adequately addressed
by the West, partly as a result of the US announcement that their
troops will begin to draw down in July 2011. We therefore call
on the FCO to work with its counterparts in the US State Department
with a view to better understanding how to reassure Pakistan that
the West takes seriously Pakistan's genuine concerns about the
future stability of Afghanistan and the impact of what it perceives
to be a precipitate withdrawal of Western military forces. (Paragraph
166)
The debate over deadlines: assessment
20. We
conclude that the security rationale behind the Government's decision
to announce the 2015 deadline for the unconditional withdrawal
of UK armed forces from combat operations in Afghanistan remains
unclear and that there are a number of potential risks inherent
in such an approach. We further conclude that as the decision
has now been taken and could not be reversed without causing irreparable
damage to the UK's standing at home and abroad, the task must
be to ensure that the 2015 deadline has the effect of focusing
both Afghan and international minds on the core tasks at hand.
It is crucial, in this respect, that if the risks of using deadlines
are to be minimised, there must be a concerted UK and US push
forward on a genuine process of political reconciliation and a
more effective and co-ordinated campaign designed to reassure
Afghans that the focus of international engagement in Afghanistan
may change in 2015, but Afghanistan will not simply be abandoned.
It should remain a place in which the international community
has obligations and interests. (Paragraph 176)
ASSESSING THE SUITABILITY OF THE UK's MISSION
AND GOALS
Protecting UK national security: the core mission
in Afghanistan?
21. We
conclude that there is evidence to suggest that the core foreign
policy justification for the UK's continued presence in Afghanistan,
namely that it is necessary in the interests of UK national security,
may have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited
strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Although the Government disputes
this, we are seriously concerned that this fundamentally important
assessment appears to be based on intelligence that has not been
subject to parliamentary scrutiny. (Paragraph 184)
Are the UK's goals appropriate and achievable?
22. We
conclude that the evidence presented to us suggests that the current
full-scale and highly intensive ISAF counter-insurgency campaign
is not succeeding. We question the fundamental assumption underpinning
this approach, namely the idea that success in Afghanistan can
be 'bought' through a strategy of 'clear, hold and build'. The
distinction between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which is so often
overlooked or confused in current debates, is crucial to generating
appropriate policy responses in Afghanistan. We question the Government's
logic that a full-scale counter-insurgency campaign aimed at the
Taliban is necessary to prevent al-Qaeda returning or that it
could ever succeed. (Paragraph 193)
23. We cannot overestimate
the importance of direct US support for, and leadership of, a
process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. If the US
wishes to disengage its forces from Afghanistan, it must first
engage more fully, and swiftly, with the process of political
reconciliation. Given that the pre-requisites for a successful
military campaign are currently lacking, we conclude that the
US should not delay its significant involvement in talks. Without
the US's support for talks with the Taliban leadership, there
can be no longer-term peace in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 197)
24. Given the significant
governance and security challenges which exist, and the limited
timeframe in which the UK is seeking to achieve the key goal of
political reconciliation in conjunction with its Afghan and international
partners, we recommend that in its response to this Report, the
Government explains the basis upon which a political settlement
can be reached which supports human rights and the rule of law,
within the framework of the existing Afghanistan constitution.
(Paragraph 198)
25. We conclude that
of all the UK Government's stated goals, the pursuit of a political
settlement is arguably the most relevant and most appropriately
framed. Regrettably, we see few signs that progress is being made
on this front but we continue to be of the view that an Afghan-led,
but US driven, process of political reconciliation is the best
remaining hope that the UK and others have of achieving an honourable
exit from Afghanistan, of achieving an outcome that serves as
a tribute to the sacrifice of British and other troops, and that
helps to justify the billions of pounds and dollars that have
been spent in and on Afghanistan. (Paragraph 199)
26. We conclude that
the evidence presented to us suggests that despite the significant
resources that have been invested in Afghanistan, and the enduring,
wholehearted and admirable commitment and sacrifices of British
personnel, the UK has not yet achieved its stated goals. This
is in no way a criticism of British personnel who are risking
their lives on a daily basis in Afghanistan, and whose efforts
are rightly described in so many instances as heroic. Nor does
it mean that nothing has been achieved in the 10 years since the
US-led intervention. There have, for instance, been significant
improvements in education, especially for girls, and in the fields
of health, telecommunications, human rights, and media freedom.
However, at a strategic level, we seriously question whether the
efforts expended towards these ends have a direct connection to
the UK's core objective, namely the national security of the UK
and its allies and we also question whether the ambitious aims
of the Government and the international community more widely
are achievable. (Paragraph 201)
COMMUNICATING THE CASE EFFECTIVELY?
Communicating the campaign in Afghanistan
27. The
importance of clearly communicating to Afghans why the international
community remains in Afghanistan and what its role will be over
the longer term is crucial, particularly given the announcement
of deadlines for combat withdrawal by a range of ISAF countries.
We are particularly concerned, therefore, that international efforts
in this regard appear to be failing. We recommend that the Government
stress to ISAF partners the importance of addressing this as a
matter of urgency and of ensuring that the presence of international
forces in Afghanistan is recognised as an important part of the
problem. (Paragraph 205)
28. We recommend that
in its reply to this Report, the Government reports on what progress
has been made in improving its strategic communications in Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 208)
Communicating the campaign to British audiences
29. We
recognise the difficulties involved in trying to develop a narrative
on intervention in Afghanistan that satisfies different audiences,
both domestic and international. However, the Government's current
national security narrative is out of step with the current situation
and, in light of the announcement of 2015 as a date for combat
withdrawal, now out of line with the general thrust of UK policy.
The 2015 date jars with the Government's national security justification
which signals something very different; namely that the UK must
do whatever is necessary to secure the safety of British interests.
The two positions are not compatible and send mixed messages to
the public. We recommend that the Government review its strategic
communications strategy as a matter of urgency to ensure that
public messages provide certainty about future plans, but also
highlight that the ultimate UK goal is a political settlement
in the pursuit of peace. (Paragraph 212)
Parliamentary engagement on current and future
plans
30. We
welcome the Government's attempt to engage more pro-actively with
parliamentarians on Afghanistan. We therefore regret that the
Prime Minister used media interviews to reveal the 2015 withdrawal
date and to raise the possibility that British combat troops could
begin to be withdrawn as early as 2011, rather than announcing
this significant development in Government policy in the first
instance to Parliament. We recommend that in future all such significant
announcements should be made to Parliament first. (Paragraph
214)
OVERARCHING ISSUES OF CONCERN
Who's driving British policy on Afghanistan?
31. We
conclude that there are grounds for concern over the relationship
between the military and politicians. We further conclude that
this relationship has, over a number of years, gone awry and needs
to be re-calibrated. Military advice is of course, vital, but
it must be appropriately balanced against a full spectrum of advice
from other relevant sources. In this respect, we welcome the creation
of the National Security Council as an institutional mechanism
through which the FCO has a greater opportunity to influence the
strategic direction of the UK's Afghan policy, to work with other
relevant Whitehall Departments, and more generally to ensure that
there is genuine unity of effort within the Government's approach.
However, we believe that problems in Afghanistan highlight the
need for a corresponding cultural shift within Whitehall to ensure
that those charged with taking foreign policy decisions and providing
vitally important political leadership are able to question and
appraise military advice with appropriate vigour. (Paragraph
224)
The need for realistic goals and honest assessments
of progress
32. We
accept the understandable desire to recognise progress in Afghanistan,
but we conclude that some of the language used by the military,
in particular, risks raising expectations beyond a level that
can be sustained over the longer term. It is useful to remember
that Helmand accounts for only 3.5% of the population of Afghanistan,
and those living in areas under the control of UK armed forces
make up only 1% of the population. Therefore, while successes
in Helmand should be recognised, the overwhelming focus on this
province in official British assessments inevitably obscures the
challenges which exist elsewhere in Afghanistan, and in which
the UK, as a coalition partner, has a considerable stake. (Paragraph
227)
Practical constraints on UK action
33. We
are concerned about evidence that suggests that the impact that
FCO staff are having in Afghanistan is severely constrained by
a relative lack of language training and skills, short tour lengths,
and the limited access that many staff have to ordinary Afghans.
We are also concerned about the recent lack of direct country
experience among FCO staff in London who are involved in directing
and implementing policy on Afghanistan. We recommend that in its
response to this Report, the Government sets out what it is doing
to address these shortcomings. (Paragraph 234)
LEARNING LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
34. We
recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO sets out
what specific lessons it has learnt thus far from its engagement
in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 240)
35. We conclude that
there are numerous lessons that must be learned from the intervention
in Afghanistan which are beyond the immediate scope of this Report.
We recommend that, at an appropriate point in the future, when
British combat operations have ceased, a full and comprehensive
public inquiry into the Government's policy towards Afghanistan
be conducted. It should include, but not be limited to, the decision
to deploy to Afghanistan in 2001, and Helmand in 2006, civil-military
relations both in Whitehall and on the ground, the efficacy of
the comprehensive approach, the appropriateness of the counter-insurgency
doctrines deployed, the adequacy of resources provided, the decision
to set a timetable for withdrawal, and what conditions should
apply in the future before the UK enters into a multinational
military effort. (Paragraph 241)
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