4 Transition to Afghan control: creating
the conditions for withdrawal?
65. The success of the Government's strategy and
of the broader ISAF counter-insurgency campaign depends on more
than just the military campaign. The other two key components
are the creation of Afghan National Security Forces capable of
maintaining security after ISAF withdraws, and a governance structure
which is equally capable of withstanding pressure and, crucially,
of delivering justice and fairness for Afghans. We consider the
prospects for each below.
Progress on security transition
66. As we noted above, one of the UK's key goals
in Afghanistan is to help create security conditions that will
enable the withdrawal of UK combat troops by 2015. This necessitates
the establishment of Afghan National Security Forces that are
capable of maintaining security when ISAF withdraws. The UK's
position is broadly in line with President Karzai's desire, as
set out in his 2009 inaugural address, to ensure that Afghan forces
are capable of taking over lead responsibility from ISAF for security
in all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces by 2014. The UK supports
plans for a phased security transition by 2014 which received
formal international endorsement at the Kabul Conference in July
2010 and at NATO's Lisbon Summit in November 2010.[104]
UK CONTRIBUTION
67. To this end, the UK provides, or is the process
of providing, 160 military personnel and three civilian secondees
to the 1,300-strong NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A)
which is in charge of generating and building the capability of
the Afghan National Security Forces.[105]
The UK leads the Combat Arms Directorate, as the principal nation
supplying the Infantry Branch School. It also provides personnel
to the Afghan Defence University, the Officer Cadet School, the
Counter Insurgency Academy, and the Non-Commissioned Office Training
School. As a contribution to improving the quality of the Afghan
National Police, the UK provides three police officers to NTM-A
who provide strategic level advice on all aspects of civilian
policing, including the implementation of the Focused District
Development (FDD) programme and the development of police training
curricula.[106] As
of January 2010, the total size of the ANP was 116,856 officers.
The UK also contributes to the EU's police reform mission (EUPOL),
with 13 serving or retired officers currently deployed in Kabul
and Helmand.[107] Officers
perform a wide range of duties including advising the Deputy Minister
of the Interior on police reform, leading the development of a
Police Staff College, heading all of the ANP's anti-corruption
work and mentoring the Head of the Counter-Terrorism Police.[108]
68. In Helmand, personnel are helping the Provincial
Chief of Police develop a provincial policing plan and are building
the criminal investigation department's capabilities at the provincial
headquarters.[109]
The UK has also developed a comprehensive approach to supporting
police development, using resources drawn from EUPOL, the MOD,
police and the military. The Government states that this has allowed
influence to be exerted at the strategic, operational and tactical
levels of policing (provincial, districts and local communities).
Direct training to patrolmen and NCOs is delivered at the Helmand
Police Training Centre in Lashkar Gah, where over 1000 patrolmen
and 25 NCOs have graduated since it opened in December 2009. The
UK military mentors the ANP across the province and UK civilian
police provide strategic advice and mentoring to senior police
leadership in District Police headquarters.[110]
During our visit we were able to see for ourselves training of
Afghan National Army and police recruits in both Kabul and Helmand,
and to speak to British mentors whose work is clearly highly valued
by a wide range of Afghan and ISAF partners. We commend their
efforts.
69. It is not yet clear what roles UK forces will
play in the post-2015 period and what shape and form British engagement
will take, particularly in respect of military training and the
recourse that may be had to the use of Special Forces. Giving
evidence to the Defence Select Committee, the Secretary of State
for Defence said that it was not possible to decide upon this
at the moment as it would depend upon the situation and conditions
at the time.[111]
70. We recommend that in its response to this
Report, the Government explains what planning is currently being
undertaken across different Departments on scenarios for UK engagement
in Afghanistan after 2015.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
71. Although the international community has been
engaged in Afghanistan since 2001, it was not until 2007 that
efforts to build Afghan forces began and, even then, those efforts
prioritised force quantity over quality. In August 2009, our predecessor
Committee detailed a series of criticisms and raised serious concerns
about the quality of recruits, their training and a lack of appropriate
resources, which the Government at the time stated would be addressed
by NTM-A.[112]
72. During our visit we were briefed on the work
of the multi-national, US-led NTM-A team responsible for training
and developing the ANSF. The message was cautiously upbeat. We
were told that in a bid to achieve quality and not just quantity,
increased resources were now being diverted to army training (including
that for non-commissioned officers) and that the US was said to
be spending $2 billion a month through NTM-A for both ANA and
ANP development.[113]
The number of foreign trainers has doubled (ensuring better instructor-pupil
ratios), army and police pay has also increased, literacy rates
are improving, and attrition rates are better.[114]
Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary told us that the Government is
confident of achieving the goal of creating an army of 171,600
troops (currently 149,553)[115]
and 134,000 police (currently 116,856)[116]
by 31 October 2011. Speaking recently, Lieutenant-General (retd)
Sir Graeme Lamb, former Commander of the Field Army at Land Command,
said that "there are absolutely Herculean efforts going on
out there to improve the quantity and the quality of the forces,
and they will make a significant difference".[117]
73. However, the longer-term challenges facing trainers
are of a significant magnitude. As the Foreign Secretary acknowledged,
achieving quality, not just quantity is going to be difficult:
[
] Is the level of training the same level
that you would get in a European or American army? No, it isn't,
because the emphasis here is on driving up the strength as rapidly
as possible, but [
] the quality of training, the quantity
of training and the way in which the troops in the Afghan forces
then gain experience alongside NATO troops are all gathering pace
and improving.[118]
74. Witnesses pointed to other intractable problems
such as the lack of ethnic balance in the ANA and ANP. At present
less than 3% of recruits are from the Pashtun south. As Sir Sherard
Cowper-Coles observed, this can result in a situation in which
the Afghan army "is almost as alien to the farmers of the
Helmand valley as the 3rd Battalion, The Rifles or the 82nd Airborne
Division of the United States Army".[119]
General Sir Nick Parker, the former Deputy Commander, ISAF, recently
told the Defence Committee that it is "incredibly important
to the credibility of the ANSF in the south to get more recruits
from the south".[120]
Achieving ethnic balance in the Afghan National Police (ANP),
which is widely regarded as a Tajik-dominated force, is proving
equally problematic. As Gerard Russell commented, it is "very
hard for those who do not speak Pashtun to do the job that particularly
the police are meant to do, which is to integrate themselves [
]
and establish co-operative mechanisms with the community".[121]
The Foreign Secretary accepted that achieving ethnic balance was
an issue and said it would be important to address this "over
time". However, he added that "it has to be seen against
the context of the very rapid build-up of the Afghan National
Security Forces and the huge improvement in the training of officers
and non-commissioned officers that we have seen over the past
year".[122]
75. A recent survey commissioned by the UN suggests
that the ANP is only slightly more popular than the Taliban in
the south of Afghanistan. It also found that the ANP's popularity
has dropped over the past year from 67% to 48%. Nationwide, 60%
of Afghans reported a significant level of corruption among police
officers, and a quarter reported police favouritism on the basis
of personal connections in the investigating of crimes.[123]
The FCO maintains that whilst the ANP continue to suffer from
serious problems such as corruption, low levels of education,
lack of training, and heavy casualties as a result of fighting
the insurgency, "progress is being made".[124]
However, it also acknowledges "strong leadership from within
the Ministry of Interior is essential to tackle embedded problems
of corruption [...] as well as in providing a clear vision of
the reforms required to build a national police force".[125]
76. Overall, in spite of the progress identified
by the Government and the hard work which is clearly being undertaken
by those in the field to improve standards, many of those who
submitted evidence were unconvinced that the Afghan National Security
Forces would be capable of taking lead responsibility by the end
of 2014.[126] Gilles
Dorronsoro told us that it was going to be "extremely difficult"
to create an Afghan National Army and an Afghan National Police
in the next three or four years, and said he was doubtful that
the Afghan National Army will be able to stop or contain the Taliban
in two years.[127]
Gerard Russell stated:
If you think about the Afghan National Army as
a way to contain the Taliban, it's not going to workfirst,
because the Taliban are already penetrating the Afghan National
Army and the Afghan National Police [and] secondly [because],
the ethnic composition of the army is a real, serious problem.
I don't see how you can train officers in two or three years,
considering that the overall state structure is truly disappearing
in a lot of places in Afghanistan. That is the problem. How can
you build an army without a state?[128]
77. We conclude that in spite of substantial amounts
of money being made available to train and develop the Afghan
National Security Forces, and the obvious commitment and effort
of UK and other personnel engaged in training and security transition,
serious questions remain as to the quality of the force that will
eventually emerge. It is regrettable that the issue of quality
was not dealt with at an earlier stage in the international community's
intervention and that it still appears to be playing second fiddle
to force generation. Given that, despite considerable efforts,
there can be no guarantee that the Afghan National Security Forces
will necessarily be able to cope after ISAF withdraws, we further
conclude that it is even more vitally important to pursue, swiftly,
a process of political reconciliation.
BURDEN SHARING
78. As with so many other aspects of the UK's involvement
in Afghanistan, when it comes to training the Afghan National
Security Forces and transitioning security control, the UK is
dependent upon its allies to contribute towards the achievement
of common goals. At NATO's Lisbon Summit, allies agreed to a district-by-district
phased transition of security control to Afghan forces; and yet,
during our visit, we heard about the very real problems the NTM-A
continues to face filling vacancies for military trainers. In
order for it to sustain its training commitment and remain on
schedule to reach NATO's agreed goals, an additional 760 trainers
are needed. The UK provides seven of the Operational Mentor and
Liaison Teams (OMLTs)[129]
required and has lobbied allies to provide additional OMLTs to
meet the existing shortfall. There are now 22 countries that either
contribute to or have pledged to contribute to OMLTs. However,
as the ANA expands and starts to take the security lead, there
will be an increasing requirement for more. Speaking in December
2010, the Prime Minister stated that if security conditions continue
to improve, the UK might be willing to re-assign some combat troops
into training roles, helping to plug the shortfall.[130]
As the ANA and ANP grow there will also be additional costs involved
in sustaining both forces, which the Afghan government will not
be able to sustain given its limited revenue stream.[131]
On current estimates, it is thought that $6 billion a year would
be needed simply to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces.[132]
As yet, the Government has not provided any details as to what
contribution the UK might be reasonably expected to make and what
form, financial or otherwise, that may take.
79. We recommend that in its response to this
Report, the Government sets out what steps it is taking to ensure
that the withdrawal of NATO allies from Afghanistan in the coming
months and years, and after withdrawal in 2014, does not result
in unacceptable and additional military and financial burdens
falling upon the UK.
Civilian transition: bolstering
the Afghan state?
80. For many years in Afghanistan, following the
West's intervention in 2001, the majority of resources made available
by the international community have been deployed to support military
attempts to defeat al-Qaeda and the insurgency instead of seeking
to use these considerable means to tackle the conditions that
gave rise to, and sustained, the insurgency in the first instance.
Yet the importance to the success of the counter-insurgency campaign
in Afghanistan of leaving in place a legitimate, functioning government
when the West withdraws, cannot be underestimated. As Gerard Russell
states "even if foreign forces could secure Afghanistan today,
they would not be able to secure it forever. In the long-term,
it is the Afghan government which has to achieve the social and
political equilibrium which can sustain permanent peace. [
]
The presence of foreign forces may therefore be a necessary condition
for peace in Afghanistan but it is obviously not a sufficient
one."[133]
A CLIMATE OF DISAFFECTION
81. The current situation is of considerable concern.
Disaffection with the Afghan government has been, and continues
to be, high, despite 10 years of international assistance designed
to bolster the Afghan state. A recent editorial piece in The
Independent stated that:
Again and again in Kabul one hears Afghans say
that the Taliban may not be liked, but that the Afghan government
and its US Allies are increasingly distrusted, even hated, by
the mass of the population. It is this rapidly increasing disaffection,
underestimated by foreign governments, that enables a maximum
of 25,000 Taliban to hold their own against 140,000 US-led foreign
troops in addition to the Afghan government's army and police.[134]
82. In many parts of the country, the Afghan government
continues to be perceived to be corrupt and ineffective, and its
officials unjust, predatory and benefitting from impunity. Second
only to insecurity, bad governance is the issue that most troubles
Afghans who were polled by the Asia Foundation. Its 2010 survey
found that of those who believed the country was moving in the
wrong direction, corruption was cited as a reason for pessimism
by 27% of respondents (up from 17% in 2009). The other main reasons
for pessimism identified by respondents included bad government
(18%) and unemployment (16%).[135]
A Western diplomat quoted recently in the New York Times
stated, "We have metrics that show increased progress but
those positives are extremely fragile because we haven't done
enough about governance, about corruption. 2010 was supposed to
be a year of change, but it has not changed as much as we hoped."[136]
83. A November 2010 report on progress in Afghanistan
by the US Department of Defense stated that within the 124 districts
considered to be key by the Coalition, only 38% of the population
live in areas rated as having "emerging" or "full
authority" Afghan governance.[137]
This reflects no substantial change since March 2010 when the
previous report was published. In key "swing areas",
including Kunduz, Badghis and Ghor, the lack of effective state
structures have allowed power vacuums to develop which Taliban,
local, and other insurgent forces have ruthlessly exploited, stepping
into the breach, and creating powerful systems of shadow government
where none previously existed.[138]
With no-one else to turn to, many Afghans tolerate the Taliban
who "have more staying-power and determination than the Afghan
government's civilian officials and police".[139]
As one commentator stated, "Here's the fragility: the Afghans
don't trust the Americans or the Afghan government yet. They supported
the Taliban for years because it provided a kind of rough justice
and security, and they don't know if the new power structure will
last."[140] The
result, as Christian Aid stated, is that "the Taliban have
de facto control of many districts in the South and the
East and have a strong presence in all the Southern provinces".[141]
84. According to Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, "for
many southern Pashtuns [The Taliban] represent a less bad alternativea
fairer, more predictable alternative than a corrupt and predatory
government".[142]
Jolyon Leslie told us that the international community's response
had been to "vilify that and [say] "No, that isn't real
government. What we can do is bring you real government."
Yet this approach, as Mr Leslie explained, "does not cut
any ice with Afghans at all, because we have not shown them real
government, or we have not delivered it when we promised it, as
they see it. Even where there is not head-on kinetic conflict
between foreign forces and Afghan opposition, that is often what
might swing it".[143]
85. In the north of the country, Ahmed Rashid writes
that Tajik and Uzbek warlords are reported to have become so "rich
and powerful that they barely listen to Karzai". He adds
that Governors of northern provinces have created their own fiefdoms
that are left alone by NATO forces based there, because removing
them would create further instability".[144]
THE IMPORTANCE OF A SOLID LOCAL
PARTNER
86. A successful counter-insurgency campaign depends
upon a solid local partner. As Gerard Russell states, the major
challenge for the stabilisation effort is that of Afghan leadership:
"Can the country's leaders inspire its people to risk their
lives to defeat the insurgency? If they cannot, then it is hard
to imagine that foreigners can inspire them to do soespecially
when those foreigners are present so briefly, and are not perceived
as having delivered on past promises".[145]
87. The Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit
observes that "it is increasingly evident that the absence
of a credible Afghan partner and senior Afghan leadership poses
the greatest threat" to good governance, and that key elements
of the Afghan administration feel that "preventing the discovery
of corruption, criticising Afghanistan's foreign partners, and
perpetrating electoral fraud are the most effective means of clinging
to power".[146]
In a recent article, Richard Haas, of the Council on Foreign Relations,
concluded that "two years of sustained investment and multiple
but flawed elections suggest that the Afghan central government
will not reach the point where it is considered effective and
legitimate".[147]
Others speak of the fundamental conundrum facing the UK and other
states, insofar as they are committed to working with an administration
which appears to be loathed by many ordinary Afghans. Sir Sherard
Cowper-Coles told us that "President Karzai is a much better
man than he is made out to be. He's gone from hero to zero, but
the truth is somewhere in between. He's a great king, but a poor
chief executive".[148]
He added:
Many of his instincts about civilian casualties
and private security contractors are right. He is a true politician,
a true retail politician, who feels what his people feel. He is
just an absolutely hopeless administrator, and he doesn't realise
that governing means choosing. He thinks that governing means
avoiding a choice.[149]
THE LEGACY OF INTERNATIONAL DISUNITY
88. A solid local partner may be a pre-requisite
for success but so too, argued witnesses, are co-ordinated, and
coherent international policies grounded in the realities of Afghan
society which do not inadvertently undermine any progress that
the Afghan state may make. Most were critical of the international
community's track record thus far in these respects. Oxfam pointed
to the problems that had arisen because of the international community's
imposition of a "highly centralised, top-down government
that lacks responsiveness and accountability to Afghans across
the country". It added that, "at the same time, the
role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in conducting development
activities (which should properly be carried out by national or
local state institutions and their civil society partners) has,
in general, contributed to the undermining of the state's role
and perceptions of its legitimacy".[150]
Gilles Dorronsoro stated that Washington's "gravest error"
had been its lack of interest in shoring up the Afghan central
government:
Whatever the official word about fighting corruption,
the international coalition is bypassing Kabul in favour of local
strong-men, on whom it is growing more and more dependent for
protection and logistics, especially in the south. Worse, the
population rejects the militias, which are often brutal toward
civilians, and do little to increase support for Karzai or the
coalition.[151]
89. Mr Dorronsoro added that even inside the Afghan
legal system, "the coalition is choosing its partners at
a local level, skirting the political centre, and that NATO's
Provincial Reconstruction Teams act with total independence from
Kabul, which is often not even informed of their actions".[152]
Matt Waldman argued that it is unsurprising that the Afghan government
has failed to tackle corruption, given that the West has failed
to challenge corruption and has "channelled millions of dollars
to Afghan power-holders it deems politically expedient, regardless
of their records. Many Afghan officials, including those suspected
of corruption, continued to receive large sums of money from various
international actors, including the US Central Intelligence Agency."[153]
He continues:
Graft has been compounded by the allocation of
vast reconstruction funds to Afghan and Western contracting companies
that are wasteful or ineffective, with limited oversight. These
factors have led to a conspicuous and increasing inequality between
a rich elite and impoverished population.[154]
Transparency International lists Afghanistan as the
second most corrupt country in the world. However, written evidence
from the British Aid Agencies Group (BAAG) argues that "given
that every year billions of dollars are directly spent by donor
and troop contributing countries through contracts with private
(international and national) security and construction companies
totally bypassing the Afghan government systems, the international
community is also to blame for the rampant corruption that exists
in the country".[155]
The British contribution
90. The UK Government's strategy for Afghanistan
has long acknowledged the importance of helping the Afghan state
to extend its control and improve its effectiveness. Giving evidence
to the Defence Committee recently, the Secretary of State for
Defence stated that "the Afghans have an unequalled tradition
of fighting spirit, as Britain discovered during its long historical
engagement there, but a very limited history of competent and
honest government".[156]
Working via the FCO in some instances and the Department for International
Development (DFID) in others, the UK Government has provided support[157]
and funding (£175 million, 2010-14) to the Afghan government
via the World Bank-managed, multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund (ARTF). This contributes to the salaries of civil servants,
teachers, doctors and nurses, and to national priority programmes
funded via the ARTF, in education, health, human rights, community
investment and development, infrastructure, and governance. The
Government's written evidence points out that continued support
will help to increase the number of schools in Afghanistan from
just under 11,000 to 16,500, and to increase youth literacy rates
from 39% to 50%.[158]
The Government also provides support aimed at improving economic
policies, tax systems and access to finance and is working with
the private sector to develop key markets.[159]
There has also been a heavy investment in developing the rule
of law and the UK is regarded as a key advocate of working with
the Afghan grain as much as possible and using traditional styles
of justice where appropriate.[160]
The FCO's written evidence acknowledges that "strengthening
the rule of law across Afghanistan is a long-term endeavour. It
will require significant financial and human resources for many
years to come."[161]
91. In Helmand, where much of the British effort
is focused, the Government is keen to show progress is being made
and states that the number of district governors "installed"
has doubled from five to 10 in the past two years, and that there
are 26 Afghan Ministries now represented in Lashkar Gah.[162]
Giving oral evidence to us, the Foreign Secretary argued that
in "very difficult areas of the country such as Helmand",
the fact that state institutions are "there at all"
amounted to a measure of success. He added that it was "vital
that Afghans are able to have confidence that the government are
not corrupt, that they work in the interests of the people",
but acknowledged that "there is much more to do there",
particularly in relation to corruption.
92. During our visit we heard about a range of projects
supported by the UK Government which are having a tangible effect
on the everyday lives of Afghans. These include support for micro-finance
initiatives which have allowed Afghans, including a high proportion
of women, to set up in business and its attempts, through the
PRT in Helmand, to support justice through community-based dispute
resolution mechanisms such as the Justice Sub-Committees of District
Community Councils and the Prisoner Review Shuras in those districts
without prosecutors. The Government told us this helps increase
access to the statutory system and promotes respect for rights
and constraining abuse in both sectors. In addition the UK is
building, equipping and providing training for Lashkar Gah prison
which will conform to international standards. It also run projects
for women and juveniles in prison and has plans to implement a
vocational training programme.
93. However, Oxfam GB's written evidence expressed
concern that "the FCO and others are increasingly prioritising
funding for short-term security activities, using Conflict Pool
funds in Helmand at the expense of longer-term conflict prevention
projects which the funds are intended for." They state that
while there is evidence to suggest that "tackling fundamental
issues such as poverty and injustice can contribute to improved
security and stability in the long term, there is scant evidence
to support the notion that using aid for short-term counter-insurgency
objectives, force protection, or to win hearts and minds is actually
effective".[163]
A similar point was raised by Matt Waldman in his written evidence.[164]
Oxfam adds that "aid used this way tends to be spent inefficiently
and fails to bring real benefits to recipient communities. This
short term, politicised focus also means that less UK aid money
is being spent on programmes that meet Afghan needs and in ways
that can sustainably alleviate poverty and address the underlying
causes of chronic crises."[165]
We asked the FCO to respond to these claims and were told that
it did "not know what Oxfam are referring to". It added:
The FCO, through its contribution to the Conflict
Pool uses funds to help counter the insurgency and reduce and
ultimately prevent conflict in Helmand. Providing the people of
Helmand Province with security from intimidation and violence
is an absolutely critical element of counter-insurgency and long
term conflict prevention. The Conflict Pool fund has increased
funding for long-term security in Helmand from approximately £6
million spend in 2008-09 to approximately £12 million scheduled
spend in the current financial year. Over the same period expenditure
on short term security activities in Helmand has decreased steadily,
from approximately £2 million in 2008-09 to approximately
£600,000 committed spend this financial year. Long term security
projects funded by the Conflict Pool in Helmand include training
the Afghan police in detective and community policing techniques,
upgrading police checkpoints, building prison accommodation in
Lashkar Gah that meets international standards, and the Helmand
Police Training Centre.[166]
94. At a national level, the UK Government's current
approach, like that of its international partners, is to encourage
'Afghanisation', by accelerating the speed at which power and
decision-making is transferred to the Afghan government. To this
end, and as recommended in the communiqué of the January
2010 London Conference, it is progressively to align development
assistance behind national priority programmes, as well as channelling
at least 50% of assistance, through the Afghan government's core
budget by the end of two years. The Afghan government has been
working on a "cluster" system which draws together working
groups of Ministries, to finalise priority programmes. The Foreign
Secretary told us that in terms of progress "some of the
commitments entered into at the time of the Kabul conference in
July [2010] are being met".[167]
However, other witnesses, such as Jolyon Leslie, were more sceptical
as to whether the intense system of international conferences,
compacts and benchmarks were appropriate for the current Afghan
situation, stating that "people sometimes feel that they
are being frogmarched into a process that will unravel inevitably
if it is not on their terms".[168]
BAAG stated: "there is a growing scepticism among many people
in Afghanistan of the value of such conferences, which seem to
make little difference to their lives, or adequately recognise
the challenges that that they face".[169]
Oxfam GB warned that the programmes seemingly failed to acknowledge
the mistakes of the past, and stated that the process "is
already faltering", while Jolyon Leslie told us:
My worry is that we are beginning to believe
our own assumptions. It is going round and round and becoming
a self-fulfilling delusion. I don't mean this in a particularly
negative sense, but someone needs to have the courage of their
convictions and say, "Stop, let's put a spotlight on some
of these goals, on the benchmarks that we have set in the London
conference and on the other milestones", and ask whether
we are doing well enough. We need to have a radical re-look at
how to get out of it. Because it's becoming a holeit is
very difficult to back out of.[170]
95. Gerard Russell stated that:
The array of international interlocutors that
engage with President KarzaiAmbassadors of the five or
six most important troop contributors, especially of course the
US Ambassador; the military and civilian chiefs of NATO in Afghanistan;
the UN and EU special representatives, the special representatives
of 15 nations, and apparently the head of the Central Intelligence
Agencycan [...] cause confusion. When those individuals
fail to deliver the same message to President Karzai, not only
is the message itself undermined but so is the credibility of
the international community.[171]
96. Oxfam also stated that although the amount of
information that the British Government had submitted to the Afghan
Ministry of Finance on its disbursements had been more than that
of most other donors, comprehensive data on where and how funds
are spent, are yet to be published. It added, "given rising
concerns about corruption, timely and accessible information will
go a long way towards reassuring the public in the UK and Afghanistan
that British funds are spent appropriately".[172]
97. We conclude that despite 10 years of international
assistance designed to bolster the Afghan state, the international
community has not succeeded in materially extending the reach
and influence of the central Afghan government or in improving
governance more generally. We further conclude that the current
international approach has yet to fully reflect Afghanistan's
history, regional differences and realities on the ground, and
is in danger of failing despite the vast sums of money expended.
We believe that it is only right and proper that responsibility
for Afghan affairs rests primarily with the Afghans themselves,
and this should and will eventually reflect the complex and diverse
nature of Afghan society.
104 See for example, Declaration by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership signed at the NATO Summit
in Lisbon, Portugal. Back
105
NTM-A currently has around 1,300 international trainers, but is
set to expand to over 2,500 trainers by March 2012. Back
106
Ev 6 Back
107
EUPOL, the EU's police training mission, provides strategic advice
and mentoring for senior officials in the Ministry of the Interior
and ANP, as well as providing training in specialised areas such
as criminal investigation and forensics. EUPOL also works to strengthen
wider rule of law institutions such as the Attorney General's
Office. Back
108
Ev 7 Back
109
Ev 7-8 Back
110
Ev 7 Back
111
Q 364, Q 366 Back
112
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Afghanistan and
Pakistan, paras 66-79 and Response of the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, October 2009, Cm 7702, p
3 Back
113
Ev 35 Back
114
Q 152 Back
115
As at 28 December 2010 Back
116
As at 12 January 2011 Back
117
Oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee, 17 November
2010, HC (2010-11) 554-iv, Q 290. Back
118
Q 152 Back
119
Q 91 Back
120
Oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee, 17 November
2010, HC (2010-11) 554-iv, Q 238. Back
121
Q 121 Back
122
Q 136 Back
123
Reuters, 3 February 2011 Back
124
Ev 7 Back
125
Ev 7 Back
126
See for example written evidence from The Post-War Reconstruction
Unit, Matt Waldman, James Fergusson, Oxfam GB. Back
127
Q 119 Back
128
Q 121 Back
129
OMLTs provide training and mentoring to the ANA. They also serve
as a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces, co-ordinating
the planning of operations and ensuring that the ANA units receive
necessary enabling support (including close air support, casualty
evacuation and medical evacuation). Back
130
Ev 84 Back
131
Ev 7 Back
132
Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Army Colonel John
Ferrari, Deputy Commander for Programs, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
(NTM-A), 16 December 2010 Back
133
Ev 57. See also Q 117 [Gerard Russell]. Back
134
The Independent, 18 December 2010 Back
135
"Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People",
Asia Foundation, 9 November 2010 Back
136
New York Times, 17 December 2010 Back
137
Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,
US Department of Defense, April 2010 Back
138
Q 49 Back
139
Ev 57 Back
140
"Progress in Afghanistan, with caveats", David Ignatius,
The Washington Post, 17 December 2010 Back
141
Ev w8 Back
142
Q 101 Back
143
Q 52; see also Ev w23. Back
144
Ahmed Rashid, "The Way out of Afghanistan", The New
York Review of Books, 13 January 2011 Back
145
Ev 57 Back
146
Ev 23 Back
147
"Let's un-surge in Afghanistan", The Wall Street
Journal Online, 20 December 2010 Back
148
Q 102 Back
149
Q 106 Back
150
Q w13 Back
151
"A London fog on Afghanistan", foreignpolicy.com, 5
February 2010 Back
152
Ibid. Back
153
Ev 52 Back
154
Ev 52 Back
155
Ev w11 Back
156
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Defence
Committee on 15 December 2010, HC (2010-11), 554-v, Q 309 Back
157
Detailed fully in the FCO's written evidence. See Ev 13 et seq. Back
158
Ev 13 Back
159
Ev 12 Back
160
Ev 12-14 Back
161
Ev 14 Back
162
Ev 154 Back
163
Ev w14 Back
164
Ev 53 Back
165
Ev w15 Back
166
Ev 86 Back
167
Q 153 Back
168
Q 29 Back
169
Ev w18 Back
170
Q 54 Back
171
Ev 56 Back
172
Ev w20 Back
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