PART 2: ASSESSING THE UK'S FOREIGN POLICY
APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN|
6 The debate over deadlines
143. The West's exit from Afghanistan has already
begun. The Dutch
were the first to announce their plans to withdraw in 2009, with
the decision taking effect as of August 2010. However, with US
public support for the war in Afghanistan falling, and under pressure
from his party and Congress for troop withdrawals, it was President
Obama's announcement in December 2009 that the US planned to begin
to start troop withdrawals from mid-2011 onwards that substantially
altered the international debate on Afghanistan.
144. Several allies followed suit. In early 2010,
the Spanish government said it would be reasonable to expect Afghanistan
to provide its own security by 2015, although it stopped short
of setting out a formal timetable for its own withdrawal. The
UK was next in June, with an announcement by the Prime Minister
that British forces would not stay in Afghanistan in a combat
role beyond 2015, regardless of the conditions on the ground.
The Prime Minister subsequently stated in July 2010 that the process
of bringing British troops home could begin in 2011.
Although the Government's position is that British combat
forces will not remain in Afghanistan after 2015, it is keen to
stress that the withdrawal will not signal the end of the UK's
engagement in Afghanistan and that civilian and economic support
will intensify as Afghanistan stabilises further.
145. Then in July 2010 Poland stated its intent to
complete its withdrawal by 2015, followed swiftly by an announcement
by Italy in October 2010 that it would start a gradual drawdown
of troops from summer 2011 with the intention completely to withdraw
in 2014. After much domestic opposition to its continued presence
in Afghanistan and protracted speculation as to what its role
there should be, Canada announced in November 2010 that it would
withdraw combat troops in July 2011, although it will maintain
a force of 950 non-combat personnel for a further three years
to train the ANSF. Although no official announcements have yet
been made, Germany is also expected to announce that it will start
to drawdown troops later this year.
Chronology of a changing British
146. As Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron stated
on a number of occasions that he was opposed to setting "artificial
timetables" for withdrawing British troops and said that
any timetables would have to be conditions-based. He is quoted
in the Daily Telegraph in December 2009 as stating that
"we all want to make progress and bring British troops home
as soon as possible but any timetable has got to be based on success
Just over a year later, in January 2010, less than four months
before the General Election, Mr Cameron continued to reject the
idea of setting artificial deadlines for the withdrawal of troops
from Afghanistan, stating, "We want to withdraw troops on
the basis of successon the basis of an Afghan National
Army that's able to take control of parts of the countryrather
than believing there are artificial deadlines where we can do
these things automatically".
147. This continued to be the Government's position
in the weeks immediately after the General Election. On 23 May
2010, during a visit to Afghanistan, the Foreign Secretary William
Hague said, "I don't think it's possible and I don't think
it's wise to set a date". He added that British troops should
be "here for as long as we need to work towards that objective
of Afghans being able to look after their own security. [...]
I don't think setting a deadline helps anybody. I think so much
of what we're doing in Afghanistan, setting targets for people
then to jump through hoops doesn't help them in their work, because
of course sometimes things take longer than you expected".
148. In the same week, the Defence Secretary, Liam
Fox, spoke out in the House against an arbitrary deadline for
the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan, arguing that
this must be done "when the time is right and not to some
arbitrary deadline. [...] [W]e will not turn Afghanistan into
a self-sustaining country if we advertise an early departure".
On a later date in June, the Defence Secretary stated: "I
would love to be able to tell people exactly when we can bring
our troops home, but the decision to do so has to be conditions-based
rather than calendar-based".
On 14 June, in response to a question in the House, the Prime
Minister sent out a similar signal when he stated that "it
is right not to set an artificial deadline about when troops will
149. However, less than two weeks after this statement,
and three weeks after holding a seminar on Afghanistan at Chequers,
the Prime Minister's position shifted when, during a visit to
Canada, he stated his desire to see troops home by the next General
Election in 2015: "I want that to happen. We cannot be there
for another five years having effectively been there for nine
Seeking to clarify the Prime Minister's position the following
day, Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey stated that David Cameron
was "not committing to a firm timeline" and that it
would "depend on the conditions on the ground".
150. In July, shortly before the Kabul Conference
was due to be held, the Prime Minister again stated in response
to a parliamentary question that he did not see a combat role
for British troops in Afghanistan beyond 2015: "let me be
clear. Do I think we should be there, in a combat role or in significant
numbers, in five years time? No, I do not. This is the time to
get the job done, and the plan that we have envisages our ensuring
that we will not be in Afghanistan in 2015".
Confusingly, therefore, on 21 July, the Deputy Prime Minister
told the House that "no timetable can be chiselled in stone".
Yet, by November 2010, Ministers again appeared to be stating
that conditions were irrelevant to the decision to withdraw troops.
Giving evidence to us, the Foreign Secretary made it clear that
the timetable for combat withdrawal was fixed regardless of what
the situation is in 2015. When asked if there was any conceivable
way that the deadline would be altered, the Foreign Secretary
told us: "It won't be changed. The Prime Minister is being
very clear about that".
151. The situation was further confused by the Government's
written evidence to us which stated that "since Transition
is conditions based, timelines cannot be made and it is important
that transition planning does not interfere with the primary task
of providing security to the Afghan people".
We asked the FCO to explain this apparent contradiction and its
response was as follows:
In 2009 President Karzai set an objective that
transition of the security lead across the country should be completed
by the end of 2014. The NATO/ISAF Lisbon Summit in November 2010
endorsed this objective. The Lisbon Declaration said "The
process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and
leadership in some provinces and districts is on track to begin
in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment
and decision. Transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven,
and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Looking to the
end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility
for security across the whole of Afghanistan
means that identifying individual priorities and districts for
transition to ANSF lead will be conditions-based and ISAF and
the Afghan authorities have established mechanisms for this process.
The process is intended to be completed by 2014. The Government
has made clear UK forces will be out of combat by 2015. The latest
ISAF assessments are that the 2014 objective is achievable.
Why the change in policy?
152. Of all the changes made to the UK's Afghan policy
following the election, the volte-face on conditions-based combat
withdrawal outlined above is perhaps the most significant. It
not only has the potential to significantly affect UK mission
goals and British military efforts on the ground but also to influence
the UK's relationship with key allies, particularly the US. It
is therefore imperative that the Government explains what prompted
such a significant change in policy.
153. The Government's response has been to focus
less on the rationale behind the change and more on the benefits
it believes the 2015 deadline can bring about. For instance, the
Prime Minister contends that it is important to send a signal
to both domestic and Afghan audiences "that we won't be in
Afghanistan forever" to give "people some certainty".
The Foreign Secretary told us that by 2015 the UK will "have
been in Helmand for much longer50% longerthan the
entire second world war, so we feel it right to say that, by then,
we will not be involved in combat operations".
He added that the deadline would send a clear signal to allies
and the Afghan government about the UK's intentions.
The Government has also argued that it is "safe" to
say combat troops will be out in 2015 because the coalition forces
planned to hand over to Afghan forces by 2014.
Meanwhile, FCO Minister, Lord Howell, speaking on 21 July had
stated that the deadline amounted to "a firm harness of pressure
on the Karzai government and the Taliban".
In November, the Prime Minister claimed that the 2015 deadline
was an "alternative" to "endless pressure to set
very short-term deadlines for transitioning this province or district
at this time." He added, "I would rather we had a proper-worked
out process and plan to deliver that".
Who made the decision on the
154. In spite of the justifications outlined above,
which emerged in a piecemeal fashion after the announcement, we
were still no closer to understanding the basis upon which this
decision was made and the security rationale behind it, particularly
given that the mission is supposed to be about UK national security.
Therefore, in November, we asked the Foreign Secretary about the
decision-making process that led to this wholesale policy shift.
In response, the Foreign Secretary told us that the decision was
taken by Ministers in the National Security Council and the Cabinet,
led by the Prime Minister.
We then asked who took the decision:
Mr Hague: The decision
was taken by Ministers in the National Security Council and the
Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister.
Was it taken in the National Security Council?
Mr Hague: It was taken
by the Prime Minister in consultation with other senior Ministers,
Were you consulted?
Mr Hague: Yes.
When were you consulted?
Mr Hague: Before the Prime
Minister made his announcement.
Was the Defence Secretary consulted?
Mr Hague: I am sure the
Defence Secretary was consulted, but I cannot tell you when everybody
was consulted. You would have to ask the Prime Minister.
155. In a subsequent evidence session with the Foreign
Secretary, we asked for further clarification as to whether the
decision was taken in the National Security Council:
Chair: ...[I]t would appear
that although the decision to withdraw troops by 2015 at the latest
might have been made by members of the National Security Council,
it wasn't made in the National Security Council. Could you confirm
that it wasn't made in it, and tell us why not?
Mr Hague: Members
of the National Security Council have all discussed and debated
that, and the Prime Minister will be familiar with all their views.
He spoke about our intentions for 2015, with my, the Defence Secretary's
and the Deputy Prime Minister's readiness to support and implement
them; so, the decision was made in that way.
Chair: Fine, but you can
confirm that the decision wasn't actually made in the Council.
Mr Hague: It wasn't
a formal item in the National Security Council.
156. We recommend that in its response to this
Report the Government explains why the decision to announce a
deadline for British combat withdrawal in 2015 was not taken within
the National Security Council.
157. We conclude that the Government's policy
statements on the withdrawal of combat forces are inconsistent
and we invite it to explain why there was such a sudden and dramatic
shift in policy in favour of an arbitrary deadline. We recommend
that in its response to this Report, the Government explains what
political and international factors prompted the Prime Minister
to decide upon 2015 as a deadline, what the security rationale
is, what advice he received from the military in advance of this
decision, and what consultations the UK had with the US on this
The possible consequences of
POTENTIAL RISKSTHE DOWNSIDE
158. In the course of our inquiry we discussed at
length with witnesses and interlocutors whether it was prudent
for ISAF countries to announce deadlines for withdrawal from Afghanistan.
We heard a variety of concerns in response. Some of these were
based on the belief that deadlines provide insurgents with succour,
thereby degrading the appeal of reconciliation and providing an
incentive to attempt to outlast international forces. For instance,
while Matt Waldman accepted that "there will inevitably be
some sort of phased withdrawal", he said he did "not
believe that it is sensible from a strategic point of view to
lay out your plans for the future before the enemy".
Others argued that the decision had provided a psychological boost
to the Taliban by signalling a lack of long-term western commitment
to the mission.
Others again were concerned that securing the trust of the Afghan
people would be difficult if the West was perceived to be on the
verge of leaving Afghans to fend for themselves.
159. On this point, the British Government has countered
that ISAF is training the Afghan National Security Forces precisely
to avoid this scenario. It adds that even after 2014 the international
community will retain a large presence in Afghanistan to ensure
its longer term stability and development. We were also told during
our visit that any US drawdown would be slow and shallow, and
would therefore avoid the risks inherent in a precipitate withdrawal.
160. We also heard more general concerns about the
potential message that deadlines could send to the West's enemies
beyond Afghanistan, to the effect that when faced with failure,
the West capitulates.
The Henry Jackson Society stated it was important that self-imposed
deadlines were not capable of being perceived to amount to an
admission of failure: "The message that failure would send
out both to terrorist movements and hostile state actors worldwidethat
the West can be taken on and overcome by violent meansis
not one that anyone with a care for safeguarding British national
security should wish to send".
161. Yet, it is worth noting that although the debate
in the UK is very much focused on the 2015 date, most of the views
we heard suggested that it was the Americans' 2011 deadline for
the beginning of draw-down that was of greater strategic concern.
In many respects this is unsurprising given that, as Gerard Russell
notes, "The United States is providing 80% of the Coalition
troops in Afghanistan and a very substantial part of the overall
international expenditure there. Other countries are in charge
of PRTs in at most two provinces each. The United Kingdom meantime
provides a fraction of the troops and development assistance in
Afghanistan and is in charge of only one PRT."
In a similar vein, Matt Waldman noted, "In a sense, what
Britain does with its troopswe are a fraction of the international
force in Afghanistanwon't be decisive either way. As you've
seen, we are pulling out of areas of Helmand and we are being
replaced by the Americans". In this context, it is worth
recalling, as the Secretary of State for Defence stated recently,
that Helmand accounts for only 3.5% of the population of Afghanistan,
and those living in areas under the control of UK armed forces
make up only 1% of the population.
162. Although the 2015 deadline may be of less strategic
significance within Afghanistan than the US announcement that
it would start to drawdown troops in 2011, it does not necessarily
follow that it is not of wider importance. Indeed, concerns have
been raised in the House about how the UK can reconcile its unconditional
2015 position with that of NATO which continues to state that
the deadline is "aspirational", that security transition
to Afghan control in parts of the country could go into 2015 and
beyond, and that 2014 is a goal which is realistic but not guaranteed.
The impact on Pakistan
163. The other major concern that we heard from witnesses
relates to the effect that the US's decision to announce the drawdown
of troops has had on regional powers and, in particular, Pakistan.
At the time, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry said: "Pakistan
looks forward to engaging closely with [the] US in understanding
the full import of the new strategy and to ensure that there would
be no adverse fallout on Pakistan." Media reports suggested
that Pakistani officials were concerned that a dramatic increase
in US troops in Afghanistan would push militants and refugees
across its borders and complicate its own battle against the Taliban.
164. We were told by both interlocutors and witnesses
that the announcement of the 2011 date led Islamabad and Kabul
promptly to start planning for a post-US future. Professor Shaun
Gregory stated that "there is much evidence that Pakistan
has supported the return of the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan in
order to have a strong hand in Afghanistan post-NATO, to [...
] avoid the kind of chaos into which Afghanistan was plunged when
the Soviets withdrew in 1989 and the US abandoned the region [which
had appalling consequences for Pakistan], and to keep Indian influence
in Afghanistan to a minimum and away from the Af-Pak border".
Given this historical context, and in light of increased drone
attacks, the US's increasingly close relationship with India and
what some Pakistanis perceive to be bribery in the form of conditional
aid packages, some witnesses suggested that the deadline had given
the Pakistani population and authorities further cause to resent
the US. Others argued that news of a US drawdown was seen as "absolute
confirmation that the United States" [would be] "turning
its back" on Pakistan and was showing itself to be the fickle
friend that many Pakistanis believe it to be.
165. We gained the impression from witnesses and
interlocutors that as long as Pakistan felt it would be left to
pick up the pieces after an American withdrawal from Afghanistan,
its inclination to promote Western interests, as opposed to its
own, would be low. Indeed, Dr Gohel stated that unless Pakistan
has confidence in NATO's commitment to winning in Afghanistan,
it will continue to hedge its support for the Afghan Taliban and
tolerate terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda.
In this context, we welcome not only the recently initiated Strategic
Dialogue between the US and Pakistan but also the comments made
in January by the US Vice-President in which he stated that "the
only productive way forward is a long-term, enduring partnership,"
as well as his pledge that the US would not abandon Pakistan in
the aftermath of the Afghanistan war.
166. We are concerned that Pakistan may feel that
its security interests in connection with Afghanistan are not
being adequately addressed by the West, partly as a result of
the US announcement that their troops will begin to draw down
in July 2011. We therefore call on the FCO to work with its counterparts
in the US State Department with a view to better understanding
how to reassure Pakistan that the West takes seriously Pakistan's
genuine concerns about the future stability of Afghanistan and
the impact of what it perceives to be a precipitate withdrawal
of Western military forces.
POTENTIAL BENEFITSTHE UPSIDE
The impact in Afghanistan
167. The debate over deadlines is far from one-sided.
In remarks made in December 2010, President Obama argued that
much of the progress that the US states has been made in the past
the result of us having sent a clear signal that
we will begin the transition of responsibility to Afghans and
start reducing American forces next July. This sense of urgency
also helped galvanise the coalition around the goals that we agreed
to the recent NATO summit in Lisbonthat we are moving towards
a new phase in Afghanistan, a transition to full Afghan lead for
security that will begin early  and will conclude in 2014,
even as NATO maintains a long-term commitment to training and
advising Afghan forces.
168. Indeed, during our visit, a wide variety of
Afghan interlocutors ranging from senior policy-makers to ordinary
Afghans who, understandably, wish to see Afghans decide upon Afghanistan's
future, voiced their strong support for a 2014 transition date,
the natural corollary of which is the gradual withdrawal of troops
in the run-up to that period. This was echoed by a number of the
witnesses we heard from at Westminster, including James Fergusson
and Jolyon Leslie, who both argued that deadlines would give Afghans
the space to come up with their own solutions to the current situation.
Mr Leslie told us that withdrawal could not come "a day too
explained that, "we shouldn't forget that the 2014-15 date
was immensely relieving to the Afghan people. It didn't come across
] 'Oh my God, they are cutting and running.' It came
across as, 'Thank goodness, we can get beyond this and we can
work things out for ourselves'".
As things stand at the moment, [...] we need
to back off and give Afghans some space to work things out themselves.
[...]The hope is with the kind of Afghans that I have worked with
for years and years, not necessarily with combatants. At the moment,
they are feeling very confined by the international military who
tell them what to do day and night, and who intrude on their space.
I do not think that we should underestimate that [...] in terms
of losing hearts and minds.
Mr Leslie also said:
I believe that we should also pull back militarily,
and face the consequences. I think that Afghans will work it out,
much more than we would wish to acknowledge after our investments.
169. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles also said it was a
"courageous" decision and the "right thing"
to do. He explained his reasoning thus:
[M]ost Afghans believe that we and America are
there to seek some long-term military presence, some kind of neo-colonial,
long-term hegemony over the area. They don't believe that rationally
] but they do believe it, so announcing that we are going,
that we are getting out of combat, is a good thing, in my view.
I support the idea of deadlines. I didn't initially
when I first arrived there, but the Taliban can read the politics
of the western troop-contributing democracies as well as anybody.
They are perfectly aware that American troops are due to start
leaving in July next year and that the next British General Election,
all being well, will be in May 2015.
170. Others, such as Gerard Russell, also supported
the idea of an "early move by the international community
towards a long-term, smaller, sustainable presenceoriented
towards training and air strikes in support of Afghan ground forces,
rather than direct combat", and argued that, in the long
run, this would benefit Afghanistan given that one of the main
causes of the conflict was the large-scale presence of troops,
particularly in the south.
HELPING TO PREVENT A FUTURE ESCALATION
OF THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
171. As we noted earlier, there is a risk that come
2014, the US military may still not be ready to negotiate and
may wish to push ahead with the counter-insurgency campaign, calling
for more resources and more time, at the very point when the UK
is set to leave. A divergence of this sort, in a relationship
already shaken militarily in recent years by the legacy of British
action in Basra, would in the view of Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles,
"have a major impact on the transatlantic relationship".
172. Matt Cavanagh, formerly a Prime Ministerial
Special Adviser to Gordon Brown, is one of those who believes
that it is likely that "the military will ask for more time
to get it right".
Some of those who gave evidence to us thought likewise.
From a British perspective, given that the UK's strategy is closely
tied to that of the US, pressure could be put on the British military
to support the US. According to Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, conversations
between the US and British military "end up with things being
pre-cooked between the US and the UK militaries before they are
subject to political approval back in London, and/or you get different
parts of the military lobbying for their own hobby-horses without
clear political approval".
Sir Sherard added that to avoid this situation it would be necessary
gradually [...] move the British Army and British
forces [...] from a ground-holding territorial operation to a
functional operation, to switch them out of holding territory
into a training role, which could be in the south as well as in
the north, and to do that by evolution, rather than by revolution,
always taking the Americans with us, but being very firm with
them about what we want and what we don't want.
173. In light of this, there is an argument to be
made that by setting out the Government's position now, and making
clear the plans of ISAF's second largest troop contributor, the
UK's action could conceivably help President Obama deliver on
his commitment to set an end-point for combat involvement. This
is particularly important given the opposition the Administration
faces domestically, not least from some quarters of the US military,
who may make the case for additional troops, risking an ongoing
escalation of the conflict, rather than the longer-term de-escalation
that ISAF governments have opted to pursue.
Arguably, therefore, the British deadline of 2015 could help to
reinforce the message that the way forward is to address the root
causes of the conflict through a political settlement, rather
than suppressing the symptoms, which as we noted above, in isolation,
can only bring temporary relief at best.
174. There were no easy choices available to the
Government when it came to deciding upon whether to announce a
combat withdrawal deadline in Afghanistan. There are undoubtedly
risks in pursuing such a strategy, not least that they may embolden
the insurgency or encourage a more general perception among the
West's enemies that its foreign policy commitments are wholly
at the mercy of domestic public opinion. It is worth noting, however,
that these risks are not entirely of the British Government's
making. The current situation is a legacy of NATO's desire to
conduct out of area operations, the UK's relationship with the
US, and an international effort that has proved itself to be deficient
in many respects, over a number of years, leaving little prospect
of the Government achieving its stated goals. Successive British
Governments must take their share of responsibility for these
collective failings. It is, however, important to recall that
the decision has been taken at a time when the UK faces a range
of critical foreign policy challenges ranging from Iran and the
Middle East to terrorist threats from the Arabian peninsula, in
light of an economic challenge of almost unprecedented proportions,
in the face of genuine concern about casualties and the success
of the war in Afghanistan on the part of many people in the UK
and in view of the desire of Afghans to take control of their
Reconciliation: a pre-condition for reducing deadline-related
175. According to several witnesses, the best way
to mitigate the potential risks that are associated with using
deadlines is to ensure that the international community's combat
withdrawal is accompanied by an urgent and wholehearted push forward
towards a political settlement. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles told
us that a deadline "is a risk, and it needs to be accompanied
with a vigorous political process and strategy", otherwise,
"every day that goes by without us launching a serious negotiation,
the more likely it is that [the insurgents] will say, "we'll
just sit this out and once the foreigners have gone, we'll fight
Jolyon Leslie made a similar point when he stated, "I don't
think that it should be rapid, but we should withdraw. We should
pull back and, as I have said, we should give space, but [...]
[w]e also really need to push the political track, rather than
just twiddling our thumbs while President Karzai, bless him, appoints
the High Peace Council. There has to be, of course, an element
of sovereignty in all this, and I wouldn't want to propose cutting
deals more than they are being cut, but there are other tracks
176. We conclude that the security rationale behind
the Government's decision to announce the 2015 deadline for the
unconditional withdrawal of UK armed forces from combat operations
in Afghanistan remains unclear and that there are a number of
potential risks inherent in such an approach. We further conclude
that as the decision has now been taken and could not be reversed
without causing irreparable damage to the UK's standing at home
and abroad, the task must be to ensure that the 2015 deadline
has the effect of focusing both Afghan and international minds
on the core tasks at hand. It is crucial, in this respect, that
if the risks of using deadlines are to be minimised, there must
be a concerted UK and US push forward on a genuine process of
political reconciliation and a more effective and co-ordinated
campaign designed to reassure Afghans that the focus of international
engagement in Afghanistan may change in 2015, but Afghanistan
will not simply be abandoned. It should remain a place in which
the international community has obligations and interests.
254 For a more detailed examination of the withdrawal
timetable of individual ISAF countries see, Claire Taylor, The
Timetable for Security Transition, House of Commons Library,
Standard Note 5851, 2 February 2011. Back
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, United States Military Academy, West
Point, New York, 1 December 2009. Back
Ev 84 Back
Ev 1 Back
Daily Telegraph, 4 December 2009 Back
Interview on CNN, 20 January 2010 Back
BBC Politics Show, 23 May 2010 Back
HC Deb, 26 May 2010, col 274 Back
"300th fatality must not cloud our judgement" Ministry
of Defence website, 22 June 2010 Back
HC Deb, 14 June 2010, col 608 Back
Sky News, 25 June 2010 Back
Today Programme, BBC Radio 4, 26 June 2010 Back
HC Deb, 7 July 2010, col 367 Back
HC Deb, 21, July 2010, col 343 Back
Q 148 Back
Ev 6 Back
Ev 86 Back
BBC News Online, 21 July 2010 Back
Q 148 Back
Q 148 Back
"Cameron denies mixed messages on Afghan pull-out",
BBC News Online, 21 July 2010 Back
HL Deb, 21 July 2010, col 985 Back
HC Deb, 22 November 2010, col 983 Back
Q 142 Back
Qq 143-47 Back
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Foreign
Affairs Committee on 7 February 2011, HC (2010-11), 665-v, Q 259 Back
Q 58. See also Ev 81 [Dr Gohel]. Back
Ev 81 Back
Ev w3-4 Back
Ev w2 Back
Ev 56 Back
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Defence
Committee on 17 December 2010, Q 312 Back
Daily Telegraph, 19 November 2010 Back
The Nation, 2 December 2009 Back
Ev 83 Back
Synnott, Hilary, "After the Flood", Survival,
vol 52 (2010), 249-256; Q 88 Back
Ev 81 Back
Washington Post, 13 January 2011 Back
Statement by President Obama on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual
Review, 16 December 2010 Back
Q 59 Back
Q 44 Back
Q 29 Back
Q 29 Back
Q 95 Back
Q 95 Back
Ev 57 Back
Q 104 Back
Matt Cavanagh, "Inside the Anglo-Saxon war machine",
Prospect, December 2010 Back
See for example Q 120 ff. Back
Q 104 Back
Q 104 Back
Q 120 [Gerard Russell], [Gilles Dorronsoro] Back
Q 103 Back
Q 44 Back